

A.

GENERAL HISTORY OF GREECE.

FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE DEATH
OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

*WITH A SKETCH OF THE SUBSEQUENT HISTORY TO THE
PRESENT TIME.*

BY GEORGE W. COX, M.A.,

AUTHOR OF "TALES OF ANCIENT GREECE," "MYTHOLOGY OF THE ARYAN NATIONS," ETC.



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PREFACE.



IN the preparation of this volume it has been my wish and purpose to present the history of the Greek people in a form which may interest readers of all classes, as well as the scholar and the critic. The great lessons which that history teaches must be learnt by all who would really understand the life of the modern world; and the task of learning them is one which calls for no greater effort than the attention which the honest love of truth will never fail to awaken.

During the present century historical criticism has, it is well known, been largely busied with the earlier history both of Greece and Rome; but stress may be fairly laid on the fact that in the former the most rigid scrutiny has tended rather to determine the true course of events than to throw over the whole traditional story a dark, if not an impenetrable, veil. In his *General History of Rome*, Dean Merivale is constrained to admit that 'there is scarcely one particular of importance throughout three centuries of our pretended annals on the exact truth of which we can securely rely.' The historian of Greece may well rejoice in the happier assurance that our knowledge of the Persian Wars and of many events which preceded those wars is scarcely less full or less trustworthy than our knowledge of the Norman Conquest of England.

Throughout this earlier portion of my task I have striven to exhibit clearly the motives and policy of the actors in this great struggle; and the conviction that I have established rather than destroyed the history has enabled me to give without hesitation my reasons for calling into question or rejecting the statements of the traditional narratives, whenever it became necessary to do so.

The history of Greece is the history of the most wonderful political and intellectual growth which the world has

yet seen. Its interest is the more absorbing from the rapid march of events in the mighty drama which may fairly be said to have been played out in less than three centuries. This astonishing quickness of development and decay must be ascribed to the fact that the ancient Hellenic communities never coalesced into a nation. The explanation of this fact is the most important task of the historian of Greece. Nor can we regard it as explained by a mere reference to the centrifugal tendencies (as they have been called) which compelled the Greeks to see in the Polis or City the ultimate Unit of Society, or by the assertion that particular clans or tribes worshipped particular gods and that the mixture of persons of different race in the same commonwealth tended in their belief to confuse the relations of life and their notions of right and wrong ;—for, in truth, the tendency which brought about these results is the very fact to be explained. Nor can the question be really answered until we have traced the political and social life of the Greeks to its source in the earliest Aryan civilisation. The clue once given may be followed through the whole history of the Greek states. I may honestly say that I have followed it with special care, sparing no pains to bring out in the clearest light all the circumstances which at Athens tended to soften, if not to remove, and at Sparta to keep alive, the narrow exclusiveness of the primitive society.

We are thus able to understand the wonderful development of Athenian power which followed the flight of Xerxes and the defeat of Mardonios. The empire so called into being was in reality nothing more than an attempt to weld isolated fragments into something like national union, —an attempt which roused the fiercest opposition of the Spartans and their allies, as soon as they began to comprehend the significance of the changes which they themselves had been foremost in bringing about.

The necessary result of this antagonism was the Peloponnesian War, which ended in the triumph of the old theory of exclusiveness. Thus far my narrative is in substance the same as that of the more detailed history which I have brought down to the Surrender of Athens, B.C. 404. In the subsequent chapters, written for this volume, I have had to exhibit the falling back of Athens into the ranks of mere city communities, sharing in the suspicions or jealousies always awakened where the growth of one city seemed likely to affect the complete independence of its

neighbors. Such a state of things could end only in foreign subjugation. From this point therefore the historian is charged with the gloomier task of tracing the influence of Makedonian and Roman conquest on the country which was to become the seat of the Empire of the East, and ultimately to pass under the sway of the Ottoman Turks.

To relate in detail, in addition to the narrative of previous events, the history of the Greek people from the times of the Makedonian conquests to our own, is in the limits of a single volume of moderate size obviously impossible. I would gladly have dwelt more especially on the working of the federal principle in central Greece when the day of the great cities, Sparta, Thebes, and Athens, had passed away; but although this could not be attempted, I felt that some acquaintance with the later fortunes of a people still representing, in blood scarcely less than in language, the Greeks of Perikles, Agesilaos, and Philopoimen, is almost as necessary as a knowledge of the more brilliant history of earlier times. This want has not been met, so far as I am aware, by any of the smaller Greek histories hitherto published. The last Book of the present volume may therefore, I trust, lay before the reader the outlines of a picture which I hope to draw out in more full detail in the concluding volumes of my larger history.

The actors in this great drama I have striven to bring before the reader as living persons with whom we may sympathise, while they must be submitted to the judgment of the moral tribunal to which we are all responsible. Of all I have spoken plainly and honestly, being well assured that the sternest condemnation of the treasons and lies of men like Alkibiades and Theramenes will in no way clash with the profoundest veneration for the sober wisdom of Themistokles and Perikles, for the heroism of the gallant Demosthenes who all but saved the army brought to its doom by Nikias, and for the genius and patriotism of his mightier namesake who, in the immortal speech which unmasked the treachery of Æschines, pronounced the funeral oration of Athenian freedom.

I am indebted to the Proprietors of the Encyclopædia Britannica for permission to make use of some portions of the Chapter on Alexander the Great.

To the Rev. North Pinder I express my grateful thanks for much valuable aid given to me in carrying this volume through the press.

Note on the Spelling of Greek Names.

No attempt has been made in this volume to alter the spelling of Greek names which have assumed genuine English forms,—e. g., Athens, Thebes, Corinth, Thrace. It would be well perhaps if such forms had been more numerous.

The Latin form has been kept, where it has become so familiar to English ears that a change would be disagreeable, e. g., Thucydides, Cyrus. This last name is, indeed, neither Latin nor Greek; and the adoption of either the Greek or the Latin form is a matter of comparative indifference. Probably it would be to the benefit of historical study to revert to the true Persian form, and to write Gustasp for Hystaspes.

But these exceptions do not affect the general rule of giving the Greek forms, wherever it may be practicable or advisable to do so. This rule may be followed in all instances in which either the names or the persons are unknown to the mass of English readers. Thus, while we speak still of Alexander the Great, his obscure predecessor who acts a subordinate part in the drama of the Persian wars may appear as Alexandros.

The general adoption of the Greek form is indeed justified, if not rendered necessary, by the practice of most recent writers on Greek History. It is, therefore, unnecessary perhaps to say more than that the adoption of the Greek form may help on the change in the English pronunciation of Latin, which the most eminent schoolmasters of the day have pronounced to be desirable. So long as the Phrygian town is mentioned under its Latin form of *Celæna*, there will be a strong temptation for young readers to pronounce it as if it were the Greek name for the moon *Selênê*. It is well therefore that they should become familiarised with the Greek form *Kelainai*, and thus learn that the Greek spelling involves practically no difference of sound from that of the true Latin pronunciation, the sound of the *C* and *K* being identical, and the diphthongs being pronounced as we pronounce *ai* in *fail*.

CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

THE FORMATION OF HELLAS.

CHAPTER I.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CONTINENTAL HELLAS.

	PAGE
Hellas not a geographical name	1
Mountain systems.—The Thessalian mountains	1
The ranges of Oita, Othrys, and Parnassos	2
Mountains of Attica and the Peloponnesos	2
The rivers of continental Greece	3
Land and sea communication	3
Climate and products of Hellas	4

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF HELLENIC CIVILISATION.

Character of ancient civilisation	5
The family the original unit of society	6
Exclusiveness of the ancient family	6
Origin of the religious character of the family	7
The house and its dependents	8
Ideas of property	9
Laws of inheritance	9
Identity of religious and civil penalties	9
Influence of religion	10
Obstacles hindering the growth of civil society	10
Slow growth of the State	11
The Family and the Clan	11
The Clan and the Tribe	12
The Tribes and the City	12
Course of political development in Greece and Rome	12

CHAPTER III.

THE MYTHOLOGY AND TRIBAL LEGENDS OF THE GREEKS.

	PAGE
General character of Greek mythical tradition	13
Greek ideas of nature	13
Religious festivals of the Greek tribes	15
Inconsistencies and contradictions of Greek myths	15
Dynastic and tribal legends	16
Greek tribal legends	16
Historical value of Greek myths	17
The return of the Herakleids	18
Movements following the Dorian migration	20
Greek settlements in Asia Minor	20

CHAPTER IV.

HELLENES AND BARBARIANS.

Growth of a common Hellenic sentiment	21
The Hellenes and the barbarian world	21
Religious associations among the Greek tribes	22
The great games	23
Greek ethnology	24
Evidence of geographical names	24
Early condition of Thessaly	24
The Lokrians, Dorians, and Phokians	25
The Aitolians and Akarnanians	26
The Boiotian confederacy	26
Ancient supremacy of Argos	26
The Eleians and the Arkadians	27
The Messenians	28
The Spartans	28
Lykourgos	29
Mythical lawgivers	29

CHAPTER V.

THE CONSTITUTION AND EARLY HISTORY OF SPARTA.

The Spartan Gerousia ; the Ephors ; and the Kings	30
The Spartiatai, the Perioikoi, and the Helots	31
Gradual improvement in the condition of the Perioikoi and the Helots	32
The Krypteia	32
The Messenian wars	32
Narratives of the Messenian wars	33
The first Messenian war	33
The second Messenian war	34
Spartan aggression against Arkadia	37
Rivalry of Sparta and Argos	38
Early supremacy of Sparta	39

CHAPTER VI.

THE GREEK DESPOTS.

	PAGE
Tendencies of early Aryan civilisation	39
Decay of the kingly power in Hellas	40
Subversion of the Greek oligarchies by tyrants	40
Ancient and modern notions of monarchical government	41
The power of the kings in Sparta	42
History of the Greek despots,—Kleisthenes of Sikyon	43
The Bacchiad oligarchs of Corinth	44
Kypselos and Periandros	44
Theagenes of Megara	46

CHAPTER VII.

THE INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION OF THE GREEKS.

The greatness of the Ionic race, and the settlement of Euboia	47
Pan-Ionic festival at Delos	47
Pan-Hellenic festivals	48
The Delian Hymn to Apollon	48
The Nemean and Isthmian games	49
The influence of art on the growth of a Pan-Hellenic sentiment	50
Growth of physical science	51
Source of Greek philosophy	53
Greek astronomy	54
Thales and the Ionic school	54
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans	55
The Pythagorean brotherhood	55
Influence of the philosophers	56

CHAPTER VIII.

HELLAS SPORADIKÊ.

	Early Hellenic migrations	56
	Greek colonisation in Sicily	57
	Social conditions of the Greek colonists in Sicily	58
B.C.	Greek settlements in Italy	58
510	War between Sybaris and Kroton	59
	Effects of the destruction of Sybaris	60
	The Corinthian colony of Korkyra	60
	Joint colonies of the Corinthians and Korkyraians	61
	Akarnanians and other neighboring tribes	62
	Epeirota	62
	Illyrians and Makedonians	62
	Thrakians	63
	Greek settlements in Thrace	63
	Megarian colonies on the Propontis	64
	Greek colonisation in Africa	64
	Sources of the prosperity of Kyrênê	65

	PAGE
	65
	65
B.C. Foundation of the Gelonian dynasty of Syracuse	66
481 Incroachments of Gelon on Carthaginian ground	66
480 ? The Battle of Himera	67
467 The fall of the Gelonian dynasty	69

CHAPTER IX.

EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ATHENS.

Contrast between Sparta and Athens as drawn by Perikles	69
Complicated character of the Athenian constitutions	70
Athens in the time of Kleisthenes	70
The Trittyes and Naukrariai	71
The Union of the Attic Demoi	71
Right of intermarriage	72
The Eupatridai, Geomoroï, and Demiourgoi	72
The council of Areiopagos	73
The Drakonian legislation	73
The conspiracy of Kylon	74

CHAPTER X.

ATHENS, AND THE SOLONIAN LEGISLATION.

Historical records of the time of Solon	75
Misery of the Athenian people	75
Various opinions as to the causes of this misery	76
The question of debt and mortgage	76
Actual measures of Solon	79
Lowering of the currency	79
New classification of the citizens ; the Pentakosiomedimnoi, Hippeis, Zeugitai, and Thetes	79
The Probouleutic Council	80
Relationship of the four classes to the Tribes	81
Later years of Solon	81
Usurpation of Peisistratos and death of Solon	82

CHAPTER XI.

THE TYRANNY OF THE PEISISTRATIDAI.

	82
560 Seizure of the Akropolis by Peisistratos	83
Character of the administration of Peisistratos	83
Expulsion and restoration of Peisistratos	83
Second expulsion of Peisistratos	84
527 ? Death of Peisistratos and subsequent history of his house	84
Policy and plans of Hippias	85
Intrigues of the Alkmaionidai for the overthrow of Hippias	85
510 Final expulsion of the Peisistratidai	86

CHAPTER XII.

THE REFORMS OF KLEISTHENES.

	PAGE
B.C. Oligarchical elements in the Solonian constitution	87
509 Renewal of factions after the fall of Hippias	87
Need of a new classification of citizens	88
This classification the cause of the opposition of Isagoras	88
The Council of the Five Hundred	89
The Heliaia and the Dikastai	89
The Archons	89
The court of Areiopagos	90
Ostracism	91
Expulsion and return of Kleisthenes	92
509 ? Alliance of Plataia with Athens	93
Discomfiture of Kleomenes at Eleusis	93
Victories of the Athenians over the Boiotians and Chalkidians	94
Warlike activity of the Athenians	94
Predominance of Sparta in Athens	94
Congress of allies at Sparta	95
Return of Hippias to Sigeion	96

BOOK II.

THE STRUGGLE WITH PERSIA, AND THE GROWTH OF THE
ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER CYRUS AND KAMBYSES.

The historical and traditional Cyrus	97
The story of Astyages and Cyrus	97
The story of Deiokes	98
Scythian invasion of Media	99
Physical geography of Persia	100
The Median and Lydian dynasties	101
Geography of Asia Minor	101
The Lydian dynasties	103
The Lydian Kings and the Asiatic Greeks	104
The last of the Mermnad Kings	104
Conquest of the Asiatic Greeks by Kroisos	104
The drama of the life of Kroisos	104
The beginning of woes in the death of Atys	105
The paying of the penalty due for the iniquity of Gyges	106
Unhistorical character of all the details	109
546 The revolt of Paktyas	110
Flight and surrender of Paktyas	111
The story of the Phokaians	111
The conquest of Lykia	112

	PAGE
Later conquests of Cyrus	112
Babylon and its people	112
Siege and capture of Babylon	114
Last scenes in the drama of the life of Cyrus	115
The Valley of the Nile	116
B.C. The people of the Nile Valley	117
570 ? Opening of Egypt to Greek commerce	118
525 ? Invasion of Egypt by Kambyzes	118
Expeditions against the Ethiopians and the temple of Amoun	119
Failure of the proposed expedition against Carthage	120
Kambyzes and the Egyptian priests	120
Kambyzes and the Magian Smerdis	121
The conspiracy of the Seven Persians	122
520 ? Accession of Dareios to the Persian throne	123

CHAPTER II.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER DAREIOS.

The revolt of Babylon	124
The despotism of Polykrates in Samos	125
The last scenes in the career of Polykrates	126
The despotism of Maiandrios and of Syloson	126
Organization of the Persian Empire	127
The story of Demokedes	127
Influence and intrigues of Atossa	129
516 ? The Scythian expedition	130
Credibility of the narrative of the Scythian expedition	132

CHAPTER III.

THE IONIC REVOLT.

Dareios and the Athenians	134
The schemes of Aristagoras of Miletos	136
502 ? The mission of Aristagoras at Sparta and at Athens	137
The burning of Sardeis	139
Extension of the revolt to Byzantion and Karia	139
Mission of Histiaios to Sardeis	139
The revolt of Kypros and Karia	139
The death of Aristagoras	140
Adventures and death of Histiaios	140
The Ionian fleet at Ladê	141
495 ? Battle of Ladê, and fall of Miletos	143
Third conquest of Ionia	144
Flight of Miltiades to Athens	144
The punishment of Phrynichos	144

CHAPTER IV.

THE INVASION OF THRACE BY MARDONIOS, AND THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

Administration of Artaphernes in Asia Minor	145
493 ? The reforms of Mardonios	146

B.C.		PAGE
492 ?	Failure of Mardonios in Thrace	147
	Mission of the Persian heralds to demand earth and water from the Western Greeks	147
491 ?	Treatment of the heralds at Sparta and Athens	147
	Deposition and exile of Demaratos	149
490	Capture of Naxos and Eretria by the Persians	149
	Landing of the Persians at Marathon	150
	Rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides	150
	Genius and policy of Themistokles	151
	Debates in the Athenian camp at Marathon	151
	The story of the battle of Marathon	152
	The details of the battle	154
	The raising of the white shield	155
489	The expedition of Miltiades to Paros : his trial and his death	157
	The alleged ingratitude of the Athenians	158

CHAPTER V.

THE INVASION AND FLIGHT OF XERXES.

	Preparation for the invasion of Europe	160
	The opposition of Artabanos	161
	Character of the narrative of Herodotos	162
	March of Xerxes to Kelainai	163
490	Bridge across the Hellespont	163
	Scourging of the Hellespont	163
	The march from Sardeis to Abydos	164
	The crossing of the Hellespont	166
	The review of the army and fleet at Doriskos	167
	The conference of Xerxes and Demaratos	169
	Significance and value of this conversation	170
	Functions of Demaratos in the narrative of the Persian war	170
	Forced contributions from Hellenic and other cities	171
	Visit of Xerxes to the vale of Tempe	172
	Rivalry of Themistokles and Aristeides	173
	Pan-Hellenic congress at the Isthmus of Corinth	174
	Sending of the spies to Sardeis, and the answers received at Delphoi by the Athenians	175
	Faithlessness of the Argives, Kretans, and Korkyraians	177
	Mission to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse	178
480	Abandonment of the pass of Tempe	179
	Mission of Leonidas from Sparta to Thermopylai (June)	180
	Destruction of a portion of the Persian fleet by a storm on the Magnesian coast	182
	March of Hydarnes over Anopaia	183
	Heroism of Leonidas	185
	The victory of the Persians	186
	The sight-seeing in Thermopylai	188
	The generalship of Leonidas	189
	The motives of Leonidas and his allies	190
	The Greek fleet at Artemision	191
	Indecisive action off Artemision	192

	PAGE
Destruction of the Persian squadron dispatched to the Euripos	192
Second action off Artemision, resulting in the victory and retreat of the Greeks	193
Fortification of the Corinthian isthmus	193
Migration of the Athenian people	194
Devastation of Phokis	194
The attack on Delphoi	195
Occupation of Athens by Xerxes	196
Intended abandonment of Salamis by the confederates	197
Policy of Themistokles	198
Battle of Salamis	200
Artemisia and the Kalyndian ship	202
Ruin of the Persian fleet	203
Counsel of Mardonios	203
Alleged second message of Themistokles to Xerxes	204
The flight of Xerxes	205
General credibility of the narrative	207
Siege of Andros by the confederates	210
Distribution of honors among the Greeks	210

CHAPTER VI.

BATTLES OF PLATAIAI AND MYKALÊ.

	211
Movements of the Greek and Persian fleets	211
Offers of alliance made by Mardonios to the Athenians	212
Embassy of the Spartans to Athens	213
Re-occupation of Athens by Mardonios	213
March of the Spartans under Pausanias from Sparta	215
Paction of the Argives with Mardonios	215
The feast of Attaginos	216
B.C. Historical value of the story	217
479 Advance of the confederates into Boiotia	218
Attack of the Persian cavalry, and death of Masistios	218
Change of the Greek position	219
Counsel of Timagenidas	219
The infatuation of Mardonios	220
The conference of the Makedonian Alexandros with the Athenian generals	220
Changes of position in the Greek and Persian armies	221
The resistance of Amompharetos to the orders of Pausanias	222
The battle of Plataiai	223
Retreat of Artabazos	224
Obstinate resistance of the Thebans	225
Storming of the Persian camp	225
The graves at Plataiai	226
Siege of Thebes	226
Movements of the Greek fleet to Samos and Mykalê	227
Battle of Mykalê	228
Foundation of the maritime empire of Athens	230
The siege of Sestos	230
General character of the history of the Persian war	232

CHAPTER VII.

THE CONFEDERACY OF DELOS.

B.C.		PAGE
479	The rebuilding of Athens, and the fortification of Peiræus	232
	Public works of Themistokles	234
478	Change in the conduct of Pausanias	234
477	Formation of the confederacy of Delos	236
	The assessment of Aristеides	236
	Treason and death of Pausanias	237
	Traditional narrative of the later history of Themistokles	238
	Alleged journey of Themistokles to Sousa	240
	Uniform policy of Themistokles	240
	Amount of evidence against Themistokles	242
	Relations of Themistokles with the Persian King	243
	Alleged personal corruption of Themistokles	243
	Extent of the guilt of Themistokles	244
468 ?	Death of Aristеides	245

CHAPTER VIII.

THE GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

	Objects of the Delian confederation	246
	Change in the relations of Athens with her allies	246
466	Athenian operations to the battles of the Eurymedon	247
465	The Delian synod, and the revolt of Thasos	248
464	The revolt of the Helots ; and the the alliance of Athens with Argos	248
459-8	Siege of Aigina. Building of the Long Walls of Athens	250
	Battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta	250
457	Fall of Aigina	251
455	Disaster of the Athenians in Egypt	251
	Final victories and death of Kimon	252
447	Evacuation of Boiotia by the Athenians	252
446	The revolt of Euboia and Megara. The Thirty Years' Truce Gradual development of the Athenian Democracy	253
	Rivalry of Kimon and Perikles	255
	The reforms of Ephialtes	256

BOOK III.

THE EMPIRE OF ATHENS. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN
ATHENS AND SPARTA.

CHAPTER I.

THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE.

	Public works of Perikles	258
	Extension of Athenian settlements	259
440	Revolt of Samos	259

B. C.		PAGE
436	Quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra	261
433	Proposals for an alliance between Korkyra and Athens	263
	Counter arguments of the Corinthians	263
432	Defensive alliance between Athens and Korkyra	264
	Battle between the Corinthian and Korkyraian fleets off the Island of Sybota	264
	Revolt of Potidaia	266
	Council of the Peloponnesian allies at Sparta	267
	Secret debate of the Spartans	269
	Formal Congress of the allies at Sparta	270
	Efforts of the Spartans to bring about the downfall of Perikles	270
	Prosecutions of Anaxagoras, Pheidias, and Aspasia	271
	General policy of Athens in reference to the alleged causes of the Peloponnesian War	272

CHAPTER II.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE SURPRISE OF PLATAIAI
TO THE CLOSE OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PERIKLES.

431	Night attack on Plataiai by the Thebans	273
	Slaughter of the Theban prisoners	274
	Impolicy and immorality of this act	275
	Spartan overtures to the Persian king	275
	The allies of Athens and of Sparta	275
	The resources of Athens	276
	Attack of Oinoê, and invasion of Attica	277
	The expulsion of the Aiginetans	278
	Measures for the safety of Attica and Athens	278
	Alliance of the Athenians with the Thracian chief Sitalkes	279
	Public burial at Athens and funeral oration of Perikles	279
430	The plague at Athens	281
	Depression of the Athenian people	283
	Close of the career of Perikles	284

CHAPTER III.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE CLOSE OF THE PUBLIC
LIFE OF PERIKLES TO THE DESTRUCTION OF PLATAIAI.

	Execution of Spartan envoys at Athens	285
	The surrender of Potidaia	286
429	Attack on Plataiai by the Spartans under Archidamos	286
	Defeat of the Athenians in Chalkidikê	288
	Invasion of Akarnania by the Spartans, aided by Chaonians, Molossians, and other mountain clans	288
	Victory of Phormion over the Corinthian fleet	289
	Athenian expedition to Krete	290
	Battle of Naupaktos, and second victory of Phormion	291
	Proposed night attack on Peiraieus	292
	Expedition of Sitalkes against Makedonia and Chalkidikê	293
428	The revolt of Lesbos	294

CONTENTS.

xix

B.C.		PAGE
	Audience of the Lesbian envoys at Olympia	296
	Measures taken by the Athenians for the suppression of the revolt	296
427	Surrender of Mytilênê to Paches	297
	Condemnation of the Mytilenaian people by the Athenian assembly	298
	Influence and character of Kleon	299
	Second debate, and withdrawal of the sentence against the Mytilenaian people	300
	The subjugation of Lesbos	302
	The destruction of Plataiai	303

CHAPTER IV.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION IN KORKYRA TO THE CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA BY DEMOSTHENES AND KLEON.

427	State of parties in Korkyra	305
	Intrigues of the prisoners set free by the Corinthians	306
	Open enmity of the populace and the aristocratic factions	306
	Massacres at Korkyra	308
	Capture of Minôa by Nikias	310
426	Second outbreak of plague at Athens	311
	Foundation of Herakleia by the Spartans	311
	Defeat of Demosthenes in Aitolia	312
	Attempt of the Aitolians and Spartans on Naupaktos	313
	Retreat of the Peloponnesians after the defeat at Olpai	314
	Destruction of the Ambrakiots at Idomenê	314
425	Occupation of Pylos by Demosthenes	315
	The bay of Sphakteria	316
	Attack of Brasidas on Pylos	316
	Embassy of the Spartans to Athens for the negotiation of a peace	318
	Debate at Athens on the propositions of the Spartan envoys	319
	Rupture of the truce	320
	Resumption of the war; blockade of Sphakteria	320
	Causes tending to prolong the siege	321
	Mission of Kleon with reinforcements for Pylos	321
	Attitude of Nikias and the oligarchic party	322
	Attack of Sphakteria by the Athenians	323
	Return of Kleon with the Spartan prisoners to Athens	325

CHAPTER V.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.

	Change in the popular feeling at Athens	325
	Campaign of Nikias on the coasts of the Saronic gulf	326
	Capture of the Persian envoy Artaphernes on his way to Sparta	326
	Order to the Chians to pull down the new wall of their city	327
424	Athenian occupation of Kythera	327

B.C.		PAGE
	Massacre of Helots by the Spartans	328
	Proposed expedition of Brasidas to Thrace	329
	Attempts of the Athenians on Nisaia and Megara	329
	Schemes of the Athenians for the recovery of their supremacy in Boiotia	330
	Battle of Delion	331
	Refusal of the Boiotians to yield up the Athenian dead	332
	Assault and capture of Delion	333
	March of Brasidas through Thessaly	333
	Remissness of the Athenians	334
	Revolt of Akanthos	334
	Surrender of Amphipolis	335
	Lightness of the Athenian imperial yoke	336
	Effects of the fall of Amphipolis on the Athenians and the Spartans	337
	The exile of Thucydides	337
	Capture of Torônê by Brasidas	338
423	Truce for a year between Athens and Sparta	338
	Revolt of Skiônê and Mendê from Athens	338
	Difficulties of Brasidas in Makedonia	339
	Recovery of Mendê by the Athenians	340
	Arrival of Ischagoras and other Spartan commissioners	340
422	Expedition of Kleon to Makedonia	341
	Capture of Torônê by Kleon	342
	Battle of Amphipolis. Death of Brasidas and of Kleon	342
	Comparative merits of Brasidas and Kleon	344
	Negotiations for peace	345
	Terms of the treaty	345

CHAPTER VI.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE MASSACRE AT MELOS.

421	Separate treaty of alliance between Athens and Sparta	346
	Scheme for setting up a new Peloponnesian confederacy under the presidency of Argos	347
	Intrigues for bringing about an alliance between Sparta and Argos	348
420	Separate alliance between Sparta and the Boiotians	349
	Dismissal of the Spartan ambassadors from Athens	349
	Intrigues of Alkibiades	349
	Treachery of Alkibiades to the Spartan envoys	351
	Alliance between Athens and Argos	352
	Exclusion of the Spartans from the Olympian games	352
419	Operations of Alkibiades in Argos and Epidaurus	353
418	Invasion of Argos by the Spartans under Agis	354
	The battle of Mantinea	354
	Treaties between Sparta and Argos	356
417	Restoration of democracy at Argos	356
	Failure of an Athenian expedition for the recovery of Amphipolis	357
416	The massacre of Melos	357

B.C.		PAGE
	Historical authority of the Melian Conference	359
	The ostracism of Hyperbolos	360
	Position of the chief Hellenic states	360

CHAPTER VII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR—THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

427	First interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily	361
424	Congress of Sicilian Greeks at Gela	361
	Punishment of the Athenian commanders	362
423	Renewed dissensions in Leontinoi	362
416	Quarrel between Selinous and Egesta	363
	Resolution of the Athenians to maintain the cause of the Egestaians	363
415	Opposition of Nicias	364
	Counter arguments of Alkibiades	365
	Attempt of Nicias to disgust the people by insisting on the vast efforts needed to carry out the enterprise	366
	Compliance of the Athenians with all the demands of Nicias	366
	The mutilation of the Hermai	367
	Accusation of Alkibiades	368
	The departure of the fleet from Peiræus	369
	Public debate at Syracuse	370
	Reply of Athenagoras to Hermokrates	370
	Progress of the Athenian armament to the Straits of Messênê	371
	Plans of the Athenian commanders	372
	Occupation of Katanê, and alliance with the Katanaians	372
	Recall of Alkibiades	373
	Victory of the Athenians on the shores of the Great Har- bor of Syracuse	374
	Activity of the Syracusans during the winter	377
	Debate at Kamarina	377
	Neutrality of the Kamarinaians	378
	Traitorous schemes of Alkibiades	379
414	Mission of Gylippos to Sicily	381
	Surprise of Epipolai by the Athenians	382
	Destruction of the first Syracusan counterwork	383
	Destruction of the second Syracusan counterwork. Death of Lamachos	384
	Prospects of the Athenians and Syracusans	385
	Voyage of Gylippos to Italy	386
	Entry of Gylippos into Syracuse	387
	Third counterwork of the Syracusans	388
	Letter of Nicias to the Athenians	389
413	Outbreak of the so-called Dekeleian war	390
	Peloponnesian and Athenian reinforcements for Sicily	391
	Naval victory of the Athenians ; and capture of Plemmyrion by Gylippos	391
	Indecisive Athenian operations in the Great Harbor	392
	Voyage of Demosthenes to Korkyra and Italy	392
	Arrival of Demosthenes at Syracuse	393

	PAGE
Night attack by the Athenians on the Syracusan cross-wall.	395
Refusal of Nicias to retreat, or allow the fleet to leave the Great Harbor	396
The eclipse of the moon	398
Defeat of the Athenian fleet, and death of Eurymedon	398
Effects of the victory on the Syracusans	399
Closing of the mouth of the Great Harbor by the Syracusans	400
Preparations for the final conflict in the Great Harbor	401
Destruction of the Athenian fleet	402
Stratagem of Hermokrates to delay the retreat of the Athenian army	403
The departure of the Athenians from their fortified camp	404
Exhortations of Nicias on the march	405
History of the retreat to the surrender of Demosthenes	405
Defeat and surrender of Nicias	407
Sufferings and treatment of the prisoners	408
Death of Nicias and Demosthenes	409
Effect of the expedition on the subsequent history of Greece	409

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN) WAR FROM THE CATASTROPHE AT SYRACUSE TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE OLIGARCHY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

B.C. 413	Effects of the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia	410
	The massacre of Mykalessos	411
	State of Athens when the catastrophe in Sicily became known	412
	State of feeling in Peloponnesos and among the oligarchical factions in the cities subject to Athens	412
	Overtures of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos to the Spartans.	413
	Synod of the Spartan allies at Corinth	414
412	Defeat and death of Alkamenes at Peiraion	415
	Revolt of Chios, Erythrai, and Klazomenai from Athens	416
	Employment of the Athenian reserve fund to meet this crisis.	416
	Revolt of Miletos. First treaty between Sparta and Persia	417
	Rising of the Samian Demos against the Geomoroi	418
	Revolt and recovery of Lesbos	418
	Defeat and death of Chalkideus. Athenian ravages in Chios.	419
	Victory of the Athenians and Argives over Astyochoch and Tissaphernes at Miletos	420
	Dispute between Tissaphernes and Hermokrates	421
	Second treaty between Sparta and Persia	422
	Fortification of Delphinion; and ravaging of Chios by the Athenians	422
	Defeat of Charminos by the Spartan admiral Astyochoch	423
	Rupture between Lichas and Tissaphernes	423
	Revolt of Rhodes from Athens	424
	Intended murder of Alkibiades by the Spartans	424
	Growing influence of Alkibiades with Tissaphernes	425
	Suggestion of Alkibiades for prolonging the war	425
	Overtures of Alkibiades to the Athenian officers at Samos	426

B.C.		PAGE
	Opposition of Phrynichos	427
	Reception of Peisandros and the envoys from Samos at Athens	428
	Appointment of Athenian commissioners for settling affairs with Alkibiades and Tissaphernes	429
	Organization of the oligarchic conspiracy at Athens	429
	Victories of the Athenians at Rhodes and Chios. Death of Pedaritos	430
	Abortive negotiation of the Athenian commissioners with Tissaphernes	430
411	Progress of the oligarchic conspiracy in Samos	431
	Revolt of Thasos	432
	Political assassinations at Athens by the oligarchic conspirators	432
	Expulsion of the Council of the Five Hundred	434
	Overtures of the Four Hundred to Agis	435
	Attempted oligarchic revolution at Samos	435
	Determination of the Athenians in Samos to maintain the constitution	436
	Resolution of the citizens at Samos to treat Athens as a revolted city	437
	Election of Alkibiades as general by the citizens at Samos	437
	Reception of the oligarchic envoys at Samos	438
	Opposition of Theramenes in the Council of the Four Hundred	439
	Fortification of Eetionia by the Four Hundred	439
	Destruction of the fort on Eetionia with the sanction of Theramenes	440
	Defeat of Thymochares, and revolt of Euboia	441
	Consternation at Athens on the defeat of Thymochares	442
	The suppression of the tyranny of the Four Hundred	442
	Restoration of the Kleisthenean democracy	443
	Trial and execution of Antiphon	443
	Indecisive movements of the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets	444
	Revolt of Byzantion from Athens	444
	Tumults in the Spartan camp at Miletos	445
	Dismissal of the Phenician fleet from Aspendos	445
	Revolt of the Lesbian town of Eresos from Athens	446
	Voyage of Mindaros to the Hellespont	446
	The battle of Kynossema	447
	Moral effects of the victory on the Athenians	447

CHAPTER IX.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR FROM THE BATTLE OF KYNOSSEMA TO THE BATTLE OFF THE ISLANDS OF ARGENNOUSSAI.

	Change in the Athenian character	448
	Departure of Tissaphernes for the Hellspond	449
	Defeat of Dorieus and Mindaros in the bay of Dardanos	449
410	Escape of Alkibiades from imprisonment at Sardeis	449
	Battle of Kyzikos	449
	Alleged embassy of Endios to Athens	450
	Energy of Pharnabazos.	451

B.C.		PAGE
	Repulse of Agis before the walls of Athens	451
409	Operations of Thrasylos in the Egean	452
	Recovery of Pylos by the Spartans	452
408	Reduction of Chalkedon by the Athenians	453
	Surrender of Byzantion	453
	Arrival of Cyrus the Younger in Ionia	454
407	Intrigues and operations of Lysandros	454
	Return of Alkibiades to Athens	455
	Defeat and death of the pilot Antiochos at Notion	456
	Attack on Kyme by Alkibiades	457
	Removal of Alkibiades from his command	457
406	Arrival of Kallikratidas to supersede Lysandros	458
	Character of Kallikratidas	458
	Insubordination in the Spartan fleet and army	459
	Speech of Kallikratidas to the Milesians	459
	Capture of Methymna by Kallikratidas	460
	Blockade of the fleet of Konon at Mytilene	461
	The battle of Argennoussai	461
	Departure of Eteonikos from Mytilene	462

CHAPTER X.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR FROM
THE BATTLE OF ARGENNOUSSAI TO THE SURRENDER OF
ATHENS.

	The tempest after the battle of Argennoussai	463
	Measures taken by the Athenian generals for rescuing the crews of the disabled ships	464
	Numbers of the men lost in the disabled triremes	464
	Charges brought against the generals	465
	Intrigues and conspiracy of Theramenes	467
	Violations of Athenian law in the proceedings against the generals	469
	Condemnation of the generals	472
	Infamous conduct of the Athenian Demos	473
	Moral effect of the execution of the generals	474
	Difficulties of Eteonikos in Chios	474
405	Appointment of Lysandros as Secretary of Arakos	475
	Surprise and capture of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi	476
	Treatment of the Athenian prisoners by Lysandros	478
	Utter dismay at Athens on receipt of the tidings from Aigos- potamoi	480
	Operations of Lysandros in the Egean and the Hellespont	481
	Pressure of famine at Athens	481
	Siege of the city, and negotiations for peace	481
	The surrender of Athens	483
	Character of Athenian and Spartan polity as determining the issue of the war	484
	The social and domestic life of Hellas	485

BOOK IV.

THE EMPIRE OF SPARTA.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE SURRENDER OF ATHENS TO THE RETURN
OF XENOPHON FROM ASIA.

	PAGE
B.C	487
	487
404	490
	491
	492
	492
	493
	493
	494
403	495
	495
404	497
	498
	499
	501
401	502
	502
	503
	504
	505
	506
	507
	508
	508
	509
400	510
	511
	512
	513
	514
	514
	515
	515
	516
	518

CHAPTER II.

SOKRATES.

B.C.		PAGE
400	Charges brought against Sokrates by Anytos, Meletos, and Lykon	520
	Early life of Sokrates	520
	Sokrates and the science of Physics	521
	Sokrates and the science of Ethics	521
	The religious mission of Sokrates	522
	Sokrates and the Elenchos, or system of cross-examination	523
	The Sokratic method in its relation to the Athenian drama	524
	Political influence of the Athenian drama	525
	Rhetoric and Dialectic	526
	Influence of the Sophists	526
	Effect of the teaching of the Sophists on Athenian character	527
	Ethical theories of Sokrates and Prodikos	528
	Ethical theory ascribed to Kallikles	529
	Character of the paid teachers of Athens	530
	Origin and character of Attic comedy	530
	Slanders of the comic poets	531
	Aristophanic caricatures of Sokrates	532
	Causes of the unpopularity of Sokrates	533
	Influence of Sokrates on the young	534
	Intercourse of Sokrates with Kritias and Alkibiades	535
	Sokrates and the Sophists	535
	The trial and defence of Sokrates	536
	The apologies of Xenophon and Plato	539
	Effect of the defence on the jurymen	540
	Motives of Sokrates in his defence	540
	Value put by Sokrates on his own work	541
	Address of Sokrates after the sentence of death	542
399	The death of Sokrates	543
	Peculiarities in the method of Sokrates	544
	His negative and positive teaching	545
	Protest of Sokrates against physical research	546
	Modern aspects of ethical and physical philosophy	546

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE RETURN OF THE TEN THOUSAND TO THE BATTLE OF LEUKTRA.

	Character of Greek history from the fall of Athens to the battle of Leuktra	547
	Support given to the Spartans by the oligarchic factions in Athens and other cities	548
403	Intrigues of Lysandros	548
400	Punishment of the Eleians	549
399	Election of Agesilaos as king in Sparta	549
	Effects of the influx of money into Sparta	550
	The conspiracy of Kinadon	551
	Spartan operations in Asia Minor	551

CONTENTS.

xxvii

B.C.		PAGE
396	Mission of Agesilaos to Asia Minor	553
	Discontent of the Thebans and Corinthians with Sparta	553
398	Activity of Konon under the protection of Euagoras, despot of Salamis	554
396	Mission of Lysandros to the Hellespont	554
395	Defeat and death of Tissaphernes	555
	Anti-Spartan changes in Rhodes	555
394	Increased power of Konon	556
	Battle of Knidos	557
395	Boiotian war between Thebes and Sparta. Death of Lysan- dros	557
	Alliance between Thebes and Athens. Retreat of Pausanias from Boiotia	558
394	Corinthian war	559
395	The recall of Agesilaos	560
394	Battle of Coroneia	560
	Return of Agesilaos to Sparta	561
393	The rebuilding of the Athenian Long Walls	561
392	Mission of Antalkidas to the Persian King	562
389	Death of Thrasyboulos	563
388	Attack of Teleutias on the Peiræius	564
387	The peace of Antalkidas	564
	Effects of the peace of Antalkidas on the position of Sparta	565
386	The restoration of Plataiai	566
	Breaking up of the city of Mantinea	566
384	Formation of the Olynthian confederacy	567
383	Opposition of Akanthos and Apollonia	567
	Amyntas king of Makedonia	568
	Resolution of Sparta to suppress the Olynthian confederacy	568
	Seizure of the Theban Kadmeia by Phoibidas	569
	Seizure and execution of Ismenias	569
	Suppression of the Olynthian confederacy	569
384	Orations of Lysias and (380 B.C.) of Isokrates	570
379	Conspiracy of Pelopidas	571
	Surrender of the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia	572
	Attempt of Sphodrias on Peiræius	573
	Formation of a new Athenian confederacy	574
	Epameinondas and the Sacred Band of Thebes	574
378	Decline of Spartan power	575
	Renewed jealousy between Athens and Thebes	575
	Peace between Athens and Sparta	576
374	Iasôn of Pherai, Tagos of Thessaly	576
	Renewed war between Sparta and Athens	576
373	Operations in Korkyra	577
	Seizure of Plataiai by the Thebans	577
371	Declaration of war by Sparta against Thebes	578
	March of Kleombrotos to Leuktra	579
	Battle of Leuktra	580
	Loss of the Spartans	580
	Reception of the tidings at Sparta	581
	Character of Spartan government	581
	Inevitable results of Spartan principles of action	582

BOOK V.

THE RISE AND CULMINATION OF THE MAKEDONIAN POWER.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE BATTLE OF LEUKTRA TO THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS.

B.C.		PAGE
371-62	General policy of Epameinondas	583
371	Treatment of the hoplites of Kleombrotos at Sparta	584
	Punishment of Orchomenos and Thespiæ by Thebes	584
	Amphiktyonian verdict against Sparta	585
	Re-establishment of Mantinea	585
370	Invasion of Lakonia by Epameinondas	586
369	Appeal of the Spartans for aid to Athens	586
	Formation of Megalopolis	587
	Restoration of the Messenians, and building of Messênê	587
	Reception of Epameinondas at Thebes	588
370	Relations of the Athenians with Amyntas	588
	Assassination of Iasôn of Pherai	589
	State of affairs in Makedonia	589
369	Alliance between Athens and Sparta	589
368	The Tearless Battle	590
367	Third expedition of Epameinondas into Peloponnesos	590
366	Theban embassy to Sousa	590
	Peace between Thebes and Corinth with other cities	591
365	Recovery of Samos to the Athenian alliance	591
	Operations on the Thracian Chersonesos	591
363	Battle of Kynoskephalai. Death of Pelopidas	592
364	Conflicts in the Peloponnesos	592
362	Resentment of the Thebans against the Arkadians	593
	March of Epameinondas to Sparta	593
	Failure of the attempt to surprise Mantinea	594
	Battle of Mantinea	595
	Death of Epameinondas	596
	Review of his career	597

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS TO THE BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA.

	Results of the battle of Mantinea	598
361	Death of Agesilaos in Egypt	598
	Decay of Athenian generalship	599
358	Greatest extension of the second Athenian empire	599
	Growth of Makedonian power	600
	Relations of Philip (father of Alexander the Great) with the Athenians	600
	Disinclination of the Athenians for personal military service	600
	Early life and character of Philip	601
	Recovery of Euboia by the Athenians	601

B.C.		PAGE
357-	The Social War	602
355	Character of the Athenian generals	603
	Chares and Phokion	603
358	Reduction of Amphipolis by Philip	604
356	Alliance of Philip with the Olynthians	605
357	The Phokians fined by the Amphiktyonic assembly	605
356	The Sacred War	605
355-4	Defeat of Philomelos	606
352	Defeat of Onomarchos by Philip of Macedon	606
	Fortification of Thermopylai by the Athenians	607
351	Report of Philip's illness and death	607
353	Beginning of the public life of Demosthenes	608
	Early life and training of Demosthenes	608
	Opposition of Æschines and Phokion to the policy of Demosthenes	610
350	Remissness of the Athenians with regard to Olynthos	611
	Repeated warnings of Demosthenes	612
349	Revolt of Eubœia from Athens	613
	Proposition of Apollodoros respecting the Theoric Fund	613
347	Fall of Olynthos	615
	Temporary agreement between Æschines and Demosthenes	615
	Alliance of Philip with the Thebans	615
	Mission of Æschines with other envoys to Philip	616
	Conversion of Æschines	616
346	Reply of Philip to the proposals for peace	617
	Omission of the Phokian name from the treaty	618
	Delay of Æschines in receiving the engagements of Philip	618
	March of Philip to Thermopylai	619
	Ending of the Sacred War by the surrender of Phalaikos	620
	Alliance of Philip with Thebes	620
	Treachery of Æschines	620
	Election of Philip into the Amphiktyonic brotherhood	620
	Day-dreams of Isokrates	621
343	Disputes between the Athenians and Philip	622
	Revived energy of the Athenians	623
339	Financial reforms of Demosthenes	623
	Origin of the Third Sacred War	623
	Refusal of the Athenians and Thebans to send envoys to the Amphiktyonic assembly	625
	Fortification of Elateia by Philip	625
	Proposal of Demosthenes that the Athenians should aid the Thebans	626
	Alliance between Thebes and Athens	627
338	Battle of Chaironeia	627
	Increased influence of Demosthenes after the defeat	628
	Surrender of Thebes	628
	Acknowledgment of Philip as supreme chief of all the Hellenes	629
	Expedition of Philip into Peloponnesos	629

CHAPTER III.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

B.C.		PAGE
	Early years of Alexander the Great	630
	Feuds in the house of Philip	631
336	Assassination of Philip at Aigai	631
	Alexander becomes king	631
	Alexander at Thermopylai	632
335	Destruction of Thebes	632
	Alexander at Corinth	633
334	Passage of the Hellespont	633
	March of Alexander to Gordion	633
	Battle of Issos	634
332	Expedition into Phenicia. Fall of Tyre	636
	March into Egypt. Founding of Alexandria	636
331	Battle of Arbela, or Gaugamela	637
	Surrender of Babylon, Persepolis, and Pasargadai	637
330	Death of Dareios	638
	Murder of Philotas and Parmenion	639
330-29	Passage of the Jaxartes	639
328	Murder of Kleitos	640
	Murder of Kallisthenes	641
326	Alexander in the Land of the Five Streams	642
324	Return to Sousa	643
	Death of Hephaistion	644
323	Death of Alexander at Babylon	644
	Purposes and motives of Alexander	645

BOOK VI.

LATER FORTUNES OF THE HELLENIC PEOPLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE LAMIAN WAR. SICILIAN AFFAIRS, FROM THE USURPATION OF THE ELDER DIONYSIOS TO THE RESIGNATION OF TIMOLEON.

	Course of events in Hellas in Alexander's absence	648
	Contest between Æschines and Demosthenes	649
324	Arrival of Harpalos at Athens	650
	Charge of embezzlement against Demosthenes and other citizens	650
323	Return of Demosthenes from exile	651
323-22	Lamian war. Death of Demosthenes	652
	Sicilian history after the ruin of the Athenian armament at Syracuse	652
405-367	Despotism of the elder Dionysios	653
367-343	Tyranny of the younger Dionysios	653
344-340	Career of Timoleon	653

CHAPTER II.

FORTUNES OF THE GREEK PEOPLE FROM THE SAMIAN WAR TO THE
EXPULSION OF THE BAVARIAN OTHO.

B.C.	PAGE
	Sequel of the career of Phokion 655
	Administration of the Phalerean Demetrios 656
315-14	Extinction of the Family of Alexander the Great 656
	Expulsion and return of the Athenian philosophers 657
	Worship of Demetrios Poliorketes at Athens 657
300	Battle of Ipsos 658
168	Fall of the Makedonian monarchy 658
	The Achaian League 658
	The career of Aratos 659
	Career of Philopoimen 660
	Roman interference in Hellas 660
197	Battle of Kynoskephalai 660
168	Battle of Pydna 661
146	Sack of Corinth 661
	Influence of Greek literature and art 661
A.D.	Gothic invasions 661
329	Transference of the imperial throne from the old Rome to the new 662
	The Byzantine empire 662
726	Insurrection against Iconoclasm 662
	The Basilian emperors 662
1057-67	Inroads of the Seljukian Turks 662
1095	The Crusades 663
1204	Capture of Constantinople 664
	The Latin empire of Constantinople 664
	Rise of new empires at Nice, Trebizond, and Durazzo 665
	Rise of the Ottoman Turks 665
1329	The enrolment of the Janissaries 665
1449	Coronation of Constantine XI. 666
1453	Fall of Constantinople 666
	Ottoman administration in Western Greece 666
1573	Victory of the Venetians at Lepanto 667
	Campaigns of the Venetian Morosini in Greece 667
1718	Peace of Passarovitz 668
	Improvement in the condition of the people 668
	Rebellion of the Western Greeks against the Turks 668
1821	Declaration of Independence 668
1822	Massacre of Chios (Scio) by the Turks 669
1827	Capture of Athens by the Turks 669
	Battle of Navarino 669
	Appointment of Otho, by the Great Powers, as King of the Greeks 669
1862	Deposition of Otho 670
	Present condition of Western Greece 670

LIST OF MAPS.

General Map of Greek and Phenician Settlements	<i>To face Title</i>
Greek Settlements in Asia Minor	<i>To face Page 102</i>
Thermopylai	,, 180
Battle of Salamis	,, 200
Battle of Plataiai	,, 219
Athens and its Neighborhood	,, 258
Plan of the Harbor of Navarino	,, 316
Athenian Operations before Syracuse :—	
1. First Counterwork of the Syracusans	,, 383
2. Second Syracusan Counterwork	,, 384
3. Third Syracusan Counterwork	,, 388
Campaigns of Alexander	,, 634

The Latin forms of Greek names are given in the Index, with their Greek equivalents, in all instances in which there seemed to be any need to do so. The following list contains the very few names about which the reader can be in any doubt.

Latin Form.	Greek Form.
Ægina	Aigina
Ægospotami	Aigospotamoi
Æolians	Aiolians
Ætolians	Aitolians
Agrigentum	Akragas
Bucephalus	Boukephalos
Celænæ	Kelainai
Cithæron	Kithairon
Cræsus	Kroisos
Cyclades	Kyklades
Cyprus	Kypros
Corcyra	Korkyra
Tarentum	Taras

The difference in sound between the Latin pronunciation of these names and that of the Greeks was scarcely more than perceptible.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

BOOK I.

THE FORMATION OF HELLAS.

CHAPTER I.

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF CONTINENTAL HELLAS.

To the Greeks of the historical ages the idea of Hellas was not associated with any definite geographical limits. Of a Hellas lying within certain specified bounds, and containing within it only Greek inhabitants, they knew nothing. Not only were some of the most important Greek states planted on the soil of barbarian tribes, but for ages the title of many so-called Greek clans to the Hellenic name remained a matter of controversy. Nor in the description of Greece can we start with an historical order, as though there were some definite region which could be styled the mother country of the rest. In the prehistoric age the name Hellas is confined to the small and mountainous territory from which Achilles, it is said, went forth with his Myrmidones to fight at Ilion;¹ but it is absurd to regard the land of the Phthiotic chieftain as the original seat of the Hellenic people, and all attempts to determine the course of the migrations which brought about the geographical distribution of the historical Greeks can yield at best only conjectural results.

For the sake of convenience Greek geographers drew a distinction between the lands which they regarded as the continuous or continental Hellas and the Sporadic or scattered Hellas of the Egean sea and of the Asiatic, Sicilian, and other coasts.² Adopting this division, we have in the former a country with an area not so large as

Hellas not a geographical name.

Mountain systems.—The Thessalian mountains.

¹ *Iliad*, ii. 683. ix. 447.

² 'Ελλάς *σποραδική*. The other name, 'Ελλάς *σποραδική*, is seldom used.

that of Portugal, stretching from the gigantic range of Olympos and the Kambounian mountains on the north to the southernmost promontories of the Peloponnesos, and exhibiting, throughout, a singularly distinct and marked geography. Olympos itself, rising to a height of nearly 10,000 feet, forms with its neighboring hills only the northern wall of a lower region which may be roughly described as a square 60 miles in length and breadth, the western rampart of these Thessalian lowlands being the chain of Pindos, which runs southward at right angles to the Kambounian range about halfway between the Ionian and the Egean seas, until at about the 39th parallel of latitude the southern barrier juts off eastwards from Pindos, under the names of Tymphrestos and Othrys, and ends in the highlands between the Malian and Paga-saian gulfs. From the latter gulf northwards the eastern wall of Thessaly is formed by the mighty masses of Pelion and Ossa, to the east of which lies the narrow strip of Magnesian coast, terrible for its ruggedness and its storms. The waters of this mountain-locked basin are carried off by the stream of Peneios through the far-famed vale of Tempe which separates Ossa from Olympos.

Starting almost from the point whence Tymphrestos shoots eastwards from Pindos, the great chain of Oita trends for a few miles in a more southerly direction and then, running parallel with Othrys, reaches the Malian gulf, leaving between its base and the sea only the narrow pass of Thermopylai, and shutting in between itself and Othrys the fertile valley of the Spercheios. To the southwest of Oita the lands to the north of the Corinthian gulf are for the most part occupied by the wilderness of mountains which formed the fast-nesses of Aitolian and Akarnanian tribes, and which still shelter a marauding and lawless population. To the southeast the range extends with but little interruption under the names of Parnassos, Helikon, and Kithairon, leaving to the north the rugged territory of Phokis and the more fertile region of Boiotia.

Separated from mount Parnes to the east by the pass of Phylé, Kithairon forms with that mountain the northern wall of Attica, which stretches from the eastern end of the Krissaian Mountains of Attica and the Peloponnesos. or Corinthian gulf to the headland of Rhamnous, and rises up as the back-ground of the plain of Marathon. To the southwest of Kithairon the ridges of Aigioplanktos and Geraneia run as a back-bone along the Corinthian isthmus, and by the Akrokorinthos are joined with that labyrinth of mountains, which, having started as a continuation of the Aitolian highlands from the western end of the gulf, rise up as an impregnable fortress in the heart of the Peloponnesos, leaving to the north at the base of Kyllênê and Erymanthos the long and narrow

region known as the historical Achaia. To the south of this mass of mountains, and dividing the southern half of Peleponnesos into two nearly equal portions, the huge and rugged chain of Taygetos, forming a barrier between the lowlands of the Eurotas on the one side and the splendidly fertile plains of Stenyklaros and Makaria on the other, runs on to its abrupt termination in cape Tainaros. Following a nearly parallel course about 30 miles to the east, another range, striking southwards from the Arkadian mountains under the names Parnon, Thornax, and Zarex, leaves between itself and the sea a strip of land not unlike the Thessalian Magnesia and ends with the formidable cape of Maleai.

The whole of this country, which may be described generally as consisting of grey limestone, exhibits almost everywhere the same features. Less than half the land is even capable of cultivation; and of this land, of which a mere fraction is at present in use, a large portion probably even at the best of times lay idle. ^{The rivers of continental Greece.} Of the mountains not a few are altogether barren, while others, if not well wooded, supply pasture for flocks when the lowlands are burnt up in summer. If, again, these mountain masses, leaving room for few plains and even for few valleys of much length, raise barriers practically fatal to intercourse between tribes who in a plain country would feel themselves near neighbors, this difficulty is not removed or lessened by the presence of any considerable rivers. The Greek streams are for the most part raging torrents in winter and dry beds in summer; and the names Charadrai and Cheimarroi commonly applied to them attest the fury with which they cleave their way through the limestone rocks, when they carry off the mountain drainage in the rainy season. Of these rivers the most important are the Peneios, which drains the Thessalian valley, and the Achelôos which separates Akarnania from Aitolia. The Kephisos and Ilissos pour in summer a scanty tide not much surpassed by that of the Eleian Alpheios; and the persistent flow of the Argive Lyrkeios¹ when the neighboring streams are absorbed in the marshes of Lernai was recorded in the myth of Lynkeus and the Danaid Hypermnestra.

This country, so broken by mountains, so imperfectly penetrated by rivers, was inhabited by a race, which, as we shall see, had advanced from the notion of the family to that of the clan, from that of the clan to the tribe, and from the union of tribes to the idea of the Polis or City, and which, having assumed this as the final unit of society, stuck to

¹ The Lyrkeios was the name given to the Inachos in the upper part of its course. For the explana-

tion of the myth see *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, book ii. ch. vi.

Land and sea communication.

the belief with an apparent unconsciousness that any alternative was possible. In the geographical features of their country there was everything to foster that love of absolute isolation which was the inevitable result of this political creed. But for one circumstance this centrifugal tendency would have kept them much on a level with the half-civilised or wholly savage tribes of Thrace or Epeiros. From this monotony of feeble self-sufficing units they were saved by being brought almost everywhere within reach of the sea. Less in area than Portugal, continental Greece alone has a coast line equal to that of the whole Pyrenean peninsula. The gulfs of Pagasai and Ambrakia are practically inland lakes: but the island of Eubœia with an area of less than 1,500 square miles furnishes with the opposite shores of Lokris, Boiotia, and Attica a coast line of not less than 300 miles. Still more important was the isthmus which separated by a narrow neck, three miles and a half in width, the waters of the Corinthian from those of the Saronic gulf, thus affording to merchants and travellers the advantages of a transit across the isthmus of Panama as compared with the voyage round Cape Horn. So too the Lokrians, Phokians, and Boiotians had access to the sea both to the northeast and to the southwest, while all the cities on the Corinthian gulf itself had a common highway altogether more easy and safe than any road by land. Pre-eminently favored in situation, Attica was practically an island from which ships could issue in all directions, while they could cut off access through the narrow strait of the Euripos. Two Greek states alone had no access to the sea. These were the Dorians to the north of the Krissaian gulf, and the Arkadians of Peloponnesos; and these states remained far in the rear of Hellenic development generally.

For the growth of states confined within these self-imposed limits no country could have been found more favorable than Hellas. It could produce all or nearly all that the needs of Greek life required; and its powers of production, whether of grain, wine, or oil, were turned to account with a diligence and skill in marked contrast with the obstinate stupidity of modern Greek statesmanship. Ages of oppression and mismanagement have probably in their turn affected the climate more than the climate has affected the inhabitants; but although the country generally is perhaps less healthy now than it used to be, there were at all times differences more or less marked in the physical conditions of the Greek towns. These differences gave rise to epithets and proverbial sayings, many of which probably had the slenderest foundation in fact; but these fancies served to keep up the fatal antipathies of which such phrases

Climate and
products of
Greece.

were the expression.¹ In reality, the feuds and jealousies of the Hellenic tribes made them practically a mere aggregate of independent, if not hostile, units; and until we reach the traditional history of these tribes separately, it is unnecessary to fill in with more minute detail the outlines of a geographical sketch which is intended to convey a mere general notion of the physical features and conditions of the country lying between the ranges of Olympos and the southernmost promontories of Peloponnesos.

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF HELLENIC CIVILISATION.

ENGLISHMEN, it is said, are tempted to regard their constitution as something possessed of a necessary and eternal existence. If they care to take their stand on facts, it would be more safe to assert that the forms and principles to which the most ancient polities in the world may be traced are altogether in antagonism with the principles not of English law only, but of the laws of all civilised nations of the present day. Modern law, if we speak roughly, raises no impassable barrier between men who belong to different nations or even different races, far less between the inhabitants of different cities or the members of different families. In all the states of that which we call the ancient world, as in some which are not yet things of the past, absolute isolation stands out in glaring contrast with the modern tendency to international union. The member of one country or city or even family had nothing to do, and according to the earliest ideas could have nothing to do, with the members of any other. For the primitive Aryan, whether in the East or in the West, the world beyond the limits of his own family contained nothing, or contained his natural and necessary enemies. With all who lay beyond the bounds of his own precincts he had nothing in common. They were by birth foes, for whom in the event of war he could feel no pity, and on whom he could have no mercy. In such a state of things war meant to the defeated utter and hopeless ruin. Their lives were at the absolute disposal of the conqueror; and if these

Character
of ancient
civilisation.

¹ Thus Tanagra was supposed to be the abode of envy, Thebes of insolence, Haliartos of stupidity, and so with the rest of the Boiotian towns.

were spared, the alternative was the doom of life-long slavery. In peace the barriers between them were scarcely less rigid. The stranger could have no rights whether of intermarriage or of inheritance; nor could the lapse of generations furnish the faintest legal ground for the relaxation of these conditions. If, again, the old society was thus hard in its relations with all who lay within its narrow boundaries, it was not less imperious within its own limits. The father was the absolute lord within his own home.¹ He was master of the lives of his children, who, so long as he lived, could be nothing but his subjects; and his wife was in theory his slave.

The origin of this state of things can be understood only if we trace the society and laws of all the Aryan tribes to their earliest forms; and in this task we may be greatly aided by an examination of social conditions which even at the present day exhibit the primitive type. Such conditions may be found in the village communities of India and other countries; but the inquiry is obviously one which extends beyond the limits of Greek history, and we may here start from the fact as proved that the narrow limitations and absolute intolerance which were rather forced on than congenial with the legislation of the Greek or Roman states,² carry us back to the time when the house of each of our Aryan progenitors was to him what the den is to the wild beast which dwells in it; something, namely, to which he only has a right and which he allows his mate and his offspring to share, but which no other living thing may enter except at the risk of life.

This utter isolation of the primitive Aryan, as doubtless of every other, human home, is sufficiently attested by an examination of social conditions which we find existing in historical times. In Latium and Rome, as in Hellas, every house was a fortress, carefully cut off by its precinct from every

¹ The word *father*, *πατήρ*, denoted, at first, mere power, without a trace of the holier feeling since associated with it. It is but another name for the potent man, and reappears in the Greek *δεσπότης*, *dasa-pati*, the lord or conqueror of enemies. Precisely the same notion of mere power is expressed in the Greek *πόσις*, a husband.

² It cannot be questioned that the Roman *patria potestas* is not the creation of Roman state law. It is of the very essence of a state to be intolerant of private jurisdiction. It cannot possibly recognise in any

except itself a right to deal with the lives and property of its members. If these do wrong, the state must claim to be their sole judge. If the right of judging them be under certain circumstances conceded to others, this must clearly be the result of a compromise. The same remark applies to the ancient laws of marriage and inheritance. The history of investitures and of the legal immunities of the Clergy shows the natural workings of a state in reference to claims of private or alien jurisdiction.

other. No party walls might join together the possessions of different families; no plough might break the neutral ground which left each abode in impenetrable seclusion. The action of the state, as such, must be to unite its citizens, so far as may be possible, into a single body, by common interests, by a common law, and by a common religion. When then we have before us a condition of society in which each house or family stands wholly by itself and is only accidentally connected with any other, worshipping each its own deity at its own altar, and owning no obedience to a law which may extend its protection to aliens, we see that the materials out of which states have grown are not those which the state would have desired as most suitable for its work. Such as they were, they must be rough hewn to serve a wider purpose; and the history of the Greek and Latin tribes is the history of efforts to do away with distinctions on which their progenitors had insisted as indispensable.

But the den which the primitive man defended for his mate and his offspring with the instinctive tenacity of a brute would have remained a den for ever, if no higher feeling had been evoked in the mind of its possessor. This impulse was imparted by the primitive belief in the continuity of human life. The owner of the den had not ceased to live because he was dead. He retained the wants and felt the pleasures and pains of his former life; his power to do harm was even greater than it had been;¹ but above all, his rights of property were in no way changed. He was still the lord of his own house, with the further title to reverence that he had now become the object of its worship, its god. This religious foundation once laid, the superstructure soon assumed the form of a systematic and well-ordered fabric. If the disembodied soul cannot obtain the rest which it needs, it will wreak its vengeance on the living; and it cannot rest if the body remain unburied. This last office can be discharged only by the dead man's legitimate representative,—in other words, his eldest son, born in lawful wedlock of a woman initiated into the family religion. Thus, as the generations went on, the living master of the house ruled simply as the vicegerent of the man from whom he had

¹ That this belief would become a source of frightful cruelty, it is easy to imagine. The dead man would still hunt and eat and sleep as in the days of his life; therefore his horse, his cook, and his wife must be dispatched to bear him company in the spirit world. He must be clothed; and therefore the costliest raiment must be offered to him and

consumed by fire, as in the story of Periandros and Melissa. Herod. v. 92, 7. If he be slain, his spirit must be appeased by human sacrifices, as by the slaughter of the Trojan captives on the pyre of Patroklos. In short, the full developement of Chthonian worship with all its horrors would follow in a natural and rapid course.

inherited his authority ; and he ruled strictly by virtue of a religious sanction which set at defiance the promptings and impulses of natural affection. His wife was his slave. He might have sons grown up about him, and they might even be fathers of children ; but so long as he lived, they could not escape from the sphere of his authority. Nor even, when he died, could he leave his daughter as his heiress or co-heiress with her brothers ; and for the younger brothers themselves the death of their father brought no freedom. They became now the subjects of the elder brother, as before they had all been at the absolute disposal of their father. At once, then, the master of each household became its priest and its king. He alone could offer the sacrifices before the sacred hearth ; and so long as these sacrifices were duly performed, he was strong in the protection of all his predecessors. In the worship which he thus conducted they only who belonged to the family could take part, as the lion's cubs alone would have a right to share the lion's den. Hence the continuity of the family became an indispensable condition for the welfare and repose of the dead. These could neither rest nor be rightly honored, if the regular succession from father to son was broken. Hence first for the father of the family and then for all its male members marriage became a duty, and celibacy brought with it in later times not merely a stigma but political degradation. If the natural succession failed, the remedy lay in adoption. But this adoption was effected by a religious ceremony of the most solemn kind ; and the subject of it renounced his own family and the worship of its gods to pass to another hearth and to the worship of other deities. Nor can the solemnity of this sanction be better attested than by the fact that except in case of failure of natural heirs resort could not be had to adoption.

Thus each house became a temple, of which the master or father (for, as we have seen, the two terms have but the same meaning) was also the priest, who, as serving only the gods of his own recesses, knew nothing of any religious bonds which linked him with any one beyond the limits of his own household. These, of course, were extended with each generation, the younger sons becoming the heads of new families which were kept in strict subordination to the chief who in a direct line represented the original progenitor and who thus became the king of a number of houses or a clan. But it was indispensable that the same blood should flow or be thought to flow through the veins of every member of these houses, and that they must worship the same gods with the same sacrifices. All who could not satisfy these conditions were aliens or enemies, for the two words were synony-

The house
and its de-
pendents.

mous ; and thus we have in the East the growth of caste, in the West that of a plebs or a clientela, beneath whom might be placed the serf or the helot.¹

Hence in the primitive Aryan states whether of the East or the West the distinction of orders was altogether based on religion ; and if in these states citizenship was deriv- Ideas of
able, as it has been said, only from race, this was the Property.
necessary result of the action of the earliest religious faith, and nothing more. The question of property was at first merely a secondary consideration. The home of the family must, it is true, have its hearth and its altar ; but the notion of property in the soil was fully developed only when the death of the founder made it necessary to set apart a certain spot of ground as his tomb and as the burial-place of his successors ; and from the inviolability of the grave followed necessarily the doctrine that the soil itself might not be alienated.

From the reverence or the worship paid to the master or the founder of the family after death followed that strict law of primogeniture which made the eldest son, as his father Laws of in-
had been, the absolute lord of all other members of his heritance.
house. It was impossible for the father to divest him of his sacred character, and impossible for him to admit any of his younger sons to a share of his dignity. From this root sprang that exclusive and intolerant spirit which pervaded the whole civilisation of the ancient world and which in its intensity is to us almost inconceivable.

But if the walls of separation between the orders in the state or city slowly crumbled away, the barriers which cut off the stranger from the rights of citizenship were never re- Identity of
moved. The Athenian, the Spartan, the Megarian, religious
and the Theban were as closely akin as the men of and civil
penalties.
Kent and Essex, of Norfolk and Lincoln. Yet out of the bounds of his own city each was a stranger or alien who had no proper claim to the protection of the laws, who could not become an owner of land in a soil sacred to the worship of other gods, or inherit from the citizens, because all inheritance involved the maintenance of a particular ritual. In short, to the citizen of the ancient communities the city was not merely his home ; it was his world. Here alone could he live under the protection of law, that is, of religion. Hence the doom of banishment became not less terrible than that of death, and was regarded as an adequate punishment for the gravest political offences, for the

¹ The position of the domestic slave was in one sense higher. He was initiated into the family worship, and so far had a community of interest with his master. The plebeian, as such, could have no worship at all, and had therefore no title to the consideration of those who were above him.

banished man was wiped out from his family and from the worship of the family gods. He was no longer husband or father; and his wife and children were free to act as though he had never lived.

The same religious feeling ran through every relation into which the citizens of one state could be brought with those of another. Each city remained as much an isolated unit as each original family of the state had ever been; and the process of consolidation never went further than the immediate neighborhood of the great cities. But the effects of the old religion did not stop here. If it denied to all strangers the right of intermarriage, it fed the feelings of jealousy, suspicion, and dislike which the citizens of one state felt for those of other states even in times of peace, and intensified all the horrors of war. Each war was, in short, a crusade, not a struggle for the attainment of some political end. The duties of mercy and pity to the conquered were things unknown. The life of the vanquished was at the disposal of the victor who, if he did not slay him, sold him as a slave; and if terms were made with the enemy, the contract went for nothing if the religious ceremonies were neglected.

The history of every form of Aryan polity, although it exhibits the working of a more generous feeling, points unmistakably to the time when each house existed in utter loneliness and in necessary antagonism with all around it. All indeed that the state could do was to modify the rules of the ancient family life to suit its own purposes, and to work out its own ends rather by means of compromise than by open opposition to principles which derived their sanction from religion. The Greek *Phratrîai* and the Latin *Curîæ* were but clubs in which a number of houses were combined. No change was made in the character of the houses themselves. All that was done was to provide a common ground on which certain families might meet to promote their secular interests, while their religion and their morality remained unchanged. This morality was the fruit chiefly of a religious belief, which touched neither the heart nor the conscience. If a certain act was to be done or left undone, this was not because they had in themselves a certain sense which told them that the one was right and the other wrong, but because a wolf or a rabbit had crossed their path, or because they had heard a crow chatter, or seen the lightning flash on one side rather than on the other. Their only idea of the gods whom they worshipped, that is, of their own ancestors, was that of beings who retained their human appetites while they had acquired superhuman power and superhuman malignity. It was impossible that kindly affections could have any real scope among

Obstacles
hindering
the growth
of civil so-
ciety.

men who breathed such a moral atmosphere as this, or that the society to which they belonged could fail, to exhibit the intolerance, harshness, and cruelty of the principle which lay at the root of their family life, if not of their social order.

By bearing in mind this origin of Hellenic polity, we shall be able to find our way with comparative ease through the complicated forms which that polity assumed at different periods. We might indeed have thought that the con-^{slow growth of the state.}stitution of the primæval Aryan family could never depart from its ancient simplicity: and of itself possibly it might never have done so. But the members of these families recognised no duties beyond the limits of their own homes; and on others who were not so strong or not so cunning they could prey without hindrance or scruple. Hence the natural inequality of mankind allowed the most powerful families to lay the foundations of an irresponsible despotism, while the weaker were brought into a condition of clientship which differed from slavery in little more than its name.

But so far as these original families were actually or nearly on a level in point of power, it was possible that they might combine for the purpose of extending that power and increasing it: and by the establishment of a common worship ^{The Family and the Clan.} which in no way interfered with that of the family this union was at once accomplished. Thus united, the Greek houses formed a Phratría or brotherhood. But while the circle of interests was widened, the bond of union remained not less strictly religious; and each group of families had a common altar erected in honor of a common deity who was supposed to be more powerful than the gods of each separate household. The principle of combination thus introduced was capable of indefinite extension; and as the grouping of houses or families had formed the Phratría, so the union of Phratría alone was needed to form in the tribe a religious society strictly analogous to the Phratría or the family. The societies thus formed would always have their own territory, the fields in which each family had its own tomb with the common ground which lay between their several landmarks; but the principle of these combinations was essentially not local, and thus the dependents of these houses could never acquire interest or possession in the soil on which they lived, toiled, and died. At best they might be suffered to retain a certain portion of the produce on condition of their laying the rest at the feet of the lord; and thus a perpetual burden was laid not on the land but on the tillers of it who, if they failed either to yield the amount demanded, or in any other way, might be reduced to personal slavery.

But as the worship of the family was subordinated to that of the Phratría, and that of the Phratríai to the worship of the tribe, so tribes which were locally near to each other could not fail to desire for themselves a union similar to that of the phratríai or the houses. This final union of tribes constituted the Polis or State, the society which, founded on a common religion, embraced all its members within the circle of a common law, and which was destined in the end to sweep away those distinctions of blood in which its foundations had been laid.

With the formation of the State, in other words, of the individual city, the political growth of the Greek may in strictness of speech be said to have ended; and his inability to advance to any other idea of Parliament than a Primary Assembly¹ involved a fatal hindrance to the growth of a nation. In blood and in religion the men of Athens, Thebes, and Sparta were as closely connected perhaps as the men of London, Manchester, and Liverpool; but in going to war with each other Athens, Thebes, and Sparta could not even be charged with that violation of duty which during their great civil war was urged against the southern states of the American Union. Hence the country which was called Hellas remained practically throughout its whole history a territory in which a certain number of cities inhabited by people more or less resembling each other might or might not be allied together. The theory of Greek citizenship was the same as that of the Latin city which achieved the conquest of the world; but Rome attained her power not by calling nations into existence but by numbering Italians or Gauls among her citizens by a process which would intitle Englishmen or Prussians to their rights only as possessing the freedom of the cities of London or Berlin.

This device secured to Rome universal dominion: the refusal or the failure to adopt it insured the reduction of the Hellenic land to the form of a Roman province. But whatever might be the extent of Roman or Athenian power, the character of each was the same. It was a power which they only could share who were citizens, and a vast body of men lay at all times beyond the circle of citizenship. The powerful families, who were able to domineer over their weaker neighbors and whose confederation was essentially religious, drew between themselves and their dependents a line of separation, to pass which was an impiety and a sacrilege. The attempts to pass it sum up the history of the political contests between the patricians of Rome and the plebeians; in other forms the same struggle marks the history of Athens, and in greater or less degree that of all the other cities of Greece.

¹ A parliament in which every citizen has his place.

CHAPTER III.

THE MYTHOLOGY AND TRIBAL LEGENDS OF THE GREEKS.

OF all the Aryan nations, and therefore, it may be said, of all the nations of the world, none has amassed so rich and varied a store of popular tradition as the Greek. Into this magnificent storehouse of his thoughts the Greek gathered together all that he knew, or thought that he knew, of the heaven and the earth, of day and night, of fire and frost, of light and darkness, of the bright and the swarthy gods, of giants and nymphs and men. All were there, endowed with life and with all the feelings and the passions of men. But if this rich harvest sprung with a random or irregular growth, it was destined to be garnered up not only by the greatest of epic, lyric, and tragic poets, but by the more systematic hands of mythographers who wove the whole into a connected history from the awful confusion of Chaos, the parent of Erebus and Night, to the settlements of the Herakleids in the Peloponnesos and the founding of every Hellenic city. It follows then that this vast mass of popular tradition was not all of one kind. If in portions it expressed the religious or philosophical thought of the people, in others there were blended stories of tribal wars and heroic exploits which may have had some foundation in the world of historical fact. But all rest upon the same authority, and the achievements of Hektor, Achilleus, and Sarpédôn are as much or as little attested as the terrific combats of Zeus with Typhon and the Titans or the torturing of Prometheus on the crags of Caucasus.

It is enough to say that for the Greek, as for the Aryan conquerors of India, the whole world of sense was alive. For him the trees, the clouds, the waters were all sentient beings: the dawn and the gloaming were living persons, connected with the brilliant god whose daily approach waked all things from slumber and whose departure left them in darkness repulsive as that of death. For him the blue heaven over his head was the living husband of the earth on which he seemed to descend each evening. He was Zeus, the glittering or shining god, whose bride Gaia or Ida was the teeming mother of growths awful or lovely, healthful or deadly; or he was Ouranos, the being who spreads his veil over the earth which he loves. For him the sun was Helios, the inhabitant of a house so dazzling in its splendor that no mortal might look on its glory and live; or he was Phoibos the lord of

General
character of
Greek
mythical
tradition.

Greek ideas
of nature.

life who sprang into light and strength in Delos or Ortygia, the land of the morning ; or he was Herakles toiling along up the steep path of heaven, laden with blessings for mankind ; or he was Sisypchos, the wise or crafty, doomed to roll daily to the mountain summit the stone which then rolled down again to the abyss ; or Tantalos sentenced to parch into slime the waters from which he would drink, or to scorch the fruits, which were his own children, before the eyes of Zeus, the broad heaven. For him the corn came up from the living bosom of the Earth Mother, and the summer was her child, torn from her arms as Persephonê each winter and restored to her at Eleusis, the joyous trysting place, in the spring. For him the golden grape was the gift of the wine-god Dionysos, the wonderful being who, gentle at his birth as a babe, could change himself into a fierce lion and rouse his worshippers into irrepressible frenzy. But more frequently present to his thoughts were the bright inhabitants of the dawn land,—the flashing-eyed maiden who springs fully armed from the cloven forehead of her sire and who has her home on the sunlit rock of brilliant and happy Athens,—the queen of loveliness and grace who, as Aphroditê, rises in faultless beauty from the sea foam,—the rosy-fingered Eôs who leaves the couch of Tithonos to gladden the eyes of mortal men,—the pure Artemis whose spear never misses her mark,—the shortlived Daphnê who vanishes away before the fiery breath of her lover,—the beautiful Arethousa who plunges into the blue waters in her flight from the huntsman Alpheios,—the glowing Charites who tend the bath of Aphroditê or array in a robe of spotless white the form of the new-born Phoibos,—the tender Prokris who dies loving and loved, because earth has no longer a place to shelter her ;—and over all these, rather oppressive in her greatness than winning in her beauty, Hêrê the majestic queen of heaven, whom Ixion woos to his ruin, bringing on himself the doom which binds him to his blazing wheel for ever and ever. With these beings of the dawn land came the harper Hermes, the babe who can soothe all cares away as he sings softly in his cradle, the Master-Thief who, when a few hours old, steals the bright cattle of the sun-god, the mighty giant who in his rage can dash the branches of the forest together till they burst into flame but who, be he ever so hungry, cannot eat of the flesh which the fire has roasted. For the Greek, lastly, Hephaistos, the youngest of the gods, limping from his birth, yet terrible in his power, was the lord of earthly fire, while the spotless Hestia dwelt in the everlasting flame which gleamed on the sanctuary of each household hearth.¹

¹ In this brief summary I have named a few of the beautiful or awful beings who peopled the mythical world of the Greeks. Ex-

All these beings with a thousand others were to the Greeks objects of love or fear, of veneration, reverence, or worship; and the worship of some among them may be regarded as the very foundation of the brilliant social life on which, in some of its aspects, in spite of its failure to waken the Greeks to a national life, we still look with undiminished admiration. In the magnificent gatherings of Olympia, in the contests of the Corinthian isthmus, in the Nemean and Pythian games, the Hellenic race received an education, which, regarded in the light of the purpose which it was designed to serve, has fallen to the lot of no other people upon earth. Here strength of body was used not as a means for supplying the bloody and brutal pleasures of a Roman amphitheatre, but as an instrument for a systematic training which brought out all its powers. Here the painter and the sculptor could feed his genius in the study of the most splendid of human models; and here the simple wreath which formed the prize of victory in the games carried with it a glory which kings might envy and a power which struck terror into the mind of the barbarian.¹

For working purposes then it may be said that the mythical or popular beliefs about the gods and the heroes formed a kind of religion, which no one felt it to be to his interest, and perhaps none regarded it as his duty, to gainsay or to weaken. But in no other sense can we identify Hellenic religion or morality with Hellenic mythology. The so-called Hesiodic poems give us some of the most repulsive of these legends, and string together the loves of Zeus, his fight with his father Kronos, his struggles with the giants, and his cheating of mankind. But when the poet betakes himself to his work as a teacher, we hear no more of these stories; and we are told simply that the eyes of Zeus are in every place beholding the evil and the good; that his even justice requites every man according to his work, and that all are bound to avoid the smooth road to evil and to choose the strait path of good, which, rough at first, becomes easy to those who walk in it.²

If, however, these popular traditions are not to be taken as embodiments of either religious faith or moral convictions or philosophical thought, by the vast mass of the Greeks they were

cept in its bearing on the intellectual and religious growth of the people, this mythology cannot be regarded as a part of Greek history. For the myths connected with these gods and heroes, and their

origin, I must refer the reader to the *Mythology of the Aryan Nations* and the *Tales of Ancient Greece*.

¹ Herod. viii. 26.

² *Works and Days*, 35, 215, 263. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 351.

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unquestionably received as genuine and veritable history. The strongest sentiment of the Hellenic mind was that of the absolute independence of each city from all other cities; and each town had its founder or heroic Eponymos whose name it bore and whose exploits shed a lustre on his descendants for ever. The Argives looked back to the glorious days of Perseus, the child of the golden shower, who, bearing the sword of Chrysâôr in his hand and the sandals of the Nymphs on his feet, journeyed away to the land of the gloaming and there by the merciful stroke of his weapon brought to an end the woes of the mortal Gorgon.¹ The Theban legend told the tale of Laios and Oidipous from the day when the babe was cast forth to frost and heat on the slopes of Kithairon to the hour when, after the slaughter of the Sphinx and his unwitting offence against the sanctities of law, the blind old man departed on the wanderings which were to end in the holy grove of the Erinyes.² The Athenian pointed proudly to a richer inheritance. He could tell of the Dragon-kings Kekrops and Erechtheus and recount the sorrows of the gentle Prokris and the wrongs done to the beautiful Aithra. He could dwell on the glorious career of the child Theseus, how, on reaching the vigor of full manhood, he raised the great stone and, taking in his hand the sword of destiny, proved, like Arthur, that he was rightwise born a king,³ how he cast in his lot with the doomed tribute-children, and sailing to Krete trod the mazes of the labyrinth and smote the horrible Minotauros.⁴

But the mere naming of a few such mythical stories can scarcely give an idea of the stupendous fabric reared by later poets and Greek tribal mythographers, when they came to cement together the stones which they found more or less ready hewn to their hand. Not only were there myths which belonged to particular families, clans, or cities; but around these flowed the stream of a tradition which in a certain sense may be called national, and which professed to furnish a continuous history in the tales of the Kalydonian boar hunt, of the voyage of the Argonauts, of the rescuing of Helen, the returns of the heroes, the banishment of the Herakleidai, and their triumphant restoration to their ancient home. But the fact on which we have now to lay stress is that all these stories were to the several tribes or cities genuine records of actual events, the independent chronicles of kings and heroes whose fortunes ran each in its own peculiar channel; and yet that, regarded as a whole, these traditions strictly

¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 58 *et seq.*

dle Ages, Introduction.

² *Ib.* ii. 68 *et seq.*

⁴ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 61.

³ *Popular Romances of the Mid-*

resemble a prism in which a thousand pictures flash from a few planes while all are reflected from a single piece of glass.¹

It is therefore no part of the historian's task to relate at length the mythical tales which make up the great fabric of Hellenic tradition. Grains of fact may lie buried in its stu- ^{Historical}pendous mass; but the means of separating the fact ^{value of} from the fiction are lacking. It is, of course, pos- ^{Greek}sible that there may have been a war undertaken to avenge the

wrongs of an earthly Helen, that this war lasted ten years, that ten years more were spent by the leaders in their return homewards, and even that the chief incident in this war was the quarrel of the greatest of all the heroes with a mean-spirited king. But for this war we have confessedly no contemporary historical evidence, and it is of the very essence of the narrative, as given by the poets, that Paris, who had deserted Oinônê, and before whom the three queens of the air had appeared as claimants of the golden apple, steals from Sparta the divine sister of the Dioskouroi; that the chiefs are summoned together for no other purpose than to avenge her woes and wrongs; that the seamyth's son, the wielder of invincible weapons and the lord of undying horses, goes to fight in a quarrel which is not his own; that his wrath is roused because he is robbed of the maiden Briséis; that henceforth he takes no part in the strife until his friend Patroklos has been slain; and that then he puts on the new armor which Thetis brings to him from the anvil of Hephaistos and goes forth to win the victory. But this is a tale which we find with all its essential features in every Aryan land:² and therefore, if such a war took place, it must be carried back to a time preceding the dispersion of the Aryan tribes, and its scene can be placed neither in the Penjab (the land of the Five Streams), nor on the plains of the Asiatic Troy, not in Germany, or Norway, or Wales. It has, therefore, in strictness of speech, nothing to do with Greek history. The poems may, and undoubtedly do, tell us much of the state of society and law at the time when they took shape. The pictures of Andromache and Nausikaa may be fairly taken as proof that the condition of women in the days of the poets was indefinitely higher than that of Athenian women in the days of Perikles. The Boulê or Council of the chiefs may be regarded as the germ of the great assemblies of the future Athenian people; and in spite of the manifest working of feudal tyranny we see in the

¹ See further *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book i. ch. x.

² The proposition is a sweeping one. For the proof of it I must refer the reader to my *Aryan My-*

thology, and the *Introductions to the Popular Romances of the Middle Ages*, and the *Tales of the Teutonic Lands*.

Achaïans the forefathers of the conquerors of Xerxes. We may even allow that the poet rightly gives the names of dynasties of which he speaks as flourishing in his own day; but these names can give us no knowledge of the deeds which may have been done by those who bore them.

Pre-eminent among the traditions for which a larger amount of credibility has been claimed, stands the legend which relates the return of the Herakleïdai. Of this event it is enough to say that it is the last in the series of movements which balanced each other in the popular stories of the Greeks, and that the object of all these movements is to regain a stolen treasure or to recover a lost inheritance.¹ But we cannot venture to say that we have these traditions in their original form. They were altered, almost at will, by later poets and mythographers in accordance with local or tribal prejudices or fancies, and forced into arrangements which were regarded as chronological. The story ran that when Herakles died, his tyrant and tormentor Eurystheus insisted on the surrender of his sons, and that Hyllos the son of Deianeira with his brothers hastily fled, and after wandering to many other places found a refuge at last in the only city where the children of Herakles could be safe. Eurystheus marches with his hosts against Athens, and the Athenians come forth to meet him led by Theseus, the great solar-hero of the land, who is accompanied by Iolaos, the son of Iphikles the twin brother of Herakles, as well as by the banished Hyllos. Eurystheus is slain, and Hyllos carries his head back to Alkmênê. In other words, the children of the sun return to the evening land with the treasure which the dark powers had carried away to the east; but day and night follow each the other, and thus the Herakleïdai cannot maintain their footing in the Peloponnesos for more than a year and then by an irresistible necessity find their way back to Athens. These alternations, which represent simply the succession of day and night, might be, and would have been, repeated any number of times, if the myths had not at length become mixed up with traditions of the local settlement of the country,—in other words, if certain names found in the myths had not become associated with particular spots or districts in the Peloponnesos. To follow all the versions and variations of these legends is a task not more profitable than threading the mazes of a labyrinth; but we may trace in many, probably in most of them, the working of the same ideas. Thus the version which after the death of Eurystheus takes Hyllos to Thebes makes him dwell by the Elektrian, or Amber, Gates. The next stage in the history is

¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. iii.

another homeward journey of the children of Herakles which ends in the slaughter of Hyllos in single combat with Echemos; and the Herakleidae are bound by compact to forego all attempts at return for fifty or a hundred years, periods which are mere multiples of the ten years of the Trojan war and of the Nostoi or homeward wanderings of the Achaian chiefs. The subsequent fortunes of Kleodaios and Aristomachos, the son and grandson of Herakles, simply repeat those of Hyllos; but at length in the next generation the myth pauses, and the repetition of the whole drama is prevented by the gradual awakening of the historical sense in the Hellenic tribes. For this last return the preparations are on a scale which may remind us in some degree of the brilliant gathering of the Achaian chieftains with their ships in Aulis. A fleet is built at the entrance of the Corinthian gulf, at a spot which hence bore the name of Naupaktos, and the three sons of Aristomachos,—Aristodemos, Temenos, and Kresphontes,—make ready for the last great enterprise. But Aristodemos is smitten by lightning before he can pass over into the heritage of his fathers, and his place is taken by his twin sons Eurysthenes and Prokles, the progenitors of the double line of Spartan kings. The sequel exhibits yet other points of resemblance to the tale of the Trojan war. The soothsayer Chryses reappears in the prophet Karnos, whose death by the hand of Hippotes answers to the wrong done to Chryses by Agamemnon. In either case the wrath of Apollon is roused, and a plague follows. The people die of famine, nor is the hand of the god lifted off them until, as for Chryses, a full atonement is made. Hippotes is banished, and the chiefs are then told to take as their guide the three-eyed man who is found in the Aitolian Oxylos who rides on a one-eyed horse. But as the local myth exhibited Tisamenos the son of Orestes as at this time the ruler of Peloponnesos, that prince must be brought forward as the antagonist of the returning Herakleids. A great battle follows, in which he is slain, while, according to one version, Pamphylos and Dymas, the sons of the Dorian Aigimios, fall on the side of the invaders. With the partition of the Peloponnesos among the conquerors the myth comes to an end. Argos falls to the lot of Temenos, while Sparta becomes the portion of the sons of Aristodemos, and Messênê that of Kresphontes. A sacrifice is offered by way of thanksgiving by these chiefs on their respective altars; and as they draw near to complete the rite, on the altar of Sparta is seen a serpent, on that of Argos a toad, on that of Messênê a fox. The soothsayers were, of course, ready with their interpretations. The slow and sluggish toad denoted the dull and unenterprising disposition of the future Argive people; the serpent betokened the

terrible energy of the Spartans ; the fox, the wiliness and cunning of the Messenians.

The legends which relate to this so-called Dorian Migration have lost in great degree the freshness and charm of the myths which gathered round the fairhaired Helen and the wise Medeia. This poverty may arise from their comparative nearness to an historical age, and from the intermixture of real incidents on which the floating myths of earlier times had fastened themselves. That this may have occurred again and again, is matter less of conjecture than of certainty, although the fact of the intermixture furnishes no ground of hope for those who think to find history in mythology. Unless they are known to us from contemporary writers, the real events, whatever they may have been, are disguised, distorted, and blotted out as effectually as the stoutest trees in American forests are killed by the parasitical plants which clamber up their sides. Whether the eastward migrations, which are said to be caused by the return of the Herakleids, represent any real events, we cannot tell. All that can be said further about these legends as a whole is that the historical character of any of the incidents recorded in them can be attested only by evidence distinct from these myths ; and no such evidence is forthcoming.

These eastward migrations which followed the Herakleid conquests led, it is said, to the founding of those Hellenic settlements which studded the western coasts of Asia Minor, with the shores of the Hellespont and the Propontis, and which were found even on the banks of the Borysthenes and the Tanais. These settlements are grouped under the three classes of Aiolian, Dorian and Ionian colonies. Of these colonies we shall speak more particularly hereafter. It is enough to remark here that the chronology of many of these events is given with an assurance which might well mislead the unwary, and that Thucydides has as little hesitation in assigning dates to events following close on the Trojan war or to the successive settlements of non-Hellenic and Hellenic inhabitants of Sicily as to the expulsion of the Peisistratidai from Athens or the formation of the confederacy of Delos.

CHAPTER IV.

HELLENES AND BARBARIANS.

LONG before the dawn of contemporary history a certain feeling of kinship had sprung up among the tribes which were in the habit of calling themselves Greeks, or rather Hellenes, and this feeling found expression in customs and usages which separated them from other tribes by which they were surrounded. There was first the bond of a common language; but this connexion was acknowledged, necessarily, only in so far as one tribe understood the dialect of another, and the frontier was soon passed in an age which regarded only the practical uses of speech in the common business of life. All who could not be thus easily understood were cut off from the great Hellenic society by barriers which were supposed to be impassable. They were speakers of barbarous tongues, and belonged, therefore, virtually to another world. But these convictions rested on no solid historical grounds. Thus Herodotos could assert, as we shall see more clearly hereafter, that the dialects common to the distant towns of Plakia and Kreston, settlements reputed to be Pelasgic, proved that the old Pelasgic speech was barbarous, that is, non-Hellenic;¹ but he could also maintain in a far larger number of passages that there was no essential difference between the Pelasgic and Hellenic dialects, and that the Pelasgians formed common names from strictly Hellenic roots by etymologies not always very obvious. In short, it may be safely said that, in spite of one or two disclaimers, Pelasgians and Hellenes were in his eyes one and the same people. Inconsistencies such as these suffice of themselves to show that the ethnological traditions of the Greek tribes are not to be trusted, and that the attempt to extract history from the genealogies of eponymous heroes is a mere waste of labor.

All that can be said, then, is that long trains of circumstances, which it would be impossible to trace or to account for, led certain tribes to acknowledge in some cases relationship which they repudiated in others, unconscious that their tests of union, if logically applied, would carry them far beyond the range of the Hellenic horizon. So far as this relationship was recognised, a common speech was regarded as evidence of descent from a common stock. But this evidence was not admitted in many cases where we see the affinity clearly enough; and thus to the Dorian or the Ionian a Roman was

¹ Herod. i. 57.

not much less a barbarian than were the Phenicians or the Gauls. Still, as time went on, the character of many of these tribes was so far modified by like influences as to present features which sufficiently distinguished them from other tribes. To the Asiatic generally the human body was a thing which, if he had the power, he might insult and mutilate at will, or disgrace by unseemly and servile prostrations, or offer up in sacrifice to wrathful and bloodthirsty deities. In his eyes woman was a mere chattel, or instrument of his pleasures; and while he might have about him a multitude of wives, he might make profit of his children by selling them into slavery. Of these abominable usages the Greek practically knew nothing; and as he would have shrunk from the gouging out of eyes, the ripping up of stomachs, and the slitting of ears and noses, which Persians and Englishmen, it would seem, have regarded as a duty, so he rejoiced to look upon the vigor and beauty of the unclad body which carried to the Oriental a sense of unseemliness and shame, and the exhibition of this form in games of strength and skill became through the great festivals of the separate or collected tribes bound up intimately with his religion. Above all, with him this respect for the person was accompanied by a moral self-respect which no adverse conditions could ever wholly extinguish. The Boiotian oligarch who could oppress his serfs still refused to submit to the rule of one absolute master; and the most powerful of Greek despots, though he might be guarded by the spears of foreign mercenaries, still moved familiarly among his subjects, who would as soon have thought of returning to primitive cannibalism as of approaching him with the slavish adoration of Persian nobles. Looking at these points of marked contrast with the nations of Asia whether Aryan or Semitic, we may speak broadly of a Greek national character; and this contrast would, we cannot doubt, have crossed the mind of every Athenian and Spartan on being asked to what race he belonged.

This feeling of nationality, which, however, was never allowed to intrude into the region of politics, was sustained and strengthened, as we have seen, by a common religion. The primitive hearth and altar had been from the first the sacred spot where the members of the family might meet on all occasions of festival; and these feasts were marked by games which in the course of ages began to attract visitors from other clans now recognised as sprung from the same stock. Such was the simple origin of those splendid and solemn gatherings which made the names of Pytho and Olympia famous. For their preservation and for the general regulation of the festivals some of the Greek tribes formed themselves into societies called

Religious
associations
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Greek tribes.

Amphiktyoniai, as denoting the nearness of their abode to the common sanctuary. Of the many societies thus formed some attained a wide celebrity. But there was one which from the completeness of its organisation became so far pre-eminent as to be styled expressly the Amphiktyonia. This was the alliance of which the representatives met at Delphoi in the spring, and in the autumn at Thermopylai. The chief work of this council was to watch over the safety and to guard the interests of the Delphian temple; and the discharge of this office sometimes involved the carrying on of war against those who were supposed to have injured them. But it is obvious that, unless this alliance rested on a thorough national union, its action or inaction would be far more mischievous than beneficial. Its powers might be diverted to promote the schemes of the predominant states, or they might be kept altogether in abeyance, while on the other hand the plea of defending the weaker members of the Amphiktyonia might be used to justify the interference of the Makedonian kings in the politics of the Greek cities. Under these conditions the alliance was at one time prominent, at another obscure; but at no time did it achieve that subordination of separate cities under a central representative government, without which nations cannot exist.

The tribes composing this Amphiktyonia did not include all who were intitled to be called Hellenes; but the tribes which were shut out could make use of the oracle at Delphoi or ^{The great} contend in the games at the Olympic and Pythian ^{games.} festivals. All Greeks therefore were admitted to share the large intellectual inheritance which placed them in the front ranks of mankind. The full influence of these great gatherings on the education of the people at large cannot be easily realised; yet, as we read the stirring strains of the great Delian hymn, we may to some extent understand the charm which attracted to them all that was noble and generous through the wide range of Greek society. But although from Pytho or Olympia, from Delos or Nemea or the Corinthian isthmus, he returned to his home ennobled by the stirring associations with which these splendid festivals were surrounded, he was brought none the nearer to that English feeling which would regard as treason the mere thought of war between Birmingham and Manchester. He felt a justifiable pride in being a Hellen; but he was as far as ever from wishing to merge the sovereign authority of his city under a central government which should check the feuds and rivalries of all the Greek cities alike. In various portions of Hellas the system of village communities still kept its ground. The Spartan boasted that his city had not walls, and the historian pointed to the four hamlets of which it was composed, with the remark that the ruins of

Sparta would never tell the tale of its ancient greatness.¹ This life of villages was kept up not merely throughout Epeiros, where it has continued to our own day, but in Arkadia, Achaia, and Elis.

This great Hellenic aggregate, in one sense a nation, in another a mere fortuitous combination of isolated and centrifugal atoms, must be accepted as the starting point of our history. Of Greek ethnology. the changes which preceded the advent or growth of this Hellenic people we know nothing. The record of them was never made, or it has been lost irretrievably. It would, in truth, be easy to fill a volume with speculations on the origin and the early movements of these several tribes: but history is not a legitimate field for speculation, and the result of such speculation must be a pretence of knowledge in place of the reality. In any attempts of this kind we can but take their traditions; and these traditions betray not merely complete ignorance, but the fixed idea that they might be moulded at will to suit the sentiment of each tribe, of which indeed they were only the expression.

There are, however, other sources from which we may obtain sure historical results and from which we may be justified in drawing important inferences. Of these the most trustworthy is language. From the speech of Greeks and Romans, Teutons and Hindus, we infer with certainty not merely their common origin from a single home, but their mode of life, and the stage which they reached in civilisation, science, and law. From identical geographical names, however widely separated may be the regions in which we find them, we infer that they have been given by the same or nearly cognate tribes, and thus we assert that Keltic races have dwelt on the banks of the Don and the Danube, of the Teign and the Tyne, the Tagus, the Tavy, and the Tay, of the Neda and the Nith, the Euênos and the Avon, the Kebren and the Severn, the Dart and the Douro, the Durance and the Derwent, while their kinsmen have sojourned on those of the Axios and the Achelôos, the Exe and the Esk.

Confining ourselves within these limits, we may yet form a clear idea of the actual condition of the several countries collectively regarded as Hellas, at a time when history was in its dawn. The statement of Thucydides² that the Spartan colony of Herakleia in Trachis, founded early in the Peloponnesian war, was planted on Thessalian ground proves the fact of Thessalian supremacy from Thermopylai to the pass at Tempe, while the wall built by the Phokians to bar the pass at Pylai³ may be taken as evidence that long before the Persian war the Thessalians threatened to make further conquests to the

¹ Thuc. i. 10.

² iii. 92, 93.

³ Herod. vii. 215.

south. But in this region were found Magnesians to the east, Achaians and Malians on the south, and Dolopes in the western highlands of Pindos and Tymphrestos. Whatever may have been the precise affinities of these tribes with each other or with the Thessalians, they were certainly in a state of more or less dependence on the latter, who were lords of the rich plains watered by the Peneios and studded with cities, among which Pherai and Pharsalos, Krannon and Larissa are historically the most prominent. In these towns dwelt a nobility who, drawing their revenues from the rich lands round about, spent their time in feuds and feasting and the management of their splendid breed of horses. Of the origin of that third class of the Thessalian population, which, as contrasted with the subject tribes already named, was known by the title Penestai, or working men, we can say little. That these were earlier inhabitants reduced to serfdom, there is perhaps little doubt; but whether they were, as some said, Perrhaibians and Magnetes, or Pelasgians, or, as some would have it, Boiotians driven from the territory of Arne, it is impossible to determine.¹ The legends which brought them from the south of the lake Kopais are contradicted by others which reverse the process. From the turbulent oligarchs, of whom the Skopadai of Krannon and the Aleuadai of Larissa may be taken as fair specimens, not much unity of action was to be expected. The Thessalian Tagos answered to the Dictator chosen, like Lars Porsena, to head the Etruscan clans; but fierce feuds often made the election of a Tagos impossible, and even in the Peloponnesian war not all the Thessalian cities sent their forces to aid their ancient Athenian allies.²

To the south of the rich and beautiful valley of the Spercheios, bounded by the luxuriant slopes of Othrys to the north and the more barren range of Oita to the south, dwelt the Lokrians, Dorians, and Phokians, of whom it cannot be said that we possess any continuous history. Separated by the territory of Daphnous, a small corner of ground to the north of mount Knemis which gave to the Phokians their only access to the Euboian Sea, lay the lands of the Epiknemidian Lokrians to the west, and of the Lokrians of Opous to the east. With these sections of the Lokrian name must be taken another isolated portion of the same race inhabiting the corner of land which ran up northwards from the Corinthian gulf between Aitolia and Phokis, and also the town of the Epizephyrian Lokrians at the southern extremity of the Italian peninsula. These Lokrians were regarded as Hellenes; but their name seems to point to an affinity with the Ligurians of the gulf of Genoa and

¹ Grote, *Hist. Gr.* ii. 375.

² Thuc. ii. 22.

the Lloegry of Britain and Gaul. To the south of mount Knemis lay the Phokian plain of the Kephisos, which, flowing from Parnassos, receives the stream of the Euênos near the town of Elateia and runs into the lake Kopaïs near the Boiotian Orchomenos.

To the west of the Ozolian Lokrians and of the little state of Doris lay the fastnesses of mountain tribes, some of which were The Aitolians and Akarnanians. allowed to be Hellenes while to others the title was refused,—on what grounds, it would perhaps be not easy to determine. Probably both in their language and their usages the Aitolians and Akarnanians were as much or as little entitled to be regarded as Greeks as were the Agraians and Amphilocheians of the Ambrakian gulf, who were classed among barbarians.¹

With these rude and savage clans the comparatively orderly people of Doris and Phokis stand out in marked contrast; but in The Boiotian confederacy. historical importance all these are far surpassed by the Boiotians, whose theory even from prehistoric times seems to have been that the whole country stretching from Chaironeia and Orchomenos to the Euboian sea and from the lands of the Opountain Lokrians to the Corinthian gulf was the inalienable possession of the Boiotian confederacy. Whether this confederacy was coeval with the greatness of Orchomenos, we cannot say; but certain it is that Orchomenos was the seat of a powerful people at a time when Mykenai and Tiryns stood foremost among the cities in the Peloponnesos. The huge works by which the imperfect drainage of the lake Kopaïs through the natural Katabothra was rendered complete point to a government as stable as that which produced the Cloacæ of Rome. But before the dawn of the historic ages the greatness of Orchomenos had passed away, and Thebes becomes the leader of the confederacy, from which by the aid or the connivance of Sparta Plataiai seceded to form its splendid but disastrous alliance with Athens.

If from these communities to the north of the Corinthian gulf we turn to the Peloponnesos at the beginning of the Ancient supremacy of Argos. genuine historical age, we find that the preponderant state is Sparta. Her territory includes nearly half the peninsula in a line extending from Thyrea on the east to the mouth of the Neda on the west. She has thus swallowed up all Messênê, and no small portion of land which, as the tradition asserts, had once been under the dominion of Argos. There had, indeed, been a time in which the same Argos had devoted not merely the city which held aloof from the struggle with Xerxes, but the

¹ Yet these Agraians are in the common designation of the name simply the Graioi or Graikoi, Hellenic tribes, whose name the Latins adopted as

whole of the Peloponnesos and many a district lying beyond its limits ; and therefore the town of Argos was already shrunk when she was deprived of that long strip of land which, stretching from Thyrea to Cape Malea, is cut off, like Magnesia, by the mountain range of Thornax and Zarex from the lands which lie to the west. This ancient supremacy of Argos may be indicated in the myth which in the Herakleid conquest assigns the northeastern portion of the peninsula as the prize of Temenos the eldest surviving son of Aristomachos ; and thus the Dorian conquerors would become inheritors of her ancient greatness.

Here, as in the Hellenic lands to the north of the Corinthian isthmus, we must content ourselves with that grouping of states which is revealed to us at the dawn of the historical ages ; and this grouping in the Peloponnesos exhibits The Eleians and the Arkadians. Dorians as possessing the whole peninsula with the exception of that portion to the northwest which included the lands of the Triphylians, Pisatans, Eleians, Achaians, and Arkadians. The Triphylians, separated from the Dorian states by the river Neda, fell, it was said, like the men of Pisa, under the yoke of the Eleians, later immigrants from Aitolia, while the Achaians retained in their dodekapolis some fragments of the ancient inheritance won from Ionians whom they had driven from their homes.¹ It is of more importance to remark that the tribes who occupied the central highlands of the Peloponnesos exhibit, at the time when we first become historically acquainted with them, social conditions much resembling those of the highland tribes to the north of the Corinthian gulf. Girt in within the mighty ranges of Kyllênê and Erymanthos to the north, of Pholos to the northwest, of the Mainalian and Parthenian hills to the southeast, this bare and rugged region furnished a home to village communities ordered after the primitive Aryan model.

But if Arkadia could boast of no beautiful or magnificent cities, it was rich in its wealth of popular traditions. The birth-place of Hermes was in the Kyllenian hill, and here lay the cradle to which the child returned when wearied with his work of destruction. Among these same hills, near the town of Nonakris, flowed the awful stream of Styx, the water which imparted a deadly sanction to the oaths of those who swore by it, while far away on the Lykaian heights rose the town which the simple faith of the people maintained to be the most ancient of all cities and the first which Helios (the sun) had ever beheld. Here, as they would have it, Zeus had been nourished by the nymphs Theisoa, Neda, and Hagno ; and here in Kretea, and not in the Egean island, was the

¹ Herod. viii. 73.

mighty son of Kronos born. Half conscious that he was but saying in other words that the blue heaven is seen first in the morning against the bright mountain-tops on which the sun's rays rest before they light up the regions beneath, the Arkadian, localising in his Lykaian Temenos the old faith that no man might look on the face of Zeus and live, averred not only that all living things which might enter it would die within the year, but that not a single object within it ever cast a shadow.¹

Lastly, to the west of the great mountain-chain of Taygetos which runs down to Tainaron the southernmost cape of the peninsula, lay the richest land to the west and south of the Corinthian isthmus, the plains of Stenyklaros and Makaria, watered by the Bias and the Pamisos. This fertile Messenian land (for no city called Messênê existed in the days of Herodotos) must once have been independent both of Argos and of Sparta, if there be the least foundation for the belief that it was assigned as the portion of the Herakleid Kresphontes.

Whatever may have been the origin of the Messenian state, certain it is that its fortunes were precisely opposed to those of the half savage hamlets which together formed the city of Sparta. Messênê after a long and desperate struggle went down before her austere rival; Sparta, having extended her borders to the Western and Eastern seas, became not merely the head of the Dorian tribes, but a power which made itself felt throughout all Hellas, and in some sort succeeded in enforcing a common law. Distinguished from all other states by the rigidity of its system and the peculiarity of its institutions, it has, perhaps from the mere fact of its prominence, come to be regarded as the type and model of a Doric state, and as exhibiting in their logical completeness the general principles of that which, in the absence of a national Hellenic sentiment, must be termed Dorism. This reputation is altogether undeserved, and probably would have been thoroughly distasteful to the companions of Leonidas or Archidamos. In her chief characteristics Sparta stood alone. Neither in Argos nor in Corinth nor even in Krete from which she was supposed to have derived her special institutions, do we find that military and monastic system which converted Sparta into an incampment of crusading knights, and waged an impartial war not only against luxury but generally against art, refinement, and speculation. This lack of sympathy with the general Hellenic mind was shown in her whole polity; and this polity, it was

¹ The chapter in which Pausanias (viii. 38, 1) describes the phenomena of Lykosoura is one of the most important in the whole range

of Greek literature in its bearing on the mythopœic stage of Aryan civilisation. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 363.

believed, was brought into permanent shape by the legislation of Lykourgos.

The historian who lived nearest to the alleged time of the great Spartan lawgiver is Herodotos; and the account which he gives is briefly this,—that Lykourgos became guardian of his nephew the young king Leobotas or Labotas, while Sparta was still utterly disorganised and unruly; that, resolving to put an end to this shameful anarchy, he went to Krete, and thence returned to change all Spartan manners and customs; that when afterwards he visited Delphoi, the priestess, although she confessed some hesitation, ranked him among gods rather than among men, and that after his death the Spartans built a temple in his honor and speedily became the orderly and mighty people which he wished to make them.¹ He adds that, although this was the Spartan tradition, yet many maintained that he owed to the Pythia at Delphoi the remedies which he applied with so much success to the maladies of his countrymen; and all that we need remark here is that Labotas according to the popular chronology began to reign perhaps half a millennium before the birth of the historian. According to Herodotos, the Spartan tradition made Lykourgos the guardian of Labotas, of the Agiad or Eurysthenid line of kings; but the writers whom Plutarch followed would have it that the child intrusted to him was not Labotas but Charilaos, of the Prokleid or Eurypontid house, and that Lykourgos, having been appointed regent on the death of his brother Polydektes, had rejected the proposals of his widow who wished him to marry her and make himself king. According to this version the love of the widow was thus turned to hate, and the charge which she brought against him, of seeking the life of the babe whom he had presented to the Spartans as their king, drove him into exile. Going first to Krete, he there found in working order the institutions which he transferred to Sparta, and thence wandered on to Ionia, Egypt, Libya, Iberia, and India, obtaining in the first of these countries a copy of the Homeric poems which with his laws he was the first to introduce into Peloponnesos. The framers of this narrative had heard of his visit to Delphoi, and it was their business to find a reason for his going. This reason was the appalling confusion which astonished him on his return to Sparta and drove him to take counsel with the Delphian god.

In short, of Lykourgos, of his life, and of his works we know absolutely nothing. To us he is a mere phantom; and so unsubstantial did his form appear to Timaios and to Cicero that they made two Lykourgoi, and simplified matters by assigning to the one all deeds and schemes which would not

Mythical
lawgivers.

¹ Herod. i. 65.

suit the other. The mythical Lykourgos is not, like the mythical Solon, a person for whose historical existence we have contemporary documents and of whose constitutional changes we have accounts on the whole adequately attested; but he is one around whom the mists of oral tradition have gathered as they have gathered round Karl the Great and Hruodland, the Roland of Roncesvalles. Solon lives and dies among men, of whom we have at least some historical knowledge. Lykourgos is removed from the period of genuine history by a gulf of centuries, and he belongs to the ages in which Mann, like Prometheus, Hermes, and Phoroneus, bestows on his kinsfolk that boon of fire without which they would never have attained to social order and law.¹ We must therefore content ourselves with such knowledge of the early condition of Sparta as may be furnished by statements relating to the working of the Spartan constitution at a time which may be said to mark the dawn of contemporary history.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONSTITUTION AND EARLY HISTORY OF SPARTA.

THE Spartans in relation to the inhabitants of the country generally formed strictly an army of occupation; and their whole polity may be said to be founded on the discipline of such an army. In its earlier stages the Spartan constitution, according to the accounts given of it, much resembled the constitution of the Achaians as described in the Iliad. Externally, then, the Spartans occupied a position closely analogous to that of William the Conqueror and his Normans in England; internally they were governed by a close oligarchy. But the Spartan constitution differed from that of the Achaians in its peculiar feature of two co-ordinate kings, both Herakleids, and referred by way of explanation to the twin sons of Aristodemos. The power of the kings, whatever it may have been (and it certainly had been far greater than that which they retained in the time of Herodotos), is said to have received some limitations from Lykourgos to whom the Spartans attributed the establishment of the Gerousia, or senate of twenty-eight old men (the whole number of the assembly being thirty, as the kings sat and voted with them), and also of the periodical popular

¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 191.

assemblies which were held in the open air. In these meetings the people were not allowed to discuss any measures, their functions being bounded to the acceptance or the rejection of the previous resolutions of the Gerousia. To this earlier constitution, according to Plutarch, two checks were added a century later in the reigns of the kings Polydoros and Theopompos, the first being the provision that the senate with the kings should have the power of reversing any 'crooked decisions' of the people, and the second the institution of a new executive board of five men called Ephoroi (overseers), who acquired, if they did not at the first receive, powers which in the issue became paramount in the state. By the oath interchanged every month, the kings swore that they would exercise their functions according to the established laws, while the ephors undertook on that condition to maintain their authority. This oath could have been instituted only at a time when the kings still possessed some independent power; it was retained long after the period when their authority became almost nominal as compared with that of the ephors.

When we reach the times of contemporary historians, we find the population of the Spartan territories marked off into three classes, the Spartiatai or full citizens, the Perioikoi, and the Helots. The distinctions between these classes severally are sufficiently clear; but it seems impossible to attain any certainty as to the mode in which they grew up. In the age of Herodotos no distinction of race existed between the full Spartan citizens and the Perioikoi, while a large proportion of the Helots was also Dorian, if the fact that they were conquered Messenians gave them a claim to that title. We are therefore left to mere guesswork, when we seek for the reason why the Dorians of outlying districts did not share the privileges of the Spartans, and why certain other Dorians, with other inhabitants whose very name of Helots we cannot account for, should have been reduced to the condition of villenage. The Dorian conquest of the Peloponnesos is shrouded in the mists of popular tradition; and when we reach the historical ages, we can but accept facts as we find them. These facts exhibit to us an oligarchical body filling towards the other inhabitants the relation of feudal lords to their dependents, supported, like the Thessalian nobility, entirely from their lands, and regarding all labor, whether agricultural or mechanical, as derogatory to their dignity. In their relations with one another, these lords were the soldiers of an army of occupation and subjected, as such, to a severe military discipline. In fact, they retained their citizenship only on condition of submitting to this discipline and of paying their quota to the Syssitia or public messes, which supplied the place of home life to

The Spartiatai, the Perioikoi, and the Helots.

the Spartans. Failure in either of these duties intailed disfranchisement: and it may be readily supposed that the multiplication of families too proud to labor, and even forbidden to labor, had its necessary result in producing a class of men who had lost their franchise merely from inability to contribute to these public messes. These disfranchised citizens came to be known by the name Hypomeiones or Inferiors, and answered closely to the 'mean whites' of the late slave-holding states of the American union. The full citizens were distinguished by the title of Homoioi, or Peers.

Thus while the oligarchic body of governing citizens was perpetually throwing off a number of landless and moneyless men, the condition of the Perioikoi and even that of the Helots was by comparison gradually improving. The former carried on the various trades on which the Spartan looked with profound scorn; the latter, as cultivators of the soil, lost nothing by the increase of their numbers, while they differed altogether from the slaves of Athens or Thebes as being strictly 'adscripti glebæ,' and not liable to be sold out of the country, or perhaps even to be sold at all.

Such a polity was not one to justify any great feeling of security on the part of the rulers. We find accordingly that the Spartan government looked with constant anxiety to the classes which it regarded with an instinctive dread. The ephors could put Perioikoi to death without trial; crowds of Helots sometimes disappeared for ever when their lives seemed to portend danger for the supremacy of the dominant class; and the Krypteia (even if we reject the idea of deliberate annual massacres of the Helots) was yet a police institution by which young citizens were employed to carry out a system of espionage through the whole of Lakonia. But with all its faults the Spartan constitution fairly answered its purpose, and challenged the respect of the Hellenic world. In the belief of Herodotos and Thucydides Sparta, in times ancient even in their day, had been among the most disorderly of states; but since the reforms of Lykourgos none had been better governed or more free from faction. The fixity of their political ideas or sentiments won for them the esteem of their fellow-Hellenes, among whom changes were fast and frequent, while this esteem in its turn fed the pride of the Spartans and inspired them with a temper as self-satisfied as that of the inhabitants of the Celestial Empire, and even more arrogant and exclusive.

The empire of Sparta was extended to the western sea by the result of two wars with the Messenians, the second of which ended in their utter ruin. Of these wars we have some scanty knowledge from the fragments which remain of the elegies of Tyrtaios. This poet who belonged to

Gradual improvement in the condition of the Perioikoi and the Helots.

The Krypteia.

The Messenian wars.

the Attic deme of Aphidnai was for the Spartans in the later war what Solon was to the Athenians in the struggle for Salamis. From him we learn that the two contests were separated by an interval of two generations. The fathers of our fathers, he said, conquered the Messenians; but this first conquest, he tells us, was achieved at the cost of a war which lasted for twenty years and in which the most eminent of the Spartan warriors was the king Theopompos. The second war he describes as not less obstinate and dangerous for Sparta, against which the Messenians were supported by the aid of other states in the Peloponnesos. This is practically all that we learn from Tyrtaios, and it is not much. Of Tyrtaios himself later writers related that he was a lame school-master sent by the Athenians to aid the Spartans who had been commanded by the Delphian priestess to find a leader at Athens.

Of these wars we learn nothing from writers preceding the age of Epameinondas; and the inference seems to be that for the wealth of incident and splendor of coloring thrown over the narrative of this long struggle we are indebted not to traditions of the time but to fictions which grew up after the restoration of Messenia and the founding of the city of Messênê. If either from Herodotos or Thucydides or Xenophon we had heard of the treasure buried by Aristomenes as a pledge of the future resurrection of his country, we might have pointed to the later story of Pausanias as the genuine sequel of an old tradition. As it is, we can but take as we find it the tale which tells us how, when the battle of Leuktra had justified the hopes of Aristomenes, the Argive Epiteles was bidden in a dream to recover the old woman who was well nigh at her last gasp beneath the sods of Ithômê; how his search was rewarded by the discovery of a water jar in which was contained a plate of the finest tin; how on this plate were inscribed the mystic rites for the worship of the great gods, and how the history of the new Messênê was thus linked on with that of the old.

That the first war lasted twenty years and ended in the abandonment of Ithômê by the Messenians, we learn on the authority of Tyrtaios; but the causes and the course of the war are wrapped in the mists which gather round all popular traditions, if the accounts of these conflicts can be called traditions at all. We can make nothing of stories which speak of disputes at the border temple of Artemis Limnatis, arising, as the Messenians said, from the licence of the Spartan youths, or, as the Spartans retorted, by the insolence and lust of the Messenians. In one of these disputes the Spartan king Teleklos, it is said, was slain; and the war broke out in the reign of Theopompos and Alkamenes on the refusal of the Messenians to surrender

Narratives
of the Mes-
senian wars.

The first
Messenian
war.

Polychares, who, to avenge himself of wrongs inflicted on him by the Spartan Euaiphnos, had invaded and ravaged Spartan territory. The sequel of the war exhibits a series of battles by which the Messenians are so weakened that they send to ask aid from the god of Delphoi. When the answer came that a virgin of the royal house of Aipyros must die for her country, Aristodemos slew his daughter with his own hand; but for a time the sacrifice seemed vain. Six years had passed when the Spartans advanced against Ithômê, and a drawn battle took place in which the Messenian king was slain. Aristodemos was chosen to fill his place, and in the fifth year of his reign at length won a decisive victory over his enemies. From this point the narrative is lost in a recital of oracular responses, visions, and prodigies. A headache restored the sight of the blind prophet Ophioneus, and the wonder seemed a portent of good. But the statue of Artemis dropped its brazen shield; and as Aristodemos in his panoply approached the altar of sacrifice before going forth to battle, his slaughtered child stood before him in black raiment and pointing to her wounded side stripped him of his armor and, placing on his head a golden crown, arrayed him in a white robe. Aristodemos knew that not for nothing had she thus wrapped him in the garb of the dead, and going forth to her tomb, he slew himself upon it. Why he should thus despair, it is indeed not easy to see. Pausanias who tells the story is obliged to admit that his career had been almost uniformly successful, and winds up with the statement that on his death the Messenians instead of electing a king appointed Damis dictator, that in a battle which Damis was compelled to fight owing to failure of supplies in the stronghold, he, his fellow generals, and the chief men of the Messenians were all slain, and that five months later the garrison abandoned Ithômê.¹ So far as we may see, there was no more reason for this than for the death of Aristodemos: but it was necessary to kill them off somehow, and we have here manifestly the lame ending of a fiction framed to glorify the Messenians by representing them as practically victorious throughout the war and ascribing the catastrophe at its close to the direct interference of the gods.

The story of this struggle was told in verse by the Kretan Rhianos and in prose by Myron of Priênê. But the latter, it is said, confined himself to the chronicle of events down to the death of Aristodemos, while Rhianos began with the revolt of the conquered Messenians and carried on his tale to the final destruction of the Messenian state.² Both, however, introduce into their narratives the hero Aristomenes;

The second
Messenian
war.

¹ Paus. iv.

² Ib. iv. 6, 1.

but in the pages of Myron this Messenian champion is no very extraordinary personage, whereas in the poem of Rhianos his glory is surpassed only by that of Achilleus. Myron, again, assigns the hero to the first war, Rhianos to the second; and as according to Tyrtaios¹ the second war was waged by the grandchildren of those who had fought in the first, it follows that either Myron or Rhianos is wrong. The elegies of Tyrtaios throw indeed a gleam of light on the interval which separates the first war from the second. It was, the poet assures us, a time of intolerable oppression for the Messenians, who were constrained to stoop like asses beneath heavy burdens, to yield to their conquerors a full half of all the produce of their land, and to appear in mourning garb at the funerals of Spartan kings. At length the Messenians resolved to strike a blow for freedom, and the war thus begun ended after nineteen years, so Tyrtaios said, in the final subjugation of the country. The story of the struggle is the glorification of Aristomenes whose final defeat, inexplicable otherwise, is accounted for by a series of treasons from his friends and his allies. Throughout this narrative we are carried away into the world of the Argonautic or the Trojan heroes. Like Kekrops, he is the dragon's son;² and no sooner is he made dictator after the drawn battle of Derai, (king he would not be), than he achieves a series of exploits which rival those of Herakles or Samson. Entering Sparta by night, he went straight to the temple of Athana of the Brazen House, and in the morning a shield was seen nailed up on the wall with an inscription which declared it to be an offering by Aristomenes from Spartan spoil. When in the next year his enemies met him by the Boar's Grave (Kaprou Sema) in the plain of Stenyklaros, they were saved from utter destruction only because Aristomenes sitting down under a wild pear-tree was robbed of his shield by the Dioskouroi. Still so splendid was his victory that the Messenian maidens crowned him with garlands and gave utterance to their joy in songs which told how into the midst of the Stenyklarian plain and up to the summit of the hill Aristomenes chased the flying Lakedaimonians.³ Open force, it was clear, could avail nothing against him, and the Spartans found it easier to work their way by corruption. Ample bribes secured the treachery of Aristokrates the Arkadian ally of the Messenians, who in the battle of the Great Trench (Megalê Taphros) played the part of Mettus Fuffetius in the Roman legend.⁴ Thus defeated, Aristomenes gathered his routed forces, and taking refuge on mount Eira, as Aristodemos had maintained himself on Ithômê, held his ground

¹ See the fragment of Tyrtaios quoted by Pausanias, iv. 15, 1.

² Paus. iv. 14, 5 *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 369.

³ Paus. iv. 16, 4.

⁴ Liv. i. 27.

for eleven years longer. Far from reaping any benefit from the victory, the Spartans saw their lands ravaged, their people worn down by famine or by seditions more fatal than famine, and learnt at length that Aristomenes had surpassed his former exploit in the Brazen House by the capture of Amyklai not three miles distant from Sparta. He had plundered the city and was retreating with the spoil when the enemy overtook him in overwhelming numbers, and made him prisoner with fifty of his fellows. With these he was thrown into the Keadas, a pit used like the Barathron at Athens for the execution of criminals. The fifty were at once killed. Aristomenes alone reached the bottom alive, borne, as some said, on the outstretched wings of an eagle.¹ Rescued from this dismal cavern, like Sindbad in the Arabian tale, by following a fox which came to prey upon the dead, the hero appeared once more at Eira and offered up for the second time the Hekatomphonia or sacrifice for the slaughter of a hundred enemies. But he must again lose by the craft of his foes what he had gained by his own prowess. In a time of truce he is seized by some Kretan bowmen; but a maiden had dreamed the night before that wolves had brought into the city a chained and clawless lion, and that she had given him claws and set him free. The sight of Aristomenes amongst his captors revealed the meaning of her vision, and having made the archers drunk, she placed a dagger in his hands and cut his bonds. Seizing the weapon, the hero slew his enemies; and the maiden was rewarded by becoming the wife of his son Gorgos. But the fated time was now drawing near. The Pythian priestess had warned him that the god could no longer defend Messênê if the he-goat (Tragos) should drink the waters of the Neda. The Messenians thought of beasts and felt no fear; but a fig-tree sprang up, and, instead of spreading its branches in the air, let them droop into the stream, and the seer Theoklos, as he looked upon it, knew that this was the deadly sign, for in the Messenian dialect the fig-tree was called Tragos. Warned by the prophet, Aristomenes buried in Ithômê the pledge of the restoration of his country and hastened away to Eira. Here again treachery accomplished what strength could not achieve. Yet so terrible was Aristomenes, as he stood at bay with his men formed in square round the women and the children, that his enemies readily suffered him to pass free with those whom he still guarded. Retreating into Arkadia, he planned another attack upon Sparta, and was again foiled by the treachery of Aristokrates, who was now stoned to death by his countrymen. But the spirit of the

¹ Paus. iv. 18, 4. The Euenem- broken by a shield bearing an out-
ists maintained that his fall was stretched eagle as its device.

Messenians was broken. Many of them had been made Helots; some had taken refuge in Kyllênê, a port of the Eleians; others turned their thoughts to Sicily and besought the hero to become their leader. This he refused to be. There was still a hope that he might yet be able to do some hurt to the Spartans; and with this hope he went to take counsel at Delphoi. Here he met Damagetos the king of the Rhodian Ialysos, who had been bidden to marry the daughter of the bravest of the Hellenes. Damagetos, knowing that none could challenge the right of Aristomenes to this title, besought of him his child and offered him a home in the beautiful island which rose up from the sea to be the bride of Helios.¹ To Rhodes therefore he went, and thus became the progenitor of the illustrious family of the Diagoridai. A peaceful end in the happy island of the sun was the fittest close of a career in which, as in a stormy day, the blackness of darkness is from time to time broken by outbursts of dazzling light.

Far older than the comparatively modern romances of the Messenian wars were the legends which told the story of Spartan aggressions or conquests in the direction of Arkadia and Argolis. If we are to believe Pausanias,² Tegea was attacked by Charilaos, the king whose rights were maintained by Lykourgos; but the invader was taken prisoner by the Tegeatan women who had placed themselves in ambush near the scene of battle. According to Herodotos,³ the unity and discipline of the Lykourgean system so materially added to the strength of Sparta that nothing less than the conquest of all Arkadia could satisfy her ambition. But when the Spartans asked Phoibos at Delphoi, how this ambition could best be gratified, the answer was that the larger scheme must be given up, although they might dance on the plain of Tegea and measure it out with ropes. If the expedition undertaken in the faith of this response was that in which Charilaos failed, we must suppose further that the Spartans carried with them fetters to be worn by the conquered Tegeatans, and learnt by bitter experience that the chains were to be worn not by their enemies but by themselves. The long series of defeats which the Spartans underwent at the hands of the Tegeatans was at length brought to an end in the reigns of Anaxandridas and Ariston. The Pythian priestess had told them that they would win the day if they could bring back to Sparta the bones of Orestes, which lay on a level spot in Tegea where two winds were made to blow by main force, and where stroke followed stroke and woe was laid on woe. The riddle set the wit of the Spartans to work, and at length it was solved by

¹ Pind. *Olymp.* vii. 127.² iii. 7, 3.³ i. 66.

Lichas, one of their roving police, who, happening to visit a blacksmith's forge, gazed in wonder as the hammer fell with mighty power on the anvil. The smith told him that he would have had better cause for wonder if he had seen the coffin, seven cubits long, and the body as gigantic as the coffin, which he had found beneath his forge. Hastening home, Lichas said that the blows of the blacksmith's hammer must represent the stroke on stroke and woe on woe of the Delphian enigma; and bidding them pass on him a sentence of banishment, he departed, like Zopyros or Sextus Tarquinius, to work the ruin of an unsuspecting enemy. Obtaining after some difficulty a lease of the forge, he dug up the gigantic bier and departed with a treasure as precious as the bones of Oidipous or the purple locks of Nisos. Henceforth the success of the Spartans was as great as their disasters had been; but what may have been the result of their victories it is not easy to see. If Tegea was conquered, it still remained independent. In the Persian wars we shall find the Tegeatans serving as the equal allies of Sparta, and claiming as their right the post of honor on the left wing, which in the battle of Plataiai was for the first time yielded to the Athenians.

Not more, and perhaps not less, likely, and certainly not better attested, is the tradition which asserted that before the last Lydian king Kroisos sought alliance with the chief state of Western Hellas, Sparta had gained possession of that long strip of Argive territory which, lying between the range of Mount Thornax and the sea, stretched from Thyrea to the Malean cape. The dispute about the Thyreatis was settled, it is said, by a duel, in which three hundred Spartans fought with three hundred Argives on a field from which all but the combatants were rigidly shut out. The combat was as fierce and fatal as that of the Clans Chattan and Key on the Inch of Perth before Robert III. of Scotland, and at sundown the only survivors were the Spartan Othryades and the Argives Chromios and Alkenor. The latter hastened home, claiming the victory; the Spartan plundered the bodies of the dead, and kept his post until on the next day the Spartan and Argive armies came to see the result. The Argives declared that by the terms of the agreement Thyrea must remain with them as two of their champions had returned home. The Spartans argued that the victory must be adjudged to the side which held the ground, and the controversy ended in a battle which rendered the previous duel superfluous. The countrymen of Othryades were again conquerors; but Othryades, ashamed to return to Sparta as the sole survivor of three hundred, slew himself on the field.

However it may have been acquired, the conquest of Thyrea

Rivalry of
Sparta and
Argos.

marked the utmost extension of Spartan territory within the limits of the Peloponnesos. Over two-fifths of the peninsula the Spartans were now supreme; and if their state had its weak side in the discontent of the Helots or the Perioikoi, it had its strength in a geographical position which made it practically secure against all attacks from foreign enemies. With these conditions there is nothing to surprise us, if, as we approach the age of genuine history, we find Sparta not merely supreme in the Peloponnesos, but tacitly or openly recognised as the head of the ill-cemented communities which claimed the Hellenic name. The true narrative of the events which brought about this result may be lost irretrievably; but the result itself stands out as the most important fact in the early history of the Greeks.

Early supremacy of Sparta.

CHAPTER VI.

THE GREEK DESPOTS.

ALTHOUGH the foundations of Aryan society were laid, as we have seen, in an intense selfishness which regarded all persons not actual members of the family as beyond the pale of law, yet from the first it was possible that two or more of the heads of such families might enter into a league either for mutual protection or to advance their own interests—a task which in these primitive ages would mean simply interference with and opposition to the interests of others. These heads of families thus combined would naturally form a close and exclusive order—in other words, an oligarchy. They would also be sole owners of the land on which their families lived; and as soon as all the houses within a given district were combined in this league, the name of Landholder, Gamoros or Geomoros, would become a general designation for the ruling class, as contrasted with the main body of people whom they may have been able to subjugate. Thus the members of the dominant houses would be called Gamoroi and Eupatridai indifferently. But the growth of population would, by increasing the number of younger sons and their families, multiply the number of so-called Gamoroi who would not be owners of land, but who, by virtue of their common descent from the same sacred stock, would belong to the great patrician order. Thus far the natural tendency of Hellenic as of other Aryan society would be towards

Tendencies of early Aryan civilisation.

oligarchy. The chiefs of the houses thus formed into clans, having been originally independent of each other, would be theoretically at least on an equality. Each would of necessity have his seat and his vote in the council, and his voice would carry equal weight with that of the wealthiest and most powerful of his fellows. But if equal among themselves in relation to their subjects they would be a college of kings, owing no duties except to the members of their own houses, acknowledging no responsibility even to them, and extending the benefits of law to their dependents, so far as they extended them at all, as a matter not of right, but of favor, which might at any moment be withdrawn.

We are justified, therefore, in regarding Hellenic kingship as a comparatively late development which carried with it the signs of its speedy decay. If the description in the Iliad of the kingly power in Hellas may be accepted as a faithful picture of early Hellenic society, the Basileus is one who holds his power in direct trust from Zeus, and who, if he takes counsel with his chiefs, is still free to reject their advice. But, whatever might be its seeming insignificance, the gathering of subordinate chiefs was the germ of those democratic assemblies in which Athenian citizens learnt to respect themselves and to obey the law. When, therefore, an Hellenic dynasty was set aside and an oligarchy set up in its place, this was strictly nothing more than a return to the earlier form of government. The great chiefs resumed the full rights, of which they had conceded, or been compelled to yield, some portion to the king. For this reason also the change from monarchy to oligarchy seems to have been effected generally without any great convulsion and even without much disturbance.

It might be supposed that the Greek cities which were thus governed by oligarchies were now on the high road to constitutional order and freedom; but many an English citizen who would rise against the tyranny of men above him with the energy of Hampden, and who would even spend his life in pulling down the shattered fabric of feudalism, may yet show to his inferiors not a little of feudal impiousness. In these such conduct is, of course, grossly and unreasonably inconsistent; to the ancient oligarch the charge of such inconsistency would have seemed simply ludicrous. It was true that there lay a large multitude beyond the sacred circle of his order, a multitude constantly increasing from many causes which kept his own class stationary, or even lessened its numbers; but then it was a sacred circle, and beyond its limits he recognised no duties. In this unprivileged crowd lay the sunken rocks on

which oligarchies must sooner or later make shipwreck, for, happily for the advancement of mankind, these close and exclusive bodies are pre-eminently liable to the plagues of jealousy and dissension, and divergence of interest is sure to create an opposing minority which, if it cannot gain its own ends, may yet clog the movements of others. Of the general effect of oligarchical rule on the subject population we shall be better able to judge when we reach the early history of Athens. It may be enough to say here that whether under the kings or under the oligarchs the subject classes were alike shut out from the benefits of an equal and impartially administered law. The change from kingship to oligarchy had been in theory no change for them; and the later state of things differed from the former only in this, that even in the ruling class there were persons whose discontent and disaffection might break out at any time in revolution, and who, to achieve their own selfish purpose, might court the favor of the people, and enlist their aid by promising them justice. This was, in fact, the most potent, and perhaps the most frequently employed of the modes by which some ambitious or discontented member of the ruling class succeeded in making himself absolute. The man who aimed at supreme power came forward commonly in the character of the demagogue, and declaiming against the wanton insolence and cruelty of his fellow Eupatrids, perhaps exhibiting in his own person the real or pretended evidences of their brutality, induced them to take up arms in his behalf and to surround him with a bodyguard. The next step was to gain a commanding military position; and then if, like Peisistratos in the Athenian Akropolis, he could gather round him a band of foreign mercenaries, his task was at once practically accomplished.

But both among the oligarchs and among the unfranchised people were some in whom the sense of law and of duty, as arising from law, seemed almost intuitive; men who were animated by the conviction that law is an eternal power, being the expression of divine righteousness.¹ Such a conviction must be repressed by stern and prompt persecution, or it will spread like a slow fire ready to burst out at any vent: but so long as this feeling existed, it was impossible for the tyrant to rule with impartial justice, even if he might desire to do so. Living in constant fear of unknown dangers and unseen enemies, he was tempted to trust more and more to terrorism, and to seek his own safety by cutting off the tallest among the ears of corn.² By slaying or banishing dangerous or

¹ Soph. *Oid. Tyr.* 863-871.

v. 92, 6, and to Tarquin the Proud,

² This is the counsel ascribed to Livy, i. 54. Arist. *Polit.* iii. 13, the Milesian Thrasybou'os, Herod. 16; v. 10, 13.

suspected citizens and by confiscating their property he might maintain himself in power during his own lifetime ; but the chances were always against the establishment of any permanent dynasty, and when at length the tyrants were put down, the feelings of hatred long pent up burst forth with a vehemence which showed plainly the bent of the popular mind. The despots had really done good service. They had made the idea of irresponsible power inexpressibly odious, and they had made the name of the monarch or tyrant the most hateful and contemptible of titles. For them the rule of one man was henceforth associated with the ideas of lawlessness and violence, and with nothing else.

We may thus ascribe to the tyrants the greatest impulse given to Greek democracy. If the despotism of Peisistratos had not followed the legislation of Solon, and made the Athenians realise the full extent of their loss, the reforms which were carried in the days of Kleisthenes might not have been accomplished before the time of Perikles, and a different turn might have been given to the history of the Persian invasion. As it was, a state of feeling was produced eminently unfavorable to the schemes of the Persian monarch. The mind of the people was constantly becoming more and more awake to the need of legal safeguards for all their rights, and more and more averse to that stolid servility which, seeking no further remedy for unbearable oppression, is well satisfied when Tibni dies and Omri reigns. Sparta, with its two hereditary kings, the *ex officio* commanders of her armies, might seem to be an exception. The theory of kings ruling by divine right was there acknowledged down to the days of Agis and Kleomenes ; but it was acknowledged, even in words, only because they had never been suffered to make themselves despots and because the jealousies and contentions of the kings presented an effectual hindrance to common action for the purpose of setting up a tyranny. Still the Spartans were not satisfied with these negative checks. There was fair ground for thinking that the council of twenty-eight old men holding office for life might be rather an instrument in the hands of the kings than an independent assembly ; and this danger was averted by the appointment of a board of annually renewed commissioners.¹ When the kings had been made directly responsible to the Ephors both in peace and in war, the Spartans might well feel that there was no need to interfere with the style and dignity of chiefs who, as lineal descendants of the mighty Herakles, were pre-eminently fitted to be the generals of a state depending for its safety on the perfection of its military discipline.

¹ See p. 31.

The history of the Peisistratidai at Athens, in spite of some perplexing passages in the narrative, sufficiently illustrates the means by which tyrannies were established and put down; and when we find stories more or less resembling the Athenian traditions told of other Greek cities at the same or in earlier times, we may fairly infer that throughout Hellas generally the change was going on which by the substitution of oligarchical for kingly rule, followed by the usurpation of despots who made the sway of one man still more hateful, fostered the growth of the democratic spirit, until it became strong enough to sweep away every obstacle to its free development. But when we examine the tales which profess to relate the deeds of these tyrants and to determine their characters, we find ourselves in that misty twilight which marks the province of oral tradition, and especially of oral tradition warped and colored by strong political passions and prejudices. From the stories related of the Orthagorid Kleisthenes of Sikyon we may be tempted to infer the existence of a bitter feud between that city and Argos; but how far the acts ascribed to the tyrant are his own and how far they may be reflexions of popular antipathies among his Dorian and non-Dorian subjects, we have no means of ascertaining. Nor can we venture to say how far their antagonism may have given color to the singular story which ascribes to Kleisthenes the expulsion of Adrastos from Sikyon. This hero of the Theban wars who is regarded as personally present in Sikyon is represented as exciting the violent hatred of the tyrant who sees in him the tutelary genius of Dorism. Everything must be done to get rid of him; but Kleisthenes seeks in vain to get his plan of direct banishment sanctioned by the Pythian priestess. Her answer is that Adrastos is king of Sikyon while Kleisthenes is a murderer; and the despot, sending to Thebes, invites the hero Melanippos, the enemy of Adrastos, to come and take up his abode in Sikyon. The invitation is accepted, and when the festivals hitherto kept in honor of Adrastos had been transferred to Melanippos, it is concluded that the former has deserted a place which could no longer have any attractions for him.¹ Of Kleisthenes we are further told that he took part in the sacred war against Kirrha, that he gave his daughter in marriage to the Alkmaionid Megakles, and that thus the name of the Sikyonian despot became connected with the reforms carried out at Athens by his grandson Kleisthenes the son of Megakles and Agaristê. But the strange story² which tells us how this marriage was brought about, belongs apparently to the class of legends framed to explain proverbial sayings and only adds

History of the Greek despots.—Kleisthenes of Sikyon.

¹ Herod. v. 67.

² Ib. vi. 126, *et seq.*

to the darkness which has gathered round the last of the Orthagoridai. The accounts given of Kleisthenes serve but to convince us of the fact that lost history cannot be recovered.

The same lesson is brought home to us still more forcibly by the contradictory legends of the despots of Corinth. According to The Bacchiad oligarchs at Corinth. Herodotos the Bacchiad oligarchs of that city had been warned by the Delphian priestess to be on their guard against the lion which should be born of an eagle among the rocks (Petrai); and when Eetion one of the Lapithai and a descendant of Kaineus sent to Delphoi to learn the fortunes of the child of his wife Labda the lame daughter of the Bacchiad Amphion, the answer that he would be the bane of the Corinthian oligarchs determined the latter to slay the babe as soon as it should be born. Ten of them accordingly went to the house of Eetion in the demos of Petrai (the rocks among which the lion should be born), and there received the child from the unsuspecting Labda. But the man who took him from his mother's hands, unnerved by a smile of the babe, handed him on to the next man, and this man to the third until, when all had in turn taken him, the tenth restored him to Labda who, pausing to listen at the door, heard them chiding each other for their faint-heartedness until they agreed to enter the house together and slay the child. Before they went in, the mother had had time to place him in a chest; and the murderers thus foiled went back and informed the Bacchiads that they had done the work for which they had been sent. The child grew up, and as having been saved from his pursuers in the coffer was called Kypselos. Having reached manhood, he became tyrant of Corinth and verified the predictions of the Delphian priestess. Many of the Corinthians, we are told, he drove into exile, many more he deprived of all their goods, and a larger number still he put to death.¹ The story refutes itself. That ten of the Bacchiad chiefs should be faithless to their own body, is simply incredible; nor can it be supposed that they could have the least scruple or difficulty in compassing the death of the child at some later and more convenient season.

Writing at least two centuries later, Aristotle² places Kypselos in the ranks of those tyrants who rose to power by courting the Kypselos and favor of the people, and ascribes to him so firm a Perian-dros. hold on their affections that he never needed or used the protection of a body guard. The two traditions, if they be such, exclude each other. But strange as may be the inconsistencies of these Kypselid legends, the stories told of his son Perian-dros are far more astonishing. Like Aristodemos of the Italian

¹ Herod. v. 92.

² *Polit.* v. 12, 4.

Cumæ, he is a model tyrant, chastising with scorpions where his father had scourged with whips; and a portion at least of the story of Oidipous and Iokastê was by some mythographers imported into the tradition to account for that excess of cruelty which Herodotos traced to the influence of Thrasyboulos tyrant of Miletos. This despot, he tells us,¹ on receiving from Periandros a request for counsel in the general management of his affairs, gave no verbal answer to his messenger, but going into a cornfield cut off and threw away the tallest and richest of the ears of corn. Like Sextus Tarquinius at Gabii, Periandros knew that he should deal with the first men of his city as his friend had dealt with the ears of corn, and the mildness of his previous rule was followed by a savage and merciless oppression. Whatever the father had spared, now fell by the hand of his bloodthirsty son who in one day stripped of their raiment all the women of Corinth, whether free or enslaved, and burnt the dresses that their ghosts might clothe the shivering phantom of his beautiful wife Melissa the daughter of Prokles tyrant of Epidaurus.² Melissa had been murdered by her husband; and on hearing of the crime Prokles sent for her two sons, and having kept them for some time, bade them at parting remember who it was that had slain their mother. On the elder son the words made no impression: in the younger they awakened a feeling of ineradicable hatred for his father, whom he treated with silent contempt. The patience of Periandros was at last exhausted, and the young man was driven from his home, a heavy penalty to be paid to Apollon being denounced on all who might speak to him or give him food or shelter. Undismayed, Lykophron lived as best he might in the porticoes, where his father came to see him when he was half starved. Contrasting his present misery with the luxury which he had forfeited, Periandros prayed him to return home. The only answer of the young man was that his father was debtor to Apollon for the penalty denounced on any who might speak to him. Wearied out with his obstinacy, the tyrant sent his son to Korkyra, and then marching to Epidaurus made Prokles a prisoner. But still yearning for his younger son, he sent his sister who in a speech garnished with a profusion of proverbs worthy of Sancho Panza besought him to return to Corinth. The answer was that he would never look on its walls so long as his father was there; and Periandros in his despair proposed that he should go to Korkyra while his son took his place as despot at Corinth. So great, however, was the dread or the hatred of Periandros that on hearing of the proposed arrangement the Korkyraians at once put Lykophron to death. But

¹ Herod. v. 92-6

² See note 1, page 7.

we have other versions of the story of Melissa and the burnt garments, first in the tale that Periandros at a feast stripped the women of their golden ornaments because he had made a vow to dedicate a statue of gold at Olympia if he won the chariot race, and secondly in the statement that he obtained the gold by exacting for ten years a property tax of ten per cent. In short, from first to last, Periandros lives in a world of marvels and wonders; and the story of Arion¹ carried on the dolphin's back from the Italian seas to Tainaron is a worthy pendant of the legends of Lykophron and Melissa. We need only to note further that this rigid ruler or bloodthirsty murderer is in other legends ranked among the seven wise men of Hellas and that from this point of view he is represented as compelling his subjects to support themselves by honest industry and to make a report of their means of livelihood. The dilemma is clearly not to be solved like the quarrel of the two knights about the shield with the brazen and silver sides.

We can scarcely be said to know more of the Megarian despot Theagenes. Like Kypselos, he is represented as acting the part of a demagogue, and thus obtaining from the people a Theagenes of Megara. bodyguard which he employed after the fashion of Peisistratos at Athens. At best the traditions respecting him are uncertain and obscure; but Megara, as the mother-city of colonies so important as Byzantion in the east and Thapsos in the west, stands forth as a state fully able to hold its ground against Athens which only after a desperate struggle succeeded in wresting the island of Salamis from her dominion. Henceforth, as with Argos, her greatness belonged to the past; and it is possible that the prosperity of these cities may have been promoted by the friendship or alliance of the despots who governed them.² But while the general course of development from oligarchy to despotism, and from despotism through oligarchy to democratic rule is perfectly clear, it is strange that the history of individual despots should have come down to us in forms so fragmentary and distorted with a coloring so unreal and deceptive. That the government of these despots and oligarchs secured to their cities for the time a large amount of wealth and power, although it may have hastened their decay or their downfall, there is no reason to doubt; and with this conclusion we must be content.

¹ Herod. i. 94. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 26, 245.

² Herod. vi. 128.

CHAPTER VII.

THE INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION OF THE GREEKS.

IN the historical ages Athens stands pre-eminent above all the states or cities whose people belonged to the Ionic stock. But before we reach these ages the glory of the Ionic name had in great part passed away. The time had been when all the Ionian tribes regarded as an honorable title the name by which the Greeks generally were known to the barbarian world of the East. But the sons of Javan on the western coasts of Asia Minor and in many of the islands of the Egean sea had fallen under the power of local despots or of the Lydian kings, and with these had been brought under the harsher yoke of the Persian monarch ; and if constant oppression had not, as some said, destroyed the spirit and bravery of the Asiatic Ionians, it had so far weakened their judgment and their powers of combination and action that the Western Ionians, and more especially the Athenians, no longer cared to be distinguished by the name.¹ The Athenians, indeed, still delighted in being known as the men of the violet crown :² but they had probably forgotten that in ages not very far removed from their own they were not the foremost or the greatest of the Ionian race. In this respect the history of Athens bears no distant likeness to that of Rome, the insignificant Latin town which was destined to extend its empire first over Italy and then over the world. But in the times of the despots and the oligarchs the power of Athens was eclipsed by that of many cities which in the days of her own greatness had almost vanished from the political stage.

The prosperity of these cities belongs to that golden age of the Ionic race in which Delos was a centre of attraction not less brilliant than Olympia became for all the Hellenic tribes.

Here in the craggy island where Phoibos was born and to which after his daily wanderings he returned

Pan-Ionic
festival of
Delos.

with ever fresh delight,³ were gathered at the end of each fourth year the noblest and the most beautiful of the children of men. Here, as he looked on the magnificent throng of women⁴ whose loveliness could nowhere be matched and of men unsurpassed for

¹ Herod. i. 143.

² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 228. Arist. *Acharn.* 606.

³ Hymn, *Apoll.* 146.

⁴ Hence the miserable change which before the days of Perikles

had secluded the women of Athens had not yet taken place among the Ionians ; and the Delian festival presents a pleasant contrast to that of Olympia from which women were excluded on pain of death.

splendor of form and strength of nerve, the spectator might well fancy that he gazed on beings whom age and death could never touch. Here on the sacred shore were drawn up the ships which brought thither the riches and the treasures of distant lands, and which had already made the Ionians formidable rivals even of the Phenician mariners.¹ But in the days of Thucydides the glowing descriptions of the blind old bard of Chios were those of a time which had long since passed away. The splendor of the Delian festival had long faded before the growing popularity of the Ephesian games; and when in the days of the brilliant Pan-Athenaic celebrations of their own city the Athenians made some attempt to renew the glories of the Delian feast, the Hymn which spoke of those ancient gatherings was the only document from which Thucydides could obtain any knowledge of that time.²

At no time was the Delian festival more than a Pan-Ionic gathering. But similar restrictions had been common to those festivals which afterwards became Pan-Hellenic, just as the feasts open to the Ionic, Aiolic, or Dorian races respectively had once been strictly local celebrations of cities or villages; nor can we doubt that but for its geographical position Delos would have become the resort of a congress not less general. But the conquests of the Lydian kings first broke up the Ionic society, and their downfall left the Egean waters open to the Phenician fleets of the Persian despots; and thus the especially ennobling influences of the gathering at Delos passed for the time away. The genius of Athens had as yet been very partially called forth, and at Olympia there was neither that free mingling of men and women which is one of the redeeming features of the so-called heroic age, nor that rivalry of art and poetry in which the bard of the Delian hymn expresses so keen an interest.³ Far removed, not only as an inland city but by its position in the western corner of the Peloponnesos, from all danger of attack by Persian fleets, Olympia rose to greatness as the glory of Delos waned. In marked contrast with the shortlived prosperity of Delos, the quadrennial celebration of the Olympic festival was never interrupted until the Christian Theodosius decreed its abolition 800 years after the death of Herodotos and Thucydides.

The so-called Homeric Hymn to Apollon combines with the poem which speaks of the Delian festival another and a later poem in which Apollon is represented as journeying westwards, seeking a home which he cannot find either in Iolkos or the Lelantian plain, in Mykalessos or in

¹ Hymn, *Apoll.* 148-155.

² Thuc. iii. 104.

³ Hymn, *Apoll.* 167-175. The enumeration of the Olympiads begins with the alleged victory of Koroi-

bos, B.C. 776. The era may be convenient as a chronological basis, but it represents no well-attested historical fact.

Thebes. At last he is advised by the nymph of the Telpousian stream to go further still until in one of the glens of Parnassos he should reach the village of Krisa. There beneath the mighty crags which beetled over it, he marked the spot on which Trophonios and Agamedes raised his shrine, and there he slew the mighty dragon, the child of Hêrê, and leaving his body to be scorched by the sun commanded that thenceforth the place should be called Pytho, the ground of the rotting. But though his temple had been reared, priests were lacking to it, and spying a Kretan ship far off on the sea, he hastened towards it and assuming the form of a dolphin brought the vessel without aid of wind or helm or sail along the Lakonian coast by Helos and Tainaron to Samê and Zakynthos, and then through the gulf which severs the Peloponnesos from the northern land to the haven of Krisa with its rich soil and its vine-clothed plain. There coming forth from the sea like a star, he guided them to their future home where their hearts failed them for its rugged nakedness. 'The whole land is bare and desolate,' they said; 'whence shall we get food?' 'Foolish men,' answered the god, 'stretch forth your hands and slay each day the rich offerings, for they shall come to you without stint and sparing, seeing that the sons of men shall hasten hither from all lands to learn my will. Only guard ye my temple well, for if ye deal rightly, no man shall take away your glory; but if ye speak lies and do iniquity, if ye hurt the people who come to my altar and make them go astray, then shall other men rise up in your place and ye shall be thrust out for ever.'¹

But if the Hymn speaks of Pytho or Delphoi as rich in wealth of offerings and as crowded with pilgrims from all lands, it seems to draw out almost with anxious care the contrast between this rock-bound sanctuary and the broad ^{The Nemean and Isthmian games.} Olympian plain with its splendid Stadion and vast racecourse. Here among the glens of Parnassos, the ear of Phoibos, it is said, can never be vexed with the tumult of beasts of burden or the stamping of war steeds; and we are thus prepared to learn that the Pythian festival was designed to call forth rather the rivalry of poets than the competition of the chariot race. It is perhaps only an accident that traditions not less rich in marvels have failed to reach us respecting the origin of the games which the Kleoniaians or the Argives celebrated in the Nemean valley in honor of Zeus, or of the festival which the Corinthians kept at the isthmus in honor of Poseidon. These feasts, unlike those of Pytho and Olympia, were held every two years; but all four were

¹ Hymn, *Apoll.* 182-554. The and Phinehas in their dealings conduct against which they are with the congregation. warned is precisely that of Hophni

instances of local celebrations which, having passed through the stage of tribal popularity, had become centres of attraction to the whole Hellenic world. That the full force of all these influences on minds so sensitive and impressible as those of the Greeks can scarcely be realised under our changed conditions of society, we have already admitted : but powerful as they may have been, they could not even tend to produce the convictions which seem to us the very basis of our political beliefs. However vivid might be the glow of Pan-Hellenic sentiment at Eleusis or Olympia, it left untouched the veneration paid to the city as the first and the final unit of human society, and in no way interfered with the local jealousies and the strifes of towns which challenged for their quarrels the high-sounding title of wars. Even the sacred truce proclaimed before these games might be used to further the interests of one belligerent city against those of another. So far therefore as there was a common national feeling and any national action among Greeks, it was created and kept alive by influences with which their political tendencies were in complete antagonism. Happily the ambition of the Persian kings awakened in some of the Hellenic tribes feelings more generous than the selfish and brutal instincts which arrested the growth of Thrakians, Aitolians and Epeirots ; but it is obvious that the ill-organised resistance made in fact by Athens and Sparta would have been no resistance at all, if they had not been so far educated as to value their national life above the mere independence or wealth of their own cities.

This education even before the days of Peisistratos was of a very complex kind. Imperfect in all its parts, it exhibited the germs of the mighty growth of after ages ; and the great festivals with their tribal or Pan-Hellenic gatherings were without doubt the most powerful instruments in promoting it. These supplied a constant incentive to genius, and the activity awakened in one direction led by a necessary consequence to greater energy in another. The old heroic lays, which told the tales of Ilium and Thebes, of the Argonauts and the Herakleidai, were followed by a school of poetry which unveiled the mind of the poet himself, and lit the torch which has been handed down from Hellas to Italy and from Italy to Germany and England. Along with the poet, the sculptor, and the painter the orator was daily attaining to wider power ; but the eloquence even of Themistokles was necessarily directed first and chiefly to promoting the individual interests of Athens. Art cannot be thus selfish : and the sense of beauty, springing as it did from a thoroughly patient and truthful observation of fact, was combined with the possession of a common trea-

The influence of art on the growth of a Pan-Hellenic sentiment.

sure of poetry, linking together by a national bond tribes which could never be schooled into our notions of political union.

But beyond the province of the poet, the rhetorician, and the statesman, there lay a boundless field in which the Greek first dared to drive his plough; and the very fact that this attempt was made, at the cost of whatever failures or delusions, marked the great chasm between the thought of the Eastern and the Western Aryans, and insured the growth of the science of modern Europe. The Greek found himself the member of a human society with definite duties and a law which both challenged, and commended itself to, his obedience. But if the thought of this law and these duties might set him pondering on the nature and source of his obligations, he was surrounded by objects which carried his mind on to inquiries of a wider compass. He found himself in a world of everlasting change. The day gave place to night; the buds and germs put forth in the spring ripened through summer into fruits which were gathered in autumn tide, and then the earth fell back into the sleep from which it was again roused at the end of winter. By day the sun accomplished his journey in calm or storm across the wide heaven: and by night were seen myriads of lights, some like motionless thrones, others moving in intricate courses. Sometimes living fires might leap from the sky with a deafening roar, or the earth might tremble beneath their feet and swallow man and his works in its yawning jaws. Whence came all these wonderful or terrible things? What was the wind which crashed among the trees, or spoke to the heart with its happy and heavenly music? These and a thousand other questions were all asked again and again, and all in one stage of thought received an adequate answer. The subject was one which admitted of no doubt, and the system thus gradually raised had the solemn sanction of religion. This system was the mythological, and it was marked by this special feature that it never was, and never could be, at a loss for the solution of any difficulty. All things were alive, most things were conscious beings; and all the phenomena of the universe were but the actions of these personal agents. For the Greek the moon 'wandering among the stars of lesser birth' was Asterodia surrounded by the fifty daughters of Endymion, the attendant virgins of Ursula in the Christianised myth. All the movements of the planets were for him fully explained by this unquestioned fact; and with the same unhesitating assurance he would account for all sights or sounds on the earth or in the heavens. The snow-storm was Niobe weeping for her murdered children; ¹ the earthquake was the heaving caused

Growth of physical science.

¹ *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 279.

by the struggles of imprisoned giants who were paying the penalty for rebellion against the lord of heaven. Such a belief as this might seem to give a dangerous scope to utterly capricious agents; but even here the theological explanation was forthcoming. There was a fixed and orderly movement of the sun through the sky, a stately march of the stars across the nightly heavens; but this was because the great Zeus ruled over all, and all were his obedient or unwilling servants. The movements of some were penal; with others they were the expression of gladness and joy. The stars and the clouds were the exulting dancers who clashed their cymbals round the cradle of Zeus;¹ the sun was the hero compelled to go his weary round for the children of men,² or crucified daily on his blazing wheel,³ or condemned to heave to the summit of the heaven the stone which thence rolled down to the abyss.⁴ This system might be developed to any extent; but it amounts to nothing more than the assertion that all phenomena were the voluntary or involuntary acts of individual agents. Its weak point lay in the forming of cosmogonies. It might be easy to say that the great mountains and the mighty sea, that Erebus and Night were all the children of Chaos;⁵ but whence came Chaos? In other words, whence came all things? The weakest attempt to answer this question marked a revolution in thought; and the man who first nerved himself to the effort achieved a task beyond the powers of Babylonian and Egyptian priests with all their wealth of astronomical observations. He began a new work and he set about its accomplishment by the application of a new method. Henceforth the object to be aimed at was a knowledge of things in themselves, and the test of the truth or the falsity of the theory must be the measure in which it explained or disagreed with ascertained facts.⁶ His first steps, and the steps of many who should come after him might be like the painful and uncertain totterings of infants; but the human mind had now begun the search for truth, and the torch thus lit should be handed down from Thales to Aristarchos,⁷ and from Aristarchos to Galileo, Copernicus, and Newton.

¹ Ib. i. 364; ii. 314.

² Ib. ii. 42 *et seq.*

³ Ib. ii. 36.

⁴ Ib. ii. 27.

⁵ Hes. *Theog.* 123.

⁶ It is scarcely necessary to say that Macaulay, when writing his essay on Lord Bacon, never thought of this aspect of early Greek philosophy; but it is unfortunate that for many the true facts should be kept out of sight by the fallacies of a popular writer.

⁷ The protest of Aristarchos

against the intricate system of Eudoxos of Knidos is perhaps the most noteworthy fact in the whole history of ancient philosophy. Archimedes rejected his theory, and is therefore a witness beyond suspicion, when he tells us that that most illustrious man believed the earth to revolve in a circle of which the sun was the immovable centre, the fixed stars being also motionless, and that he explained the apparent annual motion of the sun in the ecliptic by supposing the orbit

Such was the mighty change wrought by the old Hellenic philosophers. But was the Greek himself reaping on a field where others had sown the seed? Was his work confined to the introduction of a philosophy which had grown up elsewhere? Greek traditions of a later day pointed to foreign lands as the sources of their science: and the admission was eagerly welcomed by Egyptian priests who boasted of observations extended over more than 600,000 years, and professed to have unlocked the secrets of heaven to the stargazers of Chaldæa. Thus the Egyptian claimed to be the teacher of the Greek, and the later Greeks made no resistance to the claim. It remains to be seen whether it had any foundation in fact. At the outset we may note that the Egyptians are said to have been taught how to measure the height of the pyramids by Thales¹ who is stated to have gained his knowledge in Egypt. The assertion is not more likely than the statement that he discovered the seasons,² while his speculations on the risings of the Nile would not prove that he had even seen it. Herodotos³ speaks of these risings as caused by the Etesian winds without mentioning Thales; and the phenomenon was one which attracted the attention of Greek observers in general. If the Egyptians had accumulated a stock of astronomical observations indefinitely larger than that of the Greeks, Aristotle makes no mention of Egyptian astronomical treatises, or indeed of anything received from them in writing. It is not pretended that Aristotle or later writers derived their knowledge from Egypt; and the plea that they revealed to Hipparchos the precession of the equinoxes discovered by that illustrious astronomer is a purely gratuitous assumption. If on the other hand the relative precedence of Egyptian and Asiatic astronomers were to be determined by their own assertions, we should have simply to reject a mass of claims and counter claims, all equally incredible and absurd. The debt due from Greece to Egypt was expressly repudiated by Hipparchos; but if taken in their widest meaning, the statements of Greek writers come to no more than this,—that in their time the Egyptians had amassed a store of observations, that they had a calendar scarcely so accurate as the Greek, and that they used sundials for the notation of time. If there is nothing to contradict Herodotos when he says that the Egyptians were careful in recording unusual phenomena,⁴ there are yet the more significant facts that no single Egyptian astronomer is known to us by name and

Source of
Greek philosophy.

¹ Lewis, *Astronomy of the Ancients*, 80.

² *Ib.* 81, 85.

³ *ii.* 20.

⁴ Herod. *ii.* 82. Lewis, *Astr. Anc.* 70.

that even Ptolemy never mentions any observations made by a native Egyptian. The most that can be said for Egypt is that if its science was meagre and its influence weak, it seems to have been at least harmless. It was otherwise with the Babylonians. The great gift of Syrian science was the boon of genethliac astrology. It was the special work of Chaldean astronomers to link the fortunes of man with the position of the planets at his birth, and to draw out into elaborate system a superstition which almost more than any other dwarfs and cripples the human intellect. In Egypt that system was an exotic, not less than at Athens or Rome; but Egyptian vanity, or the weakness of Egyptian intellect, was dazzled by the mysterious art; and forged treatises sprung up in abundance to prove that it was of ancient and indigenous growth.¹

These characteristics of the so-called science whether of Egypt or of Assyria dispose effectually of the assertion that it was the parent of the really historical and always progressive Greek astronomy. science of Greece. While the names of Chaldean, Babylonian, and Egyptian astronomers remain wholly unknown, with Thales begins a long line of philosophers who contributed to the advance of practical astronomy as much as they failed to improve it in theory.

Most of these philosophers here mentioned are to us little more than shadows. They belong to that happy band who, in the words of Euripides, have given their lives to the task of scrutinising the everlasting order of immortal nature, and by their task have been raised far above the murky regions of meanness and vice.² But they lived before the age of a written history; they left behind them no writings of their own, and the outlines of the picture have in each case become faint and blurred. The lifetime of Thales is said to belong in part to the age of Solon, who with him was numbered among the Seven Wise Men; but Solon as a philosopher recedes far into the mists of popular tradition. We shall come across Thales hereafter in the stories of the two last Lydian kings and again in the disastrous revolt of the Ionians against Dareios.³ But what is there said of him proves no more than that his name was associated with ideas of great knowledge and power; and Aristotle who speaks of him as the founder of philosophy cites his opinions from hearsay.⁴ Nor are we justified in saying that he established a definite school, for the series of the so-called Ionic philosophers were independent

¹ See at length Sir G. C. Lewis, *Astron. Anc.* chs. i. and v.

² *Fragm.* (965) 136. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* iv. 25, § 157.

³ As according to the reputed chronology some sixty years inter-

vened between the death of Solon and the Ionian revolt, Thales must have been a mere child in the last days of the Athenian lawgiver.

⁴ Lewes, *Hist. Phil.* i. 7.

thinkers, not much indebted perhaps the one to the others and exhibiting wide differences of belief.

The so-called Ionic school is connected with a more widely extended and more celebrated society, if the tale be true that Pythagoras, the contemporary of Solon and Thales, was a pupil of the Ionian philosopher Anaximandros. Tradition assigned him to the age of Polykrates and of Tarquinius Superbus; but association with these misty personages can scarcely impart an historical character to a being still more shadowy. If we say that of his personal life we have no trustworthy information, we call into question neither his own existence nor that of his school or brotherhood. But the stories told of him must be classed along with the tales which related the exploits of the Messenian Aristomenes. These tales, as we have seen,¹ were seemingly unknown to the historians who lived before the re-establishment of Messênê, and thus are rather the deliberate manufacture of a later age than the genuine growth of popular tradition. The revival of Pythagorean doctrines by the Neoplatonists answers to the political changes wrought by Epameinondas; and the result was that the person of Pythagoras became the centre of a throng of myths which had been applied to many before him and were yet to be applied to many after him. He now became the son of Phoibos, whose glory rested everlastingly on his form. He had a golden thigh, as Indra Savitar had a golden hand,² and the Hyperborean Abaris³ flew to him on a golden arrow. He was present in more than one place at the same time, and his ears were soothed with that music of the spheres to which duller mortals are deaf. Clad in robes of white and crowned with a golden diadem, he became the embodiment of that impassive and eternal calm which the worshipper feels stealing over him as he gazes on the majestic face of Buddha.

This mysterious being was, it is said, the first who called himself a philosopher.⁴ The Peloponnesian Leontios wished to know his art. The sage replied that he had none. He was the lover and the seeker of wisdom, that source of happiness more precious than fine gold, sought by so few among the children of men who have all come down from heaven to sojourn upon this earth for a little while. The answer

¹ See p. 33.

² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 370 : see also references in index s.v. Maimed Deities.

³ *Ib.* ii. 114.

⁴ With Herodotos, iv. 95, Pythagoras is a Sophist, in the primary and obvious meaning of the word,

which denoted a man of large powers of thought and observation honestly used for the discovery of truth, without any of those secondary and selfish considerations which in later times formed part of the connotation of the term.

points to the doctrine of Metempsychosis, which became prominent in the system bearing his name. But his name is for us more closely linked with the sect or brotherhood or secret society of which he is the real or the reputed founder.

The teaching of all these schools was marked by fancies and notions which may seem to us as grotesque as they are strange.

Influence of the philosophical. But the mere propounding of the first guess was the emancipation of the human mind from the yoke of mythological belief; and each successive guess, linked

as it was to the theories which had preceded it, and having further a certain logical justification, had the effect of strengthening the mind and widening the range of its knowledge. The influence of these philosophical schools must be carefully distinguished from those general influences which, culminating in the great games and festivals, wrought so powerfully towards the formation of a Panhellenic, although unhappily not of a really national, sentiment. It was not a popular influence. The schools themselves were liable at any moment to be drawn into deadly collision with the popular belief; and this collision became inevitable when from the condemnation of human conceptions about the gods they went on to deny the functions of the gods in the production of physical phenomena. But they did, nevertheless, a mighty work. They moulded the highest thought of their countrymen; and the teaching of Xenophanes and Anaxagoras had its fruit in the statesmanship of Perikles and in the judicial criticism of the greatest of Greek historians.

CHAPTER VIII.

HELLAS SPORADIKÊ.

At the beginning of the historical age we find the whole of the Peloponnesos with the islands of the Egean sea and the lands

Early Hellenic migrations. lying between the ranges of Pindos and the Corinthian gulf in the possession of tribes claiming the common title of Hellenes. Beyond these limits lay a vast number of Hellenic cities in countries which contained among their inhabitants tribes either non-Hellenic or barbarian. Hellas thus became a land which had no borders, for, inserting itself in wedge-like fashion amongst indifferent or hostile races, it was found on the banks of the Tanais and under the ranges of the Caucasus, on

the mouth of the Rhone and the shores of Spain. At Trapezous and Sinope, in Massalia, Aleria, and the Iberian Zakyntos (Saguntum) were seen societies of men who in language and religion, in manners and in forms of thought, acknowledged some common bond; and the citizen of the Tauric Chersonesos or the Scythian Olbia, although he might know nothing of our modern national life, might yet take pride in the thought that he belonged to a people which stood in the front ranks of mankind. But if the light of Greek civilisation shed some lustre even on these distant settlements, it shone out with full splendor in the magnificent cluster of cities which lined the eastern shores of the Egean sea, and gave to the southern portion of the Italian peninsula its name of Megalê Hellas (Magna Græcia). How these tribes found their way into the lands of the Kephisos and the Eurotas, we cannot say. The Greek saw in the Latin an alien, and in the Persian a barbarian: yet the evidence of language points unmistakably to a time when the ancestors of the Greek, the Roman, the Persian, the Teuton, and the Hindu, all dwelt together as a single people. It shows us further that before this ancient people was separated, they had made no small progress in the decencies of life and in the development of morality and law. We know that they could build houses, tend cattle, plough, sow, and reap, that they had devised for relations of affinity names more precisely accurate than those which we have retained ourselves,—nay, even that they had stored up a vast mass of phrases and maxims, and of popular tales illustrating these maxims and forming now the folk lore of tribes and nations which since the separation have been cut off utterly from all communication with each other. We find the Hindu in the land of the Five Streams; we find the Hellen in the valleys of Phthiotis and the cliffs of Olympos and Parnassos. But we have no means of tracing the stages of the journey which carried these offshoots from the same stock to their eastern and western homes.

When Thucydides was about to trace the course of that disastrous expedition which the sagacity of Perikles had by anticipation emphatically condemned, he thought it right to give a brief sketch of Hellenic colonisation in the island of Sicily. This sketch is drawn with all the confidence of a man who feels sure of the trustworthiness and completeness of his evidence. Nothing can be more precise than his ethnology, nothing more definite than the dates which he assigns to the several Greek settlements in the island. From first to last the narrative is to all appearance thoroughly probable; but the account which he gives of the Trojan war has the same air of likelihood. In the latter case we know the process by which this result has been obtained, and we have no guarantee that his early Sicilian

Greek colonisation in Sicily.

history may not be of precisely the same kind. This at least is certain that for none of it was there any contemporary registration and that most of the events recorded in it took place by his own admission more than four hundred years before his own day.

But whatever may be the precise order in which the Hellenic colonies of Sicily were founded, the great prosperity which for the most part they enjoyed for generations preceding the despotism of Peisistratos at Athens is beyond question. These new communities were established in a land of singular fertility, the resources of which, especially in its eastern and southern portions, had never been systematically drawn out. In a country where the people had thus far obtained from the earth just enough to supply the wants of a life spent in caves, there now sprung up cities secured by their walls against attack from without, and rich in all the varied appliances of Hellenic civilisation. The influence of this civilisation was brought to bear on the natives, the gradual blending of the new comers with these tribes being sufficiently attested by the adoption of a non-Hellenic system of weights and measures. This blending had in turn its effect on the character of the Sikeliot Hellenes, who were left behind in the race by their eastern kinsfolk. But unlike the Greek communities of Asia Minor or Africa, the Sicilian colonies soon acquired sufficient strength to insure the failure of any attacks which might be made upon them by neighboring populations. The Asiatic Hellenes lost their independence under the Lydian kings; they passed under a far heavier yoke when Cyrus entered Sardeis in triumph. The great Eastern despot had in Sicily no more powerful imitator than the Sikel prince Douketios, and the attempts of Douketios ended in nothing.

Great as were the attractions of Sicily, those of the neighboring peninsula were far greater. On either side of the mountain range which forms its backbone magnificent forests rose above valleys of marvellous fertility, and pastures green in the depth of summer sloped down to plains which received the flocks and herds on the approach of winter. The exuberance of this teeming soil in wine, oil, and grain veiled the perils involved in a region of great volcanic activity. This mighty force has in recent ages done much towards changing the face of the land, while many parts have become unhealthy and noxious which in the days of Thucydides had no such evil reputation. When we allow for the effects of these causes and subtract further the results of misgovernment, if not of anarchy, extended over centuries, we may form some idea of the wealth and splendor of southern Italy in the palmy days of Kroton and

Social conditions of the Greek colonists in Sicily.

Greek settlements in Italy.

Sybaris, of Thourioi, Siris, Taras and Metapontion. When, finally, we remember that by the conditions of ancient navigation every ship sailing from Athens or Argos, from Corinth or any other Peloponnesian port, worked its way coastwise to Korkyra and thence crossed the sea to the Iapygian or Sallentine cape, we might well suppose that every Hellenic colony in southern Italy, with the exception perhaps of Brentesion (Brundisium) which lay to the north-west of the cape, would have been established before any attempts were made to occupy the coasts of Sicily. According to the traditional chronology the course of Hellenic colonisation reversed this natural order, and the chief Sicilian cities had been established for years when at length Sybaris was founded at the mouth of the river of the same name on a line almost due west of the Iapygian promontory. Ten years later, it is said, an Achaian named Myskellos led a colony to Kroton, about forty miles to the south of Sybaris on the mouth of the Aisaros. But these cities in their turn sent out colonists to the western coasts of the peninsula. The dates assigned to these settlements claim for them a comparatively modest antiquity; but it is clear that the tales which represented a vast number of the Hellenic colonies in Italy as founded by the heroes returning from Troy were not contented with these humble limits, while they also go far to prove that the later stories are not more trustworthy than the earlier.

Whether planted earlier or later than the Sicilian settlements, these Italian colonies soon attained to a far greater prosperity. Their dominion extended from sea to sea; but their predominance was secured much less by force than by the influence of that civilisation which had been moulded by the poetry, the worship, the tribal and in a certain sense national festivals, of the mother country. How long the two great cities of Sybaris and Kroton had flourished before the friendly feeling between them gave way to furious hatred, it is impossible to say; but the story goes that, in the same year which witnessed the expulsion of the Peisistratidai from Athens, five hundred of the wealthier citizens of Sybaris fled for refuge to Kroton from the oppression of the tyrant Telys.¹ Fear of a power, which at this time, it would seem, far surpassed that of Athens, had almost impelled the Krotoniates to surrender the fugitives, when Pythagoras came forward to denounce the impiety. On hearing that his demand for the exiles had been rejected, Telys advanced southwards, and a battle was fought in which 100,000 Krotoniates under the athlete Milon utterly routed 300,000 Sybarites. Hastening onwards after a victory

¹ Herod. v. 44.

pressed without mercy, the conquerors stormed Sybaris, scattered its people, and destroyed its power. Such as escaped fled to Laos and Skidros. The result was disastrous not only for Sybaris, but for the Italian Hellenes generally. Whether the destruction of the Pythagorean order should be reckoned among the evils thus caused, it would perhaps be rash to say.

The effect of the ruin of Sybaris on the Greek world generally was a matter of greater moment. Thus far the Ionians had been the predominant race in Hellas. The prosperity of Sybaris and Kroton belonged to the golden age of the great Panionic festival at Delos. Among the representatives of the several Ionic tribes there assembled there is nothing to lead us to suppose that the Athenians filled the foremost place, and Sparta was as yet scarcely sensible of the position which the conditions of the Greek world were tending to secure to her. In the west the great Italian colonies had not merely planted themselves firmly on the coast, but were extending their influence and their power even over the inland regions of the peninsula. The defeat of Kroisos and the fall of Sybaris went far towards changing the face of things. The Asiatic Greeks became subjects of the Persian despot. The Italian Greeks became less and less able to extend their conquests, or even to maintain their ground against the pressure of native tribes; and henceforth the title of Megalê Hellas, the Magna Græcia of the Latins, becomes confined to a strip of land running along the coast.

We might have supposed that the course followed by the navigation of the ancient world would have determined chronologically the order in which the several settlements would be founded. We have already seen that the popular traditions respecting the Hellenic cities of Italy and Sicily reverse this order, and the same inversion marks the traditions of the colonies scattered along the Eastern shores of the Ionian sea. We might have supposed that the point from which all ships sailing from the Peloponnesos struck off across the open water to the Italian peninsula would have been chosen as the spot for the earliest settlement in this direction; but Korkyra¹ is said to have been colonised about the same time as Syracuse, and therefore some years later than the Sicilian Naxos. The stern and rugged mountain country which on the main land rises to the magnificent Akrokeraunian range furnished, it is true, no great attraction for Hellenic colonists; but Korkyra with its broad plains and fertile valleys might have satisfied emigrants who had not been accustomed to the rich soil of Messênê. Severed from

Effects of
the destruc-
tion of
Sybaris.

The
Corinthian
colony of
Korkyra.

¹ The name is so given on the coins of the colony.

the main land by a strait at its northern end scarcely wider than that of Euripos, it still had the advantage of an insular position against attack from without, while its moderate size, not exceeding forty miles in length by half that distance in width, involved none of the difficulties and dangers of settlement on a coast line with barbarous and perhaps hostile tribes in the rear. Nowhere rising to a greater height than 3,000 feet, the highlands of the northern end, which give to the island its modern name of Koruphoi (Corfu), subside into a broken and plain country, now covered in great part with olive woods planted under Venetian rule, but capable of yielding everywhere abundant harvests of grain and wine. Here, it might be thought that a colony would have grown up which we might class among the most peaceful of Hellenic communities: here in fact grew up perhaps the most turbulent, if not the most ferocious, of Greek societies. Alliance with Athens did little to soften the violence of their passions; and the rapid developement of the feud between the Korkyraian colony and the mother city of Corinth may be attested by the tradition that the first naval battle of the Greeks was fought by the fleets of these two cities. We have no means of ascertaining the cause of this implacable enmity against the mother city of which the Corinthians bitterly complained. It is more than likely that it had its origin in jealousies of trade. The Korkyraians had acquired on the opposite side of the strait a strip of land which enabled them to anticipate the Corinthians in traffic with the Epeirotic tribes and to protect their own property within strong fortifications; and it is not unlikely that this fact may have determined the Corinthians to found their colony of Ambrakia near the mouth of the Arachthos which after a due southward course runs into the Ambrakian gulf on its northern shore.

But in spite of their jealousies joint colonists from Corinth and Korkyra founded the settlement of Anaktorion at the southern entrance of the Ambrakian gulf, on the waters where the fortunes of the Roman world were decided by the victory of Octavianus at Aktion (Actium). Another joint colony was founded at Leukas, now Santa Maura, which became an island when, in the fourth century B.C., the Leukadians cut through the narrow isthmus between the city and the main land. The slaughter of the Akarnanian settlers who, it is said, had invited the new comers may account for the hatred with which the neighboring tribes regarded the colonies of Ambrakia, Anaktorion, and Leukas. The joint foundation of the two northernmost Greek settlements on the Epeirotic coast had more important results in the later history of Greece. These two Korkyraian colonies were founded the one at Apollonia on the mouth

Joint colonies of the Corinthians and Korkyraians.

of the Aôos about sixty miles north of Korkyra, the other at Epidamnos, about the same distance still further north, with the Corinthian Phalios as Oikistes. Corinth had thus a technical right of interference in their affairs, and the exercise of this right was one of the alleged causes for the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.

Between the coast extending from Leukas to Bouthroton (opposite the northernmost promontory of Korkyra) and the mountain range of Pindos lay a number of tribes, some of which were regarded as belonging in some sort to the Hellenic stock, while others were looked upon as mere barbarians. Socially and morally they stood probably on much the same level. The physical features of the country, broken up throughout by hills and mountains with mere glens or gaps but no broad valleys or plains between them, made the growth of cities an impossibility; and even the village communities scattered over this wild region were linked together, if joined at all, by the slenderest of bonds. Of these tribes the most reputable were the Akarnanians, who, though they preyed upon each other, met together near the Amphilocheian Argos to settle their disputes, and, though they tended their flocks with arms in their hands, lacked the deep cunning and treachery which gave to their brutal Aitolian neighbors a decided advantage over them.

Of the tribes which lay to the north of the Arkananian territory we need say but little. By the southern Greeks they were included under the common term Epeirotai, or people of the main land: among themselves they were distinguished as Chaonians, Thesprotians, Molossians, or by other names.

Beyond these Epeirotic tribes stretched to the north and the east, from the Hadriatic to the Euxine seas, a vast region inhabited by races more or less nearly akin to each other, and all perhaps having some affinity with the ruder Hellenic clans. Of these tribes the most prominent are the Illyrians, Makedonians, and Thrakians, each of these being subdivided into several subordinate tribes, and all exhibiting characteristics common to the inhabitants of countries whose physical features present an effectual barrier to political union and the life of cities. By far the larger portion of this enormous region is occupied by mountains often savage in their ruggedness and almost everywhere presenting impassable barriers to the passage of armies. At best therefore we find the inhabitants dwelling in village communities; and of some we can scarcely speak as having attained to any notions of society whatever. Of these tribes many were, as they are still, mere robbers. Some made a trade of selling their

children for exportation : many more were ready to hire themselves out as mercenaries and were thus employed in maintaining the power of the most hateful of Greek despots. The more savage Illyrian and Thracian clans tattooed their bodies and retained in the historical ages that practice of human sacrifices which in Hellas belonged to a comparatively remote past. Without power of combination in time of peace, they followed in war the fashion which sends forth mountaineers like a torrent over the land and then draws them back again whether to reap the harvest or to feast and sleep through winter. Like the warfare of the Scottish Highlanders, their tactics were confined to a wild and impetuous rush upon the enemy. If this failed they could only retreat as hastily as they had advanced. More fortunate in their soil and in the possession of comparatively extensive plains watered by the Erigon, the Haliakmon, and the Axios, the Makedonians, although in the time of Herodotos they had not yet extended their conquests to the sea, were still far in advance of their neighbors.

A few generations after the time of Herodotos the Makedonians were to be lords of Hellas and almost of the world ; but in his own day they were not the most formidable of the tribes to the north of the Kambounian hills. In his belief¹ ^{Thrakians.} the Thrakians might with even moderate powers of combination carry everything before them ; but there was no fear of such united action on the part of these tattooed savages whose roving and desultory warfare was only once interrupted by the abortive expedition of the Odrysian Sitalkes.² The Thrakian was a mere ruffian who bought his wives, allowed his children to herd together like beasts, and then sold them into slavery. With these habits was combined that fierce periodical excitement which, like the most savage of African or Polynesian tribes of our own day, they were pleased to call religious worship. The attraction of the frenzied rites which were thus celebrated among the mountains whether on the European or the Asiatic side of the Propontis was unhappily not confined to themselves. The madness spread westwards and southwards, and gave rise to one of the most disgraceful phases of Greek social life.

The coast line of the regions occupied by these savages was dotted with Hellenic settlements ; but Greek civilisation brought with it no charm for Thrakian tribes. Foremost in the enterprise was, it is said, the Euboian city which ^{Greek settle-} had founded the earliest colony in Sicily, and the ^{ments in} ^{Thrace.} whole of the country south of a line drawn between Thermê and

¹ Herod. v. 3. Thucydides, ii. 98, Scythians.
7, asserts that this remark would ² Thuc. ii. 96.
apply even more strongly to the

Stageiros received the name of Chalkidike in attestation of her activity. This territory of Chalkidike is cut off from the country to the north by a range of mountains sloping down to two of the three peninsulas which run out into the sea between the Thermaic and the Strymonic gulfs. On the easternmost of these projections called Aktê the magnificent mass of Athos, casting its shadow as far as the island of Lemnos, rises sheer from the coast to a height exceeding six thousand feet, the ridge connecting it with the mountains at the base being about half that height. The intermediate peninsula, though thickly wooded like that of Aktê, still has more of open ground; and on these spaces rose among other Chalkidian cities the towns of Torônê near the end of the peninsula and of Olynthos at the head of the Toronaic gulf. At the neck of the third or Pallenian peninsula, whose earlier name of Phlegra points to ancient volcanic action, stood the Corinthian city of Potidaia, while the peninsula itself contained Skiônê, Mendê, Sanê, and other towns.

Further yet to the east we reach the Thracian Chersonesos which, starting from a base scarcely more than four miles in width, stretches to the southwest for fifty miles from the Megarian colonies on the Propontis. long wall near the Milesian colony of Kardia to Elaious at the entrance of the Hellespontos.¹ On the European side of this strait and of the Propontis lay the Aiolic Sestos, and the Megarian settlements of Selymbria and of Byzantion, the future home of Roman emperors and Turkish sultans. The fact that a city like Megara could thus, in the century (it is said) preceding the lifetime of Solon, lay its hands on the key to the Euxine and the Egean, brings before us a picture in strange contrast with the familiar features of later Athenian history. In the extension of the Hellenic race along the Makedonian and Thracian coasts or along the shores of Epeiros, Illyrikon, and Sicily, such cities as Chalkis, Eretria, and Megara seem by comparison everywhere, Athens nowhere. We might almost say that these states, which had thus reached their maturity before Athens had passed under the sway of the Peisistratidai, exhausted themselves in the multiplication of isolated units, while the strength of Athens was reserved for the conflict which determined the future course of European history.

The opening of Egypt to Greek trade by Psammitichos² gave that impulse to Hellenic colonisation in Africa which raised up to the east of the great Syrtis a city not unworthy to be the rival of Carthage. Placed on a mountain terrace nearly two thousand feet in height and com-

¹ Herod. v. 33.

² Herod. ii. 178.

manding from a distance of ten miles a vast sweep of the sea, Kyrênê had in the loftier hills which rose behind it a source of wealth more precious than the richness of the most fertile soil. With water even poor soils will yield marvellously under an African sun; and that boon was abundantly secured to Kyrênê by the constant vapors and rains condensed and precipitated by these beneficent mountains. With this moisture the plains near the sea yielded lavish harvests of grain, while the lower hills and valleys furnished never-failing pasture. Nay, with the differences of climate between the higher and the lower lands, the fruits were ripening and harvest was going on all the year round; and lastly in the Silphium, whose leaves nourished cattle while the stalk furnished food for men and the root yielded a juice highly valued in all parts of Hellas, Kyrênê had a special source of wealth which, in spite of civil dissensions and tumults, carried the colony to a height of prosperity reached by no other African city except Carthage.

Sources of the prosperity of Kyrênê.

Thus in that fertile region which, lying between the island of Platea in the east to the settlement of Hesperides (Bengazi) in the west, stretched from the coast to the southern mountain ranges,¹ Greek colonists had a field for enterprise which, if persistent, could not fail to be richly rewarded; and commercially, it must be admitted that these colonies were successful.

Conflicts between the Carthaginians and the Greeks.

The lands which lay to the west of Hesperides were manifestly regarded by Carthage as ground over which she could suffer no dominion to be established but her own. She had now been compelled to put down Hellenic incroachments in Africa. The same task awaited her in Sicily, calling for greater efforts on her part and involving a risk of more serious failure. Her first conflict in that battle-ground of opposing races was with the Spartan Dorieus who had attempted to found a settlement on the banks of the Kinyps. The history of Dorieus belongs to a class of traditions which would seem strange if ascribed to any Greek city but Sparta. But for the officious meddling of the ephors and the senate² Dorieus would have been king instead of the mad Kleomenes. Thus deprived of his inheritance, he resolved to quit Sparta. With all the high spirit of his younger brother the illustrious Leonidas, he sailed to Libya without asking, it is said, the advice of the Delphian god; and this carelessness was probably regarded as fully explaining his expulsion by the Libyan tribes in alliance with Carthage. Thus driven out, he returned to Sparta, and had he chosen to remain there he would have

Career of Dorieus in Africa and Sicily.

¹ The land to the south of these mountains is desert.

² Herod. v. 41.

been the general in command at Thermopylai. But at Sparta he could not rest ; and he departed, this time after consulting the god at Delphoi, to seek a new home in Sicily. He landed in that island to find himself opposed not only by the people of Egesta but by the full force of the Carthaginians ; and in the battle which ensued Dorieus was slain with all the other leaders of the colony except Euryleon who with the remnant of the army seized the Selinountian settlement of Minoa, about twenty miles to the west of Akragas, and having rid the city of its tyrant Peithagoras made himself despot in his stead. His subjects were not altogether satisfied with this measure of freedom, for after a while they put him to death at the very altar of Zeus Agoraios.

But the rivalry of Carthage had little effect in repressing those innate vices of the Greek character which seemed to gain strength in new soil. The Greek colonies in Sicily exhibit generally the same transitions from oligarchical government to tyranny which mark the history of the parent country during the generations preceding the Persian wars. The great power and prosperity attained by many of these Greek cities in Sicily, in spite of everlasting feuds and frequent revolutions, furnish sufficient evidence of the extraordinary advantages which they enjoyed in the soil, the climate, and the physical resources of the country. Among the despots who rose to power in these cities the most prominent was Gelon, despot of Syracuse, and virtually master of all Sicily east of a line drawn from the borders of Messéné to those of Akragas.

When the aid of this tyrant was sought against Xerxes by the envoys from Athens and Sparta, Gelon in his reply expressed, it is said, his readiness to furnish them with a force such as no other Greek state was able to raise, and with a wealth of supplies wholly beyond the resources of all the Greek cities put together. But while in return for this aid he insisted on being recognised as supreme commander of the Greek confederation, he took care, we are told, to rebuke them for the selfishness which now made them his suppliants, when in his time of need they had refused to help him in his efforts to avenge the death of Dorieus and drive the Carthaginians out of Sicily.¹ If these words point to historical facts, these facts fully explain the real reason for that refusal of aid to the continental Greeks which the tradition of the latter ascribed to their own rejection of his claim to the Hegemony. The efforts of Gelon had succeeded in pushing the Carthaginians back to the west of a line drawn between the Greek cities of Himera on the northern

Foundation of the Gelonian dynasty of Syracuse.

Incroachments of Gelon on Carthaginian ground. 481 B.C.

¹ Herod. vii. 158. Diod. xi. 20.

and Selinous on the southwestern coast of the island ; but he had not succeeded in detaching these cities from their friendship for or their alliance with Carthage, a friendship shared further by the towns of Messêné and Rhegion.¹ Within this line the Carthaginians retained only the settlements of Motyê, Panormos, and Soloeis (Soluntum) ; and although their policy thus far had been to avoid all wars (for their contest with Dorieus was the result of open aggression on his part), the rapid aggrandisement of Gelon made them fear that without a vigorous effort they would lose their hold even on this western corner of the island. The way was opened for such an effort by those internal feuds among Greeks which raised an insuperable barrier to the growth of a Greek nation. Combination on the part of the Greek settlers would have made them absolute masters of all Sicily. Sustained and systematic action would have secured the same result for the Carthaginians. Both alike failed in the conditions indispensable for permanent ascendancy, and the end was the absorption of both in the dominion of imperial Rome.²

We shall find that but little trust can be placed in the minute details of the battles fought during the Persian war at Thermopylai, Salamis, Plataiai, or Mykalê. We are even less justified in giving credit to the narrative of the battle The battle of Himera. 480 B.C. which, fought, it is said, on the very day of the fight at Salamis, left Gelon by the utter defeat of Hamilkar master, for the time, of all Sicily. Diodoros, who like Herodotos raised the Carthaginian army to 300,000, kills off half that number on the field of Himera where, seventy years later, the grandson of Hamilkar sacrificed three thousand Hellenic prisoners,³ while he ascribes the result of the conflict to a stratagem suggested to Gelon by some intercepted letters from the Selinountians to the Carthaginian leader. The incident is in no way unlikely ; but the ground seems to be less firm when we reach the tale which relates the death of Hamilkar. This ill-fated chief, it is said, was never seen again after the fight. The whole field was searched with minute care by the order of Gelon, but his body could not be found ; and Herodotos was inclined to put faith in an alleged Carthaginian tradition that during the battle Hamilkar stood by a huge altar on which he was sacrificing whole beasts as victims, and that on seeing the day going against him he leaped into the consuming fires. The historian adds that his countrymen raised monuments to his memory in all their colonies as well as in Carthage itself and worshipped him as a god.⁴ If this be true, it is of itself con-

¹ Herod. vii. 165. Diod. xi. 23.

³ Herod. vii. 165. Diod. xi. 20.

² Ihne, *History of Rome*, ii. 23.

⁴ Herod. vii. 167.

clusive evidence that his defeat was not so overwhelming as his enemies would have it and that on the day of battle the general did something more than roast flesh to appease the hunger of Moloch. It was not the habit of Carthaginians to venerate men who brought their country to the verge of ruin. The tradition is throughout disfigured by the vanity of the Sicilian Greeks. As in one version of the eastern story Xerxes was suffered to reach the Asiatic shore with only one solitary boat, so with Diodoros a single vessel reaches Carthage with the miserable remnant of the army which Hamilkar had conveyed to Sicily in more than two thousand ships. There is, in fact, no limit to their humiliation. Carthaginian envoys fall in tears at the feet of Gelon, praying him in the name of humanity to have mercy upon them. His wife Damaretê plays the part of queen Philippa in the scene between Edward III. and the burgesses of Calais; and the Carthaginians are pardoned on condition of paying 2,000 talents as the cost of the war and building two temples in which the treaty of peace might be preserved. Like men reprieved from a sentence of death, they accept these terms, with a gratitude which finds expression in the gift to Damaretê of a golden crown 200 talents in weight. To complete the fiction, we are told that Gelon was thus indulgent to the enemies whom he had crushed, because he was anxious to take part in the continental war against Xerxes; that, before he could set sail, the tidings came of the victory of Salamis and the retreat of the tyrant; that on receiving the news, he summoned the citizens to appear armed in the assembly, and going to that assembly not only without arms but even without an upper garment, entered into an elaborate review of his acts and of the policy by which they had been dictated. No Greek despot had ever thus thrown himself on the good faith of his people. The Syracusans knew how to appreciate such confidence, and hailed the tyrant by acclamation as their benefactor, their saviour, and their king.¹ In striking contrast with this extravagant romance the lyric poet, writing at a time not many years after the event, prays that Zeus may put off as long as possible the conflict then impending with the Carthaginians, which he feels must be a struggle for life or death.²

If the defeated Hamilkar was worshipped by his countrymen, the victorious Gelon deserved at least equal honors. He too was venerated as a hero, when a few months after his great triumph he died of dropsy. He had desired that his power should be shared between his two brothers,

Diod. xi. 21-26. It is clear that this story must have been invented after the time of Herodotos, according to whom, vii. 164, the Sicilian

tradition is very modest, and therefore probably near to the truth.

² Pind. *Nem.* ix. 67. Ihne, *History of Rome*, ii. 23.

Hieron whom he had placed at Gela succeeding to the tyranny, while Polyzelos was to have the military command. The arrangement was not to Hieron's mind. Polyzelos took refuge, it is said, with Theron of Akragas, who by refusing to surrender him drew down on himself the wrath of Hieron. In short, after the death of Gelon the history of the Greek cities in Sicily falls back into the old round of faction, revolution, and war. Between Gelon and Theron of Akragas there had been a firm friendship: between Hieron and Thrasydaios the son of Theron there was a war in which the former paid a high price for his victory. The death of Hieron a few years later was followed ^{467 B.C.} by further troubles. His brother Thrasyboulos had a rival, it is said, in his nephew the son of Gelon. He met and averted the danger by corrupting the boy, and then gave full play to his vindictive and merciless nature.¹ The result was a revolt of his subjects who besieged him in Ortygia, and, if we are to believe the account of Diodoros, compelled him to yield up his power. Eighteen years² only had passed since the foundation of the Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse when Thrasyboulos departed and took up his abode among the Epizephyrian Lokrians, who dealt with him more mercifully than the Megarians had dealt with Thrasydaios. We have now to see how and with what results, on soil not much more promising at the first, the seeds of law, order, and freedom were sown at Athens.

CHAPTER IX.

EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ATHENS.

WE have already seen that the constitutions of Athens and Sparta furnish abundant evidence of their common origin from the primitive Aryan household with its absolute subjection to the father of the family, or, in other words, to the priest who alone could offer the necessary sacrifices to his deified ancestors. But although the theory of this ancient family life remained intact in both, the differences in the growth of these two states were wide indeed. If we may accept as substantially true and fair the picture which Perikles in his great Funeral Oration³ draws of the political and

Contrast
between
Sparta and
Athens as
drawn by
Perikles.

¹ Arist. *Polit.* v. 10, 31.

² *Ib.* v. 12, 6.

³ Thuc. ii. 35-46.

social condition of Athens in his own day, we shall find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that distinctions of time and place go for little indeed. All the special characteristics of English polity—its freedom of speech, the right of the people to govern themselves, the supremacy of the ordinary courts of law over all functionaries without exception, the practical restriction of state interference to the protection of person and property, the free play given to the tastes, fancies, prejudices, and caprices of individual citizens—may be seen in equal development in the polity of Athens.

But, like the constitution of England, the full development of Athenian democracy was the work of ages. It was no makeshift hastily adopted and modified at haphazard after the fashion of some European nations who expel kings and queens and then sit down to meditate on the forms of government which may best suit their interests or their fancies. Like the English constitution, it was the fruit of long and arduous struggles, slowly ripened as the people awoke more and more to that consciousness of law and order which can be fully awakened only among men who feel that the law which they obey is their own law and that they obey it because it aims more and more at being in accordance with a justice and righteousness higher than that of man.¹ Like the constitution of England at once in its coherence and in its powers of adaptation to change of circumstances, it carries us back in the history of its growth to times of which we must candidly confess that we know very little; and we must on many matters be content either to suspend our judgment or to reason from signs which, as in the early history of English polity, seem to point to sufficiently probable conclusions.

The undoubted existence down to the time of Kleisthenes (a period preceding by only a few years the battle of Marathon) of a subdivision by clans and houses takes us back, as we have already seen, almost to the earliest form of human society. Whatever may have been the origin and meaning of the names which have been variously assigned to the Athenian tribes, the evidence already reviewed² seems to leave it certain that the point of starting was from the house or family upwards, and not from the larger division downwards. We have here in fact the same growth as that of the English families into tithings, hundreds, and shires,—a division which preceded and survived the several kingdoms into which the country was from time to time parcelled out.³ Nor can we question that the principle underlying this grouping was one of blood and of religion, which could take no reckoning of those who were not sprung from

¹ Soph. *Oid. Tyr.* 864.

² Chapter ii.

³ Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, vol. i. ch. iii. § 2.

the same stock. Hence if in later times there were superadded to the old clan names a further political grouping which took in the whole country territorially, still this grouping would not necessarily embrace all its inhabitants. All who could not share in the gentile sacrifices would be shut out; and the influx of strangers and foreigners would tend to swell a population to which the existing social order allowed no political rights. It was the growth of such a population which, owing to conflicts between the ruling classes, determined the form of Athenian democracy.

In the Trittys and Naukraria we have a classification which clearly follows a downward course. The tribe must have been organised before it could be divided into three portions, and the twelve Trittyses obtained for the four tribes The Trittyses and Naukrariai. were then divided each into four Naukrariai, forty-eight in all. Solon, it is said, laid on each of these Naukrariai the charge of providing one ship for the public service; and hence it has been inferred that the classification itself was devised by him and was thus designated from its reference to the navy. But if Herodotos be right in saying that Kylon was removed from sanctuary by the Prytaneis, or presidents, of the Naukraroi, it would follow that the division existed before the days of Solon and that the Naukraroi were simply the chief householders charged with the levying and administration of the taxes in each district.¹

We are still on doubtful ground when we come to the story of the settlement of Athens as related by Thucydides.² Of the Theseus who is said to have made Athens the seat of a central government which superseded the independent action of a set of voluntarily confederated boroughs The union of the Attic Demoi. or cities, our knowledge comes only from the stories which tell us of his marvellous childhood, of the discovery of his father's weapons under the great stone, of his battle with the Minotauros and his stealing of Helen, the fatal sister of the Dioskouroi. Still, although we may not regard the narrative as history, we are not free to say that no such change ever took place. It is far more likely that it did. The mere classification into Trittyses and Naukrariai is of itself proof that the need was felt of political divisions which should run counter to the religious and exclusive constitution of the houses and clans; and this feeling is brought out still more prominently in the accounts of the political changes

¹ The word Naukraros would thus be only another form of Nauklêros in the sense of a household-er, as *vav'lov* denoted the rent of a house, and as the Nautodikai were

the officers charged with the duty of trying cases of unlawful admission into the Phratries.

² ii. 15.

attributed to Kleisthenes. There could have been no reason for substituting local Demoi for the existing tribes, if the latter could have been made as available for the purposes of the statesman.

The consolidation of the Attic Demoi into a single state would thus answer to the gradual absorption of the several English kingdoms under the sovereignty of the chiefs of Wessex. Right of intermarriage. In the one case as in the other the task was not accomplished in a day, nor without violent struggles. The prohibition of intermarriage which is said to have existed among some of the Attic Demoi would point to the jealousy and animosity of communities originally independent; nor must we leave out of sight such legends as the story of the Athenian Tellos who falls in a battle between the men of Eleusis and of Athens¹ and, more particularly, the evidence of poems like the Hymn to Dêmêtêr in which Eleusis is clearly still an independent state and in which the Athenians take no part in the mysteries of the Great Mother. The strength of this cantonal feeling is further shown in the eagerness with which the Athenians returned to their country life after the Persian invasion and in the reluctance with which they abandoned their homes to take up their quarters within the city at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.²

But when we come to the reforms of Theseus, we find, in place of four tribes whose names seem to have been by no means permanent, a new division under the three titles of Eupatridai, Geomoroi, and Demiourgoi,—in other words, The Eupatridai, Geomoroi, and Demiourgoi. the nobles, the yeomen, and the mechanics.³ Whatever else may be denoted by this classification, it represents with sufficient exactness the social order which prevailed for a long time both at Athens and at Rome, and which gave to certain families a preponderance over all other members of the state. Whatever may have been their relation to the tribes, we may fairly accept the fact that the substantial power in the state was in the hands of the Eupatridai. The days of kings had long been ended. The devotion of Kodros, it is said, had made the title too sacred to be borne by any after him, as the tyranny of Tarquin had made it too horrible to be tolerated at Rome. After him there were, we are told, archons for life, then for ten years, and then the office was put into commission, and a complicated constitution grew up, for which in the earlier stages we have no contemporary history, and to which writers who lived after the

¹ Herod. i. 30.

² Thuc. ii. 16.

³ Dionysios, ii. 8, divides the Athenians into Eupatridai and Agroikoi or dependent cultivators, answering to the Latin patricians

and clients. But he is clearly reasoning from Latin to Greek forms; and the looseness of his argument is sufficiently shown from his random guesses as to the meaning of the Latin Patres.

changes introduced by Aristides, Perikles, and Ephialtes, applied, whenever it seemed necessary, the convenient method of conjecture.

But every confederation implies a council; and Aryan history generally furnishes ample evidence that the several combinations of families into a tribe and of tribes into a city would result in a subordination of the councils representing the clans and houses to the great council of the state.

The Council of Areiopagos.

This council at Athens was that of Areiopagos or the hill of Ares, known at first simply as Boulé, the Council, which with the magistrates included in it inherited the large and undefined powers belonging of right first to the master of the family, then to the chief of the clan, and lastly to the king. Of these powers the most sacred, if not the most important to the state, was that of the priesthood. As the name and person of the father and the king were most closely associated with the sacerdotal idea, so the kingly title both at Athens and Rome was assigned to the officer charged with the guardianship and direction of the state religion; and thus the Roman Rex Sacrorum answered to the Athenian Archon Basileus whose jurisdiction embraced cases of homicide and religious offences. Two other archons, belonging to the college of nine, who are said to have entered on their functions with Kreon, bore distinctive titles,—the first, who was also head of the college, being the Archon Eponymos, as giving his name to the year, or simply the Archon, and the Archon Polemarchos. Of these two the former settled all disputes arising from the relations of the family, the gens, and the phratria, while the latter dealt with all quarrels between citizens and non-citizens, and had the command of the army in war. All other matters not restricted to these were under the cognisance of the remaining six archons who were known as Thesmothetai, a title, common doubtless to all the nine, which may be interpreted by the Homeric description of the judges who receive and maintain the laws for Zeus.¹ These officers at the end of their year of office became, on passing the necessary test, permanent members of the great council of the Areiopagos.

The whole course of Athenian history seems to attest the gradual restriction of the powers of this body, which continued to retain its jurisdiction in cases of homicide long after it had been deprived of its legislative and administrative functions. The basis of its power was distinctly religious, and the power itself was necessarily exercised inflexibly. It was not competent for the Areiopagos to draw distinctions

The Drakonian legislation.

¹ *Il.* i. 239.

between the guilt of one homicide and that of another. There could be but one doom for all who were judged guilty of having shed blood, whether they might plead accident by way of excuse, or urge provocation by way of palliating the offence. The hardness of the Drakonian laws has passed into a proverb; but if we give credit to the tradition, it was a movement in the way of lenity, not of severity, when Drakon made the distinctions demanded by equity, and ordained that the court of the Ephetai, fifty-one in number, should sit in different places to adjudicate in different cases of homicide according to their complexion or to the plea urged by the criminal. If he alleged accident, he was to be tried at the Palladion; if he pleaded provocation, he was to be arraigned at the Delphinion or consecrated ground of Apollon and Artemis. The religious scruples which regarded one spot as profaned by acts which might be lawfully done in another are exhibited still more clearly in the rules which prescribe that a person banished for homicide and charged with a second offence of the like sort should take his trial at a place called Phreattys in a boat hauled close in on the shore, while the animism of the earliest forms of thought which attribute life to all sensible objects¹ is seen in the jurisdiction of the four Phylo-basileis or tribe-kings who meet in the Prytaneion to try inanimate objects which have caused the death of a human being, and if found guilty, to cast them solemnly beyond the borders of the land.

That the rule of the Eupatridai exercised through this council and the College of Archons would be both harsh and irksome, is no more than what we might expect; and it was as likely that efforts to control or change it might come from those who wished to set up a despotism as from those who wished to introduce a democracy. Of the attempt of Kylon to seize the Akropolis, as it is said, for the former purpose, the chief importance lies in the use made of it by the Spartans to counteract the influence of Perikles before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,² as it had been employed in like sort against Kleisthenes.³ It is as likely that a vain attempt to erect a despotism should have been made by Kylon as that the exploit should have been achieved by Peisistratos. But the story itself is told with singular contradictions. In the brief summary of Herodotos Kylon tries in vain to seize on the Akropolis. When on his failure he takes refuge at the shrine, he is removed by the Prytaneis of the Naukraroi on the pledge that his life should be spared, but the covenant is disregarded by the Alkmaionidai who put him to death. In the more full report of Thucydides, Kylon, aided by his father-in-law The-

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, vol. i. ch. ii.

² Thuc. i. 127.

³ Herod. v. 70.

agenes tyrant of Megara,¹ succeeds in occupying the Akropolis, and is foiled only by a lack of the food needed to withstand a long siege, the blockade being intrusted to the nine archons, who at that time had virtually, we are told, the whole administration of the state. But according to this version Kylon and his brother escaped, and only his followers were slain in violation of the pledges given to them. With such evidence as this, we may accept the fact of the conspiracy and its failure; nor, although in its details the tradition is manifestly untrustworthy, can we question that the clan of the Alkmaionidai were permanently tainted for their bad faith in the opinion of the people, and that in times of trouble they were regarded as men on whom the divine wrath specially rested and who might fairly be treated as scape-goats to appease the anger of the gods.

CHAPTER X.

ATHENS, AND THE SOLONIAN LEGISLATION.

WITH the name of Solon, the son of Exekestides, are associated some of the most momentous changes ever made in Athenian or in any other polity; and for even some details in his work we have indisputable evidence in the fragments of his poems which have been preserved to us. Historical records of the time of Solon. Evidence also remains in the fragments of his laws; but in examining the accounts given of his legislation we are met by the difficulty that later writers and orators attributed to him many changes and ascribed to him many institutions with which he had nothing to do. Hence, except when we have positive statements of Solon himself, it must be carefully borne in mind that in the descriptions given of his measures we are dealing rather with the views of men who lived under very different social and political conditions, than with actual historical evidence; and the conclusions which we are most justified in accepting will be those which are most easily reconciled with the words of Solon and most in harmony with what we know of the earlier conditions of society in Attica and Hellas generally.

The chief interest of the life of Solon centres in the social condition of the Athenian people. If Drakon did something to soften the indiscriminate severity of the court of Areiopagos, no heed, it would seem, was taken of the frightful sufferings of the classes who were excluded from all share

¹ See p. 46. The date of Kylon's attempt is quite uncertain.

in the government. But the only points of real importance which we have to determine are the nature and the cause of the intestine disorders prevalent in the country ; and it is on these points precisely that complete information fails us. If we confine ourselves to the words of Solon, we have before us the fact that the men who exercised power in the state were guilty of gross injustice and of violent robberies among themselves, while of the poor many were in chains and had been sold away even into foreign slavery. Nay, in the indignant appeal which, after carrying out his reforms, Solon addresses to Gê Melaina, the Black Earth, as a person, he speaks of the land itself as having been in some way enslaved and as being now by himself set free, by the removal of boundaries which had been fixed in many places. Many again, he adds, had through his efforts been redeemed from foreign captivity and brought back to their ancient homes, while those who on Attic soil were reduced to slavery and trembled before their despots were now raised to the condition of freemen. The whole question, it is obvious, turns on the meaning of the words debtor, creditor, slavery, freedom, boundary and landmark, as used in these passages ; and on this meaning it is not surprising that opinions not easily reconciled should have been held by writers living under later and very different conditions of society, or that these opinions should in greater or less degree have received the sanction of modern historians.

On the one side it has been maintained, by those who regard the representations of Plutarch as in the main trustworthy, that the system which tended to reduce English freemen to villenage was in the days of Solon converting the Attic peasants into slaves. Arrears of rent or of produce payable to the owners of the soil were changed into debts, for which the tenant was allowed by law to pledge his own body or the bodies of his sisters or his children. That the smaller tenures generally should be heavily mortgaged was a circumstance, it is argued, not very favorable to the real prosperity of the country ; but this was as nothing compared with a practice which aimed at establishing and extending a servile class by the offer of loans which the lender well knew would never be repaid in money, and for which he sought no other repayment than the bodies of the borrowers. Such a state of things must sooner or later eat out the life of a nation ; and a legislator, who had the welfare of the people at heart, could see in it only a plague to be suppressed at all hazards. Doubtless the debts incurred by the Thetes or tenants were, it is maintained, legitimate debts, and the lenders were intitled to repayment. The repudiation of the debts must involve injustice to them ; but their maintenance would bring with it the destruction of the whole people. The growth of dis-

Various
opinions as
to the causes
of this
misery.

content and rebellion had frightened the ruling class ; and when Solon was invested with something like dictatorial power, he used it not to make himself a despot, but to put an end to the mischief at once by introducing his *Seisachtheia*, or Removal of Burdens,—a measure which, it is held, annulled all mortgages on land in Athens, restored to freedom all debtors who had been reduced to slavery, provided the means for recovering such as had been sold into foreign countries, and more particularly struck at the root of the evil by prohibiting all security for loans on the body of the borrower or of his kinsfolk. The losses of the lenders who may themselves have been indebted to others were, it is said, in some measure lessened or compensated by a depreciation of the currency; while the objections urged against these measures are sufficiently answered by the fact that the public credit was not shaken and that it never again became necessary either to debase the money standard or to repudiate a debt.

This view, it is maintained on the other side, involves some great, if not insurmountable, difficulties. When the distress of the Athenian agriculturists is ascribed definitely to debts secured by mortgage, the assertion lies open to the retort that the security of mortgage can be given only by the owner of the soil, and that the distressed men of Attica were not owners of the land, but only the cultivators. There can be no doubt that in the belief of Plutarch a large, if not by far the greater, part of the popular distress arose from the conditions of land-tenure imposed on the class called *Thetes*, or *Hektemorioi*, as paying to the owner one-sixth portion of the yearly produce, and that these distressed persons were not proprietors. Whether he is speaking of the same class when he mentions those who pledged their persons for the repayment of debts, or whether by the *Daneistai*, or money-lenders or usurers, he supposed the landlords and the landlords only to be meant, is not so clear ; and when we look more closely into the facts of the earliest social history of Athens, so far as they are known to us at all, we are confronted by two grave difficulties, the one turning on the question whether the more modern idea of mortgage was so much as known at that time, the other making it necessary for us to determine whether there existed then a class of professed money-lenders. It is at the least difficult, if not impossible, to imagine that capitalists could be found to advance loans in money to cultivators of the soil who were unable to pay even one-sixth of the produce ; nor can we well suppose that pressure caused simply by a somewhat excessive rent could assume very formidable proportions. If again lenders, being landowners, could be found to advance money to cultivators who could not pay to them even one-sixth part of the produce of the

soil, we can but wonder at the superfluity of the loan, when the failure of the tenant to yield the stipulated portion of the produce involved in itself the forfeiture of his freedom. If on the other hand the landowners and the money-lenders were not the same persons, then it is scarcely a matter of doubt that the Hektemorioi would never have been allowed by the landowners to pledge to professed usurers their persons, the value of which might far exceed the amount of the debt, for this would be directly to defraud the landlord whose claim to their bodies on failure to pay the proceeds would be paramount; and to make two classes of men indebted to two classes of creditors, (the Thetes or Hektemorioi being pledged to the landowners, and the free proprietors of small estates pledged to professional usurers,) is to multiply gratuitous suppositions. What then were the pillars which beyond doubt Solon removed from the land? In the absence of direct evidence that they were mortgage pillars inscribed with the name of the lender and the amount of the loan, it is reasonable to suppose that they were simply the boundaries or landmarks which, whether in Attica or in Latium, and throughout the Aryan world or even beyond its limits, it was sacrilege to touch. These landmarks represented those ancient patriarchal rights which received their whole sanction from religion. That the greater part of the Athenian soil was marked off by these landmarks, is asserted by Solon himself. In other words, the Eupatridai were still the lords of almost all the land; and thus we have on the one side a few heads of families who might in the strictest sense of the term be spoken of as despots, and on the other the dependents who trembled before them but who were suffered to draw their livelihood from the soil on condition of paying a fixed part of the produce to the lord. It can scarcely be doubted that even this fixed payment marks a step forward in the condition of the laborer who had started without even this poor semblance of right. It was, however, a mere semblance after all. So long as he could comply with the terms imposed on him, he might remain nominally free; but his real state was not changed. The lord might demand a larger portion of the produce; or a hard season might leave him unable to pay even the sixth part. In either case, he reverted necessarily to the servile state from which he had never been legally set free. So long as things continued thus, Solon might with perfect truth say that the land itself was enslaved, for the scanty class of small proprietors, even if any such existed at the time, would be powerless against the Eupatrid landowners, and would be liable to the same accidents which might at any moment make the client once more a slave.

If this be at all a true picture of the condition of Attica in the days of Solon, it was obviously impossible that things could go on

indefinitely as they were. If even the concession which raised the slave to the state of the Hektemorios was wrung, as probably it was, from an unwilling master, it was certain that the man who had gained this poor boon would never rest content in a position which had not even the guarantee of law and which left him at the mercy and caprice of a despot who might, if he pleased, sell him into foreign slavery. One of two results must follow under such circumstances. Either the half emancipated peasant must become a free owner of the soil, or he must fall back into his original subjection. Here, then, in dealing with grievances which every year must become less and less tolerable, Solon had abundant materials for his Seisachtheia or Relief Act; and the measures which such a state of things would render necessary are precisely those which seem to be indicated by his words. From all lands occupied by cultivators on condition of yielding a portion of the produce he removed the pillars which marked the religious ownership of the Eupatridai, and lightened the burdens of the cultivators by lessening the amount of produce or money which henceforth took the shape of a rent. In other words, a body of free laborers and poor landowners was not so much relieved of a heavy pressure, as for the first time called into being.

Whether the lowering of the currency attributed to Solon be or be not merely the idea of later writers, it would seem that in their accounts of the relations of debtors with creditors at the time of the Seisachtheia they transferred to the Athens of Solon notions which belonged to a much later generation, and comprehending but faintly the tremendous power exercised by the ancient lords of the soil, concluded that the relief which Solon gave was chiefly through the abolition or the diminution of debts. The words of Solon point rather to a struggle between slavery and freedom; and the tradition that it was never afterwards found necessary to modify contracts or to debase the currency may be regarded as sufficient evidence that his work was done effectually.

But Solon did more than redress existing wrongs. The tribes with their principle of religious association had remained thus far undisturbed; but the greater part of the population was not included in any tribe, and it was clear that if the statesman wished to avail himself of the full powers and resources of the country, it was indispensably necessary to introduce a new classification which should take in all the free inhabitants of the land without reference to affinities of blood and be based wholly on property. The principle thus introduced was termed the timocratic, and its most important political result was that it excluded the poor Eupatrid

Actual mea-
sures of
Solon.

Lowering of
the cur-
rency.

New classi-
fication of
the citizens:
the Penta-
kosiomedim-
noi, Hippeis,
Zeugitai,
and Thetes.

from offices and honors for which richer citizens now became eligible who could lay no claim to the religious character of the old nobility. The Pentakosiomedimnoi, or men whose annual income was equal to 500 medimnoi (about 700 imperial bushels) of corn, the Hippeis or Knights (so called as possessing sufficient means to serve as horsemen) who had from 300 to 500 medimnoi, and the Zeugitai, or owners of a team of oxen, who possessed from 200 to 300, paid a graduated income-tax called *Eisphora*, on a capital which for members of the first class was rated at twelve times, for those of the second at ten times, and for those of the third at five times their yearly income,—the Pentakosiomedimnos who had simply his 500 bushels being, for instance, rated at 6000 drachmas, the Hippeus with 300 medimnoi at 3000, and the Zeugitês of 200 drachmas at 1000, or five times his yearly income. In the fourth or Thetic class, so called as including, and not as consisting only of, the Thetes, were placed all citizens whose property fell short of 200 drachmas a year. The members of this, the largest, class in the state were not liable to the direct taxation of the *Eisphora*, although they shared with the men of the wealthier classes the more permanent burden of indirect taxation in the form of import duties. Nor were they called upon to discharge the unpaid services of the state called *Leitourgiai*, liturgies, while in war they served only as light-armed infantry, or in armor provided for them by the state. On the other hand, they were ineligible to all public offices—the archonship and all military commands being open only to members of the first class, while certain minor offices might be filled by the Hippeis and Zeugitai, the former of whom were bound to serve as horsemen, the latter as heavy-armed infantry, at their own expense. Thus in the classification which excluded the Eupatrid whose income fell short of 500 medimnoi from the high offices which he regarded as his inalienable birthright, the spell of the ancient despotism of religion and blood was broken; and a further democratic element was introduced by the law which, while it confined the archonship to members of the first class, left the election of the archons to the *Heliaia*, or general council, which included not merely the men of the first three classes, but, as the Eupatrid would have termed them, the rabble of the fourth class. This law went even further, making the archons at the end of their year of office directly accountable to the public assembly and subject to an impeachment by it in case of misbehavior.

The power of this assembly was strengthened by the institution, attributed to Solon, of the Probouleutic Council of Four Hundred (in the proportion of one hundred for each tribe) who, like the archons, were to be elected by the whole people from the first class. This council, as its name

The Probou-
leutic
Council.

implies, was charged chiefly with the preparation of matters to be brought before the assembly, with the summoning and management of its meetings, and with the execution of its decrees.

Such, in the main, seems to have been the great work of Solon, a work accomplished just at a time when attempts like those of Kylon or Peisistratos, if made at that moment, might have crushed for ever the rising freedom of Athens, and achieved by a man who was charged with madness for not following the example of those who had made themselves tyrants in other Hellenic cities. But Solon himself scarcely more than laid the foundations, and it is a common error which ascribes to him developements of the constitution belonging to a time later even than that of Kleisthenes. The members of the fourth and by far the largest class of citizens could have no further influence on the conduct of affairs than by the check, probably not always very effectual, which they exercised by electing the archons and examining them at the end of the year. But, more particularly, although a citizen of the first class who was not an Eupatrid was in point of money qualification eligible for the archonship, he could be neither archon nor a member of the Areiopagos, unless he also belonged to a tribe; and as the Probouleutic Council consisted of four hundred, or one hundred for each of the tribes, it followed that only members of the tribes could be elected to this council, and thus that the political position of non-tribal citizens, even if they belonged to the first class in the timocracy, was simply on a level with that of the fourth or Thetic class. All that the Solonian reform had done was to exclude from the archonship the poor Eupatrid and to admit to it the non-Eupatrid Pentakosiomedimnos, if he belonged to some tribe; but no one who did not possess the religious title could hold office, and thus Solon left the constitution, as he found it, practically oligarchic.

Over the sequel of the career of Solon the mists of oral tradition have gathered thickly. His work as a legislator was done; but there remained the fear that others might destroy it or that he might be induced to impair it himself. He therefore bound the Athenians, we are told, by solemn oaths that for ten years; or, as some said, for a hundred years, they would suffer no change to be made in his laws, and then, to make it impossible that this change should come from himself, he departed on the long pilgrimage which is associated with the names of other legislators as great as himself, though less historical. That he visited Egypt and Kypros (Cyprus) is proved by his own words; but the time of the visit is undetermined, and that he cannot have sojourned with Amasis, seems to be clear from the fact that the reign of Amasis began at least a generation after the legislation of

Solon.¹ Not more trustworthy chronologically is the exquisitely beautiful tale which relates the intercourse of Solon with the Lydian king Kroisos. It is clear that in the belief of Herodotos Solon visited Sardeis not more than six or seven years before the fall of the Lydian monarchy. The death of Atys which marked the turning-point in the unbroken happiness of Kroisos was followed, after two years only, by the war with the Persian Cyrus; and the catastrophe occurred scarcely less than fifty years after the legislation of Solon. The story is manifestly a didactic legend setting forth the religious philosophy of the time, insisting on the divine jealousy which hates and punishes pride and self-satisfaction in mortal man, and virtually maintaining that happiness is a state which cannot be predicated of anyone before his earthly life has reached its close.

The return of Solon to Athens was not to be followed by new reforms for the benefit of his countrymen. The tide had turned.

Usurpation of Peisistratos, and death of Solon. In the struggle which ensued Solon, it is said, foresaw that Peisistratos must be the conqueror; but he strove in vain to rouse the Athenians to combine against the tyranny with which they were threatened. To no purpose he stood in his armor at the door of his house, and he could but console himself with the thought that he had done his duty, and reply to those who asked on what he relied to save himself from the vengeance of his enemies, 'On my old age.' Peisistratos, as the story goes, did him no harm; and the man who had done more than any who had gone before him to make his country free died in peace, full of years and with a fame which is the purer for the unselfishness which refused to employ for his own exaltation opportunities greater than any which fell to the lot even of Peisistratos himself.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TYRANNY OF THE PEISISTRATIDAI.

THE success of Peisistratos is of itself sufficient evidence of the slow growth of the democratic spirit at Athens. The people, which a few generations later appears in the satire of the comic poet under the guise of the rude and intractable old man of the Pnyx, now show themselves apt disciples in that school of indifference which Solon had branded

¹ Herod. i. 30. Plut. *Sol.* 26. Lewis, *Credibility of E. R. H.* ii. 532 et seq.

as the worst of civil crimes; and the man who has crushed his rivals may count on their passive acquiescence under his sway.

In this instance the successful plotter was supported by the faction (if such it was) of the Hyperakrians or men of the hills, whose part he professed to take. As their champion, he avowed (if we are to follow the story of Herodotos) that he had narrowly escaped from the hands of his enemies who had fallen upon him in the country. Hastening to Athens, he pointed to the wounds, which he had inflicted on himself and on his mules, as attesting the truth of his tale, and prayed the people to grant him a body-guard to protect him against the weapons of the rival factions. The club-bearers by whom he was now attended may soon have become spear-bearers; but in any case the disguise was thrown off when with their help Peisistratos seized the Akropolis, and Megakles with the Alkmaionids fled from the city.

Seizure of the Akropolis by Peisistratos. 560 B.C. (?)

Whatever may be the value of these details, there is no reason to question the general statement of Herodotos that, having thus made himself master of Athens, Peisistratos ruled wisely and well, without introducing a single constitutional change.¹ With sound instinct he perceived that the Solonian forms were sufficiently oligarchic in spirit to suit his purposes: and Athens, although in the power of a despot, had the benefit of a despotism lightened as it had been lightened in no other Hellenic city. But although the praise of Herodotos is confirmed by that of Thucydides,² who asserts that with no direct impost beyond an income-tax of five per cent. Peisistratos and his successors found means to carry on wars, to pay the cost of sacrifices, and to embellish the city, their wisdom and their other qualities failed to make the course of their despotism run smoothly.

Character of the administration of Peisistratos.

The first disaster, we are told, was not long in coming. They owed their power to the divisions among the people, and a coalition of the Pediaian and Paralian factions, in other words, of the men belonging to the plains and the seacoast, was at once followed by their expulsion. But this success served only to renew and whet the strife of these parties, and Megakles, as the head of the Paralians, offered to restore the exiled tyrant on the condition that the latter should marry the daughter of the Alkmaionid chief. The terms were accepted; and to insure the assent and favor of the people, the conspirators, it is said, obtained the services of a tall and beautiful woman of the Paionian tribe, whom they placed in full armor on a chariot, and then made proclamation to the citizens that they should welcome Peisistratos whom Athene herself was bringing to her own Akro-

Expulsion and restoration of Peisistratos.

¹ Herod. i. 59.

² vi. 54.

polis. Hastening to the scene, they saw a majestic woman about six feet high, and taking her at once to be the virgin goddess, gave her worship and received the despot.¹

But the curse which rested on the house of Megakles cast its dark shadow on the mind of Peisistratos, who resolved that the marriage to which he had consented should be a barren one; and the discovery of this design led forthwith to the reconciliation of Megakles with Lykourgos, the head of the so-called Pediaian faction, and to the second expulsion of the tyrant, who, it is said, spent the next ten years chiefly in the Euboian Eretria,² aiding Lygdamis to establish his despotism in Naxos, and in some way or other helping Thebes and other cities.

The story of his restoration implies a singular indifference and inactivity on the part of the Athenians. The invader occupied Marathon without opposition; and when on his moving from that place the Athenians advanced against him, they allowed him to fall upon them while some were dicing and others sleeping after their morning meal. The sons of the tyrant rode towards Athens, and telling the citizens what had happened, bade them go home. The order was placidly obeyed, and for the third time Peisistratos was master of the Akropolis. He was resolved that this time no room should be left for the combinations which had twice driven him away. Megakles with his adherents left the country: the rest who had ventured to oppose him were compelled to give hostages in the persons of their children whom Peisistratos placed in the safe keeping of Lygdamis at Naxos; and the new rule was finally established by a large force of Thracian mercenaries.

For Peisistratos himself there were to be no more alternations of disaster and success. He died tyrant of Athens, three and thirty years, it is said, after the time of his first usurpation. His sons, Hippias and Hipparchos, followed, we are told, the example of sobriety and moderation set by their father. But their political foresight failed to guard them against dangers arising from their pleasant vices; and Hipparchos in an evil hour sought to

527 B.C. (?)
Death of
Peisistratos,
and subse-
quent his-
tory of his
house.

¹ This woman, who is called Phyê, is said to have become the wife of Hipparchos. The contempt with which Herodotos stigmatises the silliness of the Athenians for being thus duped seems to imply the existence of a general unbelief that manifestations of the gods could any longer take place. If we look to the narrative, the stratagem certainly seems superfluous. If the

union of the two factions had at once brought about the banishment of the despot, nothing more than the adhesion of one of them to Peisistratos would be needed to accomplish his restoration.

² The presence of Peisistratos in Naxos for the purpose of helping Lygdamis is asserted by Herodotos, i. 64.

form a shameful intimacy with the beautiful Harmodios. By way of revenge his paramour Aristogeiton with a few partisans determined to await the greater Panathenaic festival, being sure that on seeing the blow struck the main body of the citizens would hasten to join them. When the day came and the conspirators drew near to their work, they were astonished to see one of their number talking familiarly with Hippias, and then, supposing that their design was betrayed, determined that at least the man who had injured them should die. They found Hipparchos near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and there they killed him. Aristogeiton for the moment escaped; but Harmodios was slain on the spot by the guards of the murdered man. Tidings of the disaster were soon brought to Hippias, who was at the Kerameikos. With great presence of mind, he simply commanded the hoplites who with shields and spears were to take part in the procession to lay down their arms and go to a certain spot. The command was obeyed under the notion that their general had something to say to them; and the arms being seized by the mercenaries, all citizens found with daggers were set aside as sharing in the conspiracy.

The death of Hipparchos and the circumstances which led to it warned Hippias that yet more disasters might be in store for him and that he would do well to provide betimes against the evil day. His decision led to momentous consequences in the history of Athens and of the world; and the great struggle between Asiatic despotism and western freedom was at the least hastened by his policy. His thoughts turned to the Persian king whose power after the fall of the Lydian monarchy had been extended to the shores of the Hellespontos, and to whom the Athenian settlement at Sigeion had thus become tributary. Hippoklos, the tyrant of Lampsakos, was at this time in high favor with the Persian king; and though an Athenian might look down upon a Lampsakene,¹ Hippias gladly gave his daughter Archedikê in marriage to Aiantides, the son of Hippoklos. In Sigeion then he thought that he might have a safe refuge, and in the Lampsakene despot he found a friend through whom he gained personal access to the Persian king.

While Hippias was thus guarding himself against possible disasters, the intrigues of the Alkmaionidai were preparing the way for the expulsion which he dreaded. About five and thirty years before the marriage of Archedikê the temple of Delphoi had been burnt by accident; and the Amphiktyonic Council determined that it should be restored at the cost of three hundred talents, about

¹ This is probably the meaning of the words *Ἀθηναῖος ὦν Λαυβακηνῶ*. Thuc. vi. 59.

115,000*l.* of our money, one fourth portion of this to be contributed by the Delphians themselves.¹ When at length the money was gathered together, the Alkmaionidai took the contract for carrying out the designs of the Corinthian Spintharos; but they executed the work with greater sumptuousness than the contract specified, and the front of the new temple instead of being built with common tufa shone with all the brilliancy of Parian marble. The Alkmaionidai had thus won for themselves a lasting title to the gratitude of the Delphians, which according to Herodotus was heightened by further gifts bestowed on the condition that to all Spartans who might consult the oracle the answer should be returned by the Pythia or priestess, 'Athens must be set free.'² Wearied out by the repetition of this command, the Spartans, doing violence to their own inclinations in obedience to the divine bidding, sent Anchimolios by sea with an army which landed at Phaleron. But Hippias had been forewarned. With the help of a thousand Thessalian horsemen under their chief Kineas he utterly defeated the Spartans on the Phalerian plain, and Anchimolios found a grave on Athenian soil.

The attempt was, however, repeated on a larger scale under the Spartan king Kleomenes, the son of Anaxandridas, who invaded Attica by land, and, advancing to Athens, shut up Hippias within the Pelasgic wall. But he had no idea of a permanent blockade, and the besieged were well provided with food. A few days more would have seen the departure of the Spartan force, when an accident brought the matter to an issue. The children of Hippias were taken in the attempt to smuggle them out of the country. The tables were effectually turned, and for the recovery of his children Hippias agreed to leave Attica within five days. Thus, after the lapse of fifty years from the establishment of the first tyranny of Peisistratos, the last despot of his house betook himself to the refuge which he had prepared on the banks of the Scamandros; and a pillar on the Akropolis set forth for the execration of future ages the evil deeds of the dynasty and the names of all its members.

Final ex-
pulsion of
the Peisi-
stratidai.

¹ Of course, out of moneys received from pilgrims. The little town of Delphoi out of its own re-

sources could not possibly have furnished nearly 30,000*l.*

² Herod. v. 62.

CHAPTER XII.

THE REFORMS OF KLEISTHENES.

THE outward forms of the Solonian constitution underwent, we are told, little or no change under the dynasty of Peisistratos. By that constitution a shock had been given to the religious sentiment which invested the Eupatridai with an incommunicable dignity. By his timocratic classification Solon made property the title to Athenian citizenship and insured to the poorest the right of voting in the Ekklesia, which elected the Archons as well as the members of the Probouleutic Council of the Four Hundred and which reviewed the administration of the magistrates at the end of their year of office. But he had not interfered with the religious constitution of the tribes, phratryai, and houses; and while none but the members of the first and richest class of citizens were eligible for the archonship, even the richest had no further political privileges than the members of the fourth or poorest class, unless they were also members of a tribe. Hence the Archonship, the Probouleutic Senate, and the Court of Areiopagos were still confined to the sacred oligarchy of the ancient houses. All that the main body of the people had to do was to elect the archons and the senate from the members of the patrician tribes, and exercise a feeble judicial power on magistrates going out of office.

Oligarchical elements in the Solonian constitution.

With the expulsion of Hippias the Solonian laws, nominally at least, resumed their force. But the first fact which comes before us is a renewal of the strife which it was the object of the Solonian constitution to put down,—the contending parties being the Alkmaionid Kleisthenes, who was popularly credited with the corruption of the Delphian priestess, and Isagoras the son of Tisandros, a member of a noble house, who now appears on the political stage for the first time. The causes of the quarrel between them are not specified; but when we read that the defeated Kleisthenes took the people into partnership,¹ or rather made common cause with the Demos, and that his first act was to substitute new tribes in place of the old, we feel that the contest went to the very foundations of social order and government. From Herodotos we learn only that he changed the name of the ancient tribes, and for four substituted ten, each tribe having its own Phylarchos or chief, and each tribe being subdivided into ten Demoi or cantons. Yet the new clas-

Renewal of factions after the fall of Hippias. B.C. 509.

¹ Herod. v. 66.

sification must have involved a new principle; or else the opposition between Kleisthenes and Isagoras could never have assumed formidable proportions.

But if there be any truth in the accounts which we have received of the Solonian constitution, the fourth class contained practically not only all those whose annual income fell short of 200 drachmas, but all (no matter what their wealth) who were not members of phratriai or tribes. To such men wealth, while it added to their civil burdens, brought no political privileges; and the influx of strangers, allured by Athenian commerce, was constantly increasing the numbers of a class which already contained by far the larger portion of the population. Many of these men would be among the most intelligent and enterprising in the land; and the discontent with which they would regard their exclusion from all civil offices would be a serious and growing danger to the state. Nor could Kleisthenes fail to see that if he wished to put out a fire which was always more than smouldering and might at any time burst into furious flame, he must strike at the root of the religious organisation which rendered all true political growth impossible. There was nothing left but to do away with the religious tribes as political units, and to substitute for them a larger number of new tribes divided into cantons taking in the whole body of the Athenian citizens; and into this body Kleisthenes, according to the express statement of Aristotle,¹ introduced many resident aliens and perhaps slaves.

Such a change, although it might, as the Kleisthenean proposal did, leave the houses and phratries untouched as religious societies founded on an exclusive worship, would be regarded by the conservative Eupatrid as virtually a death-blow to the old faith. Nothing more is needed to explain the vehement opposition of Isagoras; nor can we well avoid the conclusion that it was the proposal of this change which roused his antagonism, and that it was not the rivalry of Isagoras which led Kleisthenes to promulgate his scheme as a new method of winning popularity. The struggle at Athens is reflected in the strife between the plebeians and the patricians of

¹ *Polit.* iii. 2, 3. The number of *μετοίκους*, or permanently resident foreigners (passing strangers or travellers never bore this name), was very large at Athens. Of these foreigners many became Athenian citizens, many did not. What determining circumstance may have brought about the result in each

case, it is impossible to say. Citizenship could at any time be granted by a public vote of the people; but even without this vote, wealthy non-freemen, Mr. Grote remarks, might purchase admission upon the register of some poor Demos, probably by means of a fictitious adoption. *Hist. Gr.* iv. 180.

Rome, and again between the great families of the German and Italian cities in the middle ages and the guilds which grew up around them.

While the principle which avoided all unnecessary interference with existing forms left a nominal existence to the Trittyes and Naukrariai, the Probouleutic council of Four Hundred underwent more important changes. To that assembly only those citizens were eligible who belonged to the first class and were members of one of the four tribes, which had each a hundred representatives in the Senate. In the new council of Five Hundred, to which all citizens were eligible, each of the ten new tribes was represented by fifty senators, who seem now to have been elected by lot.

The Council
of the Five
Hundred.

By the definition of Aristotle those only can be rightly called citizens, who exercise in their own persons a judicial as well as a legislative power;¹ and this judicial authority was extended to all the citizens by the constitution of the Heliaia, in which, as we find it in the days of Perikles, 6000 persons called Dikastai or jurymen, above the age of thirty years, were elected annually by lot in the proportion of 600 for each of the ten tribes, 1000 of these being reserved to fill vacancies caused by death or absence among the remaining 5000 who were subdivided into ten decuries of 500 each. To each man was given a ticket bearing a letter denoting the pannel to which he was assigned, while the distribution of the causes to be tried by the decuries was left to the Thesmothetai or six inferior archons. Thus no jurymen knew until the time of trial, in what court or under what magistrate he might be called upon to sit; and in his ignorance lay the best guarantee that he would approach without prejudice the cause which he was pledged by his solemn oath to determine with strict justice and truth. In the discharge of this function each decury was regarded as the collective state, and like the whole body of Six Thousand was called the Heliaia. Thus each decision was the decision of the people, and from it there was no appeal.

The Heliaia
and the
Dikastai.

But the constitution which intrusted to the archons the assignment of the causes to the several Dikasteria, or jury-courts, insured the downfall of their ancient power. The experience of these courts furnished a high legal education to

The
Archons.

¹ *Polit.* iii. 1, 6. In the republic of Andorre Aristotle would find all that is needed to constitute a Polis; the idea of a parliament like that of Great Britain would to him have appeared to involve impracticable complications. He could not in-

deed assign to the city an exact limit of numbers; but he asserts distinctly that the limit of a State or Polis is passed if it has a population which would be far less than that of Birmingham. *Eth. Nik.* ix. 10.

the Athenian citizens, and the exercise of judicial power became for them more and more a necessary constituent of their civil liberty, while the functions of the archon became more and more subordinate to those of the Heliæia. Accordingly in the time of Perikles we find the Dikastai in receipt of a certain fixed, though small, payment for their services, while the archons are amongst the officers who are chosen by lot. Under the Solonian constitution which admitted to the archonship none but members of tribes who belonged to the wealthiest class, such a mode of appointment would have been more acceptable to the Eupatridai than election by the Ekklesia in which the poorest had their vote, though they could not be elected themselves. But when all offices of state had been thrown open to the general body of citizens, it was clear that selection by lot could be applied to those offices only which needed on the part of those who filled them nothing more than the common honesty and average ability of ordinary citizens. This method, which had value for the poor as giving them a chance of obtaining offices to which they were legally eligible, was never applied to the appointment of the Strategoi or generals, who were always chosen by show of hands of the people in the Ekklesia. The mere fact that it was applied to the selection of archons shows how completely the relative positions of the Strategoi and the archon Polemarchos had been reversed since the days when Miltiades applied to Kallimachos to decide in favor of battle on the field of Marathon,¹ and further proves that their ancient powers had been cut down to the scantiest measure, as they could not fail to be, when the Dikastai had incroached on their judicial functions on the one side and the Strategoi had taken their place as military leaders on the other.

The law which made all citizens eligible to the archonship dealt the deathblow to the predominance of the Areiopagos. By the Solonian constitution this court remained strictly oligarchical, while during the usurpation of the Peisistratidai the archons by whom its numbers were recruited were necessarily mere creatures of the tyrant; and so long as only the wealthy members of tribes could be elected to the office, the Areiopagos would continue to be the bulwark and garrison of

¹ It is true that Herodotos, vi. 109, speaks of Kallimachos as having been chosen by lot: but if it seems impossible to believe that the Strategoi were elected, as they always were, while the Polemarchos, at a time when his functions were the same as theirs, was taken by lot, it would follow that the historian has transferred to the year

490 B.C. the political conditions of Athens in his own day.

Dr. Curtius (*Hist. Gr.* i. 478, trans.) holds that the assertion of Herodotos must be conclusive as to the fact. It would be so if Herodotos had been speaking of a time for which he had before him a written contemporary history.

oligarchy. This character it retained at the time when Perikles and Ephialtes carried their measures of reform: but when its seats began to be filled with archons who had been chosen by lot, the safeguards of its ancient dignity were taken away, and it gradually became merely a respectable assembly of average Athenian citizens.

If these various reforms raised an effectual barrier against the abuse of political power whether by the tribes or the *demoi*, there remained a more formidable danger from the over-^{Ostracism.}weening influence which might be exercised by unscrupulous individual citizens. It was true that the Kleisthenean constitution could not fail to give to the main body of the people a political education which should build up in them a strong reverence for the principle of law: but there were many in whom this moral sense had not been formed. The aliens, or slaves (if any such there were) who had been admitted to citizenship, and the citizens generally of the poorest class who had been declared eligible to high offices, would find their interest in the new order of things; but the changes welcomed by them would rouse no feeling but those of indignation and hatred in the minds of the genuine Eupatrid oligarchs. For such men there would be an almost irresistible temptation to subvert the constitution from which they had nothing to expect but constant incroachments on their ancient privileges; and if one like Peisistratos or Isagoras should give the signal for strife, the state could look to the people alone to maintain the law. In other words, the only way to peace and order would lie through civil war, in which there would be everything to encourage the oligarch, and very little to inspire their opponents. The difficulty was met by an appeal to that sense of the sovereign authority of the people which was soon to make Athens pre-eminent alike among all Hellenic and non-Hellenic states; and it was left to the citizens to decide, once perhaps in each year, by their secret and irresponsible vote, whether for the safety of the whole community one of the citizens should go for a definite period of years into an exile which involved neither loss of property nor civil infamy. But against the abuse even of this power the most jealous precautions were taken. No one could be sent into exile, unless at the least 6000 votes, or in other words the votes of one-fourth of the whole body of citizens, were given against him; and it was expressly provided by the Kleisthenean constitution that apart from this secret vote of 6000 citizens no law should be made against any single citizen, unless that same law were made against all Athenian citizens. The result might be that a less number than 6000 votes demanded the banishment of an indefinite number of citizens, and in this case the ceremony

went for nothing. If, however, more than 6000 votes were given against any man, he received warning to quit Athens within ten days; but he departed without civil disgrace and without losing any portion of his property. Thus without bloodshed and without strife the state was freed from the presence of a man who might be tempted to upset the laws of his country; and this relief was obtained by a mode which left no room for the indulgence of personal ill-will. On the whole, the Athenians had no cause to feel ashamed of a device which had wrought far more good than harm, and which at the cost of the least possible hardship to the banished men prevented the recurrence of the feuds and intrigues which had led to the despotism of former days. No shame can attach to a practice certainly less harsh than that which banishes pretenders from the countries whose crowns they claim, and which was so far from being the necessary fruit of democratic suspicions and jealousies that it fell into disuse just when the government of Athens was most thoroughly democratical.

It was this constitution with its free-spoken Ekklesia, its permanent Probouleutic senate, and its new military organisation, which Isagoras determined, if it were possible, to overthrow. His oligarchical instinct left him in no doubt that, unless the impulse given by freedom of speech and by admitting to public offices all but the poorest class of citizens were speedily checked, the result would assuredly be the growth of a popular sentiment, which would make the revival of Eupatrid ascendancy a mere dream. Feeling that his resources at Athens were inadequate to the task, he appealed to his friend the Spartan king Kleomenes, who availed himself of the old religious terrors inspired by the curse pronounced on the Alkmaionidai for the death of Kylonor his adherents more than a hundred years before. This terror was still so great that Kleisthenes with many Athenian citizens was constrained to leave Athens. After his departure Kleomenes, having entered the city with a small force, drove out as being under the old curse seven hundred families whose names had been furnished to him by Isagoras. In his next step he encountered an unexpected opposition. The Council of Five Hundred refused to be dissolved, and the Spartan king with Isagoras and his adherents took refuge in the Akropolis. But he had no means of withstanding a blockade, and on the third day he agreed to leave the city with his Spartan force. The departure of Kleomenes was followed by the restoration of Kleisthenes and the seven hundred exiled families; but impelled by the conviction that between Sparta and Athens there was a deadly quarrel, the Athenians made an effort to anticipate the intrigues of Hippias, and sent an embassy to Sardeis to make an indepen-

dent alliance with the Persian King. The envoys on being admitted to the presence of Artaphernes were asked who they were and where they lived, and were then told that Dareios would admit them to an alliance on their giving him earth and water. To this demand of absolute subjection the envoys gave an assent which was indignantly repudiated by the whole body of Athenian citizens.¹

But Kleomenes had not yet laid aside the hope of punishing the Athenians. On his retreat from the city he took the road which led him by Plataiai, a small Boiotian town Alliance of Plataiai with Athens. B.C. 509. (?) which lay at a distance of about thirty miles from Athens to the south of the river Asopos on the northern slopes of Kithairon. This town the Thebans claimed as their latest colony;² but the Plataians, who were probably unwilling subjects and certainly complained of ill-treatment on the part of the Thebans, availed themselves eagerly of the presence of Kleomenes to surrender themselves and their city on condition of being admitted among the allies of Sparta.³ For the Spartans he felt that the alliance had no attraction and must be a source of annoyance and trouble; but he was not unwilling to suggest a step which should transfer this annoyance to Athens and lead perhaps to a series of wars between that city and the Theban confederacy. The distance of Sparta was alleged as a reason why the Plataians should look out for nearer allies; and the Athenians were named as those who were best able to help them. The counsel was followed, and some Plataians reaching Athens during a festival of the twelve gods sat as suppliants at the altar and made to the Athenians the proposals which had been rejected by Kleomenes. A prayer thus urged was not to be resisted; but the anticipations of Kleomenes were justified by the event. The alliance embroiled Athens with Thebes, and did no good ultimately to Plataiai.

Foiled for the time in his efforts, Kleomenes was not cast down. Regarding the Kleisthenean constitution as a personal insult to himself, he was determined that Isagoras should be Discom- figure of Kleomenes at Eleusis. despot of Athens. With this view he gathered an army from all parts of Peloponnesos and arranged with the Boiotians a simultaneous invasion of Attica. The latter accordingly seized Hysiai and Oinoê, Attic cantons, the one about eight, the other about twenty miles from Plataiai, while the men of the Euboian Chalkis ravaged other parts of Attica. The punishment of these invaders the Athenians left to some future day. For the present they marched to Eleusis, which Kleomenes had reached with an army from which he carefully concealed the purpose of the campaign. The appearance of the Athenians, and possibly the tidings of the Boiotian invasion of Attica on the

¹ Herod. vi. 70-73.² Thuc. iii. 61.³ Thuc. iii. 68.

north, taught them what this purpose was ; and Kleomenes found that his opponents were not confined to the Kleisthenean council of Five Hundred. The Corinthians, confessing that they had come on an unrighteous errand, went home, followed by the other Spartan king, Demaratos the son of Ariston.

The Athenians were now free to turn their arms against their other enemies. They marched against the Chalkidians ; but as they fell in with the Boiotians who were hastening to their aid at the Euripos, they attacked these first, and having inflicted on them a signal defeat, crossed on the same day into Euboia and won another great victory over the Chalkidians. The Chalkidians were further punished. Four thousand Athenian settlers, who under the title of Klerouchoi retained all their rights as citizens, were placed on the lands of the wealthy Chalkidian owners called Hippobotai or horse-feeders, and served like the Roman *Coloniæ* as a garrison in a conquered country.

Such were the first-fruits of Athenian freedom ; and contrasting this outburst of warlike activity with their supineness under the factions of the Eupatrids and the despotism of the Peisistratidai, Herodotos cannot repress the utterance of his conviction that liberty of speech is a right good thing, since the Athenians under their tyrants were in war no better than any of their neighbors, but on being rid of them rose rapidly to pre-eminence, the reason being that forced service for a master took away all their spirit, whereas on winning their freedom each man made vigorous efforts for himself.¹ This change in the Athenian character excited no feelings of admiration in the Thebans, who entered into an alliance with the Aiginetans. The new energy of Athens is seen in the continued maintenance of a war with Thebes and Aigina at once. But it was now clear to the Spartan king and to his countrymen that the Athenians would not acquiesce in the predominance of Sparta ; that if they retained their freedom, the power of Athens would soon become equal to their own ;² and that their only safety lay in providing the Athenians with a tyrant. An invitation was, therefore, sent to Hippias at Sigeion, to attend a congress of the allies of Sparta, who were summoned to meet on the arrival of the exiled despot.

The words in which Herodotos relates these facts show not merely that Sparta regarded herself as in some sort the first city in Hellas, but that among the Hellenic states there were not a few who were disposed to look up to her as such. Her claim to supremacy is seen in the complaint that Athens was not willing to acknowledge it ; and the

Victories
of the
Athenians
over the
Boiotians
and the
Chalkidians.
B.C. 509.

Warlike
activity
of the
Athenians.

Predomi-
nance of
Sparta in
Hellas.

¹ Herod. v. 78.

² Herod. v. 91.

recognition of this claim in certain quarters is proved by the fact that the men of Corinth and other cities marched with Kleomenes to Eleusis even though they did not know the purpose for which they had been brought together. The Congress now summoned exhibits Sparta still more clearly as in some sort the head of a confederacy, able to convoke her allies at will, yet not able to dispense with the debates in council which implied their freedom to accept or reject her plans. The assembly in which Hippias appeared to plead the cause of despotism seems to have gone through all the formalities needed to maintain the self-respect of citizens of subordinate but independent states.

The address of the Spartans to the allies thus convoked was brief after their fashion and to the point. It candidly confessed their folly in having been duped by the Pythia at Delphoi, and in having given over the city of Athens to an ungrateful Demos, which had already made the Boiotians and Chalkidians feel the sting of democracy and would speedily make others feel it also; and not less candidly it besought the allies to help them in punishing the Athenians and in restoring to Hippias the power which he had lost. The reply put into the mouth of the Corinthian Sosikles is an indignant condemnation of this selfish and heartless policy. "Surely heaven and earth are going to change places," he said, "and fishes will live on land, and men in the sea, now that you, Lakedaimonians, mean to put down free governments and to restore in each city that most unrighteous and most bloodthirsty thing,—a despotism. If you think that a tyranny has a single good feature to recommend it, try it first yourselves, and then seek to bring others to your opinion about it. But in point of fact you have not tried it, and being religiously resolved that you never will try it, you seek to force it upon others. Experience would have taught you a more wholesome lesson: we have had this experience, and we have learnt this lesson." This moral is enforced by the strange stories which Sosikles goes on to tell of Kypselos and Periandros, the memory of whose crimes made Corinthians shudder; and he ends with Spartan plainness of speech by confessing the wonder which their invitation to Hippias had excited at Corinth, and the still greater astonishment with which they now heard the explanation of a policy, in the guilt of which the Corinthians at least were resolved that they would not be partakers. The Spartan in this debate differed from the Corinthian only in the clearness with which he saw that there was that in Athenian democracy which, if not repressed, must prove fatal to the oligarchical constitutions around it. To this point the Corinthian had not yet advanced, and he could urge now as a sacred thing the duty of not meddling

Congress of
allies at
Sparta.
B.C. 509.

with the internal affairs of an autonomous community. In the debates which preceded the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war the Corinthian deputies held a very different language. Their eyes had been opened in the meantime to the radical antagonism of the system in which every citizen is invested with legislative and judicial powers, and the system in which these powers are in the hands of an hereditary patrician caste.

That the Corinthians would be brought to see this hereafter, was the gist of the reply made by Hippias. The time was coming, he said, in which they would find the Athenians a thorn in their side. For the present his exhortations were thrown away. The allies protested unanimously against all attempts to interfere with the internal administration of any Hellenic city; and Hippias went back disappointed to Sigeion.

Return of
Hippias to
Sigeion.
B.C. 509.

BOOK II.

THE STRUGGLE WITH PERSIA, AND THE GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

CHAPTER I.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER CYRUS AND KAMBYSES.

THE Persian king by whose aid Hippias hoped to recover his lost power was lord of a vast inheritance of conquest. Within the compass of a few years the kingdoms of the Medes, the Lydians, and the Egyptians had been absorbed into the huge mass whose force was soon to be precipitated on the ill-cemented confederacy of the Hellenic tribes. If we follow the popular chronology, Peisistratos made himself despot at Athens at the very time when Cyrus founded this great empire by the dethronement of the Median Astyages. But the figure of Cyrus emerges only for a time from the cloud-land to which the earliest and the latest scenes of his life belong.

In the version of the tale which Herodotos followed, he was the grandson of the Median king Astyages, who, frightened by a prophecy that his daughter's child will be his ruin, gives the babe on its birth to Harpagos with orders that it shall be forthwith slain. By the advice of his wife Harpagos, instead of killing the child, places it in the hands of one of the royal herdsmen, who carries it home. Finding that his wife had just given birth to a dead infant, the herdsman exposes the corpse, and brings up Cyrus as his own son. But his high lineage cannot be hidden. In the village sports the boy plays the king so well that a complaint is carried to Astyages; and by the severe judge is found to be the child who had been doomed to die but who turns out to be the man born to be king. Astyages is awe-struck: but nevertheless he takes vengeance on Harpagos by inviting him to a banquet at which he feasts on the body of his own son, and his fears are quieted by the soothsayers who tell him that the election of Cyrus as king by the village children has fulfilled the prophecy. Harpagos, however, is resolved that there

The historical and traditional Cyrus.

500 B.C. (?)

The story of Astyages and Cyrus.

shall be a second and a more serious fulfilment; and he drives Cyrus into the rebellion which ends in the dethronement of the despot. To achieve this end Cyrus, according to the notion of a historian who is thinking only of the inhabitants of a small canton, convokes the Persian tribes, and holds forth the boon of freedom, in other words, of immunity from taxation, if they will break the Median yoke from off their necks. The contrast of a banquet to which they are bidden after a day spent in severe toil so weighs with them, that they at once throw in their lot with Cyrus and presently change their state of oppression for the more agreeable power of oppressing others. The latter part of this story is an institutional legend accounting for the fiscal immunities of the Persian clans. The former is a myth which reappears, amongst many more, in the tales of Oidipous, Telephos, Paris, Romulus and Remus.

The Median dynasty, which ended with Astyages, began, it is said, with Deiokes. Of this Deiokes we are told, according to The story of Deiokes. the notion which regarded all the Persians as inhabitants of a single township, that, aiming from the first at despotism, he set himself to administer justice amongst the lawless men by whom he was surrounded, and having at length won a high name for impartiality withdrew himself from them on the plea that he was unable to bear the continued tax on his time. The seven tribes or clans of the Medes then met in council and resolved on making Deiokes their king. Their offer is accepted, and Deiokes at once bids them build him a palace with seven concentric walls, and taking up his abode in the centre becomes henceforth a cruel tyrant. These seven walls have been regarded by some as having reference to the seven Median tribes: by others they are supposed to signify the seven planets, the worship of the sun being denoted by the palace in the centre.¹ Deiokes in neither case retains any historical character: and when we see that here also, in the details which do not belong to the myth, we have simply an institutional legend describing generally the origin of despotism, the credit of the whole narrative is gone. Nay, this very origin of Eastern monarchy is described not as it would be conceived by the Medes, but as it would present itself to Greeks acquainted only with the arts by which their own tyrants had worked their way to power. The turbulence and factiousness of the Median tribes in their small cantons, the rigid justice under which Deiokes masks the object steadily aimed at from the first, the care which he takes, as soon as the offer of kingship is made to him, to build himself a stronghold and surround his person with a body-guard, are all features which belong to the

¹ Lenormant, *Manual of Ancient History*, book v. ch. 3, § 3.

history of Greek rather than of Oriental despots. The Greek ideal is still further shown in the ascription to Deiokes of a severe, laborious, and impartial administration which probably no Asiatic government ever sought to realise. Thus of Deiokes himself and of the incidents of his life we know nothing; and at the utmost the whole story can be regarded as nothing more than a tradition indicating some change in the political relations of the Medes and the Assyrians, though whether this change involved the destruction of the city of Nineveh or was merely the revolt of some mountain tribes, it is impossible to say. According to Herodotos¹ Nineveh itself had undergone no disaster, when Phraortes, the son of Deiokes, after a reign of two and twenty years met his death before its walls. His successor Kyaxares sought, it is said, to avenge his father by again besieging Nineveh, but was compelled to abandon or interrupt the blockade owing to an irruption of Scythians, who had chased the Kimmerians out of Europe.²

It may possibly have been before this inroad that the cause of quarrel arose between Kyaxares the Median king and Alyattes the father of Kroisos. Herodotos tells us that some fugitive Scythians found their way into the Median territory, where they were well treated by the king as long as they brought the tribute imposed on their captures in hunting. The harsh punishment with which an accidental failure was visited led the Scythians, first, to place on the banquet board before the king the limbs of one of the Median youths who had been sent to them to be taught archery, and then to avoid the consequences of their revenge by taking refuge in the land of the Lydian king. Alyattes gave them shelter, and even refused to yield them up at the request of Kyaxares. The war which ensued lasted, it is said, for six years, and was brought to an end partly by an eclipse which took place in the midst of a battle, and in part by the mediation of Labynetos king of Babylon and the Kilikian chief Syennesis. These sovereigns determined that the doubtful reconciliation should be strengthened by a marriage between Aryenis the daughter of Alyattes and Astyages the heir to the Median throne. While the Median dynasty was thus connected with that of Lydia, the alliance with Babylon was cemented, according to Berosos, by the marriage of Nebucadnezzar, the son of Nabopolassar, with Amuhia the daughter of Kyaxares. Thus Kroisos became the brother-in-law of Astyages, and Astyages the brother-in-law of Nebucadnezzar. The chain might well have been deemed strong: but the links broke, and left to the brother-in-law of Astyages the duty of avenging him,—a duty which seems not to have troubled

¹ i. 102.² Herod. i. 103.

Nebucadnezzar, but which, if we are to believe Herodotos, was to Kroisos the strongest motive for measuring his strength against that of the Persian king.¹ For Kyaxares himself the troubles of the Scythian inroad were followed, if we may believe the story, by a brilliant triumph when with the aid of the Babylonian Nabopolassar he overthrew the ancient dynasty of the Assyrian kings and made Nineveh a dependency of the sovereigns of Media. Over the vast territory thus brought under the Median rule the Persian king became lord, on the ending of the struggle which is described as the war between Cyrus and Astyages.

The supremacy in Asia thus passed into the hands of a king whose chief strength lay in that comparatively small country which still bears the name of Fars or Farsistan. This was the home of the dominant tribe in Iran or the land of the Aryans, a term already used in an indefinitely contracted meaning. By Herodotos this region is called a scanty and rugged land,²—a description not altogether unbecoming a country which, with the exception of the hot district or strip of plain lying between the mountains and the coast line, consists chiefly of the high plateau formed by the continuation of the mountain-system, which, having furnished a boundary to the Mesopotamian plain, turns eastwards and broadens out into the high land of Persia Proper. Of the whole of this country it may be said that where there is water, there is fertility; but much that is now desert was doubtless rich in grass and fruits in the days when Cyrus is said to have warned his people that, if they migrated to a wealthier soil, they must bid farewell to their supremacy among the nations. Strong in a mountain-barrier pierced by astonishingly precipitous gorges along which roads wind in zigzag or are thrown across furious torrents on bridges of a single span, this beautiful or desolate land was not rich in the number of its cities. Near Murgab, about sixty miles almost due north of Shiraz, are the ruins of Pasargadai, probably in its original form Parsa-gherd or the castle of the Persians.³ On a larger plain, about half-way between these two towns, rose the second capital Persepolis. The two streams by which this plain is watered maintain the exquisite verdure which a supply of water never fails to produce in Persia. But rugged in parts and sterile as this plateau may be, it must be distinguished from that vast region which at a height varying between 3000 and 5000 feet extends from the Zagros and Elburz ranges

¹ Herod. i. 73.

² ix. 122.

³ Mr. Rawlinson compares the name Parsa-gherd with the names Darab-gherd, Lās-jird, Burujird, as

well as with the Latinised names of the Parthian cities Tigranocerta, Carathrocerta. This termination is found again in our *girth* and *garth*.

on the west and north over an area of 1100 by 500 miles to the Suliman and Hala mountains on the east, and on the south to the great coast chain which continues the plateau of Persia Proper almost as far as the Indus. Of this immense region, nearly two-thirds are absolute desert, in which the insignificant streams fail before the summer heats instead of affording nourishment to vegetation. In such a country the habits of a large proportion of the population will naturally be nomadic; and the fresher pastures and more genial climate of the hills and valleys about Ekbatana would draw many a roving clan with their herds and tents from regions scorched by a heat which left them no water.

Into the vast empire ruled by the lord of these Aryan tribes there was now to be absorbed another kingdom which had grown up to great power and splendor on the west of the river Halys, the stream which, flowing from the Tauros range, discharges itself into the Euxine about sixty miles to the east of the Greek settlement of Sinôpê. This stream was the boundary which separated the Semitic inhabitants of Asia Minor on its eastern side from the non-Hellenic nations on the west, who acknowledged a certain brotherhood not only between themselves but with the Thracian tribes beyond the Hellespont and the Chersonese. The conquests which had brought the Lydian king thus far placed him in dangerous proximity with a power not less aggressive and more formidable than his own. By a strange coincidence (if any trust may be placed on the narrative) the dynasty represented by Kroisos the last Lydian king had supplanted the ancient line of the Herakleidai (whatever this may mean) about the same time when the Median power asserted its independence of the Assyrian empire. But the relations which existed between Kroisos and the Greeks of Asia Minor imparted to the catastrophe at Sardeis a significance altogether beyond that which could be attached to the mere transference of power from the despot Astyages to the despot Cyrus.

The Lydian kingdom had grown up in a country inhabited by a number of tribes, between most or perhaps all of whom there existed some sort of affinity. These tribes, whatever may have been their origin, were spread over a region of whose loveliness Herodotos speaks with a proud enthusiasm. The beauty of climate, the richness of soil, and the splendor of scenery which made Ionia for him the most delightful of all earthly lands,¹ were not confined to the exquisite valleys in which for the most part the Hellenic inhabitants of Asia Minor had fixed their homes; and the only drawback even to the colder

The Median
and Lydian
dynasties.

Geography
of Asia
Minor.

¹ Herod. i. 142.

parts of this vast peninsula was that, while they yielded grain, fruits, and cattle, they would not produce the olive. These colder parts lay on the large central plain to the north of the chain of Tauros which, starting from the Chelidonian or southeastern promontory of Lykia, extends its huge mountain-barrier to the north of the Kilikian country, until its chain is broken by the Euphrates a little below the point where this stream receives the waters of the Kappadokian Melas or black river. This great plateau runs off towards the north, west, and south, into a broken country whence the mountains slope down to the sea, bearing in their valleys the streams which keep up its perpetual freshness. Stretching in a southwesterly direction from the mouth of the Hellespont, the mountains of Ida, Gargaros, Plakos, and Temnos form the southern boundary of the lands through which the Granikos, Aisepos, and Rhyndakos find their way into the Propontis or sea of Marmora. Striking to the southeast from Mount Temnos until it meets the range of Tauros runs a mountain chain which sends out to the southwest a series of ridges between which lie the most celebrated plains of Asia Minor, each watered by its own stream and its tributaries. In the triangle formed by the mountains of Gargaros and Temnos on the north and mount Pelekas on the south, the streams of Kaikos and Euénos flow into the Elaiatic gulf between Elaia and Pitanê, the latter place being about ten miles distant from the rocks of Argennoussai (disastrous in later Athenian history), opposite to the southeastern promontory of Lesbos. Again between mount Pelekas on the north and the mountains of Sipylos and Tmolos on the south lies the valley of the Hermos which, a few miles to the north of the citadel of Sardes, receives the waters of the Paktolos, and flowing westward past the Sipylian Magnesia, turns to the south near the city of Temnos and runs into the Egean about midway between Smyrna and Phokaia. To the east of Smyrna rise the heights of Olympos and Drakon, which may be regarded as a westward extension of mount Tmolos, between which and mount Messogis the Kaystros finds its way to the sea hard by Ephesos and about ten miles to the east of Kolophon. Finally beneath the southern slopes of Messogis the winding Maiandros, having received not far from Tralleis the waters of the Marsyas, goes on its westward way until, a little below the Maiandrian Magnesia, it turns like the Hermos to the south, and running by Thymbria and Myous on its left bank discharges itself into the gulf which bears its name, precisely opposite to the promontory of Miletos. From this point stretch to westward the Latmian hills where, as the tale went, Selênê came to gaze upon Endymion in his dreamless sleep. Thus each between its mountain walls, the four streams, Kaikos, Hermos,

Kaÿstros, and Maiandros, follow courses which may roughly be regarded as parallel, through lands than which few are richer in their wealth of historical association. Round the ruins of Sardéis gather the recollections not only of the great Lydian kingdom but of the visionary conversations between Kroisos and the illustrious Athenian law-giver, while from Abydos on the north to the promontory of Kynossema, facing the seaborne island of Rhodos, every bay and headland of this glorious coast brings before us some name sacred from its ancient memories, not the least among these being the birthplace of Herodotos, and among the greatest that spot on the seashore beneath the heights of Mykalê where, as fame would have it, the fleet of the barbarian was shattered at the very time when Mardonios underwent his doom at Plataiai.

It is scarcely necessary to say that of the dynasty of Lydian kings which came to an end with Kroisos we have no contemporary history whatever. The Herakleid dynasty of Lydia ends with Kandaules of whom Herodotos speaks as ^{The Lydian} ~~dynasties.~~ known to the Greeks by the wholly different name of Myrtilos. Five centuries had passed away while these kings reigned in an uninterrupted succession of father and son until Kandaules, as Herodotos believed, fulfilled his destiny by insisting on exhibiting the unclothed form of his beautiful wife to his spear-bearer Gyges. His queen, discovering the trick, offers to Gyges the alternative of death or of life and marriage with herself when he shall have slain his master. Of this story it is enough to say that we find quite another version in Plato who tells us that far beneath the surface of the earth Gyges takes from the hand of a gigantic corpse a ring which has the power of making the wearer invisible, and that having by means of this ring corrupted the wife of Kandaules he slew his lord and usurped his throne.¹ This ring, discovered beneath the earth, is the magic ring of the dwarf Andvari in the Volsung tale, and its wonderful powers are seen in the Arabian story of Allah-ud-deen where a giant is its slave as in the story of Gyges he is its lifeless guardian; and the maiden whom he wins is one of those fair women who in a crowd of legends have been wedded to beings who represent the darkness, as Iokastê of Thebes to Laios, and who are all married afterwards to the spear-bearer armed with the rays of the glancing sun. The wife of Kandaules is, in short, Urvasi, the dawn-goddess, who is invested with the beauty, the daring, and promptitude of the Teutonic Brynhild.²

For this murder of Kandaules the divine penalty, we are told by Herodotos, was to descend not on the head of Gyges but on

¹ Plato, *Polit.* 359.

² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 248, 380; ii. 63, 163, 174, 295. *Popular Ro-*

mances of Middle Ages. introd. *Tales of Teutonic Lands,* ib.

that of Kroisos his fifth descendant, the last who should sit on his throne.¹ The accession of Kroisos brings us to the last act in the drama. The heir of immense wealth and master of a stronghold, invulnerable as Achilles, in the akropolis of Sardeis, living under the brightest of skies and amid the most beautiful of earthly scenes, Kroisos is depicted as from the first animated by the ambition of being a happy man, and by the conviction that he had really attained to the state at which he aimed. The golden sands of the Paktolos, or, as others said, the produce of his mines at Pergamos, speedily filled his treasure-houses, and throughout the world the fame went that Kroisos was the wealthiest and happiest of men.

It was the destiny of this magnificent sovereign to bring under the yoke of the Persian king not merely the people who had been subject to the rule of his forefathers, but the Hellenes of the eastern coast of the Egean. The political disunion to which the Greeks whether of continuous or of scattered Hellas seem to have clung as the most precious heritage of the ancient Aryan family type, had insured his success against these Hellenic settlements as at a later day it insured the triumph of Makedonian kings and Roman consuls. Unquestionably the conquest, whatever may have been its character, had wrought a momentous change in their position. They were now included in a vast empire which was at any time liable to the sudden and irreparable disasters which so frequently changed the face of the Asiatic world. If these Hellenes could so far have modified their nature as to combine with the decision and firmness of Englishmen, their union might have broken the power of Xerxes before he could set foot on the soil of Europe. But no danger could impress on them the need of such a sacrifice as this; their position on the borders of a vast undefended country deprived them of the advantages enjoyed by their kinsmen of western Hellas; and the whips of Kroisos were therefore soon exchanged for the scorpions of the Persian despot.

Splendid as is the drama which Herodotos brings before us in his narrative of the life of Kroisos, we have to remember that it is strictly a drama, arranged in accordance with a fixed religious idea,—a drama which admirably illustrates the popular sentiment of the age, but of which,

¹ In other words, the sun kills the night: but the slaughter of the night cannot be avenged until the end of the day, when the sun in his turn must be conquered by the

darkness. In short, the traditional history of the Lydian kingdom, like that of so many other dynasties, has been fitted into the framework of a solar myth.

if we regard it as belonging to the every-day world of fact, we know neither the motives nor the incidents. To the facts that Kroisos was king of Lydia, that from some cause or other he became involved in a quarrel with Persia after having subdued the Asiatic Hellenes, that in this quarrel he had the worst, and that all his subjects passed at once under the do-^{546 B.C. (?)}minion of his conqueror, there is probably not a single detail which we can add with any feeling of confidence that we are registering an historical incident. We have to mark at the outset that Kroisos in the legend enslaves the autonomous Hellenic communities, that he can put to death with horrible tortures¹ those whom he regards as his enemies, and yet that he is loved not less by these Asiatic Hellenes than by the Lydians, and that the catastrophe which overwhelms him excites no other feeling than that of profound sorrow. In truth, as soon as he has chronicled the fact of the Ionian conquest, the historian forgets that he is dealing with an Asiatic despot, and Kroisos becomes to him a being in whose life we read the sad and stern lesson that man abides never in one stay and that he is born to trouble as the sparks fly upward. Impressive as the tale may be thus regarded as a parable, it can scarcely be said to have any other value. The very advice given by Sandanis² at the outset of the struggle shows unmistakably how far we have wandered from the regions of history. It is simply ludicrous to suppose that anyone could have represented to Kroisos the conquest of Persia as an enterprise in which he had nothing to gain and everything to lose. The conqueror of Media could not without absurdity be described as the ruler of a poverty-stricken kingdom; nor without even greater absurdity could Sandanis be said to thank the gods that they had not put into the minds of the Persians to go against the Lydians, when the whole course of the narrative implies that the one absorbing dread which oppressed Kroisos was the fear of that insatiable spirit of aggression which marks all Asiatic empires until they pass from robbery to laziness.

But the task of preparing for the invasion of Persia or for the attack of the Persian king was not for Kroisos the beginning of troubles. In the warning of Solon that none might be called happy before his life was ended he saw the handwriting on the wall which foreboded the coming catastrophe. Thus far most things had gone well with him, and the dumbness of his younger son seemed as nothing to be set in the balance against the vigor of Atys the brave and fair, the pride and the hope of his life. But the word of the god had gone

¹ ἐπὶ κνύφου ἔλκων. Herod. i. 92.

² Herod. i. 72.

forth that Atys must be smitten by the spear and die. In vain Kroisos seeks by every means to prevent the threatened calamity. All weapons are put out of the lad's reach, and he is wedded to a maiden whose love may turn away his thoughts from any tasks involving the least danger. But there comes to the court of Kroisos a suppliant who prays the king to give him shelter and absolve him from the guilt of involuntary homicide. Such a prayer was never made to Kroisos in vain; and when yet other suppliants came beseeching that Atys might be sent to hunt and slay the boar which was ravaging their land, Adrastos, whose very name carried with it the omen of inevitable doom, is sent to guard the beautiful boy from the weapon which is laden with his death. But the god spake of no other spear than that of Adrastos; and when the Phrygian in his unutterable agony slays himself on the tomb of Atys, Kroisos owns that the instrument of the divine will is not to be condemned for a result over which he had no control. From his long and bitter mourning Kroisos is at length roused by the tidings of the fall of his brother-in-law Astyages: but before he enters on the task of avenging him, he resolves to have the counsel of the gods and further to test their oracles before he puts to them the question, the answer to which shall determine him to fight out the quarrel or to lay it aside.

He sent therefore, so the story goes on to tell us (and it is useless to give it in any other words than those of the old historian), to Ammon in Libya, to Amphiarao and Trophonios and the Milesian Branchidai, to Delphoi, to Abai of the Phokians and to Dodona, charging his messengers to count one hundred days from the time of leaving Sardeis, and then to ask all the oracles at once what the Lydian king might at that moment be doing. What the other oracles answered, there were none to say; but at Delphoi the priestess answered:

' I know the number of the sand and the measures of the sea ;
 I understand the dumb man and hear him who speaks not :
 And there comes to me now the savor of a hard-shelled tortoise,
 Which is seething in a brazen vessel with the flesh of a ram,
 And brass there is beneath it and brass above it.'

These words the Lydians wrote down and carried back to the king; and when all had returned to Sardeis from the other oracles, Kroisos took the answers and unfolded them; but none pleased him until he came to the words of the Delphian god, who alone knew that on the hundredth day Kroisos went into a secret place where none might see him and boiled a tortoise and a ram in a brazen vessel on which he placed a brazen lid. This oracle alone with that of Amphiarao he held to have spoken truly; and there-

fore he asked them if he should march against the Persians and if he should get any others to help him in the war. Both gave the same answer that if he went against the Persians he would destroy a great power, and counselled him to find out the mightiest among the Hellenes and make them his friends. Still more pleased with this fancied assurance that he should throw down the kingdom of Cyrus, Kroisos besought the god for the third time, if his empire should last long. The priestess answered :

‘ When a mule shall be king of the Medes,
Then, light-footed Lydian, flee to the banks of the pebbly Hermos,
Flee and tarry not, neither care to hide thy fear.’

More pleased than ever from the supposed impossibility of a mule being ever king of the Medes, he sought now to learn who were the mightiest among the Greeks, and found that these were the men of Athens and of Sparta. Having, therefore, made a covenant with these, that they should help him in the war, he marched from Sardeis to Pteria, taking many cities and ravaging their lands, until Cyrus came up with his armies and tried to draw off the Ionians from Kroisos. But they would not hear him, and afterwards a great battle was fought in which neither side had the victory, for the night came on and parted them. On the next day, as Cyrus came out again to the attack, Kroisos drew off his army to Sardeis, for he liked not the scantiness of its numbers, and he was minded during the winter to gather to his aid the Egyptians and Babylonians with the men of Sparta and early in the spring to march out at once against the Persians. So when he reached Sardeis, he sent away all the army which he had with him ; but Cyrus, having learnt what Kroisos meant to do, marched straight after him and came before Sardeis when the allies of Kroisos were scattered. In a great strait the Lydian king led out his own people who were at this time the bravest of all the nations in Asia and who fought on horseback with long spears, and he drew them up on the large plain which lies before the city. These horsemen Cyrus greatly feared, and by the counsel of Harpagos the Mede he placed riders on all the camels and drew them up in front of his army. So when the battle began, the horses of the Lydians saw and smelt the camels and fled, and the hopes of king Kroisos perished. Still, the Lydians fought on bravely, until they were driven into the city and shut up there. Then Kroisos sent in haste to his friends and bade them come at once to his aid. Thus fourteen days passed away, and then Cyrus promised to reward richly the man who should first climb the walls. But the men tried in vain, until a Mardian named Hyroiades found the part where no guards had been placed and to which king Meles had not

carried the woman-born lion, because he thought that no enemy would ever attempt to climb a rock so steep and rugged. But Hyroiades had seen some one come down and pick up his helmet which had rolled from the wall. By this same path he went up himself and other Persians with him; and so was Sardeis taken and Kroisos made prisoner, when he had reigned for fourteen years and had been besieged for fourteen days, and when, as the oracle had foretold, he had destroyed a great power, namely his own. Then Cyrus raised a great pile of wood and laid Kroisos upon it bound in chains with fourteen of the Lydians, either because he wished to offer them up as the firstfruits of the victory or to see if any of the gods would deliver Kroisos who, as he had learnt, was one who greatly honored them. Then to Kroisos in his great agony came back the words which Solon had spoken to him that no living man was happy; and as he thought on this, he sighed and after a long silence thrice called out the name of Solon. Hearing this, Cyrus bade the interpreters ask him whom he called; but for a long time he would not answer them. At last when they pressed him greatly, he told them that long ago Solon the Athenian came to see him and thought nothing of all his wealth, and how the words had come to pass which Solon spake, not thinking of him more than of any others who fancy that they are happy. While Kroisos thus spake, the edge of the pile was already kindled; but Cyrus, hearing the tale, remembered that he too was but a man and that he was now giving alive to the flames one who had been not less wealthy than himself, and when he thought also how man abideth not ever in one stay, he charged his people to put out the fire and bring Kroisos and the other Lydians down from the pile. But the flame was now too strong; and when Kroisos saw that the mind of Cyrus was changed, but that the men were not able to quench the flames, he prayed to Phoibos Apollon to come and save him, if ever he had done ought to please him in the days that were past. Then suddenly the wind rose, and clouds gathered where none had been before, and there burst from the heaven a great storm of rain which put out the blazing fire. So Cyrus knew that Kroisos was a good man and that the gods loved him: and when Kroisos came down from the pile, Cyrus asked him, 'Who persuaded thee to march into my land and to become my enemy rather than my friend?' 'The god of the Greeks urged me on,' answered Kroisos, 'for no man is so senseless as of his own pleasure to choose war in which the fathers bury their children rather than peace in which the children bury their fathers.' Meanwhile the city was given to storm and plunder, and Kroisos, standing by the side of Cyrus who had loosed him from his chains, asked him what the Persians were

doing down below. 'Surely,' said Cyrus, 'they are plundering thy city and spoiling thy people of their goods.' 'Nay,' answered Kroisos; 'but it is thy wealth and thy goods which they are taking as booty, for I and my people now have nothing. But take good heed. The man who may get the most of this wealth will assuredly rise up against thee: so place thy guards at all the gates and bid them take all the goods, saying that a tithe must first be paid of them to Zeus, and thus thou wilt avoid the peril and no hate shall accrue to thee thereby.' For this good counsel Cyrus bade him ask as a gift what he should most desire to have; and Kroisos said, 'Let me send these fetters to the god of the Greeks and ask him if it be his wont to cheat those who have done him good.' When Cyrus learnt the reason for this prayer, he laughed and said that Kroisos might do this and aught else that he might wish. So men were sent to Delphoi to show the chains and to ask if the Hellenic gods were wont to be ungrateful; and when they came into the temple, the priestess said, 'Not even a god can escape the lot which is prepared for him, and Kroisos in the fifth generation has suffered for the sin of him who at the bidding of a woman slew his lord and seized his power. Much did the god strive that the evil might fall in his children's days and not on Kroisos himself; but he could not turn aside the Moirai. For three years he put off the taking of Sardeis, for thus much only they granted to him; and he came to his aid when the flame had grown fierce on the blazing pile. And yet more, he is wrong in blaming the god for the answer that if he went against the Persians he would destroy a great power, for he should then have asked if the god meant his own power or that of Cyrus; and therefore is he the cause of his own sorrow. Neither, again, would he understand what the god spake about the mule, for Cyrus himself was this mule, being the son of a Median woman, the daughter of Astyages, and of a man born of the meaner race of the Persians.' This answer the Lydians brought to Sardeis; and Kroisos knew that the god was guiltless and that the fault was all his own.

The didactic purpose, not less than the materials of this story, strips its incidents of all historical character. The artless remark of Herodotos that until Kroisos was actually taken no one had paid the least attention to the plain warning, uttered five generations before, that the fifth from Gyges should atone the old wrong, proves at the least that the prediction grew up after the catastrophe, even if it proves no more; and the fabrication of one prophecy brings the rest under the same suspicion. But the narrative convicts itself in other ways. Unless when a literal acceptance of oracular responses is needed

Unhistorical
character of
all the de-
tails.

to keep up a necessary delusion, the recipients of these answers take it for granted that these utterances are, or are likely to be, metaphorical; and to Kroisos himself the facts shrouded under the guise of the mule-king were better known than they could be to any others. The Median sovereign was his brother-in-law, and the very matter which had stirred his wrath was that Cyrus the son of the Persian Kambyses had dethroned his grandfather and thus brought Medes and Persians under one sceptre. But the city of Kroisos, like the great cities and heroes of tradition generally, is vulnerable only in one spot; and the mythical records of the Mermnad despots are brought to an end with the artificial chronology of a reign of fourteen years and a siege of fourteen days. The sequel of the tale Herodotos admits that he received from Lydian informants.¹ Like the stories of the mad freaks ascribed to Kambyses in Egypt, we might well suppose that the tale of the rescue of Kroisos from the flames would be found in no Persian chronicle: and accordingly this tradition cannot be traced in the pages of Ktesias. No Persian could represent his king as profaning the majesty and purity of Fire by offering to it the flesh of men; and the one fact to which the whole story points is that in some way or other and by some means or other, of which we know nothing, the great Lydian empire was absorbed in the mightier monarchy of Persia.

The fall of Kroisos was followed, it is said, by a request of the Ionians to be received as tributaries of Cyrus on the same terms which had been imposed on them by the Lydian king. The petition implies the singular lightness of the Lydian rule, and explains the stern refusal of Cyrus, who grants these terms to the Milesians only. On this many of the Ionian cities sent to Sparta a pressing intreaty for aid; but although the Spartans would take no active measures in their behalf, they sent one ship to ascertain generally the state of affairs in Ionia, the result being that one of their officers, named Lakrines, went to Sardeis and warned Cyrus that any attempt to injure an Hellenic city would bring down on him the anger of the Lakedaimonians. To this warning Cyrus replied by asking who the Lakedaimonians might be; and on hearing some account of them, he added that he had never feared men who set apart a place in their city where they came together to buy, sell, and cheat.² But Cyrus himself could tarry no longer in the west. So having placed the Persian Tabalos in command of the garrison and having with strange indiscretion charged the Lydian Paktyas to bring the plundered treasures to Sousa, Cyrus, taking Kroisos with him,

The revolt of
Paktyas.
546 B.C. (?)

¹ Herod. i. 87.

² Herod. i. 152.

hastened away from Sardeis. No sooner had he set off than Paktyas, hurrying to the coast, employed the means thus placed in his power for the hiring of an army of mercenaries by whose aid he besieged Tabalos in the Sardian akropolis. So great was the anger of Cyrus on hearing of this revolt that he threatened to reduce all the Lydians to slavery.

But Paktyas was not a man to give the Persian king much trouble. No sooner had he heard that Mazares had been dispatched to inslave all who had taken part with him in the blockade of the Sardian akropolis and to bring Paktyas himself to Sousa, than he fled in terror to Kymê, whence he was sent on to Mytilene. But the messengers of Mazares still followed him, and the Mytilenaians were just going to give him up when the men of Kymê sent a ship to Lesbos and brought Paktyas away to Chios, where the citizens agreed to surrender him, if in return they might receive the territory of Atarneus on the Mysian coast facing Lesbos. So the bargain was made and Paktyas given up, doubtless to be slain (although Herodotos takes no further notice of him) with frightful tortures at Sousa. But the curse of ill-gotten wealth clung to the Chians, who dared not offer to the gods anything that had been grown on a field of such bad repute. The resistance to Cyrus was drawing towards its close; and Mazares, having enslaved Priênê, ravaged the beautiful valley of the Maiandros. But he had scarcely done his master's bidding in the lands of Magnesia when he was struck by sudden illness and died, and Harpagos, one of the prominent actors in the mythical history of Astyages, was sent down to take his place.

The first city assailed by Harpagos was Phokaia, about twenty miles to the northwest of the mouth of the Hermos. This town was, in plain speech, a nest of pirates. Their long marauding expeditions¹ had carried them to the shores of the Hadriatic, and even as far as the region of Tartessos, or Tarshish, hard by the pillars of Herakles, the westernmost bounds of the great inland sea. A natural desire for an easy conquest led Harpagos to express to the Phokaians his readiness to accept, as evidence of their submission, a single breach in their walls and the consecration of a single house in the town. In reply the Phokaians demanded one day for deliberation, and the withdrawal of the Persians from the walls for that time. Although he knew, it is said, the meaning of this request, Harpagos did as they wished: and the Phokaians, hastily conveying their women, their children, and all their movable goods to their ships, made

¹ The foundation of Massalia (Marseilles) by these commercial corsairs is ascribed to the year 600 B.C.

sail for Chios and left an empty town for the occupation of the Persians. From the Chians they sought to purchase some islets called Oinoussai lying off the northeastern end of the island. The Chians refused, and the latter thereupon determined to betake themselves to their Kyrnian or Corsican colony of Alalia. But they would not depart without striking a blow which should make their departure memorable. Sailing back to Phokaia, they slaughtered the Persian garrison left there by Harpagos, and, sinking a lump of iron in the harbor, bound themselves by a solemn vow never to revisit their old haunts until that iron should float to the surface of the water. But although all now set off for Alalia, less than half carried out the plan. The rest returned to Phokaia: and if we are to infer that even after the loss of his garrison Harpagos yet received them as tributaries of Cyrus, we have in this fact further evidence that the burdens imposed on them by the Lydian king had been light indeed.

But whatever the Lydian dominion may have been, the Ionians were now to feel the bitterness of the slavery which compelled them to take part in the enslaving of the kindred, although non-Hellenic, tribes of Karians, Kaunians, and Lykians. The resistance of the Karians seems to have shown but little energy. The resistance of the Lykians and Kaunians was as desperate as that of the Karians was feeble. As soon as the army of Harpagos took up its position on the plains of the Xanthos, they each brought their wives, children, and slaves into the akropolis of their towns, and having set the akropolis on fire, rushed out on the enemy and fought till not a man of them remained alive.

But while these isolated communities, whose civilisation was immeasurably beyond that of their conquerors, were being absorbed in the vast mass of Persian dominion, that dominion was being extended far to the east and the south by Cyrus himself, who swept like a whirlwind over all Asia, subduing, as the historian tells us, every nation without passing over one.¹ Of the details of these conquests, with one exception, we know nothing: and even in this solitary instance the mists which rest on Mesopotamian history generally, leave little clear beyond the fact that the sceptre of the old Babylonian or Assyrian kings was broken by the despot of Persia.

But as the historical scene changes from Ionia to Babylon, we are driven to note the contrast between the intense individual energy of the autonomous Hellenic communities with their woful lack of political combination, and the iron system of Asiatic centralisation which could accomplish the most

¹ Herod. i. 177.

gigantic tasks by dint of sheer manual labor, the multitude as a political machine being everything, the individual man nothing. Between the Assyrians and Babylonians on the one hand and the Hellenic tribes on the other, the Phenicians and Carthaginians occupy a middle ground, combining the rigid manipulation of masses with the exercise of those higher independent faculties which won for them both fame and wealth from the coasts of Tyre to the Mediterranean gates. But generally it may be said that, in the measure in which it prevailed, the monotony of Eastern despotism became the seed-bed in which an imposing but utterly imperfect civilisation was forced to an early maturity. The plains of Bagdad and Mosul are now a dreary and desolate waste ; but these arid sands were thrice in the year covered with a waving sea of corn, in the days when Sennacherib or Nebucadnezzar ruled at Nineveh or Babylon. Crushing and pitiless as may have been their despotism, they yet knew that their own wealth must be measured by the fertility of the soil, and thus they took care that their whole country should be parcelled out by a network of canals, the largest of which might be a highroad for ships between the Euphrates and the Tigris. On the soil thus quickened grew the tree which attracted to itself an affectionate veneration : and while the date palm yielded both wine and bread, the grain of corn, of millet, or of sesame was multiplied, as the more cautious said, fifty or an hundred fold, or, as Herodotos believed, in years of exceptional abundance even three hundredfold. Scarcely less dazzling than this picture of cereal wealth produced in a land where rain scarcely ever fell is the description which Herodotos gives of the magnificence of Babylon, and he saw the great city after it had been given up to plunder by Dareios and robbed of its costliest treasures by Xerxes. The coloring of this sketch must be heightened, if we would realise the grandeur of that royal town inclosed amidst exquisite gardens within the stupendous walls which rose to a height, it is said, of three hundred feet, each side of the square extending to fifteen English miles, and giving the means of ingress and egress by five-and-twenty brazen gates. Within this wall rose at some distance another, less huge, but still very strong ; and within this were drawn out the buildings and streets of the city in rectangular blocks reaching down to the wall, which was carried from one end of the town to the other along the banks of the river, broken only by the huge brazen gates which at the end of each street gave access to the water. High above the palaces and houses around it towered the mighty temple of Bel, story above story, to a height, it is said, of six hundred feet, from a base extending over more than 1200 feet on each side, while the stream was spanned by a bridge, the several portions of which were drawn

aside at night, but which was used during the day by such as might not care to enter the ferry boats stationed at each landing-place along the river walls.

It might have been thought that this great seat of theocratic despotism could within its network of canals and behind its stupendous walls have bidden defiance to the utmost efforts of Cyrus. For a year the coming of the invader was, we are told, delayed by the grave duty of avenging on the river Gyndes the insult which it had offered to one of the sacred white horses. This stream which joins the Tigris near the ancient Opis and the modern Bagdad dared to drown the beast which had rashly plunged into it, and the fiat of the king went forth that the river should be so lowered by the dispersion of its waters through a hundred canals that women should henceforth cross it without wetting their knees. This seeming freak, which we might be tempted to compare with the scourging of the Hellespont by Xerxes, is ascribed by some to a wise and deliberate design by way of preparing his army for the more momentous task of diverting the Euphrates as the means for surprising Babylon. But he can scarcely suppose that Cyrus could know, a year before, that he would have either the need or the opportunity of putting this plan into action, or that with his unbounded command of labor, insuring the same results at one time as at another, he should find it necessary thus to rehearse the most troublesome scene in the coming drama. He might rather expect that he would be compelled to fight his way inch by inch from one canal to another, and that a series of victories in the open plain might render a siege of the great city superfluous. If we may trust the traditional narratives, his expectations were in every particular disappointed. The road lay open before him without resistance to the very gates of Babylon; and Cyrus resolved to see whether the stream to which his enemies most trusted for their safety might not be made the means of achieving their destruction. But whether we take the narrative of Herodotos or that of Xenophon, we are following a story which is full of difficulties. On one point only are they agreed,—that the city was taken by surprise during a time of festival. This surprise was effected, according to Herodotos, by drawing off the waters of the Euphrates into a large reservoir dug considerably to the north of the city, like the lake ascribed to queen Nitokris. But this lake is said to have been designed to receive the overflow of the river in seasons of flood; and a basin which might suffice for this purpose would be ludicrously insufficient to take off the whole stream so far as to leave the remainder easily fordable. In short, the mode by which Herodotos supposes the work to have been done may fairly be pronounced impossible: but this objection

Siege and
capture of
Babylon.

cannot be urged with the same apparent force against the account, given by Xenophon, that Cyrus drew off the water into two large canals or trenches, which ran round the walls on both sides of the river and discharged it again into its natural bed.¹ There remain in this case two difficulties, one lying in the vastness of the labor of digging trenches to inclose an area as large as that of the Landgraviat of Hesse Homburg,²—trenches, moreover, deeper necessarily than the bed of the stream, in default of a dam or barrier across the river which would have at once betrayed his design to the enemy, and of which not a hint is given by any historian. The other difficulty is more serious. The whole design assumes that the feast would be accompanied by the incredible carelessness of not merely withdrawing all the guards from the river walls but of leaving open all the gates in these walls,—a carelessness, moreover, which made the whole task of canal-digging a superfluous ceremony, for, the gates being open and the guards withdrawn, boats would have furnished means of access for the assailants vastly more easy, rapid, and sure, than the oozy bed of an alluvial stream which would in all likelihood have insured the destruction of the whole army. In truth, here, as elsewhere, the main fact may rest on adequate evidence: the details must remain unknown. Babylon was surprised by Cyrus,—how, we cannot venture positively to say.

Babylon was treated, it would seem, much like the cities of Ionia and Lydia. The walls, it is said, were breached,³ and a tribute was imposed; but it underwent neither the cruelties nor the spoliation which followed the visits of Dareios or Xerxes, and the population remained probably undiminished. From Babylon the thirst of conquest led Cyrus, according to Herodotos, against the Massagetai, a nomadic tribe whom he places on the further bank of the Araxes; and here he received the first and last check in his career of unbroken success.⁴ Cyrus, it is said, was slain; but the impulse which his

Last scenes in the drama of the life of Cyrus.

¹ It is well to see what is implied in this statement. The amount of water conveyed by the Euphrates at Hillah, according to the dimensions now assigned to the stream at that point, is not much less than that of the Thames at London Bridge. According to Herodotos, the walls of Babylon formed a square of which each side was fourteen miles in length; and thus, if we follow Xenophon, Cyrus dug two canals, each capable of conveying half the contents of the Euphrates, and each about thirty miles in length, at the least. This, moreover, he did on the mere

chance of being able to surprise the town in some unguarded moment on which he had no right to count.

² I take Mr. Rawlinson's illustration, *Anc. East. Mon.* ii. 340.

³ Mr. Rawlinson, *East. Mon.* iii. 519, affirms the fact: Mr. Grote denies it.

⁴ The plan of Herodotos rendered this arrangement indispensable. That the Persian or other traditions represented his course as less prosperous is clear from the statement of Arrian, vi. 24, that Cyrus lost his whole army in the attempt to invade India through Gedrosia.

career had given to the Persian tribes was as strong as ever. For them freedom, as they called it, meant immunity from taxation in time of peace and unbounded plunder and licence in time of war. The motive thus supplied would account for the invasion of Egypt as readily as for the campaigns in Lydia and Babylonia.

Long before the first feeble notions of a polity were awakened in the nations of Europe, long even before Mesopotamian civilisation showed its cumbrous and ungainly proportions, the Egyptians presented, in their wealth, their organisation, their science and their art, a marvellous sight which in after ages excited the astonishment of Herodotus more than all the vastness of Babylon. This wonderful exuberance of life, at a time when every other land was sunk in barbarism, was the result of the fertility of the Nile valley; and the Nile valley was the creation of the great river which first scooped out its channel and then yearly filled it up with mud.¹ The low limestone hills, which serve as a boundary to the narrow belt of luxuriant vegetation on either side of the stream, mark probably the course of the river which has been thrust hither and thither in its path according to the strength of the material with which it came into conflict. Where this material was soft, its channel is wide: where it presented a less yielding front, the stream narrows, until in the granite districts of Assuan it forces its way through the rock by plunging down a cataract. In all likelihood these falls, which the traveller now faces only in the upper part of its course, have receded gradually southwards from Cairo; and thus the Nile has only been beforehand in the process which is now slowly but surely eating away the ledge of rock which forms the barrier of Niagara. These cliffs, it is true, are now far above the level of the stream: but the markings which Egyptian kings have left at Semneh in Nubia show that at a time long preceding the visit of Herodotus to Egypt the river rose to a height exceeding by four-and-twenty feet that which it ever reaches now: and the deserted bed of a still earlier age proves that the inundation rose at least seven-and-twenty feet above its highest mark at the present day. Hence it may probably be said with literal truth that Egypt is the creation of the Nile. Throughout its long journey of more than a thousand miles after entering the region of the cataracts, this mysterious stream, receiving not a single affluent, lavishes its wealth on the right hand and on the left, not only affording to the people of each spot an easy

¹ This fact was perceived by Herodotus, ii. 11, with the clearness of a mind free from prejudice. Had he been shackled by the popular chronology which dates the creation from a period removed by scarcely sixty centuries from our own age, he could never have grasped the idea of processes which he clearly sees must have occupied many thousands or even myriads of years.

and sure maintenance which called for the use of neither spade nor plough nor for any nourishment beyond that of its life-giving waters, but furnishing the materials for an active commerce by the difference of its products in the northern and southern portions of its course and by the long prevalence of northerly winds which enable vessels to overcome the force of the descending current. All this it did, and it did even more. The ease and rapidity with which the crops were sown and the harvest gathered insured to the people an amount of leisure which to the barbarians of Europe toiling for bare subsistence was an unknown luxury. It was no wonder, therefore, that the inhabitants of the Nile valley should have grown into a compact and well-ordered state even while the beautiful banks of the Hermos and the Maiandros were still a solitude or peopled only by rude and isolated tribes. But more than this, the river which gave them wealth guarded them against their enemies. The belt of verdure which marks its course stretches to no greater width than two miles and a half on either side; and this happy region is shut in by arid deserts in which an abundance of nitre would render all rain-water, if any fell there, unfit for drinking.

But if the river insured the rapid development of the people who might dwell on its banks, it also determined the character of their civilisation. Allowance being made for some variation of climate in its long course, the physical conditions of their existence were throughout much the same. Everywhere there was the river with its nourishing stream, and the strip of verdure which was literally its child. Everywhere were the low hills girding in this garden and marking off the boundless burning desert: and over all by day and by night hung the blue unclouded sky, across which the sun journeyed in his solitary chariot, to be followed by his bride the moon with the stars her innumerable sisters or children. When to this we add that from one end of the land to the other there was no stronghold where a discontented or rebellious chief might defy the king or the people and no spot which gave access to an invader across the fiery barrier to the east or the west, we have a series of conditions which we feel sure must produce a great people but which will keep all on a dead level of submission to the one governing power. Whatever this power might be, it would be able to sweep the Nile with its ships, and by shutting off the water from the canals to reduce to starvation at any moment the inhabitants of a disaffected city or village. Thus from first to last we have a nation which could never make way against its rulers, and whose skill and labor these rulers might apply to any work however oppressive and unprofitable: nor can it for a moment be doubted that, however great may have been the blessings which

The people
of the Nile
valley.

the Nile brought with it from its mountain sources, these works involved an amount of hardship and tyranny which must at best have made life seem hard and the problem of life a strange riddle, if nothing lay beyond it. But this people, so shut off from all other nations, and thus rising into an astonishingly early greatness, exhibited few, if any, points of resemblance to the tribes of the vast continent in which their river ran. In color less dark than the Arab, in features little resembling any Semitic tribe and displaying often a strange resemblance to the Greek, in habit utterly opposed to the roving Bedouin, the Egyptians embellished their life with arts which no negro tribe has ever known. They were spinners and weavers, potters and workers in metals, painters and sculptors. Their social order harmonised in its system of caste with that of India and, it may very safely be added, with that of the Hellenic and the Latin tribes. These castes were united in a firm and centralised polity in which the king ruled conjointly with, if not in submission to, the priestly order which surrounded his life and that of the people with a multitude of ceremonial rules invested with an appalling power by the terrors of an unseen world.

To the Greeks this country with its ancient and mysterious civilisation remained, it is said, altogether unknown down to a time preceding the battle of Marathon by about 180 years, when a fleet of Milesians took possession of a harbor on the eastern shore of the Kanopic branch of the Nile and there built the city of Naukratis, which became a depot of trade between Egypt and Europe. In the reign of Amasis this settlement received the privileges of a stringent monopoly. Foreign merchants, arriving at any other mouth of the Nile, were compelled to swear that they had been driven thither by stress of weather and to depart at once for the Kanobitic mouth, or in default of this their goods were sent to Naukratis by one of the inland canals. The leanings of Amasis towards the Greeks are still further shown by his alliance with Polykrates; but the story of this alliance is only another illustration of that Divine jealousy which dashes the cup of happiness from the lips of Kroisos and of Cyrus.

This ancient kingdom with its wonderful cities and its teeming soil was now in its turn to be absorbed into the wide sea of Persian dominion: but although the fact of its subjugation is clearly established, not much confidence can be placed in the details of the narrative. The stories of Herodotos and Ktesias cannot be reconciled; and the statements of the Behistun inscription, so far as it notices the reign of Kambyses, differ in some points from both. At once then we are driven to look with suspicion on statements which represent Kambyses as a

Opening of
Egypt to
Greek com-
merce.
570 B.C. (?)

Invasion of
Egypt by
Kambyses.
525 B.C. (?)

man closely resembling the mad emperor Paul of Russia, while the facts related, if they be true, seem capable of an easier explanation as results of a scheme carefully laid and deliberately carried out. The two points which needed the most careful forethought in his plan of Egyptian conquest lay in the supply of water for his army during their passage across the desert which protects Egypt from the north-east, and in the co-operation of a fleet which should make it impossible for the Egyptian king to prolong the contest by obtaining supplies from the sea. In securing the first Kambyzes is said by Herodotos to have followed the advice of the Halikarnassian Phanes, a deserter from the service of Amasis, who advised him to make a treaty of friendship with a chief or chiefs of the Arab tribes of the desert. The fleet, with the men who manned it, was supplied by the Ionian and Aiolian cities of Asia Minor and by the Phenicians of Tyre. Had Amasis lived, the struggle might have been prolonged, perhaps even with a different result: but he had died a few months before the invasion, and his son Psammenitos seems to have inherited neither his wisdom nor his vigor. Signs from heaven were not wanting to tell of the coming troubles. Rain had fallen at Thebes; and the horrible draught in which his Hellenic mercenaries had drunk the blood of the sons of Phanes¹ may have added fierceness to the courage with which they fought for Egypt, but it could not countervail the disparity of numbers which turned the scale in the great battle near the Pelousian mouth of the Nile.

Thus had Kambyzes carried to its utmost bounds the Persian empire, as it was conceived by Herodotos, for according to his narrative all the wisdom and vigor of Darcios did not enable him to extend its limits or to guard it against some grave disasters. But Kambyzes in Memphis was lord of all the nations from Baktra to the Nile, and it was now time that the Divine Nemesis should lay its hand not merely on Kambyzes as it had done upon his father, but also on that invincible army which both he and Cyrus had headed in a career of all but uninterrupted conquest. He must therefore now begin to make war not only against men, but, like Xerxes in his defiance of Phoibos, against the gods. The madness thus sent upon him was, according to the informants of Herodotos, shown first in the insults which he heaped on the mummy of Amasis,² and then in the infatuation which led him

Expedition against the Ethiopians and the temple of Amoun.

¹ Herod. iii. 11. The indignation which Herodotos describes them as feeling against the man who had brought down strangers upon Egypt is strong evidence of the

prosperity of the Hellenic settlement at Naukratis, and of the advantages which they derived from the trade with Egypt.

² Herod. iii. 2.

from Thebes to march against the Ethiopians, while he sent 50,000 men to destroy the shrine of Amoun in the desert. Scarcely more than a fifth part of the march was to be accomplished towards the land of that mysterious people, who lay far beyond the Nile cataracts. They were going, as they thought, to a region where the earth daily produced, like the Holy Grail and the wonderful napkins and pitchers of Aryan folk-lore, inexhaustible banquets of luscious and ready-cooked meats.¹ But before they could cross the zone of burning sand which lay between them and those luxurious feasts, the failure even of grass for food drove them to decimate themselves; and this outbreak of cannibalism warned Kambyses that some tasks were too hard even for the great king. Probably before he could reach Memphis, he had heard of another disaster. The men whom he had sent to destroy the shrine of Amoun² were traced as far as the city of Oasis, where according to Herodotos a colony of Samaians was established: but from the day on which they left it, not one was ever seen again. The guardians of the shrine asserted (and the guess was in all likelihood right) that they had been overwhelmed by a dust-storm and their bodies buried beneath the pillars of fiery sand.

A third enterprise by which Kambyses proposed to extend the Persian dominion as far as the Tyrian colony of Carthage was frustrated by the blunt refusal of the Phœnician sailors to go against their kinsfolk. The refusal of these hardy mariners to serve against Carthage secured the freedom of the great city which under Hannibal was to contend with Rome for the dominion of the world; but in Kambyses this disregard of his wishes, following on the disasters which had befallen his army, stirred up, it is said, the tiger-like temper which must slake its rage in blood.

The opportunity was supplied by the jubilant cries which greeted Kambyses on his return to Memphis. The people were shouting, not for him, but because they had found the calf in whom they worshipped the incarnation of the god Apis. If the time during which they had been without such a calf³ was long, their exultation would be greater on finding an animal which met the difficult tests of complete blackness of skin with a square of white on the forehead, double

¹ That this is one of the many stories of unbounded plenty connected with the earth and its symbols, there can be no question. See *Mythology of Ar. Nat.* book ii. ch. 2, section 12.

² It is possible that this expedition may have been prompted by

zeal for the Zoroastrian monotheism which must have been his faith, if he was a true Persian.

³ The calf was not suffered to live more than twelve years. If it reached that age, it was solemnly slain and its body reverently embalmed.

hairs on the tail, and a beetle mark on its tongue. But the tyrant would have it that they were making merry over his calamities. In vain did the natives whom he had himself intrusted with the government of Memphis strive to explain the real cause of the rejoicing. They were all put to death. The priests who were next summoned gave the same explanation; and Kambyses said that he would see this tame god who had come among them. The beast was brought, and Kambyses, drawing his dagger, wounded him on the thigh. 'Poor fools, these then are your gods,' he cried, 'things of flesh and blood, which may be wounded by men. Truly the god and his worshippers are well matched: but you shall smart for raising a laugh against me.' So the priests were scourged; an order was issued that everyone found in holiday guise should forthwith be slain; and the feast was broken up in terror. The calf-god pined away and died in the temple; and the priests in secret buried it with the wonted rites. From this time, so said the Egyptians, Kambyses became hopelessly mad. It is possible that his madness may have been not without method, and that these insults to Apis and his worshippers were only part of a deliberate plan, such as would commend itself to Nadir Shah or Timour, for crushing the spirit of the conquered nation; but the opinion must remain little more than a conjecture. It is to this period that Herodotos assigns the murder of his brother whom, in jealousy of his strength and beauty, he had sent back to Sousa. In the dreams which followed his departure the tyrant had seen a herald and heard from his lips that Smerdis sat on a throne and that his head touched the heaven. Putting on this vision the only interpretation which would suggest itself to a despot, Kambyses at once sent Prexaspes home with orders to slay the prince. When it was afterwards discovered that the deed had been done to no purpose, Prexaspes swore solemnly that he had not only slain but buried him with his own hands; but the historian admits that while one account represented him as murdering Smerdis on a hunting expedition, others said that he had enticed him out to sea and thrown him overboard. The Behistun inscription shuts out both these tales by saying that the tyrant's brother was murdered long before the army started for Egypt.

We now come to the last act of the tragedy. The army had reached on its homeward march a Syrian village named Agbatana, when a herald coming from Sousa bade all Persians to own as their king not Kambyses who was deposed but his brother Smerdis the son of Cyrus. To a question of Prexaspes, put by the order of Kambyses, the herald replied that he had received his message not from the new king, whom he had never seen, but from the Magian who was over

his household. A further question put by Kambyzes to Prexaspes himself called forth the answer that he knew not who could have hatched this plot but Patizeithes, whom Kambyzes had left at Sousa as his high steward, and his brother Smerdis. So then this was the Smerdis whose head was to touch the heaven: and the despot wept for his brother whom he had so uselessly done to death. Presently he said that he would march on at once against the usurper, and leaping on his horse gashed his thigh (the part where he had wounded the calf-god) with his sword from which the sheath had accidentally fallen off. 'What is the name of this place?' asked Kambyzes, when he felt that the wound was serious. They told him that he was at Agbatana; and the tyrant, knowing now that only a misinterpretation of the oracle from Bouto which said that he must die at Agbatana had led him to indulge in pleasant dreams of an old age spent among the Median hills, confessed that his brother had been righteously avenged. His remaining days or hours were spent in bewailing his evil deeds to his courtiers, and in exhortations to them to stand out bravely against the Magian usurpation which, he clearly saw, was designed to transfer to the Medes the supremacy of the Persians. His words were naturally received with little faith, for Prexaspes, of course, swore as stoutly before the Persians that he had never harmed Smerdis as he had to Kambyzes averred that he had buried him with his own hands; and thus the Magian Smerdis became king of the Persians.

Such is the dramatic version of Herodotos, which absolutely needs the doubling of the names Agbatana and Smerdis. The Behistun inscription, it is said, affirms that Kambyzes killed himself purposely; that the name of the Magian was Gomates, not Smerdis; and that his usurpation was a religious, and not, as has been generally supposed, a national rebellion, its object being to restore the ancient magism or element worship, which the predominance of the stricter monotheism of Zoroaster had placed under a cloud. The details of the sequel may be passed lightly over. The false Smerdis, who had had his ears cut off, is discovered by the daughter of Otanes, who passes her hands over his head while he sleeps; and Otanes, taking counsel with Aspathines and Gobryas, gains over to the conspiracy Intaphernes, Megabyzos, and Hydarnes, Dareios being admitted last of all as the seventh, on his arrival from the province of Persia Proper, of which his father Hystaspes was the viceroy. The number of conspirators being complete, two debates follow, the first issuing in the resolution to slay the Magian and his supporters at once; the second, after their death, to determine the form of government which it would be wise to set up. Otanes, the author of the conspiracy,

The conspiracy of the Seven Persians.

having proposed a republic on the ground that in no other way can a really responsible government be attained, is opposed by Megabyzos who, urging that the insolent violence of the mob is quite as hateful as that of any despot, recommends an oligarchy, while Dareios with the old stock argument that, if the ruler be perfect as he ought to be, no form of polity can be preferable to monarchy, insists that the customs of the Persians shall not be changed. Upon this, Otanes, it is said, seeing that things would go as Dareios wished, made a paction that he would neither be king himself nor submit to anyone else as king. He and his successors with their families should remain independent for ever, while the king on his part must covenant to take his wives only from the families of the seven conspirators, who should have as their special privilege the right of entering the king's presence without being announced. The sovereign power was to belong to that man whose horse should neigh first after being mounted on the following morning.

All these conditions, it has been urged, furnish clear evidence that these seven conspirators are not, as Herodotos supposes, founders of seven families who form henceforth the highest nobility of Persia, but heads of seven existing princely houses, who thus carried into action their protest against the usurpation of the infidel.¹ Such a national movement may have taken place: but we can scarcely venture to affirm the fact positively, while the Behistun inscription compels us to reject almost every portion of the story as given by Herodotos. Of the mutilation of the Magian by Kambyses, of his discovery through the agency of Phaidyme, of the conspiracy of the Seven, this monument says absolutely nothing. To the version of Herodotos, who represents Dareios as the last who joined the conspirators, it gives the most complete contradiction. Dareios asserts unequivocally that no one dared to say anything against the Magian until he arrived. To the seven he makes no reference, unless possibly in the words that 'with his faithful men' he fell on the Magian and slew him, while the legend of his election by the trick of his groom Oibares is put aside by his assertion that the empire of which Gomates dispossessed Kambyses had from the olden time been in the family of Dareios.² The incidents so rejected are the chief and essential features in the narrative of Herodotos; and the rock inscription must, on the supposition of their truth, have made to them at least some passing allusion, if

The accession of Dareios to the Persian throne.
520 B.C. (?)

¹ Niebuhr, who takes this view, *Lect. Anc. Hist.* i. 131, says that as these seven grandees continue to be mentioned in later Persian history, and as Dareios, being an Achaimenid, was one of them, only six

would have remained, so that the families cannot be the descendants of the seven conspirators.

² This would mean that Cyrus, like Dareios, was an Achaimenid.

not some direct reference. But if such a monument as the inscription of Behistun overthrows on such important points a series of narratives in the history of one of the most trustworthy of men, and if other large portions are to be set aside as mere reflexions of Hellenic thought or feeling, alike absurd and impossible in the East, with what trust may we receive any story which paints the course of intrigue and illustrates the secret history of a Persian or Assyrian Court? for, with the exception of the march of armies and tales of foreign conquest, the annals of those courts are only a secret history. Hints of execrable cruelties may force their way into the outer air; pictures of fancied luxury and generosity may light up the dim recesses of the hidden harem: but what reason have we to suppose that of any single motive we shall have a faithful description, of any single deed a true report? We have arrived at a time in which such intrigues and hidden motives are said to be the mainspring of actions affecting all Hellas; and the answer to this doubt must seriously affect almost the whole history of Persia in its connexion with events which have changed the fortunes of the world.

CHAPTER II.

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE UNDER DAREIOS.

THE death of the usurper who dethroned Kambyses was followed, it is said, by a general massacre of the Magians. This massacre seems to point to a state of confusion and disorder which, according to Herodotos,¹ prevented Dareios from taking the strong measures which he otherwise would have taken against some refractory or rebellious satraps of the empire. The statement is amply borne out by the inscription of Behistun, which describes the early years of the reign of Dareios as occupied with putting down a series of obstinate insurrections against his authority. The massacre of the Magian and his partisans seems in no way to have deterred the Medians from making a general effort to recover the supremacy of which they had been deprived by Cyrus. But the fortune of war went against them. The revolt of Babylon may have appeared a matter even more serious; but our knowledge can scarcely be said to extend beyond the facts that it broke out and that it was with great difficulty suppressed; the walls of the

¹ Herod. iii. 126, 127, 150. The *πρηγμάτων*, if justified by the facts, phrases *ἡ παραχῆ*, and *οἰδεόντων τῶν* would indicate a partial anarchy.

city being now so far dismantled as to leave the place henceforth at the mercy of the conqueror.

But the worst enemies of Dareios came sometimes from his own people. In Aryandes, who had been appointed satrap of Egypt by Kambyses, he found a rival rather than a subject : but the career of the viceroy who dared to have an independent mint was soon cut short.¹ Another formidable antagonist was Oroites, the satrap of Lydia, who has a wider fame as the murderer of Polykrates the despot of Samos. This unscrupulous tyrant had, it is said, seized on the government of the island some time before the Egyptian expedition of Kambyses,² and had shared it at first with his brothers Pantagnotos and Syloson ; but having afterwards killed the one and banished the other, he entered into a close alliance with Amasis king of Egypt,³ and soon achieved a greatness inferior only to that of Minos, like whom he is said to have had a navy which was the terror of the islands and countries round about. In the emphatic words of Herodotos,⁴ he was lord of the most magnificent city in the world. His war-ships plundered friends and foes alike ; and the men of Lesbos who ventured to aid the Milesians paid the penalty by having to dig in chains the moat round the wall of the city of Samos. But in spite of all his iniquities Polykrates enjoyed an unbroken good fortune ; and his well-doing became, we are told, a cause of grief and misgiving to his ally Amasis, who reminded him of the Divine Jealousy, and counselled him to inflict some pain on himself, if none were sent to him by the gods. ' Seek out,' he said, ' that thing for the loss of which thy soul would most be grieved, and cast it away so that it may never come to mortal hand : and if hereafter thy good fortune be not mixed with woe, remedy it in the manner which I have set before thee.' This counsel Polykrates thought that he could not follow more effectually than by rowing out into the deep sea and casting into the water a seal-ring of emerald set in gold, wrought by the Samian Theodoros. A few days later a fisherman brought to him as a gift a fish which seemed to him too fine to be taken to the market. Polykrates in requital bade the man to supper : but before the time for the meal came, his servants had found the seal-ring in the fish. In great astonishment Polykrates sent to Amasis a letter telling him what had happened. The Egyptian king, feeling now that no man could deliver another from that which was to come upon him, sent a herald to Samos and broke off the alliance, in order that, when some evil fate overtook Polykrates, his own heart might not be grieved as for a friend.

¹ Herod. iv. 166.

² Ib. iii. 39.

³ Ib. iii. 55.

⁴ Ib. iii. 139.

It is possible, as some have thought, that the alliance was broken off not by Amasis but by Polykrates himself, for the next thing which Herodotos relates of him is an offer to furnish troops for the army of Kambyses.¹ The Persian king eagerly accepted the offer, and Polykrates as eagerly availed himself of the opportunity to get rid of those Samians whom he regarded as disaffected towards himself. But in the epical method of Herodotos the time was now come when the man who had been victorious over all his enemies should exhibit in his own person the working of that law which keeps human affairs in constant flow and ebb. We can, therefore, only say, as he tells us, that Oroites whom Cyrus had left as satrap in Sardeis had made up his mind to intrap and slay Polykrates, and sent a messenger to Samos with this message, 'Thus saith Oroites to Polykrates, I hear that thou art set on great things, but that thou hast not money according to thy designs. Know then that king Kambyses seeks to slay me. Therefore come and take me away and my money, and keep part of it for thyself, and part of it let me have. So, if thou thinkest for money, thou shalt be ruler over all Hellas; and if thou believest not about my wealth, send the trustiest of thy servants, and to him will I show it.' These words roused the greed of Polykrates, and Maiandrios his scribe was sent to test the words of Oroites who, when he had heard that the Samian was nigh at hand, filled eight vessels with stones all but a little about the brim, and having placed gold on the stones² fastened the vessels and kept them ready. Maiandrios, having seen the jars, brought the tidings to Polykrates, who made ready to go, although the soothsayers with his friends forbade him to do so. His daughter pleaded that she had seen a vision which betokened disaster; but she pleaded in vain. Polykrates sailed from Samos, taking with him many of his comrades, and among them Demokedes, the son of Kalliphon of Kroton, a physician famed beyond all others of his time for the practice of his art. But he reached Magnesia, the

522 B.C. (?) The despotism of Maiandrios and of Syloson.

neither himself nor his great designs, for with the exception of the despots of Syracuse no one of the Greek tyrants deserved to be compared for greatness with Polykrates.

When the tidings of his death were brought to Samos, his deputy Maiandrios made a strong effort, it is said, to restore the constitution which his master had subverted. He offered to resign his power and to obey the laws as a simple citizen, reserving to himself only a grant of six talents

¹ Herod. iii. 44.

² A trick somewhat resembling this was actually played off by the men of Egesta in Sicily upon the

Athenians, and seems to have turned the scale at Athens in favor of their disastrous expedition to that island. Thuc. vi. 8 and 46.

and the priesthood of Zeus the Deliverer. The offer was contemptuously refused, and Maiandrios against his will was compelled to remain a despot, until a new actor appeared upon the scene in the person of Syloson the exiled brother of Polykrates. Syloson by the gift of a cloak had earned the gratitude of Dareios when the latter was serving with the army of Kambyses in Egypt. He now claimed from Dareios the Persian king the aid which he had promised in his humbler station ; and a Persian fleet under Otanes appeared before Samos to enforce the pretensions of Syloson. By Maiandrios no opposition was offered, but the mad folly of his brother Charilaos brought about a massacre of the unsuspecting Persian officers in the market-place of the city. Otanes retaliated by an indiscriminate slaughter alike of men, women, and children throughout the island. Syloson remained, it would seem, tributary despot of Samos and was succeeded by his son Aiakes.¹

Thus the first whether of Hellenic or of barbarian cities passed in a state of desolation under the yoke of Dareios who was known among his subjects rather as an organiser than as a conqueror, or, as the Persians put it, rather as a huckster than as the father of his people. Under the former kings the several portions of the empire had sent yearly gifts. Henceforth the several provinces were to pay an assessed tribute ; and Herodotos is naturally careful to state the measure of the burdens imposed on the Asiatic Greeks. Four hundred silver talents were demanded yearly from the Ionians, Magnesians, Aioliens, Karians, Lykians, Milyans, and Pamphylians, who were ranged in one department or Nomos. On the second which included the Mysians and Lydians was assessed the sum of five hundred talents. The third department which stretched from the Hellespont eastwards paid three hundred and sixty talents in silver. But although something was thus done for the wealth and dignity of the king, the Persian empire remained, as it had been, a mere agglomeration of units, with no other bond than that of a common liability to tribute and taxation, with no common sentiment extending beyond the bounds of the several tribes, and with no inherent safeguards against disruption from without or decay and disorganisation within.

The tragedy of Polykrates is followed by two stories from which it is no easy task to extract much historical fact. Of these stories the former is associated with the name of the Krotonian physician Demokedes, who, on the death of Oroitēs, was carried to Sousa along with the other slaves found in his household and for some time remained there unknown and uncared for. At length it happened, so the story ran, that Dareios in

¹ Herod. vi. 13.

a hunt leaped from his horse, and so twisted his foot that the ankle bone was moved from its socket. The Egyptian physicians, whom he kept about him, made the mischief worse than they found it; and it was not until he had passed eight wretched and sleepless nights that some one, who had heard in Sardeis of the great skill of Demokedes, told the king, at whose bidding the friend of Polykrates was brought before him, dragging his chains and clothed in rags. This man's heart, we are told, was filled with one absorbing desire, for the attainment of which he was ready to shape both his words and his actions and to work on persistently, no matter what misery and ruin he might bring on the land which he yearned to see once more. Hence when Dareios asked him of his craft, Demokedes denied that he had any, fearing that, if he should be found useful to the king, he should have no hope of setting foot again on Hellenic soil. But Dareios saw that he was lying, and scourges and goads, brought at his bidding, drew from Demokedes the admission that he knew the art of the physician, but that he knew it poorly. Such as it was, Dareios bade him use it at once on the injured limb, which Demokedes so handled that in a little while it was as sound as it had ever been. Persian despots are seldom ungrateful for benefits which add to their own comfort; and Demokedes was rewarded with a great house in Sousa and with the privilege of eating at the king's table. He had, in short, every wish of his heart but one. The king would not part with him; and Demokedes would rather starve in Hellas than feast at Sousa. But the illness of Atossa, the ruling spirit in the seraglio of Dareios, brought an opportunity of escape of which Demokedes eagerly and deliberately availed himself. Grateful for the healing of a tumor which had long tortured her, this daughter of Cyrus, following the instructions of the physician, went to Dareios and reproached him with sitting idle on his throne without making an effort to gain nations or kingdoms for the Persians. Dareios hastened to answer that he had just resolved to do as she now desired him, and that he was making ready to go against the Scythians. 'Nay,' replied Atossa, in words which to the Athenians who heard or read the narrative of the great historian conveyed an exquisite irony, 'go not against the Scythians first. I have heard of the beauty of the women of Hellas, and I desire to have Laconian and Argive and Athenian and Corinthian maidens to be my servants. Go then against Hellas: and thou hast here one who above all men can show thee how thou mayest do this—I mean him who has healed thy foot.' Dareios so far yielded as to say that Demokedes should serve as a guide to the Persians whom he would send to spy out Hellas and bring back an account of what they might see there. Accordingly fifteen Persian officers

left Sidon with Demokedes, and sailing along the coasts of Hellas, made a record of all that they saw until they came to Taras, which the Latins called Tarentum, in Italy. There Aristophilides, the king of the Tarantines, at the suggestion of Demokedes, took off the rudders of the Persian ships and shut up the Persians themselves in prison as spies; and while they were in this plight, Demokedes fled away to Kroton. Having given his friend time to escape, Aristophilides let the Persians go; but their misfortunes were not yet ended. They were wrecked on the Iapygian coast, but a Tarantine exile ransomed them from slavery and took them to Dareios. So fared the first Persians who visited Hellas to the west of the Egean sea.

It is useless to speculate on the amount of knowledge which we might have obtained from the records of this Persian Periplous, if they had been preserved, when the point to be determined is whether the Periplous was made at all. The results of Persian observation would probably in any case have had but little value: but when we remember the unlikelihood of the story, we must at the least place it amongst the tales of which we can neither affirm nor deny the reality. The plan of Demokedes was to obtain his freedom at the possible cost of the ruin of his country: the plan of Atossa clearly was to precipitate the whole power of Persia upon Hellas at a time when Hippias was still tyrant of Athens, and when the Persian could have encountered no serious resistance, unless perhaps from the mountaineers of the Peloponnesos. This plan confessedly failed; but there is no record that Dareios expressed any indignation at the treatment of his officers. As a political motive, these intrigues are thus superfluous, and all that can be said in favor of the narrative is that, unlike the stories of Deiokes or of the seven conspirators against Smerdis, it is, at least in its earlier scenes, so strictly Oriental in its coloring as to come before us with a specially deceptive force. But if the plausible form thus assumed by the story may tempt us to think that it cannot be without some historical value, still the different impressions which even eye-witnesses receive of the same events and the same scenes, and the irresistible temptation or the unconscious tendency to vary the coloring of a story at each successive recital, must justify a strong reluctance to admit the truthfulness of vivid or minute detail in any but a contemporary narrative. This reluctance must pass into positive unbelief, if the tradition involves an imputation of improbable or unaccountable motives or assigns some secondary or irrelevant causes where more simple and forcible motives are not wanting. There is nothing in itself unlikely in the tale that Dareios was incited by his wife Atossa to an attack on Athens and

Sparta. But the admission of her influence cannot necessarily lead us to admit motives which are improbable in the case of Demokedes, which are more unlikely still in the case of Histiaios, and fairly pass the bounds of credibility in that of Themistokles. The very completeness of the picture drawn for us in the story of the Krotoniate physician may reasonably lead us to question whether these are the genuine movements which stirred the ancient world. Polykrates is undoubtedly an historical person: but the tale of his life is in great part a romance to illustrate an ethical or theological theory; and the image of Demokedes already grows more indistinct, when we see that his career is almost more legendary than that of his master. But in truth it seems enough to note that the inscription at Behistun is very far from bearing out the rebuke of Dareios by Atossa for warlike inactivity in the first or in any other part of his reign. The matter is not mended if we say that the words of Atossa were true and that the records of the inscription are false. These may fairly be received as the genuine work of Dareios: for the words of Atossa we can have no evidence beyond that which is attributed to a deliberate traitor.¹

When from the story of Demokedes we turn to the second tale, that, namely, of the Scythian expedition, the residuum of fact is found to be scarcely less scanty. With 600 ships and an army of 700,000 men Dareios, it is said, reached the bridge of boats thrown across the Thrakian Bosphoros, and thence marched on through Thrace to the spot where the Ionians whose ships had been sent round by the Black Sea had prepared the bridge of boats by which he was to cross the Istros, or Danube. This bridge, after all had crossed over, Dareios, it is said, gave orders to break up; but Kôês of Mytilene warned him, not of the danger of defeat in battle, (for this he professed to regard as impossible), but of starvation in a country where there were no settled dwellings and no tillage. The king, following his advice, commanded the Ionians to guard the bridge for sixty days, and, if he should not by that time have come back, then to break it up and sail away. The story of the campaign which follows is told with an abundance of detail illustrating the plan of the Scythians to avoid all battles but to entice the Persians continually further from their base of supplies, if they thought of having any, through the countries of those nations who would not take part with them in the war. In this way the Persians are lured across the Tanais and to the banks of the Oaros, which, like the Lykos, Tanais, and Syrgis, is represented as flowing into the Maïetian lake (Azoff).

¹ They are seemingly inconsistent with the words in which Herodotos himself describes the condition of

things early in the reign of Dareios. See page 124.

At this point the Scythians who act as decoys begin to move westwards; and Dareios, taking it to be a general movement of the tribes, orders his army to march in the same direction. Accordingly they wander on through the lands of the Black Coats (Melanchlainoi), the Cannibals (Anthropophagoi), and other tribes, whom the Scythians wished to punish, until Dareios in sheer weariness sent a herald to the Scythian king to beg him either to come forward and fight like a man or to give earth and water as a slave. 'Tell your master,' said the wandering chief, 'that he is quite mistaken if he thinks that we are running away from him. The fact is that we are only doing now what we always do, for it is our way to move about. If he wants to fight us, let him find out the tombs of our forefathers; and if he lays hands on them, he shall soon know how the Scythians can strike.' So Dareios was obliged to go on his way. But the monotony of his course was at last broken by the arrival of a Scythian herald who brought as gifts for the king not earth and water but a bird and a mouse, a frog and five arrows, and, having left them, went his way. Summoning his chief men, Dareios expressed his opinion that by these gifts the Scythians meant that they yielded up themselves, their land, and their water, because the mouse lives on the land and the frog on the water, and the bird signified the horses of warriors and the arrows showed that they gave up their power. But Gobryas, one of the six who rose up with him against the Magian Smerdis, gave another interpretation and warned the Persians that, unless they should become birds and fly up into heaven, or go down like mice beneath the earth or becoming frogs leap into the lake, they would be shot to death by the Scythian arrows. The words of Gobryas struck a chill into the heart of Dareios; but while he with his bulky army made what speed he could to reach the bridge on the Danube, a body of Scythians taking a shorter road hastened to the Ionians who were guarding it, and urged them to abandon their trust, not only because by so doing they would free themselves but because they were acting unrighteously in aiding and abetting a wanton invader. The advice of Miltiades, the future victor of Marathon, was that they should do as the Scythians wished. But although the other despots there present gave at first an eager assent, they at once changed their minds when Histaios of Miletos warned them that without the help of Dareios they could not possibly hope to retain their power. Still it was necessary to do something to get rid of the Scythian army on the banks of the river. The Ionians therefore pretended to accept their proposal, and setting to work to loosen the bridge on the Scythian side, urged them to go in search of the Persian host and destroy it. The Scythians accordingly hurried off, but were as

unsuccessful now in finding the Persians as the Persians had been in tracking them. Meanwhile Dareios was hurrying to the Istros. It was night when they reached the bridge: and when they found that the boats were unloosed, they feared greatly that the Ionians had left them to perish. But Dareios commanded an Egyptian in his army who had a very loud voice to call Histiaios of Miletos; and at the first cry Histiaios had the bridge fastened again. Thus the Persians got over in safety; and the Scythians on learning how they had been tricked comforted themselves by reviling the Ionians as cowards who hug their chains.

We may smile at such details; but only by a summary of the whole narrative can it be shown that no one part of the story is really more trustworthy than any other. It is quite true that the record of all that takes place on the Scythian side of the Danube is like a bewildering dream. The great rivers which water the vast regions on the north of the Black Sea are forgotten by the historian in his description of the wanderings of a million of men through a country which yielded no food and in many places no water. An eastward march of 700 or 800 miles in which no great stream seemingly is crossed except the Tanais, and in which the Scythians never attack them, when to attack them would be to destroy them utterly, is followed by a march of a like length westward, with the same result. The tale is incredible from beginning to end; but there is nothing to justify the belief that we enter the world of reality on the Thracian bank of the Istros. The motive assigned for the expedition is the desire of Dareios to avenge the wrong done to the Median or Persian empire about a hundred years before: but this motive is scarcely more constraining than that which is supposed to have taken the Persians to Egypt to avenge the slaughter of their remote forefathers by Rameses or Sesostris. The story of the ignominious retreat of Dareios must be compared with that of the still more ignominious retreat of Xerxes; and if there be good reason for calling into question the later tradition, not much can be urged in favor of the older. The incidents in the guarding of the bridge are even more bewildering than any which were supposed to have taken place in the rugged deserts of Scythia. Even under the circumstances as they are given in the narrative, there is no need to suppose a haste to cross the river so pressing as to make it impossible to wait till the day had dawned. Still more absurd is it, with the noise of a vast army in disorderly retreat, to introduce the Egyptian herald with his Stentorian voice to rouse the attention of Histiaios. If any debates took place among the guardians of the bridge, we cannot decide what amount of exaggeration or even of wilful falsehood may have been introduced into

Credibility
of the narra-
tive of the
Scythian
expedition.

the report of them. But the matter is speedily brought to an issue. Either the Ionians were faithful to Dareios or they were not. Either the Scythians were in earnest in their efforts to defend their country and to defeat the invaders, or they were not. Under either alternative it is impossible to give any credit to the story of the incidents which are supposed to have taken place at the bridge. Whether the Greeks wished to abandon Dareios or to save him, they would in either case have urged the Scythians to remain on the bank,—in the one case that these Scythians might destroy the Persian army in the desperate confusion caused by the efforts of an unwieldy multitude caught in a deadly snare,—in the other that they might fall victims to the Persian host. On the other hand, whatever may be the stupidity of wandering tribes, the folly attributed to the Scythians exceeds that which might well be ascribed to Australian savages. An enormous and unmanageable army is lost in a trackless desert or has to cross rivers which may not be forded; and yet during a march of sixteen hundred miles not an effort is made by a determined enemy to intrap or crush them. Nay more,—the Scythians are represented as knowing perfectly well the position of the Persian army at every stage of their march; and therefore, as knowing that Dareios was in full retreat for the bridge, they knew that he and his army must cross it or speedily perish.¹ Yet they are infatuated enough to depart at the bidding of the Ionians to go and look for an enemy, whom, if only they remained where they were, they might assuredly slaughter at their ease. The folly which could forego so sure and easy a means of vengeance is so stupendous that we are driven to dismiss the story of the Scythian campaign of Dareios as unhistorical in all its details, even if it be admitted that any such expedition ever took place at all. But it is perfectly natural that the Hellenic tradition should represent the defeat of the Persian

¹In his play of the *Persians* Æschylos makes neither reference nor allusion to the Scythian expedition, while the language which he puts into the mouth of Dareios seems altogether to exclude it. Dareios here speaks of the catastrophe which had befallen Xerxes as a fit retribution for his impiety in bridging over the Hellespont. It certainly is just possible that the poet may have purposely exhibited Dareios as lying by implication; and the conquests which (*Persians*, 864) he is said to have made without crossing the Halys or even without moving from his hearth can refer only to conquests achieved by his generals while he himself re-

mained at home. But it seems more likely that neither Æschylos nor his audience knew anything of the Scythian expedition; and it must be remembered that no light whatever is thrown on it by the inscriptions at Behistun. As to the Athenians, we can scarcely suppose that they would have much greater regard for Dareios than for Xerxes, or that they would have allowed the poet to exhibit the latter as the first to lay profane hands on the sacred waters of the Hellespont, when they knew that the same offence had been committed by the man whose phantom in the drama upbraids his infatuated son.

king as more disastrous than it really was. That it has thus over-colored the disorder of the flight of Xerxes, we shall presently see ; but we may note here the significant circumstance that with the passage of the Danube on his return all the difficulties of Dareios disappear. It was his wish that the Thracians should be made his subjects ; and his general Megabazos bears down all opposition with a vigor which the incapacity of the Persians on the northern side of the Danube would not lead us to expect and to which we might suppose that Scythian revenge would offer some hindrance. But from the Scythians Megabazos encounters no resistance ; and his course to the Strymon is one of uninterrupted conquest. Near the mouth of this river was the Edonian town of Myrkinos, in a neighborhood rich in forests and cornland as well as in mines of gold and silver. Here, when the great king announced his wish to reward his benefactors, Histiaios begged that he might be suffered to take up his abode, while Kôês contented himself with asking that he might be made despot of Mytilene. But Megabazos advanced still further westward, and from the lake of Prasiai sent envoys to the Makedonian Amyntas, who gave them earth and water. The supremacy of the Persian king was at the same time extended to Lemnos, an island inhabited, it is said, by a Pelasgian population ; and Lykarêtos, the brother of the Samian Maiandrios, was appointed governor. But Lemnos was not to remain long under Persian power. When the resources of the empire were being strained to suppress the Ionic revolt, the Athenian Miltiades, sailing from Elaios in the Chersonesos, made a descent on the island, which with Skyros, subsequently conquered, remained henceforth most closely connected with Athens.

CHAPTER III.

THE IONIC REVOLT.

WHEN after the outbreak of the Ionic revolt a joint expedition of Athenians and Ionians under the Milesian Aristagoras led to the accidental burning of Sardeis, Dareios, we are told, on hearing the tidings, asked who the Athenians might be, and, on being informed, shot an arrow into the air, praying Zeus to suffer him to take vengeance on this folk. About the Ionians and their share in the matter he said nothing. These he knew that he might punish as he might choose : but so careful

was he not to forget the foreigners who had done him wrong, that an attendant received orders to bid his master before every meal to remember the Athenians.¹ If the chronology of this period may at all be trusted, ten or twelve years had passed away since Hippias allied himself with Hippoklos, the Lampsakene despot, on the express ground that he stood high in the favor of Dareios; and eight years perhaps had gone by since Hippias, expelled from Athens, departed to Sigeion with the definite purpose of stirring up the Persian king against his countrymen. His intrigues were probably not less active than those of James II. at St. Germain's: and his disappointment at the congress in Sparta² probably sent him back to the Hellespont not less determined to regain his power by fair means or by foul. We may be sure that the friendship of Hippoklos was taxed to this end to the uttermost; and we may well believe the words of Herodotos that from the moment of his return from Sparta he left not a stone unturned to provoke Artaphernes, the Sardinian satrap, to the conquest of Athens, in order that the Peisistratidai might hold it as tributaries of Dareios. The conclusion seems to follow irresistibly that Dareios had heard the whole story of their expulsion, and that he gave no such answer to their prayers as effectually to discourage their importunities. The acts, of which we have here a significant glimpse, were not done in a corner. The Athenians were perfectly aware of the way in which Hippias was employing himself at Sardeis; and their ambassadors, appearing before Artaphernes, laid before him the whole state of the case, and urged every available argument to dissuade the Persian king from interfering in the affairs of the Western Greeks. The answer of Artaphernes (and we cannot suppose that it was given without the full sanction of Dareios) charged the Athenians, if they valued their safety, to receive Hippias again as their tyrant. The Athenians retorted by a flat refusal, and interpreting the words of Artaphernes as a practical declaration of war³ were induced to aid Aristagoras with a force of twenty ships, which Herodotos regarded as a beginning of evils both to the barbarians and to the Greeks.⁴ Yet these are the people of whom Dareios, on hearing of the burning of Sardeis with the temple of Kybêbê, speaks as though he had never so much as heard their name. This is a sample of the details which form the greater part of the narrative of the Ionic revolt, and furnishes a measure of their general trust-

¹ Herod. v. 105.

² See page 96.

³ Herod. v. 96. It is in these incidental remarks that we have the real history of the time, for even in the narrative of the Ionic revolt the

details are uncertain when they come from Hellenic sources, and perhaps altogether untrustworthy when the informants are Persians.

⁴ Herod. v. 96.

worthiness. In short, these details are essentially dramatic, not historical.

For the Ionic revolt, as in the earlier portions of the history, the traditional narrative must be given in its integrity. In no other way can we hope to determine the degree of trust which may be placed in it. The story takes us back to the time when Dareios, having recrossed the Danube, rewarded his supposed benefactors Kôês and Histiaios, and Megabazos found his way to Sardeis with the Paionians whom he was charged to transport into Asia. This general carried with him the tidings that Histiaios was busily occupied in fortifying Myrkinos, and warned Dareios of the great imprudence of allowing him to establish there a power which might become formidable even to the great king. Unless the enterprise were nipped in the bud, the Greeks and barbarians round about the city would take Histiaios for a chief and do his will by day and by night. If therefore war was to be avoided, Histiaios must be removed beyond the reach of temptation. So a messenger was sent to Myrkinos with a letter in which Dareios told him that he needed the help of his counsel forthwith at Sardeis. Thither Histiaios hastened, delighted with a summons which proved his importance, and was received by Dareios with the bland assurance that there is nothing more precious than a wise and kind friend. 'This, I know, thou art to me,' added the king, 'for I have learnt it not by thy words, but by thy deeds. So now thou must leave Miletos and thy Thrakian city, and come with me to Sousa.' But although Histiaios was thus carried into splendid captivity, the causes of disquiet were not removed, for either he or the king had placed the government of Miletos in the hands of Aristagoras, a nephew of Histiaios; and the help of Aristagoras was now sought by some oligarchic exiles from Naxos. But although Aristagoras would gladly have made himself master of Naxos and of the large group to which it belonged, he felt that his own power alone could not achieve the task, and he told them that they must have the help of Artaphernes, the brother of the great king. The exiles in their turn besought him to stint nothing in promises. They would pay him well for his aid and would further take on themselves the cost of the expedition. To Artaphernes, therefore, Aristagoras held out, with these inducements, the further bait that the conquest of Naxos would bring with it the possession of Paros, Andros, and the other islands known as the Kyklades, and probably of the large and wealthy island of Euboia, which would give him the command of a large portion of the Boiotian and Attic coast. One hundred ships, he said, would amply suffice for the enterprise; but Artaphernes, expressing a hearty assent to

The schemes of Aristagoras of Miletos.

502 B.C. (?)

the plan, promised him two hundred, while Dareios, when the report of Artaphernes was laid before him, expressed his full approval of the scheme. The general appointed to command the expedition was Megabates, a cousin of Dareios and Artaphernes, who, sailing with the fleet from Miletos professedly for the Hellespont, stopped at the Caucasian promontory of Chios that he might sail down on Naxos with a north wind. But it had been destined, adds the historian, that the Naxians should not be destroyed by the army under Megabates and Aristagoras. That night, as it so happened, no watch was kept on board a Myndian vessel; and Megabates in his anger ordered Skylax the captain of the ship to be placed in one of the oar-holes with his head hanging out over the water. To the prayer of Aristagoras that he would release his friend Megabates would not listen. Aristagoras therefore released the man himself; and when the Persian on learning this became even more vehement, Aristagoras told him that Artaphernes had sent him as a subordinate, not as a master. Megabates made no reply; but as soon as it was dark, he sent a vessel to warn the Naxians of their peril and to acquaint them with all that had happened. The result was that, when the fleet approached the island, the Naxians were well prepared. Four months passed away. The money which Megabates and Aristagoras had brought was all spent, and the Naxians were not subdued. Aristagoras further suspected that Megabates meant to deprive him of his power at Miletos; and the result of his deliberations was a determination to revolt, in which he was confirmed, it is said, by a message which at this time he chanced to receive from Histiaios. This man, it seems, like Demokedes, was ready to sacrifice his country and his friends, if only he might win what he called his freedom. Having shaved the head of his most trusty servant, he tattooed a message upon it, and then having kept him till his hair was again grown, he sent him to Miletos, with the simple charge that Aristagoras should shave his head and look at it. Aristagoras there read advice which jumped with his own conclusions, and made up his mind to begin the revolt which Histiaios hoped that he might be sent down to suppress.

In the council which Aristagoras then convoked the logographer Hekataios warned them that they could not expect to cope with the Persian power, but that, if they resolved to run the risk, they should at the least take care that they had the command of the sea. He further urged them to seize the vast wealth of the oracle at Branchidai, if only to make sure that these resources should not fall into the hands of the enemy. His advice was rejected; but a ship was sent to Myous, where the army was encamped on its

The mission of Aristagoras at Sparta and at Athens. 502 B.C. (?)

return from Naxos, with orders to seize on such of the Hellenic tyrants as might be found there. Among the despots thus seized were Aristagoras of Kymê and the more notorious Kôês of Mytilene. These were all given up to the people of their respective cities by Aristagoras, who, in name at least, surrendered his own power at Miletos, in order to insure greater harmony and enthusiasm in the conduct of the enterprise. Aristagoras of Kymê and the rest were allowed by their former subjects to depart unhurt, the only exception being Kôês, who was stoned to death. Thus having put down the tyrants and ordered the citizens of the towns to choose each their own Strategos or general, the Milesian Aristagoras sailed away in the hope of getting help from Sparta, bearing with him a brazen tablet on which was drawn a map of the world, as then known. Having reached Sparta, he pleaded his cause earnestly before king Kleomenes. He dwelt on the slavery of the Asiatic Greeks as a disgrace to the city which had risen to the headship of Hellas, and on the wealth as well as the glory which with little trouble and risk they could assuredly win. The trousered and turbaned Persians who fought with bows and javelins it would be no specially hard task to vanquish; and the whole land from Sardeis to Sousa would then be for the Spartans one continuous mine of wealth. The picture was tempting; but when Aristagoras appeared again on the third day to receive the final answer, he was asked how far it might be from the coast to Sousa. 'A three months' journey,' said the unlucky Aristagoras, who was going on to show how easily it might be accomplished,¹ when Kleomenes bade him leave Sparta before the sun went down. There seemed to be yet one last hope. With a suppliant's branch Aristagoras went to the house of Kleomenes. Finding him with his daughter Gorgo, the future wife of the far-famed Leonidas, he asked that the child, then eight or nine years old, should be sent away. The king bade him say what he wished in her presence; and the Milesian, beginning with a proffer of ten talents, had raised the bribe to a sum of fifty talents, when the child cried out, 'Father, the stranger will corrupt you, if you do not go away.' Kleomenes rose up and went into another house; and Aristagoras, leaving Sparta with the story of the easy march from Sardeis to Sousa untold,² hastened to Athens. Here to his glowing descriptions he added the plea that Miletos was a colony from Athens and that to help the Milesians was a clear duty. The historian

¹ A feat perhaps even more hazardous was, as we shall see, actually achieved in the march of the Ten Thousand with Xenophon.

² In fact, the difficulties lay rather in the imagination of the Spartans

than in the reality. There was an excellent road the whole way, of which Herodotos (v. 52-54) gives a minute account, with the number of the stages.

remarks that Aristagoras found it easier to deceive thirty thousand Athenian citizens than a solitary Spartan, for the Athenians at once promised to send twenty ships under the command of Melanthios. But he forgot that the circumstances of the two cities were widely different. Athens was already virtually at war with Persia; and in pledging themselves to help Aristagoras, the Athenians were entering on a course which after a severe struggle secured to them abundant wealth and a brilliant empire.

At last Aristagoras reached Miletos with the twenty Athenian ships and five sent by the Eretrians. There he set in order an expedition to Sardeis, which was occupied without The burning of Sardeis. any resistance, Artaphernes being unable to do more than hold the Akropolis; but the accidental burning of a hut (the Sardian houses were built wholly of reeds or had reed roofs) caused a conflagration which so terrified all the Lydians and Persians that they rushed with frantic eagerness to the Agora. The Athenians, fearing to be overborne by mere numbers, retreated to the heights of Tmolos, and as soon as it was dark hastened away to their ships. The fire at Sardeis by destroying the temple of Kybêbê furnished, it is said, an excuse for the deliberate destruction of the temples in Western Hellas by the army of Xerxes.

The revolt now assumed a more serious character in spite of the desertion of the Athenians. The Ionians sailing to the Hellespont, prevailed on the citizens of Byzantion and the neighboring towns to take part in the revolt. The Karians Extension of the revolt to Byzantion and Karia. for the most part also joined, and even the Kaunians threw in their lot with them when they heard of the burning of Sardeis. Still more important was the adhesion of Kypros (Cyprus), in which large and wealthy island the city of Amathous alone remained faithful to the Persians.

The tidings of these events, so the story runs, roused the vehement indignation of Dareios, who, sending for Histiaios, frankly expressed his strong suspicion that his old friend had had a hand in the business. 'Nay,' said Histiaios, The mission of Histiaios to Sardeis. 'had I been in Ionia, these things would never have happened, if they have happened at all; and even now I pledge myself, if thou wilt let me go thither, to bring this revolt to an end.' 'Be it so,' answered Dareios; 'but be sure, when thou hast done thy work, to come back to me here at Sousa.' So Histiaios departed on his errand.

Meanwhile the Kyprians with their allies now made ready for the great struggle with their antagonists; but they were completely defeated, and from this time the history of the Ionian revolt is little more than a chronicle of disasters. From Sardeis the Ionians were driven to their ships The revolt of Kypros and Karia.

by the Persian generals, who advancing thence towards the Hellespont, took the five cities of Dardanos, Abydos, Perkôtê, Lampsakos, and Paisos, it is said, in as many days, and were on their way to Parion, when tidings came that the Karians had broken out into rebellion. They at once turned their arms southwards; but the news of their approach reached the Karians early enough to enable them to take up a strong position at the White Pillars (Leukai Stelai) on the banks of the Marsyas, a tributary of the Maiandros. In the ensuing battle the Karians were borne down by mere numbers. The survivors flying to Labranda, a temple of Zeus the Lord of Armies (Stratios), were there besieged, and were holding counsel on the prudence of yielding or of abandoning Asia, when the arrival of the Milesians and their allies made them resolve on renewing the struggle. The result was a defeat more terrible than that which they had already undergone, the Milesians being the greatest sufferers. But the Karian spirit was not yet broken. Having heard that the Persians were about to plunder their cities one by one, they lay in ambush, and cut off, seemingly, the whole Persian force with Daurises, Amorges, and Sisimakes at its head.

This catastrophe had no influence on the general issue of the revolt. The golden visions of Aristagoras had now given way to the simple desire of securing his own safety, and he hastened to suggest to the allies that they ought to be ready, in case of expulsion from Miletos, with a place of refuge whether at Myrkinos or in Sardo (Sardinia). His own mind was really made up before he summoned the council. Leaving Pythagoras in command of the city, he sailed to Myrkinos, of which he succeeded in taking possession. Soon after, he attacked and besieged a Thracian town, but was surprised and slain with all his forces.

The career of Histiaios was brought to an end not long after the death of his nephew. The narrative reads like a wild and perplexing romance; and if it represents actual fact, it assuredly illustrates the adage that truth may be stranger than fiction. On reaching Sardeis Histiaios appeared before Artaphernes in seeming ignorance of all that had happened during his stay in Sousa. 'It is just this,' said Artaphernes bluntly; 'you stitched the slipper, and Aristagoras put it on.' Histiaios took the hint thus broadly given, and making his escape to Chios was seized by the Chians who, however, gave him his freedom when they learnt that he had come to fight against Dareios, not for him. His next step was to send by Hermippos of Atarneus to the Persians in Sardeis letters which spoke of a plan for revolt already concerted between them and himself.

The death of
Aristagoras.

Adventures
and death of
Histiaios.

Hermippos carried the letters straight to Artaphernes, who told him to give them to the persons to whom they were addressed and to bring him the answers. These, we are told, were of such a nature that Artaphernes ordered many Persians to be executed. From Chios Histiaios was at his own wish conveyed to Miletos; but the Milesians, well pleased to be rid of Aristagoras, had no notion of submitting to their old master. It was night when Histiaios tried to force his way into the city, and in the scuffle he received a wound in the thigh. It was clearly necessary to try some other course. His request for ships was refused by the Chians; but he succeeded in persuading the Lesbians to man eight triremes and sail under his command to Byzantion, where he seized all Ionian ships entering from the Black Sea except such as were at once surrendered to him. Here he remained until he received tidings of the last and crowning disaster to the Ionian cause in the fall of Miletos; and leaving Bisaltes of Abydos in charge of matters at the Hellespont, he sailed to Chios, where he seized Polichna. From Chios he sailed with a large force, it is said, of Ionians and Aiolians to Thasos, attracted possibly by its neighborhood to his old haunts at Myrkinos; but abandoning the siege of the island on hearing that the Phœnician fleet was advancing from Miletos, he hastened back to Lesbos, whence he crossed over to Atarneus to reap the standing corn for his army which was now starving. Here he was surprised by a troop of cavalry under Harpagos, and being overtaken in his flight he confessed to the man who was going to kill him that he was Histiaios of Miletos. His motive in thus surrendering himself was, it is said, the hope that he would easily be able to make his peace with Dareios; but Harpagos, determined that he should never have the opportunity, ordered him to be crucified, and sent his head to Sousa, where Dareios, upbraiding those who had put him to death, gave charge that it should be washed and buried as the head of a man who had been a great benefactor to himself and to the Persians.

The hopes of the Ionians now rested on their fleet. It was decided therefore at Panionion that no attempt should be made to oppose the Persian land forces, and that the Milesians should be left to defend their walls against the besiegers, while the ships should assemble at Ladê, then an island off the Milesian promontory to which by an accumulation of sand it is now attached. But even these resolutions take it for granted that the whole force of the Persians would be concentrated on the blockade of Miletos, or at least that the other towns had nothing to fear from such attacks as might be made on them. Yet of these towns Myous and Priênê were but a few miles distant from Mile-

tos ; and nothing within past experience of Persian generalship warranted the hope that the Hellenic cities would only be attacked in succession. But if the Ionians were afraid of the land forces opposed to them, the Persians seem to have been scarcely less afraid of the Hellenic fleet, although they had little reason to shrink from a comparison of their Phœnician seamen with the Asiatic Greeks. This want of confidence in themselves led them, it is said, to resort to a policy which might cause division and disunion among their adversaries. The Greek tyrants, who were allowed to go free by their former subjects when the Mytilenaian Kôês was stoned to death, were instructed to tell them that immediate submission would be rewarded not only by a full amnesty but by a pledge that they should not be called on to endure any burdens heavier than those which had already been laid upon them, but if they should carry their resistance so far as to shed Persian blood in battle, the punishment which defeat would bring upon them would be terrible indeed. These proffers were conveyed to the Greek cities by messengers who entered them by night ; and the citizens of each town, thinking, it is said, that the overtures were made to themselves alone, returned a positive refusal. For a time the debates at Ladê took another turn. The remnant of the Phokaians, who in violation of an awful oath came back to their old city while their kinsfolk sailed on their ill-omened voyage to Alalia, were brave enough or faithless enough to rise once more against their Persian masters ; and their general Dionysios now came forward to give his advice. Warning the Ionians that the issue whether of slavery or of freedom hung on a razor's edge, he told them that they could not hope to escape the punishment of runaway slaves, unless they had spirit enough to bear with present hardship for the sake of future ease ; but at the same time he pledged himself that if they would submit to his direction, he would insure to them a complete victory. Their acceptance of his proposal was followed by constant and systematic manœuvring of the fleet, while, after the daily drill was over, the crews, instead of lounging and sleeping in their tents on the shore, were compelled to remain on board their ships which were anchored. For seven days they endured this terrible tax on their patience ; but at the end of the week Ionian nature could hold out no longer. Many were already sick ; many more were threatened with illness. In short, rather than submit to be thus handled by an upstart Phokæian who had brought only three ships, they would gladly take their chances in Persian slavery, whatever this might be. What these would be, unless they submitted before fighting, they had according to the story been distinctly informed. Their grown men were to be slain, their boys made eunuchs and with the women carried away into Persia, while

their cities should be given to strangers. But their object was not, it seems, immediate submission. They were quite ready to fight, when the time for fighting should be come; but, rather than take any trouble to secure success, they would prefer death, mutilation, or everlasting banishment. In short, the two stories exclude each other, and come from two different sources. The one was apparently framed in the interests of the expelled tyrants by their partisans: the second certainly is a tale devised to account for the disastrous issue of the revolt.

Of the details of the battle which decided the issue of the revolt Herodotos admits that he knows practically nothing.¹ That in spite of its confusion and inconsistencies the narrative points to an astonishing lack of coherence among the confederates, we cannot doubt. Almost everywhere

The battle of
Ladé, and
the fall of
Miletos.

we see a selfish isolation, of which distrust and treachery are the natural fruits: but, as in the intrigues of Hippias we have a real cause for Persian interference in Western Greece which makes the story of Demokedes utterly superfluous, so in this selfishness and obstinacy of the Asiatic Greeks we have an explanation of the catastrophe to which the episode of the Phokaiian Dionysios fails to impart either force or clearness. The outlines suffice at least to show that the brief splendor of the Ionic revolt was closing in darkness and disaster. The fate of the revolt was sealed by the partisans of the banished despots; and Dionysios determined to quit his country for ever. With three war-ships which he took from the enemy, he sailed straight to Phenicia; and, if the tale be true, he must have swooped down on some unguarded or weak port, for, having sunk some merchant-vessels, he sailed with a large booty to Sicily. Here he turned pirate, imposing on himself the condition that his pillage should be got from the Carthaginians and Tyrrhenians and not from the Italiot or Sikeliot Greeks. The dispersion and ruin of the Ionic fleet left Miletos exposed to blockade by sea as well as by land. The Persians now set vigorously to work, undermining the walls and bringing all kinds of engines to bear upon them; and at last, in the sixth year after the outbreak of the revolt under Aristagoras,² the great city fell.

495 B.C. (?)
The historian adds that the grown men were for the most part slain; that the rest of the inhabitants were carried away to Sousa; and that Miletos with the plain surrounding it was occupied by Persians, while the neighboring highlands were given

¹ Herod. vi. 14.

² This date, the only definite indication of time in the narrative of the Ionic revolt, may be regarded as representing accurately the interval between the rebellion of Arista-

goras and the destruction of his city: but while the chronology of earlier and later events remains uncertain, we can scarcely say more than that the fall of Miletos may probably be assigned to the year 496-5 B.C.

to Karians from the town of Pedasa. The picture is overcolored, unless we suppose that new Greek inhabitants were afterwards admitted into the city, for, although its greatness was gone for ever, Miletos continued to be, as it had been, Hellenic.

The Persian operations of the following year were directed against the islands. Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos were taken; and, Third conquest of Ionia. 495 B.C. (?) if we choose to believe the story, the Persians, holding hand to hand and without even breaking their order, went from one end of each island to the other, caring for no hindrances of mountains, precipices, torrents and streams, and sweeping off every living thing that came in their way. This pleasant pastime of netting human beings Herodotos¹ for some not very obvious reason pronounces impracticable on the mainland; and hence the Hellenes of the Asiatic continent escaped the fate of their insular kinsfolk. Thus was brought about that which Herodotos speaks of as the third conquest of Ionia.

From the conquest of the Ionic cities the Persian fleet sailed on against the towns on the northern shores of the Hellespont. Flight of Miltiades to Athens. The towns on its Asiatic shore had already been reduced by Daurises and other Persian generals;² and the subjugation of the European cities was apparently no hard task. Perinthos, Selymbria, and the forts on the Thracian march, were at once surrendered, while the inhabitants of Byzantion and of Chalkedon on the opposite Asiatic promontory fled hastily away and founded the city of Messembia on the Euxine sea.³ The deserted towns, we are told, were burnt to the ground⁴ by the Phenicians, who also destroyed in like manner the cities of Prokonnesos and Artakê and took all the towns of the Chersonesos except Kardia. Here the future victor of Marathon lingered, until he heard that the Phenicians were at Tenedos, when with five ships loaded with his goods he set sail for Athens.

When, some years earlier, the Hellenic colony of Sybaris had been conquered by the men of Kroton, the men of Miletos had shaved their heads in token of their mourning. The punishment of Phrynichos. 495 B.C. (?) Miletos itself was a city built by colonists whom the Kolidrid Neileus had, it is said, brought from Athens: but the great disaster which had now befallen it called forth no such signs of sorrow on the part of the Athenians. The drama in which Phrynichos exhibited the terrible scenes which accompanied its

¹ vi. 31.

² Herod. v. 117, 122.

³ Herod. vi. 33. It is not easy to receive without strong qualification such statements about cities which unquestionably remained Hellenic in spite of the disasters which at

this time they may have undergone.

⁴ Κατακαύσαντες. Herod. vi. 33.

This word also must be probably taken in a very modified sense. Kyzikos, we are told, had already submitted to Oibares, the satrap of Daskyleion.

downfall brought involuntary tears to the eyes of the audience ; but his only recompense, we are told, was a fine of a thousand drachmas for daring to remind them of calamities which touched them so closely, and a decree that the play should never be acted again. Had this drama been preserved, it might possibly have explained the reason for that abandonment of the Ionic cause by the Athenians which may have been forced on them by the feuds and factions of the allies. It might also have taught us the nature of those evils or misfortunes, the remembrance of which so stung the Athenian hearers of Phrynichos. Although the subjects of tragedy had hitherto been chosen mainly, if not altogether, from the old legends or theogonies, it may be doubted whether their resentment was caused by any effort on the part of the poet to interest his audience in Persian success and Grecian suffering as such or by any dread of similar disasters for themselves, so much as by the intimation that they were in reality chargeable with the ruin of the most illustrious of their own colonies. Apart from this consciousness of their guilt or weakness, the picture of Hellenic misfortunes could have roused in them only a more strenuous patriotism, and stirred them under disappointment or defeat with an enthusiasm not less deep, although more grave, than that with which, after the victory at Salamis, they drank in the words of Æschylos.

CHAPTER IV.

THE INVASION OF THRACE BY MARDONIOS AND THE BATTLE OF MARATHON.

THE threats of terrible vengeance by which it is said that the Persians sought to chill the courage of the Asiatic Greeks might have prepared us for a long tale of wanton cruelty and oppression. But after the complete subjugation of the country the scene is suddenly changed ; and the Persian satrap Artaphernes comes before us as an administrator engaged in placing on a permanent footing the relations of these Greeks with their masters. If the materials with which he had to deal had been of a different kind, if the Ionians of Asia Minor had had any of that capacity for establishing an empire on the basis of self-government which marked their western kinsfolk, he might have deserved blame rather than praise for striking at the root of the evils which had nipped in the bud the political growth

of the Asiatic Greeks. By compelling them to lay aside their incessant feuds and bickerings, and to obey, if not a national, yet an interpolitical law which should put an end to acts of violence and pillage between the Hellenic cities, he was enforcing changes which would soon have made men of a temper really formidable to the king, and which in any case must be regarded as a vast improvement of their condition.¹ These changes, the historian remarks significantly, he compelled them to adopt, whether they willed to do so or not, while, after having the whole country surveyed, he also imposed on each that assessment of tribute which, whether paid or not, (and we shall find that for nearly seventy years it was not paid) remained on the king's books as the legal obligation of the Asiatic Greeks, until the Persian empire itself fell before the victorious arms of the Makedonian Alexander. As the amount of this assessment was much what it had been before the revolt, the Persians cannot be charged with adding to their burdens by way of retaliation.

Still more remarkable, in the judgment of Herodotos, were the measures of Mardonios who in the spring of the second² year after the fall of Miletos marched with a large army as far as the Kilikian coast, where he took ship, while the troops found their way across Asia Minor to the Hellespont. This man, whose name is associated with the memorable battle at Plataiai, was now in the prime of manhood. The errand on which he came was nothing less than the extension of the Persian empire over the whole of Western Greece; but before he went on to take that special vengeance on Athens and Eretria which was the alleged object of the expedition, he undertook and achieved, it is said, the task of putting down the tyrants and of establishing democracies in all the Ionic cities. Yet the work of Mardonios can mean no more than that he drove away, or possibly killed (as the more effectual mode of dealing with them) the Hellenic tyrants, on whose deposition the people would at once revert to the constitution subverted by these despots: nor is it easy to see wherein this task differed from that which Herodotos has just ascribed to Artaphernes. All therefore that can be said is that, if Artaphernes really carried out his measures before the arrival of Mardonios, nothing more remained for the latter than to sanction changes of which he approved.

But Mardonios was not destined to achieve the greater work for which he had been dispatched from Sousa. Thasos submitted without opposition; and on the mainland the work of conquest

¹ Herod. vi. 42. *χρήσιμα κάρτα τοῖσι Ἴωσι.*

² Herod. vi. 31, 43.

was carried beyond the bounds reached by Megabazos. But when, having left Akanthos, the fleet was coasting along the peninsula of Akte, a fearful storm dashed three hundred ships, it is said, on the iron coast of mount Athos, about twenty thousand men being killed either by the force of the waves beating against the rocks or by the sharks which abounded in this part of the sea. The disaster made it impossible to advance further south ; and Mardonios returned home, where during the reign of Dareios he is heard of no more.

Failure of Mardonios in Thrace. 492 B.C. (?)

The failure of Mardonios seems to have made Dareios more than ever resolve to ascertain how far he might rely on the submission of the Greeks to the extension of the Persian empire.

The first step came in the form of an order to the Thasians to take down the walls with which they were fortifying their city and to surrender their ships at Abdera. In the next step taken by Dareios we may fairly discern the influence of Hippias, who left nothing undone to fan the flame which he had kindled.¹ The way

Mission of the Persian heralds to demand earth and water from the Western Greeks. 491 B.C. (?)

would be in great measure cleared for the complete subjugation of Hellas if the king could, without the trouble of fighting, learn how many of the insular and continental Greeks would be willing to inroll themselves as his slaves. Heralds were accordingly sent, it is said, throughout all Hellas, demanding in the king's name the tribute of a little earth and a little water. The summons was readily obeyed, we are told, by the men of all the islands visited by the heralds, and probably also by those cities which we afterwards find among the zealous allies of Xerxes. Among the islanders who thus yielded up their freedom were the Aiginetans, who by this conduct drew down upon themselves the wrath of the Athenians with whom they were in a chronic state of war. Athenian ambassadors appeared at Sparta with a formal accusation against the Aiginetans. They had acted treacherously not towards the Athenians or towards any Greek city in particular but against Hellas : and the charge shows not merely the growth of a certain collective or almost national Hellenic life, but that Sparta was the recognised head of this informal confederacy.

The embassy of the Athenians was followed by prompt action on the part of the Spartans, or rather on the part of their king Kleomenes. This joint action of the Athenians and Kleomenes, it has been thought, can be accounted for only by the alleged treatment of the Persian heralds when they came first to Athens and then to Sparta, asking earth and water. In the former city, these men, in spite

The treatment of the heralds at Sparta and at Athens.

¹ Herod. vi. 94.

of the inviolability of the character in which they appeared, were thrown into the Barathron, in the latter into a well, and bidden to get there the earth and water which they wished to carry to the king. This treatment of the messengers of Dareios is alleged as the reason why Xerxes, when he sent his heralds again to the Hellenic states, excepted Athens and Sparta from the number of the cities to whom he offered his mercy ;¹ but the story cannot be dismissed without a reference to the difficulties which seem to be involved in it. Among the many perplexing statements in the history of the Persian wars not the least remarkable are the stories of occasional vehemence displayed by men who for the most part were little chargeable with any furious and unreasoning valor. The subsequent conduct of the Athenians may exhibit nothing inconsistent with their alleged treatment of the heralds of Dareios : but neither pride (although at this time it seems not to have been great) as the acknowledged heads of the Hellenic world, nor security against Persian invasion, can wholly explain the strange agreement of the Spartans in a retaliation which it is unlikely that they could have devised for themselves, and which, while inconsistent with their subsequent conduct, was by no means rendered more prudent by the submission of their near neighbors. But this very circumstance warrants the suspicion that the story of the violation of the heralds is the unhistorical growth of a later tradition. The point especially to be noted is this, that the political results would be precisely the same, whether the Athenians or Spartans killed the heralds sent to them or whether they were saved from this iniquity by not having any heralds to kill. It is not very likely that Dareios would send messengers to a people who, according to the story, had eagerly espoused the cause of Kroisos, had sent an imperious mandate to Cyrus himself, and had been warned by Cyrus that they should smart for their presumption. But it is altogether unlikely that any overtures for submission would be made to Athens. Had it been so, they must have taken the form of a demand that they should receive again their old master Hippias. But in truth Artaphernes had long since taken their refusal to receive him as a virtual declaration of war ;² and we can scarcely suppose that a summons addressed to those with whom the Persian king had not come into conflict would be sent to men who were his open and avowed enemies. If then these two great cities were exempted from the number of those who were bidden to acknowledge the supremacy of Persia, they would be as much driven to make common cause with each other as if they had slain the officers of Dareios. The unflinching zeal with which the Athenians in spite

¹ Herod. vii. 133.

² See p. 135.

of all discouragements maintained the contest against Xerxes would readily account for the growth of a story which seemed to be in harmony with their general conduct throughout the Persian war.

But whatever may have been the treatment experienced by the Persian heralds, Sparta might perhaps have shrunk, as she did in the case of Plataiai, from asserting her jurisdiction over the Aiginetans, if her old rival Argos had not already been humbled. The deposition and exile of Demaratos. The narrative of the struggle with Argos and of the events which followed it exhibits a strange picture of feud and discord in the Spartan state. The humiliation of Argos seemed to justify Kleomenes, the Eurysthenid king, in making an effort to seize those Aiginetans who had been foremost in swearing obedience to Dareios. His demand for their surrender was met by a refusal to yield them up to a Spartan king who was acting illegally, not only as having been bribed by the Athenians, but as having come without his colleague, the Prokleid Demaratos, the future companion and adviser of Xerxes in the wonderful epic of the Persian war. Kleomenes went back to Sparta, fully resolved to bring about the downfall of the man who had thwarted and foiled him in his march to Athens;¹ and he found the means in the stories told about his birth. Evidence was forthcoming, it is said, to prove that Demaratos was not the son of his reputed father: and his deposition was followed by his flight into Asia, where we are, of course, told that Dareios assigned him a territory with cities to afford him a revenue.

Against tribes thus agitated by the turmoil of incessant intrigues and habituated to an almost complete political isolation, the Persian king was now preparing to discharge the prodigious forces at his command. He had some old wrongs to avenge; but the Peisistratidai were at hand to urge him on by their still more importunate pleading. Capture of Naxos and Eretria by the Persians. 490 B.C. In place of the disgraced Mardonios he intrusted the command of the expedition to Artaphernes and to the Median Datis who, announcing himself, it is said, as the representative of Medos the son of the Athenian Aigeus and his wife the Kolchian Medeia, claimed of right the style and dignity of king of Athens. Their mission was to enslave the men of that city and also of Eretria and bring them into their master's presence. Their first object was to punish the Naxians for daring to defeat Megabates,² and the task was now by comparison an easy one. The suppression of the Ionic revolt had struck terror into the hearts of the Greeks generally; and the Naxians at the approach of the Per-

¹ Page 94.² Herod. vi. 96.

sians fled to the mountains. Those who remained in the town were enslaved; and the city with its temples was burnt. The Persian force was increased on its voyage westwards by men from the islands who were compelled to serve against their kinsfolk. The first opposition to Datis came from the people of Karystos the southernmost town of Euboia, which, after resisting the attacks of the Persians for six days, was taken by treachery. From Karystos the fleet sailed northwards to Eretria. Here, as elsewhere, the Persians plundered and burnt the temples and partially reduced the inhabitants to slavery.

At Eretria the Persians might well have fancied their task practically done. Thus far their enemies had given way before them like chaff before the wind; and Hippias probably flattered their vanity by assurances that they need look for no more serious resistance at Athens or at Sparta. But meanwhile they must advance with at least ordinary care; and his knowledge of the land which he had once ruled might now serve his Persian friends to good purpose. The best ground which it contained for the movements of cavalry was the plain of Marathon bounded by the northeastern Chersonesos or promontory of Attica; and at Marathon accordingly the banished tyrant of Athens landed with his Persian supporters to fight his Battle of the Boyne. By a strange turn in the course of things the exiled despot of Athens in setting foot once more on Attic ground was confronted by the very man whom, as an apt pupil in his own school of tyranny, he had sent to govern the Thracian Chersonesos. How far Miltiades, the son-in-law of a Thracian king, and the employer of Thracian mercenaries, had outgrown the ideas of his earlier years, we can scarcely venture to say. The whole history of the man from the time of his leaving Athens to his return is wrapped in an obscurity so strange that we can do no more than ascribe his election as one of the ten generals, at a time when Hippias and the Persians were known to be on their way westwards, to the reputation which he had acquired by the conquest of Lemnos.

A more formidable hindrance to the plans of Hippias and Dareios was involved in the rise of statesmen at Athens like Themistokles and Aristides. Neither of them belonged to the old Eupatrid nobility. But although neither wealthy nor by birth illustrious, these two men were to exercise a momentous influence on the history not only of their own city but of all western civilisation. Singularly unlike each other in temper and tone of thought, they were to be throughout life rivals in whom the common danger of their

country could yet suppress the feeling of habitual animosity. It would have been happy for themselves, happier for Athens, if they had been rivals also in that virtue which Greek statesmen down to our own day have commonly and fatally lacked. Unfortunately Themistokles never attempted to aim at that standard of incorruptibility which won for his rival the name of the Righteous or the Just. The very title implies the comparative corruption of the leading citizens; and thus Aristides might the more easily gain the reputation of which the rustic who asked him to write his name on the shell professed himself so heartily tired of hearing.

Of his rival it would be as absurd to draw a picture free from seams and stains as it would be to attempt the same ridiculous task for Oliver Cromwell or Warren Hastings. That he started on his career with a bare competence and that he heaped together by not the fairest means an enormous fortune, is a fact which cannot be disputed. That, while he was determined to consult and to advance the true interests of his country, he was not less resolved that his own greatness should be secured through those interests, is not less certain. Endowed with a marvellous power of tracing the true relations of things to all seeming thoroughly confused and of discerning the method by which the worst complications might be unravelled, he went straight to his mark, while yet, so long as he wished it, he could keep that mark hidden from every one. With the life of such a man popular fancy could not fail to be busy; and so the belief grew up that he knew every citizen of Athens by name. But however this may have been, he was enabled, as Thucydides tells us,¹ by his astonishing powers of apprehension and foresight, to form the truest judgment of existing things and without toilsome calculation to forecast the future, while yet no man was ever more free from that foolhardy temper which thinks that mere dash and bravery can make up for inexperience and lack of thought.

But the genius of Themistokles was not yet to shine out in its full lustre. While the Athenians were vainly seeking aid from Sparta,² Hippias was busy on the Persian side in drawing up his allies in battle array on the field of Marathon. He had a vision which seemed to portend the recovery of his former power: but he lacked the readiness of the Norman William in turning to good account the

Debates in
the Athenian
camp
at Marath-
on.

¹ i. 138.

² The feat ascribed to the courier Pheidippides, who was sent to ask this aid, Herod. vi. 106, has been re-

garded, not perhaps without reason, as an impossibility by writers who are well aware of the powers of Asiatic runners at the present time.

fall of one of his teeth which a violent fit of coughing forced from his jaw. The Conqueror would have interpreted the accident as a presage of victory. Hippias could only bewail among his friends the fate which assigned to him no larger a portion of Attic soil than might suffice to bury a tooth. On the Athenian side a sign of coming success was furnished by the arrival of the Plataians with the full military force of their little city; but the unanimity of the Plataians was not reflected in the councils of the Athenian leaders, if we may accept the story that Miltiades, who with four others wished for immediate battle, appealed to the Polemarch Kallimachos of Aphidnai to give his casting vote against the five generals who wished to postpone it. The appeal was made in stirring language. It depended on Kallimachos not only whether Athens should be the first of Hellenic cities, but whether she and Hellas should even be free. Delay would sap the energy of the faithful and swell the number of the traitors who even now counselled submission to the Persian despot. Yet the story carries with it in some measure its own contradiction. Kallimachos decides to fight at once; but the fight does not take place. The four generals who had all along agreed with Miltiades handed over to him the presidency which came daily to each in his turn; and still Miltiades would not fight until his own presidency came in its ordinary course. We can scarcely bring ourselves to think that the Athenian generals would deprive the city of its main military force, unless they had resolved already to fight on the first favorable opportunity. Still less can we think that when more than half felt the urgent need of immediate action they would allow nearly a week to pass before they took any step to bring matters to an issue. They must have known that by so doing they were putting it in the power of the Persians to detach an overwhelming force from their fleet and army and send it round Cape Sounion against Athens, while they lay inactive at Marathon.

Here then in the broad plain which by the lower road between Hymettos and Pentelikos lay at a distance of about twenty-five miles from Athens, Miltiades and his colleagues prepared to strike a blow in defence of their own freedom and that of Hellas. At either end of this plain is a marsh, the northern one being still at all seasons of the year impassable, while the smaller one to the south is almost dried up during the summer heats. On this broad and level surface between the rugged hills which rose around it and the firm sandy beach on which the Persians were drawn up to receive them, stood, in the simple story of Herodotos, the Athenian tribes. The Polemarch Kallimachos (for such was then the law of the Athenians) headed the right wing; the men of Plataiai stood on the left. But as with

The story of the battle of Marathon.

their scantier numbers it was needful to present a front equal to that of the Persian host, the middle part of the Greek army was only a few men deep and was very weak, while the wings were comparatively strong. At length the orders were all given ; and when the signs from the victims were declared to be good, the Athenians began the onset and went running towards the barbarians, the space between the two armies being not less than a mile. The Persians, when they saw them coming, made ready to receive them, at the same time thinking the Athenians mad, because, being so few in number, they came on furiously without either bows or horses. But the Athenians on coming to close quarters with the barbarians fought well, being, the historian adds, the first Greeks who charged the enemy running and who endured the sight of the Median dress, for up to this time the Greeks had dreaded even to hear their name.¹ Long time they fought in Marathon ; and in the middle the barbarians were victorious, where the Persians and Sakers were drawn up. These broke the centre of the Athenians, and drove them back on the plain ; but the Athenians and Plataians had the best on both wings. Still they would not go in chase of the barbarians who were running away ; but they closed on the enemy which had broken their centre, and fought until they overcame them. Then they went after the Persians as they fled, and slaughtered them until they reached the sea, where they tried to set the ships of the Persians on fire. In this struggle the Polemarch Kallimachos fell fighting bravely ; and there died also Ste-

¹ This is one of the few utterly astonishing and bewildering statements which we come across in the pages of Herodotos. Without the least qualification he here asserts that the Athenians were the first Greeks who could look without terror even on the dress of the Persians or dare to withstand them in the field. Not less sweepingly he affirms, viii. 132, that not only to the boorish and ignorant Spartans but to the Greeks generally the eastern waters of the Egean were as terrible as those of the western Mediterranean, and that in the imagination of the Greeks who had conquered at Salamis a voyage from Delos to Samos appeared as long as a voyage to the pillars of Herakles,—the distance in the one case being a bare 100 miles, while the other by the methods of ancient navigation extended to 4,000 or 5,000 miles, with the further difference that in the one case they could scarcely

move twenty miles without coming to some Greek island or some Hellenic city, whereas in the other they would have to grope their way along coasts on which they would find but two or three scattered settlements of their most venturesome kinsfolk.

The plain fact is that this statement of Herodotos is not true, although at the time of his writing it he made it, beyond doubt, in good faith. He had just related the history of the Ionic revolt ; and although the whole narrative shows a pitiable lack of cohesion and very indifferent generalship on the part of the Asiatic Greeks, it certainly does not justify imputations of habitual cowardice.

We shall come across another statement even more glaringly improbable in the words put into the mouth of Pausanias on the eve of the battle of Plataiai.

silaios, one of the generals, and Kynegeiros, the son of Euph Orion.¹ In this way the Athenians took seven ships: with the rest the barbarians beat out to sea, and taking up the Eretrian captives whom they had left in the islet of Aigilia, sailed round Sounion, wishing to reach the city before the Athenians could return thither. But the victors hastened back with all speed and, reaching the city first, incamped in the Herakleion in Kynosarges as they had incamped in the Herakleion at Marathon. For a while the barbarians lay with their ships off Phaleron which was at that time the port of the Athenians, and then Datis and Artaphernes sailed away to Asia, and led their Eretrian slaves up to Sousa where Darcios, though he had been very wroth with them because they had begun the wrong, did them no harm, but made them dwell in the Kissian land in his own region which is called Ardericca. There, Herodotus adds, they were living down to his own time, speaking still their own language. As to the Spartans, when the moon was full, they set out in haste and reached Attica on the third day after they left Sparta;² but although they were too late for the battle, they still wished to look upon the Medes. So they went to Marathon and saw them, and having praised the Athenians for all that they had done, went home again. Now Dareios had been very bitter against the Athenians because they had taken Sardeis; but when he heard the tale of the battle of Marathon, he was much more wroth and desired yet more eagerly to march against Hellas. Straightway he sent heralds to all the cities, and bade them make ready an army, and to furnish much more than they had done before, both ships and horses and corn; and while the heralds were going round, all Asia was shaken for three years; but in the fourth year the Egyptians, who had been made slaves by Kambyzes, rebelled against the Persians, and then the king sought only the more vehemently to go both against the Egyptians and against the Greeks. So he named Xerxes his son to be king over the Persians after himself, and made ready for the march. But in the year after the revolt of Egypt Dareios himself died; nor was he suffered to punish the Athenians or the Egyptians who had rebelled against him.

Such is the epical, or rather the religious, form which Herodotus has imparted to a history of which the most exact and searching criticism can never diminish the splendor. The details of the battle. That the great question of Hellenic freedom or barbaric tyranny was virtually settled on the field of Marathon; that this

¹ He was thus a brother of the great tragic poet Æschylos.

² This would mean in Greek computation that they accomplished the march of 150 miles in certainly not more than 60 hours from the

time of their leaving Sparta,—a feat for a large body of heavy-armed men even more astounding than that of Pheidippides. Herod. vi. 120.

battle decided the issue of the subsequent invasion of Xerxes; and that the glory of this victory belonged altogether to the men of Athens and Plataiai, are facts which none will dispute. The number engaged on either side, the precise position of the Athenians and the barbarians, the exact tactics of the battle, are points of little moment in comparison. According to the traditional accounts no cavalry took part in the struggle: but every night from that time forth might be heard the neighing of phantom horses and the clashing of swords and spears. With these wonders and with perplexities of a less extraordinary kind any elaborate description of the battle and its military incidents seems at best a superfluous labor. The event of the battle is made to turn on the rapid charge of the Athenians and on the success gained by their two wings while their centre was broken by the forces opposed to it. This ill-success of the centre and its cause have both been debated by recent historians; but although the inference seems to be fully warranted that their haste had something to do with their repulse, we are scarcely justified in attempting, without any distinct historical statements, to determine the extent of ground over which the Athenian centre was driven back.

But the tradition that the two armies faced each other for many days at Marathon is more seriously impugned by the incident which was supposed to point to the existence of dark and mysterious plots at Athens in favor of Hippias and the Persians. The banished tyrant, we are told, was not without partisans still in the city which he had ruled: and the story which Herodotos had heard was that these traitors had agreed with their former master to raise a white shield on some conspicuous point, in all likelihood on the summit of mount Pentelikos, as a signal that the Persians should at once begin an attack on Athens which they would second to the best of their power within the city. The raising of this shield Herodotos regards as a fact not to be questioned, although he admits that everything else connected with it is hopelessly uncertain, except the circumstance that it was raised when the Persians were already in their ships after their defeat,—in other words, that it was raised too late. It would follow then that the intention of the traitors was to give the sign before any battle could be fought, or indeed before the Athenian army could reach Marathon, and, as we may fairly infer, with the purpose of bringing upon Athens a powerful detachment of the barbarian fleet and army, while the rest remained to oppose the Athenians and Plataians at Marathon. The very choice of a signal is proof conclusive that time was held to be of the utmost consequence. But for this urgent need, it would

The raising of the white shield.

have been easier and far more safe to send by sea a messenger who would not, like the shield, have been seen by the Athenians whose return they wished to anticipate. Doubtless these partisans of Hippias would have preferred to raise the signal as soon as Miltiades and the other generals had left Athens. The time needed for completing their preparations may have prevented their doing this: but they could scarcely have formed a bolder or more sagacious plan for furthering the interests of Hippias and Darcios than that of bringing down on the city an overwhelming Persian force, so soon as the main body of the Athenians had set out on their way to the field of Marathon. If on this momentous journey the Athenians had seen on the heights of Pentelikos a sign which they must have construed as an invitation to their enemies to fall on Athens during their absence, the judgment of their generals and the courage of their men must have been alike paralysed, for they would remember that the plain of Phaleron (the Phaleric wall was not yet built) was as serviceable for the action of cavalry as the plain of Marathon, and that if the men left to guard Athens should be defeated there, there would be but faint hope of their being able to maintain the city against the machinations of traitors within it. All this is perfectly intelligible on the supposition that not more than about two days passed from the time when Miltiades left Athens to the hour when he returned to it in the full flush of a victory which he could scarcely have hoped to win. But according to the narrative of Herodotos the armies faced each other for several days before the battle was fought: and it becomes impossible to understand why, after the Persians must with their own eyes have seen the Athenian force in front of them, their partisans in Athens should still have insisted on hoisting a signal which was now utterly unnecessary, and which, if it had any effect at all, could only tend to disconcert their plans by betraying them to the Athenian generals. It is absurd to suppose that any sign could under such circumstances be needed to inform Datis that the Marathonian army was absent from Athens, while their very absence would be a better surety to Hippias for the success of his schemes than any signal which might be exhibited by his friends. We can far more readily suppose that Hippias planned the landing at Marathon for the very purpose of withdrawing the main Athenian force from the city and thus leaving it defenceless against the real attack to be made from the side of Phaleron, than that he should idly waste day after day when the visible presence of Miltiades and his men showed him that thus far things were going precisely as he would have them go. If then we may conclude that the raising of the shield was unavoidably delayed for

some few hours or perhaps for a day, that during this time Miltiades was able to complete his march, to engage the Persian army and to defeat them, and that he then hurried back so rapidly as to reach Kynosarges before the Persians could get round Sounion, the series of events becomes clear and coherent. But this supposition makes the anxious debates and the long delay at Marathon an utter impossibility. We can scarcely avoid the conclusion that in this instance Cornelius Nepos has hit upon the fact, and that Miltiades and his colleagues held in Athens the council of war which the informants of Herodotos transferred to the field of Marathon.

For Miltiades the battle, in which he had won an imperishable name, and in which Æschylos fought by the side of his brother Kynegeiros, laid open a path which led to a terrible disaster. According to the narrative of Herodotos, the reputation of Miltiades, already great since his reduction of Lemnos, was immeasurably enhanced by the victory of Marathon. Never before had any one man so fixed on himself the eyes of all Athenian citizens; and the confidence thus inspired in them he sought to turn to account by an expedition which, he said, would make them rich for ever. Nothing more would he say. It was not for them to ask whither he meant to lead them: all that they had to do was to furnish ships and men. These they, therefore, gave; and Miltiades sailed to Paros, an island lying a few miles to the west of Naxos, and, laying siege to the city, demanded a hundred talents under the threat that he would destroy the place in case of refusal. But the Parians put him off under various pretences, until by working diligently at night they had so strengthened their walls as to be able to set him at defiance. The siege therefore went on, and went on to no purpose. This is all that we can be said to know of the affair, beyond the fact that after a blockade of six-and-twenty days Miltiades was obliged to return to Athens with his fleet, having utterly failed of attaining his object, and with his thigh, or, as some said, his knee severely strained. No sooner had he reached Athens than the indignation of the people who professed to have been deceived and cheated by him found utterance in a capital charge brought against him by Xanthippos, (the father of the great Perikles). Miltiades was carried on a bed into the presence of his judges, before whom, as the gangrene of his wound prevented him from speaking, his friends made for him the best defence, or rather perhaps offered the best excuses, that they could. It was urged that a fine of fifty talents, which would perhaps suffice also to meet the expenses of the expedition, might

The expedition of Miltiades to Paros: his trial, and his death.
489 B.C.

be an adequate punishment for the great general but for whom Athens might now have been the seat of a Persian satrapy. This penalty was chosen in place of that of death. Miltiades died in disgrace, and the citizens whom he wished to enrich recovered from his family half the sum which he had demanded from the Parians. But there seems to be no ground for thinking that they subjected him to the superfluous indignity of imprisonment; and the words of Pausanias¹ might almost warrant the belief that his ashes were laid in the tomb raised to his memory at Marathon.

If the history of the Persian war involves (especially in all that relates to the barbarian world) the task of sifting truth from fiction, difficulties of a very different kind present themselves in the lives and fortunes of the most eminent of the Hellenic leaders. They are difficulties caused not by any commingling of fiction with reality, but by the misrepresentations or misconceptions which ensue from changes of public feeling, and which must be especially powerful in an age which can make no appeal to contemporary history. In the case of Miltiades the charge of fraud and deception urged against the general has been almost thrust into the background by that of fickleness and levity commonly advanced against the people which condemned him. Such an accusation, it must be admitted, is eagerly welcomed by all to whom any form of democratical government seems repulsive. Unquestionably a leader who has won for himself a wide fame for his wisdom and for success in war cannot on the ground of his reputation claim the privilege of breaking his trust and leading his countrymen with impunity to their ruin. As little can it be doubted that fickleness and ingratitude, in the meaning commonly attached to these words, are not to be reckoned among the special sins of democracy, and, least of all, of such a democracy as that of Athens. But because in a democracy a change of opinion, once admitted, must be expressed freely and candidly, the expression of that change is apt to be vehement and angry; and the language of indignation, when it comes to be felt, may be interpreted as the result of ingratitude when the offender happens to be a man eminent for former services. Yet more it must be admitted that the ingratitude and injustice of democracies (whatever they may be) are neither more frequent nor more severe than the iniquities of any other form of government. Still we may fairly ask whether there was not in the Athenian people a disposition to shrink from responsibility not altogether redounding to their honor, and a reluctance to take

¹ i. 32, 3.

to themselves any blame for results to which they had deliberately contributed. When the Syracusan expedition had ended in ruin, they accused the orators who had urged them to undertake it.¹ When they had condemned to death by a single vote the generals who had just returned from their victory at Argennoussai, they decreed that the men who had intrapped them into the sentence should be brought to trial.² Yet citizens, who had been trained in the daily exercise of a judicial and critical power, were surely not justified in throwing upon others the blame of their own inconsiderate vehemence or greed.³ No state or people can, under any circumstances, be justified in engaging the strength of the country in enterprises, with the details of which they have not been made acquainted. If their admiration for lofty sentiment or heroic courage tempt them to give their sanction to such a scheme, the responsibility is shifted from him who gives to those who adopt the counsel,—to this extent at least, that they cannot, in the event of failure, visit him in any fairness with penal consequences. Nor are we justified in allowing much force to the plea that Athenian polity was then only in the days of its infancy and that peculiar caution was needed to guard against a disposition too favorable to the re-establishment of a tyranny. Such a sentiment could not be expressed or felt at the time: and the imputation is not flattering to men who had lived for twenty years under the constitution of Solon, as extended and reformed by Kleisthenes. It may be true that the leading Greeks generally could not bear prosperity without mental depravation, and that owing to this tendency the successful leader was apt to become one of the

¹ Thuc. viii. 1.

² Xenophon, *Hellen.* I. vii. 39.

³ No one, of course, will suppose that the whole plan of Miltiades was confined to the expedition to Paros and the paltry demand of a hundred talents from the inhabitants of that island. Such a sum would scarcely have enriched a dozen Athenians, far less have covered with wealth all the Athenians. There can be no doubt that the scheme which Miltiades had in his mind was the same as that which Themistokles carried out with greater success after the battle of Salamis, Herod. viii. 111-2, and that Paros was merely the first island on which the attempt was made. Then at Andros, as now at Paros, the refusal to contribute money was followed by a blockade: and fearing the consequences, the Parians felt

themselves constrained to pay to Themistokles the money which they refused to yield to Miltiades. In short, Miltiades was going on an expedition by which he thought to increase the revenue and to establish the naval supremacy of Athens. It is not easy therefore to suppose that the Athenians were quite so ignorant of the object of his errand as they pretended to be, or at the least as they are said to have been; but when they chose to say that they had been led blindfolded into the plan, it was obviously dangerous whether for Miltiades or for his friends to contradict the Demos on a point on which they could not but be very sore. Regarded thus, the case of Miltiades presents a striking parallel to that of Sir Walter Raleigh.

most dangerous men in the community; but this fact cannot divest a people of responsibility for their own resolutions. It would be unjust to say less than this, even on the hypothesis that the popular tradition can be accepted as trustworthy: but a careful examination of the story seems to show that the alleged ignorance of the Athenians was rather a veil thrown over a line of action which, as being unsuccessful, they were disposed to regard as discreditable, and that in the scheme itself they were the accomplices rather than the dupes of Miltiades. In this instance the raid against the islanders failed, and failed utterly; and the unsuccessful general was crushed. The attempt of Themistokles was crowned with a larger measure of success, and was accepted as the earnest of a wide imperial sway for Athens in time to come.

CHAPTER V.

THE INVASION AND FLIGHT OF XERXES.

FROM the battle-field of Marathon we are carried back to the palace at Sousa and the closing days of king Darcios,—from a land imperfectly known to one of which we can scarcely with truth be said to know anything. In the long interval of ten years which preceded the march of Xerxes against Hellas the character of the drama is changed. Thus far the contest between Greece and Persia exhibits something like a connexion of political causes. But from the return of Datis to Sousa with his string of Eretrian captives the machinery of the tale becomes strictly ethical and religious. By Darcios the victory of Miltiades is received with a fierce outburst of rage; and his mind is henceforth concentrated on the one desire for revenge. All the might of his empire must be put forth for the destruction of the city which has dared to withstand his will. It is the crowning effort of human pride; and the gods come forth at once to curb and repress it. The vast scheme for which during three years gigantic preparations are made is first delayed by the rebellion of Egypt, and still more seriously checked by the death of the king himself. The harder experience of his earlier years had taught Darcios some useful lessons of sobriety: but his place was now to be filled by the spoilt child of luxury and splendor. The impulse of conquest has carried the Persian power to a height not safe for man; and the great king must be driven by supernatural forces to take

486 B.C.

485 B.C.

up a ruinous scheme against the warnings of his better mind. For, according to the not very consistent story related by Herodotos, Xerxes at first had no wish to carry out his father's designs against Hellas. During two years he made ready not for the invasion of Europe, but for the re-conquest of Egypt; and at the end of that time he marched into that devoted land, and having riveted more tightly the fetters which had been forged ^{484 B.C.} for it by Kambyses, left it under the rule of his brother Achaemenes, who was afterwards slain by the Libyan Inaros, the son of Psammetichos. But before Xerxes set out on his Egyptian journey, Mardonios, of whom during the reign of Dareios we lose sight altogether after his Makedonian failure, had urged upon him the paramount obligation of chastising Athens, and thus of getting a footing on a continent which, for its beauty, its fertility, and its vast resources, ought to be the possession of the great king alone. The Peisistratidai also brought forward the Athenian Onomakritos who, as editor of the prophecies of Mousaios, was as ready to promise victory to Xerxes as the prophets of Baal were to cheat Ahab with dreams of success at Ramoth-gilead; and the combined effect of the predictions of the soothsayer and the advice of the Peisistratidai constrained Xerxes, if we believe the story, to summon a council of his nobles and to lay before them his whole mind. He reminded them, we are told, of the conquests of his predecessors, and warned them that the Persian power could stand only so long as it remained aggressive. No other European tribes or nations could, for strength of will or keenness of mind or readiness in resource, be compared with the Hellenes: and if these could be conquered, there was nothing to stay the triumphant progress of the Persian king until he had made his empire commensurate with the bounds of the Ether itself. The sharp decisiveness of this speech seems to leave little room for doubt or discussion: but Mardonios is said to regard it as a mere invitation to the assembled chiefs to express their independent opinions, and he takes it up accordingly as an admission of faint-heartedness on the part of Xerxes. In his belief, there was really no need for diffidence or hesitation.

The dead silence which followed the speech of Mardonios remained unbroken until Artabanos, a brother of Dareios and uncle of Xerxes, ventured, much after the Greek but very little after the Persian fashion, to urge that there could be no decision on the merits of a question unless the arguments on both sides were heard and weighed. The Athenians alone had defeated the army of Datis and Artaphernes: what must the result be when all the Hellenic tribes are welded into a single confederacy? Every forest was eloquent with its warnings.

The opposition of Artabanos.

Everywhere the tree which would not bend to the blast was snapped or uprooted, while the pliant sapling escaped; and as to Mardonios who much at his ease in Sousa slandered absent men who were better than himself, it would be but bare justice that he should be made to give up his children as hostages for the complete performance of his boasts against the Greeks, on the understanding that Artabanos and his children should be slain if Mardonios came back from Hellas in safety. No sooner had Artabanos sat down than Xerxes, bursting into rage, swore by the whole string of his ancestors from the generation of Achaimenes himself that Artabanos should remain at Sousa with the women and children. But while he insists on the paramount duty of taking vengeance on the Athenians, he makes the startling admission that they will never rest content with merely keeping the invaders at bay, and that if the great king failed to invade Hellas, his carelessness or his neglect would be followed by the invasion of Persia itself.¹

The demoniac impulse² had now driven Xerxes to the point from which there was no retreating. The whole strength of the empire was to be lavished on one supreme effort, and that empire extended now from the eastern limits which it had reached under Cyrus to the cataracts of the Nile and the shores and islands of the Egean sea. The subjugation of Thrace and Makedonia involved the submission of the Greek colonies on these coasts; and magazines stored up in places along the line of march attested the vast resources of the Persian monarch. If we are to believe the historian, the preparations were not superfluous. There was not a single Asiatic tribe unrepresented in the army of Xerxes: there was not a stream which sufficed for the needs of his host except the largest rivers. In short, we are brought into a region where men disdain the puny scale on which mortals are ordinarily compelled to work, while by some wonderful means, in spite of the lack of contemporary records on either side, every portion of the picture which is drawn of it is filled with the most minute details. Personal anecdotes, revealing the most secret workings of the mind, light up the dry catalogues of fleets and armies; and lists of numbers, seemingly interminable, are given with a confidence which implies that it needed no effort to retain them in the memory for nearly half a century, and that no risk of error was involved in the process.

The expedition of Datis which had ended with the disaster of Marathon was strictly a maritime invasion. It was the design of

¹ Herod. vii. 11.

² δαίμονιή ὀρμή. Herod. vii. 18.
The phrase has very little to do

with the notion of demoniac possession which became so fixed in the Jewish mind.

Xerxes to overwhelm the Greeks by vast masses poured into their country by land, while a fleet hugely larger than that of Datis should support them by sea. For the passage of the army across the Bosphoros and the Strymon wooden bridges were constructed: to save his fleet from the catastrophe which befell that of Mardonios orders were given, it is said, to convert Athos into an island by a canal which might enable the ships to avoid its terrible rocks. At length the host set out from Sousa in a stream which doubtless gathered volume as it went along; but in the story of the march we are at once confronted with that exuberance of vivid detail which more than anything else must awaken suspicion of traditional narratives. The several nations met at Kritalla in Kappadokia, and having crossed the Halys marched to Kelainai near the sources of the Maiandros, where Pythios, who had bestowed on Dareios a golden plane-tree and a golden vine, welcomed the Persians with a magnificence which excited the astonishment of Xerxes.

On reaching Sardeis Xerxes sent heralds to all the cities of Hellas except Athens and Sparta.¹ But before his host was to cross into Europe, a stream of blood was to flow on the shores of the Hellespont. In making their bridges of boats the Phenicians had used hempen ropes, the Egyptians ropes made from the fibre of papyrus. A severe storm destroyed the work of both. Xerxes ordered the engineers of the bridges to be beheaded, and, sitting in judgment on the Hellespont itself, passed sentence that it should receive three hundred lashes of the scourge, and that it should at the same time be branded by men who were bidden to inform it that, whatever it might choose to do, the king would cross over it, and that it deserved no sacrifice at any human hands, as being a treacherous and bitter water. His commands were obeyed; but Xerxes took the further precaution of having the new bridges constructed with far greater strength and care.

The scourging of the Hellespont seems to be as true to Eastern instinct as the influence ascribed to Atossa; but these bridges must have been raised and the punishment of the rebellious sea inflicted in the sight of European witnesses, if the bridges were raised and the punishment was inflicted at all. If we put any faith in the honesty of these witnesses, we are scarcely justified in asserting that the latter story sprang out of the former. No room is left for doubt that the philosophy of Animism, as it has been termed, has held sway at

¹ For the reasons which seem to these two exceptions were now make it altogether unlikely that made for the first time see p. 148.

one time or another, or perhaps more or less in all times, over every nation and tribe on the face of the earth.¹ The impulses which lead us to treat inanimate things as living entities lie very deep down in our nature; and the man who feels himself almost irresistibly tempted to kick the chair or table against which he has stumbled is neither more nor less dignified than the Persian king who brands and chastises the waters which have hurt his bridges. That this impulse was felt with peculiar strength by the Persians, the narratives of Herodotos seem sufficiently to prove. The scourging of the Hellespont is precisely paralleled by the vengeance of Cyrus against the river Gyndes, and is surpassed by the horrible punishment of the horse which threw Pharnouches. The poor brute, being taken to the spot where the accident happened, was left, with its legs cut off, to bleed to death.²

The march of Xerxes from Sardeis is presented to us in a series of impressive pictures. First came the baggage train with the beasts of burden, followed by half the force supplied by the tributary nations,—all in confused masses; behind these, after a definite interval, a thousand carefully picked Persian horsemen, then a thousand spear-bearers with their lance-heads turned towards the ground. These were followed by ten of the sacred horses, magnificently caparisoned, from the Median plains of Nisa, after which, drawn by eight white horses, came the sacred chariot of Ahuromazdào,³ or Zeus, on which no mortal might place his foot, the reins of the horses being held by the charioteer who walked by the side. Then on a car drawn by Nisaian steeds came the monarch himself, followed by a thousand of the noblest Persians, then by a thousand Persian horsemen, and ten thousand picked Persian infantry with golden and silver apples or pomegranates attached to the reverse end of their spears. Lastly came a myriad of Persian cavalry. Behind these, after an interval equal to that which separated the vanguard from the household troops, followed the remaining half of the disorderly rabble which Eastern kings are pleased to regard as good military material. The line of march led them across the Kaikos by Atarneus to Karinê, whence they journeyed on to the Ilian land, keeping on the left the heights of Ida, beneath which a storm of thunder and lightning killed many in his army. He was now in that kingdom in which, when Priam reigned, his enemies had done deadly harm. Here, therefore, on the lofty Pergamos he is

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ch. xi. bright Being, who is engaged in an eternal warfare with Angrô-Mainyus, Ahriman, the spirit of

² Herod. vii. 88.

³ Ormuzd, the wise spirit, or the darkness. *Myth. Ar. Nat.* ii. 355.

said to have sacrificed a thousand cows to Athenaia Iilas, while the Magians poured libations to the heroes. The army, we are told, passed a night of weird terror, and in the morning went on its way towards Abydos. Here the great king had the delight of sitting on the lofty throne of white stones which at his bidding the men of Abydos had built for him. Beneath him his vast fleet was engaged in a mimic battle in which the Phenicians of Sidon were the victors; and Xerxes, surveying the hosts which he had brought together, first pronounced himself the happiest of men, and then presently wept. In the simple story of Herodotos, Xerxes answers the wondering question of Artabanos by confessing that the thought of mortality had suddenly thrust itself upon him, and that the tears found their way into his eyes because at the end of a hundred years not one of all this great host should remain alive. 'Nay,' said Artabanos, 'there are more woful things than this. The sorrows that come upon us, and the diseases that trouble us, make our short life seem long, and therefore from so much wretchedness death becomes the best refuge; and heaven, if it give us a taste of happiness, yet is found to be but a jealous giver.' 'Let us speak no more of mortal life,' answered Xerxes, 'it is even as thou sayest. Yet let us not bring evil things to mind, when we have a good work in our hands. But tell me this. If thou hadst not seen the vision clearly, wouldst thou have kept thine own counsel, or wouldst thou have changed? Tell me the truth.' Artabanos could not but express his hope that all things might go as the king desired; but he added, 'I am still full of care and anxious, because I see that two very mighty things are most hostile to thee.' 'What may these things be?' asked the king, 'will the army of the Greeks be more in number than mine, or will our ships be fewer than theirs? for, if it be so, we will quickly bring yet another host together.' 'Nay,' answered Artabanos, 'to make the host larger is to make these two things worse; and these are the land and the sea. The sea has no harbor which, if a storm come, can shelter so many ships; and we need not merely one haven but many along the whole coast. Chance rules men, and men cannot control chance. The land too is hostile; and if nothing resists thee, it becomes yet more hurtful, the further that we may go, for men are never satisfied with good fortune, and so the length of the journey must at last bring about a famine. Now that man is bravest who is timid in council and bold in action.' 'You say well,' answered Xerxes, 'yet of what use is it to count up all these things? for, if we were always to be weighing every chance, we should never do anything at all. It is better to be bold and to suffer half the evil than by fearing all things to avoid all suffering. See how great is the power of the Persians. If the kings

who have gone before me had followed counsellors like thee, it would never have been what it is now. They faced the danger and gained this dominion; and we, like them, go forth at the fairest season of the year; and when we have subdued all Europe, we shall return home, having been vexed neither by famine nor by any other evil. We carry great store of food with us, and we will take the corn of the lands through which we pass.' But Artabanos was not convinced; and warning the king that weighty matters need many words, he besought him not to let the Asiatic Ionians serve against their kinsfolk. 'If they so serve,' he urged, 'they must either be most unjust in enslaving the land from which they spring, or most just by setting it free. If they are unjust, our gain is but little: but if they be just, they can do us great harm. Think then on the old saying that the end of a work is not always clear at the beginning.' But the king would have it that in this Artabanos was most of all deceived, since to the conduct of these Ionians at the bridge across the Danube Darcios was indebted not only for his own life, but for the salvation of his army and his kingdom; and having with this assurance sent his uncle to Sousa to guard his house and his empire, he summoned his chiefs. 'Be strong,' he said to them, 'and of great courage. We are marching against brave men; and if we conquer these, there are none on the face of the earth who will be able to stand against us. Now then let us cross over, when we have prayed to the gods who guard the Persian land.'

On the next day, as the sun burst into sight, Xerxes, pouring a libation from a golden goblet into the sea, greeted the god with the prayer that he would suffer nothing to check his course until he should have carried his conquests to the uttermost bounds of Europe. The cup, out of which he had poured the libation, he threw into the sea, with a golden mixing-bowl and a Persian dagger. From the bridges rose the odor of frankincense: the roads were strewed with myrtle branches. By the eastern bridge the infantry began to cross with the cavalry, while the beasts of burden and the camp-followers passed over on the bridge facing the Egean. Ten thousand Persians, all wearing tiaras, preceded the confused rabble which crossed on the first day. On the next day Xerxes himself passed from Asia into Europe with the same pomp which had marked his departure from Sardeis. For seven days and seven nights the procession swept incessantly along: and the Hellespontian whose eyes may well have been wearied with watching the endless train gave utterance to abject fear or abject flattery, when he asked why Zeus had come in the guise of a Persian calling himself

The crossing
of the Hel-
lespont.

Xerxes, and bringing with him all the nations of the earth to overwhelm the Greeks whom he might have crushed with a few myriads.

Thus, without thought of coming woes, the fleet sailed westwards from Abydos to Doriskos. Here on the wide plain, through which the Hebrus finds its way to the sea, Xerxes thought that he would do well to see of how many myriads he was the master. The sum total of that host he could ascertain in no better way than by bringing a myriad of men into the smallest possible space, and by raising an inclosure round this space, into which other myriads were successively brought, until the infantry alone were found to amount to not less than 1,700,000 men. But if the method of enumeration seem rude, the details of the physical characteristics, the dress, the weapons, the ornaments, the dialects, which distinguished the several tribes or nations, are given with a minuteness and a fulness which, to be trustworthy, must be the result of contemporary registration. There is, however, no solid foundation for the belief that Herodotos in drawing up his narrative had before him the official muster-rolls of the Persian army. We have no sufficient ground for thinking that such muster-rolls ever existed, or that, if they existed, they were left in any place where they would become accessible to the historian. The number of the war-vessels (to the exclusion of all transport ships or small boats), belonging to the fleet of Xerxes, is said to be stated both by Herodotos and Æschylos at precisely 1207. The sum seems to be a departure from the round numbers by which the Persians, like all other Eastern tribes, seek to express the notion of completeness. But the familiarity of Herodotos with the drama of the great tragic poet will scarcely be questioned; and it is, to say the least, noteworthy that Æschylos seems at first sight to assert that the whole number of the Persian fleet was not 1207, but precisely, as we should have expected, 1000. He adds indeed that the number of ships in his fleet noted for their swift sailing amounted to 207; but he certainly does not say, as most interpreters have inferred from his words, that these 207 ships were to be added to the grand total of 1000. Even thus, however, the simple enumeration of the total by Æschylos stands on a very different footing from the list of factors which in Herodotos are made to yield the same result. With the exception of the 17 ships which the islanders of the Egean are said to have contributed, there is not a single uneven number to be found among them. But if the grand total as given by Æschylos was (as we cannot doubt) well known to Athenians generally, there is nothing to surprise us in the fact, if

The review
of the army
and fleet at
Doriskos.

it should be a fact, that some one who misunderstood the lines in which he sums up the numbers made out the several factors which were to yield the desired result and that Herodotos accepted these factors as historical. It is, however, quite possible that a spurious or forged list may contain factors which are accurately given ; and if we may hazard a conjecture in the absence of direct historical evidence, we should surely be justified in supposing that the contingents of the Persian fleet which would be best known to the Western Greeks would be those of the Asiatic Dorians, Ionians, and Aiolians, together with the ships furnished by the islanders. We may, therefore, fairly lay stress on the fact that in the narrative of Herodotos the number of ships supplied by these Eastern Greeks with the islanders amounts to precisely the 207 which Æschylos gives as the number of fast-sailing ships in the service of Xerxes.¹ Thus these ships would probably be the only vessels of which Æschylos would even pretend to have any personal knowledge ; and from his statement we should infer that this historical factor was merged in the artificial total of 1000, while a certain Hellenic pride may be traced in the implied fact that the Hellenic ships in the Persian fleet far surpassed in swiftness the vessels even of the Phenicians. The whole enumeration becomes still more suspicious, when we see that the 1000 (or, if so it be, 1207) ships mentioned by Æschylos are those which fought at Salamis, whereas in Herodotos this is the number which Xerxes reviewed with his land-forces at Doriskos. In the interval, according to the story of Herodotos, the Persians had lost 647 ships, while the accessions made to their fleet amounted to only 120 : and thus a further justification is furnished for the conclusion that the notion of completeness suggested 1000 as the fitting number of a fleet which must far exceed that which co-operated with the army of Kambyzes in Egypt or bore Dareios to the shores of Scythia. It is enough then to say that in the enumeration of Herodotos the ships conveyed 51 myriads of men, while the land-force had more than 180 myriads of footmen and horsemen and of Arabs who rode on camels. To these were added all those whom the king had gathered in Europe ; and these, he maintains, could not be less than 32 myriads. The number of servants, traders, and camp-followers he regards as fully equal to that of the troops, so that in all Xerxes brought 528 myriads (5,280,000) of men as far as Thermopylai and the shore of Sepias. Of the women, of all the beasts of burden, and of Indian dogs, it would, he adds, be impossible to count up the numbers, so that he marvelled

¹ According to Herodotos, vii. 89, and the islanders 17—in all *ἐκατὸν* the Ionians contribute 100 ships, *δύς καὶ ἑπτά*. the Aiolians 60, the Dorians 30,

not so much at the failing of the streams as that food could be found for so great a multitude, which must have consumed daily eleven myriad pecks of corn, even if nothing were counted for the women, the beasts of burden, and the dogs.

But in truth Herodotos, although without doubt convinced that in speaking of the millions now brought against Hellas he was speaking of an historical fact, had an object in view of a still higher and more solemn kind; and this purpose is set forth in a narrative which must be given as he has related it. No sooner was the great review ended than the king sent for Demaratos, the Spartan exile, and asked him whether the Greeks would venture to withstand him. 'Thou art a Greek,' he said, 'and, as I hear, of no mean city. Now therefore tell me, will they lift their hands against me? for I think that if they were gathered together with all the dwellers of the West, they would not be able to resist me, because they agree not one with the other.' 'Shall I speak the truth,' asked Demaratos, 'or only pleasant things?' Xerxes gave his pledge that no harm should befall him: and the Spartan then assured the king that 'poverty always dwelt with the Greeks; but courage they have won from wisdom and from strength of law, by which they keep off both poverty and tyranny. But,' he went on, 'though all the Greeks are worthy of praise, yet now I speak of the Spartans only. Be sure that these will never receive thy words which bring slavery to Hellas, and that they will come out against thee to battle, even though all the rest should take thy side: neither ask what their numbers are that they should do this, for if a thousand set out, these will fight with thee, be they more or be they less.' Xerxes laughed. 'What—will a thousand men fight my great army? Tell me now—thou wast once their king—wilt thou fight straightway with ten men? Yet if each of them will match ten men of mine, thou, their king, shouldst match twenty; and then it might be as thou sayest. But if in size they be like all other Greeks whom I have seen, thy speech is much like vain-boasting. Come, let us reason upon it. How could a thousand, or a myriad, or five myriads who are all free and not ruled by one man withstand so great a host? Nay, we are more than a thousand to one, even if they be five thousand. If, according to our custom, they were ruled by one, then through fear of this one they would become brave beyond their own nature, and being driven by the scourge would go against a larger host than their own. But now, left to their own freedom, they will do none of these things. Nay, if their numbers were equal to ours, I doubt if they could withstand us, for among my spear-bearers are men who will fight with three Greeks at once; and thus in thine ignorance thou speakest

foolishly.' The answer of Demaratos is plain-spoken and simple. 'I knew at the first, O king, that the truth would not please thee; but since thou hast compelled me, I have spoken of the Spartans as I ought to speak. What love I bear to them, thou knowest well. They have robbed me of my power and of my honors and driven me to a strange land, where thy father received me and gave me a home and food. Is it likely, then, that I should set lightly by the kindness which he showed me? I say not indeed that I am able to fight with ten men or with two, nor of my own will would I fight with one; but if I must fight and if the stake were great, then would I choose to fight with one of those whom thou thinkest equal to three Greeks. So too, the Spartans one by one are like other men: but taken together they are the strongest of all men, for, though they are free, they are not without a lord. Law is their master, whom they fear much more than thy people fear thee. Whatever Law commands, that they do: and it commands always the same thing, charging them never to fly from any enemy, how strong soever he be, but to remain in their ranks and to conquer or die. If I seem to speak foolishly, let me keep silence for the time to come.'

As we may suppose, he was not suffered to hold his peace; and for the present Xerxes is said to have dismissed him with a kindly smile. Regarded as a fact, the conversation is worthless: but if we take it as the expression of the historian's conviction, it is impossible to exaggerate its importance and its value. This value lies in the truth of the lesson which it teaches: and this lesson inforces the contrast between the principle of fear and the principle of voluntary obedience. It is profoundly true that brute force driven by the lash cannot be trusted in a conflict with minds moved by the strength of a deep moral impulse.

But the interest of these conversations lies not merely in the political or moral truths which they set forth. The career of Demaratos may be said to be significant in the measure in which it is imaginary. If his existence be historical (and this is beyond question), his story is full of mystery from beginning to end. There may be nothing strange in his flight to Sousa, or wonderful in the favor shown to him by the Persian king: but it is perplexing that so little should follow from his deep resentment against his countrymen. To Xerxes he acts the part of a wise counsellor and a fearless friend: but his counsels are never followed, and his rivals for the royal favor see treachery in the advice which, if

Significance and value of this conversation between Xerxes and Demaratos.

Functions of Demaratos in the narrative of the Persian war.

taken, must inevitably have involved the ruin of his country. Still his friendly feeling receives ample acknowledgement, while yet it is from him (by a device which bears a suspicious likeness to that of Histiaios) that the Spartans receive the first intimation of the dangers impending over them. In the conflicts at Thermopylai he prepares the mind of Xerxes for a determined resistance from his own countrymen, while the historian takes care that with characteristic Spartan pride he shall make no account of the noble courage of the Athenians;¹ and when the rejection of his advice to occupy the island of Kythera has sealed the doom of the Persian expedition,² his name no longer appears in a history which has no further room for his moral and religious functions.

Meanwhile Xerxes had been journeying through the Paionian and Krestonian land to the banks of the Echeidoros which, like the Lissos, failed to supply the wants of the barbarians. But if the highland tribes were disposed to be submissive, lions and wild cattle, we are told, more than made up for their degeneracy; and the Persian camels suffered terribly from the onslaught of these unlooked-for enemies.³ At last the army halted on the ground stretching from Thermê to the banks of the Haliakmon,—a distance of about 30 miles, which scarcely corresponds to the huge numbers of the traditional narrative. Of the support of this vast throng it was necessary that some account should be given in their long journey from the Thracian Chersonesos. It was scarcely enough that magazines of provisions should have been filled long since in forts or cities on the line of march. Possibly the invaders, who expected shortly to return dragging with them myriads of Athenian and Spartan captives, might be expected to bestow a thought on the food which would be needed for themselves and their prisoners on their homeward journey, and may have deemed it at the least not worth while to strip the land through which they passed or leave in the hearts of the people a feeling of deadly enmity. These, again, it might be supposed, would not be sorry or slow to avail themselves of the opportunity for retaliation, when a few months later Xerxes

Forced contributions from Hellenic and other cities.

¹ Herod. vii. 102.

² Ib. vii. 234.

³ Herodotos gives, as the boundary of the region within which lions at this time ranged, a line drawn from the Thracian stream Nestos to the Akarnanian and Aitolian Achelôos. The myths of the Nemean lion may perhaps be taken as evidence that in earlier

ages they had been found in the Peloponnesos. But in this narrative of Herodotos the perplexing thing is that these beasts should be allowed to get at the camels at all. A few Hottentots will keep their encampments safe against the attacks of lions; and camels picketed amongst large masses of men would run no risk whatever.

hurried through their land in his ignominious retreat to Sousa. But in this wonderful war, beyond the great issue between freedom and law on the one side and despotism with the scourge on the other, everything turns out in a way which could never be anticipated. We shall find Xerxes with his army starving in regions where not a hand is raised against him, while Artabazos, who has to guard himself against constant attacks, makes his way successfully through Makedonia and Thrace. It might have been thought that the Persian invaders would leave among the highland tribes an accursed memory: but instead of this we hear only of a singular worship paid to the very road by which the king had passed and which none were ever allowed to break up or to till.¹

From Thermê, as he looked westwards and southwards, the eyes of Xerxes rested on that magnificent chain of mountains which rises to a head in the crests of Olympos and Ossa, and leaving between these two hills the defile through which the Peneios rushes to the sea, stretches under the name of Pelion along the coast which was soon to make him feel the wrath of the invisible gods. The tidings that the channel of the Peneios was also a gate of Thessaly determined him to go and see the beautiful vale of Tempe. Here the historian represents him as gazing in wonder at the mighty walls of rock which rose on either side, and asking whether it would be possible to treat the Peneios as Cyrus had treated the Gyndes or the Euphrates. Among the Hellenic or semi-Hellenic tribes who stooped to yield him earth and water the Aleuad chieftains of Thessaly had been the most prominent and the most zealous. From them the question of Xerxes brought out the fact that they lived in a mere basin where it was needful only to stop the one outlet of its streams in order to make the whole land a sea and destroy every soul within its mountain barriers. Xerxes was not slow, it is said, in appreciating the force and meaning of Thessalian ardor. People who live in a country which can be taken without trouble do wisely, he maintained, in making a league betimes with the invader.

Long before the departure of Xerxes from Sousa the course of events in Western Hellas had been determining the parts which Athens and Sparta were severally to play in the approaching struggle. The long and uninteresting feud or warfare between Athens and Aigina had at least one good result in fixing the attention of the Athenians rather on their navy than on their army. Of the need of an efficient fleet Themistokles had from the

¹ Herod. vii. 115.

very beginning of his career been conscious, and this want he persistently strained every nerve to supply. With him the maritime greatness of Athens was the one end on which all his efforts were concentrated; and the change of policy, on which he was thus led to insist, undoubtedly embittered the antagonism which had already placed a great gulf between himself and Aristeides. The growing wealth of Themistokles, the increasing poverty of his rival; the rigid integrity of the latter, the winning versatility of the former; the attachment of Aristeides to the old forms of Athenian life, the determination of Themistokles to make Athens pre-eminently a maritime power—all presented a contrast involving so much danger to the state that Aristeides himself (if we believe a tradition already noticed) said that if the Athenians were wise they would put an end to their rivalry by throwing them both into the Barathron; and the Demos so far took the same view that by a vote of ostracism Aristeides was sent into exile. In him Athens lost a citizen incomparably superior to his rival in every private virtue and in general morality; in Themistokles she retained the only man who could guide her, through seemingly hopeless difficulties, to victory and imperial power. The ostracism of Aristeides affirmed the adoption of the new policy in preference to the old conservative theory which regarded the navy as the seed-bed of novelty and change: and it cannot be doubted that Themistokles would strengthen this resolution by dwelling on the certainty of a fresh effort on the part of the Persian king to carry out the design on which, as they knew, his father Dareios had set his heart. From the petty strife with Aigina he would lead them to the momentous contest which awaited them with the whole power of Asia. He would not fail to impress on them the fact that this mighty force was to be directed especially against themselves, and that it was as necessary to be prepared against the formidable Phœnician fleet which had crushed their eastern kinsfolk as against any armies which might assail them by land. Nor would there be any difficulty in persuading them that the foundations of their naval supremacy should be laid in the fortification of Peiræus with its three natural harbors¹ rather than in the open bay of Phaleron to the east of the promontory of Mounychia. It was a happy thing both for the statesman and for the city whose true interests he had so thoroughly at heart, that the proposed expedition of Dareios was delayed first by the revolt of Egypt, then by his death, and lastly by the long time spent by Xerxes before he set out from Sousa, while the internal

¹ Thuc. i. 93.

resources of Athens were enormously increased by the proceeds of the silver mines of Laureion, a district lying between the triangle of which a line drawn from Thorikos on the east to Anaphlystos on the west forms the base with cape Sounion for its apex.

This quickening of the Athenian mind under the guidance of Themistokles was not the only good effect produced by the shadow of the storm-cloud approaching from the East. Some at least among the other Greeks began to see that they were not fulfilling their true mission by wasting their years in perpetual warfare and feud; and in an assembly which deserved to be considered in some degree as a Pan-hellenic congress, they acknowledged the paramount need of making up all existing quarrels in presence of a danger which threatened all alike. In face of this common peril the men of Aigina laid aside their feud with the Athenians; but the joint action of the day was in their case followed unhappily by the renewed enmity of the morrow. In fact, whatever might be the outward look of things, the Hellenic character was not changed; and although invitations were sent to the Greeks of Sporadic¹ Hellas from Krete to Sicily, the summons was by some disregarded, while even among the states which were prepared to sacrifice most in the common cause no further approach was made towards a true national union. It was a time of high excitement. Of all the Hellenic cities the greater number were Medizing, or taking sides with the Persian, while they who refused to submit to Xerxes were cast down at the thought of the utter inadequacy of their navy to cope with his Phœnician fleet. In this season of supreme depression the great impulse to hope and vigorous action came from Athens. The historian asserts that his words, which he knows will give great offence in many quarters, are forced from him by strong conviction of their truth; and his emphatic judgment is that if the Athenians had feared the coming danger and left their country, or, even without leaving it, had yielded themselves to Xerxes, none else would have dared to withstand the king by sea, while on land, even if many walls had been raised across the isthmus, the Spartans would have been forsaken by their allies, as these submitted one by one to the Persian fleet. Hence the Athenians are with him pre-eminently the saviours of Hellas. With them the scale of things was to turn; and they chose that Hellas should continue free, and raised up and cheered all those who would not yield to the Persian. Thus next after the gods, he adds, they drove away the king, because they feared not the

Pan-hellenic
congress at
the isthmus
of Corinth.
481 B.C.

¹ See p. 1.

oracles of Delphoi neither were scared by the great perils which were coming upon their country.¹

But for the present the plan of his narrative rendered it necessary to bring out in the most striking contrast the seemingly irresistible might of the Persian king and the disunion and vacillation of his adversaries. This contrast becomes most forcible when the Athenians, who are regarded as the special objects of his wrath, betake themselves for counsel in the hour of need to the god at Delphoi. How little worth are the answers ascribed to the Pythian priestess, we shall see at once when we remember that the numerical majority of the Greek states was decidedly in favor of submission to Xerxes, that the policy of resisting chiefly by sea was thoroughly distasteful to the strictly conservative citizens headed by Aristides, and that even those Greeks who were determined not to submit to the Persian were greatly depressed by the memory of the Ionic revolt and its disastrous issue. Here, as elsewhere, the epical feeling of the historian and his informants has exhibited itself in a narrative of singular beauty. We have first the very blackness of darkness in the pitiless response of the god to the Athenian messengers when first they approached the Delphian shrine.

The answers received at Delphoi by the Athenians.

O wretched people, why sit ye still? Leave your homes and the strongholds of your city, and flee away.
 Head and body, feet and hands, nothing is sound, but all is wretched; For fire and war, which are hastening hither on a Syrian chariot, will presently make it low;
 And other strong places also shall they destroy and not yours only,
 And many temples of the undying gods shall they give to the flame.
 Down their walls the big drops are streaming, as they tremble for fear;
 And from their roofs the black blood is poured down, for the sorrow that is coming:
 But go ye from my holy place and brace up your hearts for the evil.

The messengers were dismayed; but they received the first glimmering of comfort from the Delphian Timon who bade them take olive-branches and try the god once more. To their entreaty for a more merciful answer they added that, if they failed to receive it, they would stay there till they died. Their supplication was rewarded with these mysterious utterances,

Pallas cannot prevail with Zeus who lives on Olympos, though she has besought him with many prayers;
 And his word which I now tell you is firmly fixed as a rock.
 For thus saith Zeus that, when all else within the land of Kekrops is wasted, the wooden wall alone shall not be taken; and this shall help you and your children.

¹ Herod. vii. 139.

But wait not until the horsemen come and the footmen; turn your backs upon them now, and one day ye shall meet them.
 And thou, divine Salamis, shalt destroy those that are born of women, when the seedtime comes or the harvest.

These words, as being more hopeful, the messengers, we are told, wrote down, and having returned to Athens read them before the people.¹ This fact is distinctly asserted by Herodotos, and we have no reason for questioning it: but the very ease with which this response was made to coincide with the policy of Themistokles, seems to throw a clear light on the influence which produced it. The mind of the great statesman had long been made up that Athens should become a maritime power. He had resolved not less firmly that the main work of beating off the Persians should be wrought at sea, as he saw little chance of its being done effectually by land only; and his whole career supplies evidence that he would with slight scruple or none adopt whatever measures might be needed to carry out his resolutions. We have then no reason for doubting that when the answer was read out before the assembled citizens, Themistokles could at once come forward and say, as he is reported to have said, ‘ Athenians, the soothsayers who bid you leave your country and to seek another elsewhere, are wrong; and so are the old men who tell you to stay at home and guard the Akropolis, as though the god pointed to our Akropolis when he speaks of the wooden wall, because long ago there was a thorn hedge around it. This will not help you; and they are all leading you astray when they say that you must be beaten in a sea-fight at Salamis, and that this is meant by the words which tell of Salamis as destroying the children of women. The words do not mean this. If they had been spoken of us, the priestess would certainly have said “Salamis the wretched,” not “Salamis the divine,” if the people of the land were doomed to die there. They are spoken not of us, but of our enemies. Arm then for the fight at sea, for the fleet is your wooden wall.’ But if we may not question the fact that the response was susceptible of the interpretation put upon it by Themistokles, and indeed that it could not well bear any other, we have to remember the means by which the responses were produced which bade Kleomenes drive the Peisistratidai from Athens,² or enjoined the deposition of Demaratos.³ It is notorious that Themistokles was at least as unscrupulous as Kleisthenes; and it is to the last degree unlikely that he should fail to avail himself of an instrument so well fitted to further his designs.

¹ If we take these words in their strict sense, they would imply that the previous answer was not written down,—a conclusion which seems

to involve the fact that that response was of later fabrication.

² See p. 86.

³ See p. 149.

But although by adopting the policy of Themistokles Athens virtually insured her own supremacy in Hellas, the time was not yet come when it could be generally recognised. The position of Athens and the large number of ships which she was able to contribute seemed to justify her claim to the conduct of the war by sea : but the allies assembled in the congress at the isthmus declared bluntly that they would rather dissolve the confederacy than submit to any other than the Spartan rule ; and the genuine patriotism of the Athenians led them at once to waive a claim on which they might fairly have insisted.¹ From Argos, from Boiotia generally, and from Thebes in particular they had nothing to hope. The Argives were content, as they said, to be neutral in a strife in which their kinsfolk on either side were antagonists. With the exception of Thespiæ and Plataiæ the Boiotian cities, it is clear, were passive instruments in the hands of their chief men ; and these men were actuated by a vehement Medism which with them became the expression of an anti-Hellenic feeling beyond the power of defeat and disaster to repress or even to check. The Kretans urged as an excuse for not meddling in these matters a Delphian response which bade them remember how little they had gained by their efforts to avenge the death of Daidalos and the wrongs and woes of Helen.² The men of Korkyra, carrying thus early into practice the policy of isolation for which they afterwards became notorious,³ met the messengers from the Congress with eager assurances of ready help. They even carried their words into action : but the sixty ships which they manned were under officers who were charged to linger on their way along the southern coasts of Peloponnesos. Their conviction was that the Hellenic fleet and armies must alike be defeated ; and thus, when Xerxes had become lord of Hellas, they might fall down before him and take credit for the goodwill which had withheld them from exerting against him a force not altogether to be despised. The event disappointed their expectations : but it was easy to satisfy the victors of Salamis that they were making what haste they could to the scene of action when the Etesian winds baffled all their efforts to double cape Malea.⁴

Faithlessness of the Argives, Kretans, and Korkyræians.

From Gelon, the tyrant of the great Corinthian colony of Syracuse, the continental Hellenes expected greater things. In this hope they were disappointed ; but the inconsistent stories told to account for his refusal to help them sufficiently show the stuff out of which popular traditions are made and the processes by which they take shape. The city of Syracuse had risen to a posi-

¹ Herod. viii. 2, 3.

² Ib. vii. 169.

³ Thuc. i. 32-37.

⁴ Herod. vii. 168.

tion and a power second only to that of Sparta or of Athens : and it was as natural to suppose that Gelon would stand on his dignity and insist on co-ordinate power with those two states as that they should refuse to admit his claim. This idea has taken shape in the tale which relates how the messengers from the Congress told him of the coming of the Persian, professedly for the purpose of taking vengeance on Athens, but really with the design of enslaving all the Greeks, and besought him, in his own interest as well as theirs, to unite hand and heart in the effort to break his power. ‘It is vain to think,’ they urged, ‘that the Persian will not come against you, if we are conquered. Take heed in time. By aiding us thou savest thyself ; and a good issue commonly follows wise counsel.’ The answer of Gelon was a vehement outburst against their grasping selfishness. ‘When I sought your aid,’ he said, ‘against the men of Karchêdôn (Carthage), and promised to open to you markets from which you have reaped rich gains,¹ ye would not come ; and, as far as lies with you, all this country had been under the barbarians to this day. But I have prospered ; and now that war threatens you, ye begin to remember Gelon. I will not, however, deal with you, as ye have dealt with me. I will give you 200 triremes and 20,000 hoplites, with horsemen and archers, slingers and runners. I will also give corn for all the army of the Greeks as long as the war may last ; but I will do this only on condition that I be the chieftain and leader of the Greeks against the barbarians.’ This demand over-taxed the patience of the Spartan Syagros. ‘In very deed,’ he said, ‘would Agamemnon the son of Pelops mourn, if he were to hear that the Spartans had been robbed of their honor by Gelon and the Syracusans. Dream not that we shall ever yield it to you. If thou chooseth to aid Hellas, do so, under the Spartans : if thou wilt not have it so, then stay at home.’ But Gelon was ready with his answer. ‘Spartan friend,’ he said, ‘abuse commonly makes a man angry ; but I will not pay back insults in kind, and thus far I will yield. If ye rule by sea, I will rule by land ; and if ye rule by land, then must I rule on the sea.’ But here the Athenian messenger stood forth and said, ‘King of the Syracusans, the Hellenes have sent us not because they want a leader, but because they want an army. Of an army thou sayest little ; about the command much. When thou didst ask to lead us all, we left it to the Spartans to speak : but as to ruling on the sea, that we cannot yield. We grudge not to the Spartans their power by land ; but we will give place to none on the sea. We have more seamen than all the Greeks ; we are of all Greeks the

¹ Herod. vii. 158.

most ancient nation, and in the war of which Homer sings, our leader was the best of those who came to Ilium to set an army in battle array.'¹ 'Athenians,' answered Gelon, 'you seem likely to have many leaders, but few to be led. But since ye will yield nothing and grasp everything, hasten home and tell the Greeks that the spring-time has been taken out of their year.' Such is the tale which Herodotos relates as most generally believed among the continental Greeks about the conduct of Gelon during the Persian war; but he has the candor to give other accounts which deprive the popular tradition of all its value. According to one of these stories Gelon sent Kadmos of Kos with a charge similar to that which was given to the commander of the Korkyraian fleet. He was to go with a large sum of money to Delphoi; and if the Persian gained the victory, he was to present the money to Xerxes as a peace-offering. If the Greeks should gain the day, he was to bring it back again. The historian, having added that to his great credit he did bring it back, goes on to give the Sicilian version of the affair which asserted that in spite of Spartan supremacy Gelon would still have aided the Greeks, had not Terillos the banished tyrant of Himera brought against him under Hamilkar a host of Phenicians, Libyans, Iberians and other tribes equal in number to the Persians who fought under Mardonios at Plataiai,² and that therefore, being unable to help them with men, he sent a supply of money for their use to Delphoi.

But if Argos and Korkyra, Krete and Syracuse, were not to be trusted, and if Thebes with the Boiotian cities was bitterly hostile, it was still possible to preserve the Hellenic tribes which lay to the south of the pass of Tempe and to secure their aid against the invader. In any effort to guard the defile of Tempe the Thessalians declared themselves eager to take part to the utmost of their power: but they admitted plainly that their geographical position left them absolutely dependent on the aid of their Hellenic kinsfolk, and that, if this aid were withheld, they must secure their safety by making a covenant with the Persian king which would assuredly constrain them to fight against those whom they would infinitely prefer to help. It might well have been thought that no post could have been more easily tenable than this Thessalian defile, along which for a distance of five miles a road stretches, nowhere more than 20, and sometimes not more than 13 feet in width. Hence no time was lost in occupying the pass with 10,000 hoplites, aided by the Thessalian cavalry, under the command of

Abandonment of the pass of Tempe. 480 B.C.

¹ Herod. ii. 554.

² Ib. vii. 165.

the Spartan Euainetos and the Athenian Themistokles. But they held the pass for a few days only; and popular traditions, as usual, assigned its abandonment to different motives. The thought of guarding Tempe being given up, it was resolved that a stand should be made in the defile of Thermopylai while the fleet should take up its station on the northernmost coast of Euboia which received its name from a temple of Artemis. It would have suited better with the Greek tactics of this day to await the Persians in the narrower pass of the strait which separated Chalkis from the Boiotian coast: but to do this would have been to allow the Persian fleet to take the guardians of Thermopylai in the rear.

The accumulation of mud at the mouth of the Spercheios has in the course of three-and-twenty centuries so changed the coast of the Malian gulf that some of the most material features in the description of Herodotos no longer characterise this memorable spot. In his day the Spercheios, which drained the plain between the range of Tymphrestos and Othrys on the north and that of Oita on the south precisely as the Peneios drained the great Thessalian plain to the south of Pindos, ran into the gulf near the town of Antikyra at a point about 22 miles due west of the Kenaian or north-westernmost promontory of Euboia. From its mouth the coast, having stretched southwards for somewhat more than two miles, trended away to the east; and at short intervals the sea here received the small streams of the Dyras, Melas, and Asopos. These insignificant rivers are now discharged into the Spercheios which, flowing on the south instead of on the north side of Antikyra, reaches the sea at a point considerably to the east of Thermopylai. We look therefore in vain for the narrow space which, leaving room for nothing more than a cart track, gave access to the pass within which so many Persians were to meet their death. Close above the town of Anthela, the ridge of Oita, known there by the name Anopaia, came down so close to the water as to leave only this narrow pathway. Between this point, at a distance of perhaps a mile and a half to the east and a little to the west of the first Lokrian hamlet of Alpenoi, another spur of the mountain locked in the wider space within which the army of Leonidas took up its post, but which for all practical purposes was as narrow as the passes at either extremity which received the name of the Gates or the Hot Gates (Pylai, or Thermopylai). This narrow road was hemmed in by the precipitous mountain on the one side, and on the other by the marshes produced by the hot springs. But to render the passage still more difficult than nature had made it, the

The mission
of Leonidas
from Sparta
to Thermo-
pylai. June.
480 B.C.

Phokians had led the mineral waters almost over the whole of it and had also built across it near the western entrance a wall with strong gates. Much of this work had fallen from age ; but it was now repaired, and behind it we are told that the Greek army determined to await the attack of the Persians. Here, about the summer solstice, when Xerxes had already reached Thermê, was assembled a force of Spartans and their allies under Leonidas who to his surprise had succeeded to the kingly office. Of his two elder brothers Dorieus had been killed in Sicily,¹ and Kleomenes had died without sons. Thus Leonidas became the representative of Eurysthenes, and, as Spartan custom permitted, married his brother's daughter who had foiled the efforts of the Milesian Aristagoras to bribe her father into undertaking a wild and desperate enterprise.² He had set out on this his first and last expedition as king with three hundred picked hoplites or heavy-armed citizens. On his march he had been joined, it is said, by 1000 from Tegea and Mantinea, by 120 Arkadians from Orchomenos and 1000 more from other cities, together with 400 Corinthians, 200 from Phlious and 80 from Mykenai, the once proud city of Agamemnon. As he drew near to the pass, his army was increased by 1000 Phokians, by the whole force of the Lokrians of Opous, by 700 Thespians, and lastly by 400 Thebans whom Leonidas was anxious to take with him as hostages for the good faith of a city strongly suspected of Medism. The fact remains, if the narrative generally deserve any credit, that at a time when they supposed the Persians to be coming against them almost with millions, they were content to send forward for the maintenance of a pass second in importance only to the defile of Tempe a body of troops not exceeding 10,000 men. It was the month, Herodotos tells us, of the Karneian festival, during which it was forbidden to Dorians to go out to war. It was also the time of the great Olympic feast ; and the conclusion is forced upon us that this was regarded at Sparta as a sufficient reason for sending on an advanced guard of only 300 heavy-armed citizens, and by the Athenians as a reason for sending none at all. But according to the story the power of the Persians was still too great to allow to the Greeks even the possibility of resistance ; and the terror which already oppressed them was deepened when they heard that ten of the fastest sailing ships of the Persian fleet had fallen in with the three scout ships which the Greeks had stationed off the island of Skiathos about three miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Magnesia. At the sight of the Persian vessels the Greek ships fled ; but the Troizenian ship was soon taken. The

¹ See p. 65.

² See p. 138.

Athenian ship steered straight for the mouth of the Peneios, and, wonderful to say, found its way safely along a coast some eighty miles in length through the throng of Persian ships which were hurrying southwards. The crew left the stranded hull to the barbarians, and by a good luck still more wonderful contrived to march through Thessaly then occupied by some three or four millions of Persians, and so to reach Athens. But the tidings of this first encounter of Hellenes and barbarians at sea had been conveyed by fire signals from Skiathos to the fleet at Artemision; and the commanders at once sailed to Chalkis with the intention of guarding the Euripos.

Starting from Thermê, eleven days after the departure of Xerxes with the land-forces, the Persian fleet reached, we are told, after a single day's sail the southern part of the strip of coast stretching from the mouth of the Peneios to the promontory which marks the entrance of the gulf of Pagasai. In utter unconsciousness of danger the Persian commanders moored upon the Magnesian beach those ships which came first, while the rest lay beyond them at anchor, ranged in rows eight deep facing the sea. At break of day the air was clear, and the sea still: but the breeze, here called the wind of the Hellespont, soon rose and gathered to a storm. Those who had time drew their ships upon the shore and escaped; but all the vessels which were out at sea were borne away and dashed upon the Ovens of Pelion and all along the beach as far as Meliboia and Kasthanaia. Of the corn-ships and other vessels that were wrecked the numbers were never known: but with the wood obtained from them the captains threw up a strong fortification on the shore as a precaution, it is said, against attacks from the Thessalians.¹ Meanwhile the Greeks, who on the second day of the storm had heard of the mischief done to their enemies, plucked up courage and through the comparatively smooth waters of the Euboian sea sailed back to Artemision. The barbarians, however, were not so sorely crippled as the Greeks had hoped to find them. When the storm abated, their ships, drawn down from the shore, sailed to Aphetai at the entrance of the Pagasaian gulf and took up their position precisely opposite to the Greek fleet at Artemision. Some hours later, fifteen ships, having taken longer to repair, mistook the Greek

¹ Herod. vii. 191. The statement is singularly inconsistent with the conduct ascribed to the Thessalians after the abandonment of the pass of Tempe by Themistokles. But is it credible that even Thessalian wreckers would venture on practis-

ing their vocation upon men whose wrongs might be avenged by an army of many millions or even many myriads then passing on the other side of the ridge which had proved so fatal to the Persian fleet?

fleet for their own and sailing straight to Artemision were presently captured.

Xerxes in the meanwhile had advanced through Thessaly to the Achaian Alos on the western shore of the Pagasaian gulf. Thence working his way along the Pagasaian shore under the southern slopes of Othrys, he reached Antikyra, and about twelve days after his departure from Thermê incamped in the Malian Trachis between the streams of Melas and Asopos. Here he was separated only by a few miles of ground from the defenders of Thermopylai which, if we may believe Diodoros,¹ the Lokrians, who had now gone over from the Greek side, had promised to keep open for the passage of the Persian army. At this point the traditional narrative, as given by Herodotos, breaks out into one of those beautiful pictures which impart a marvellous life to his history. There was enough of disunion and dissension in the Greek camp, when a horseman sent by Xerxes came to learn their numbers and see what they were doing. The Greeks had repaired the old Phokian wall, and the horseman could advance no further: but outside of it were the Lakedaimonians with their arms piled against the wall, while some of them were wrestling and others combing their hair. The horseman having counted their numbers went back quietly, for none pursued him or took notice of him. His report seemed to Xerxes to convict his enemies of childish folly: but Demaratos was at hand to explain to him that when the Spartans have to face a mortal danger, their custom is to comb and deck out their hair. 'Be sure,' he added from that Spartan point of view which was needed to throw a plausible coloring over the story, 'be sure that if thou canst conquer these and the rest who remain behind in Sparta, there is no other nation which shall dare to raise a hand against thee, for now thou art face to face with the bravest men of all Hellas.' 'How can so few men ever fight with my great army?' asked the king. The only answer which he received was that he might deal with Demaratos as a liar, if things came not to pass as he said. Still Xerxes could not believe him, and for four days he waited, thinking that they would assuredly run away. At last his anger was kindled and he charged the Medians and Kissians to go and bring them all bound before him. The time for testing the power of Hellenic discipline and the force of Hellenic weapons was now come. The messengers of Xerxes advanced to do his bidding. Many were slain, and although others took their places, their errand was not done. At last, like the Imperial Guard at Waterloo, the Immortals under Hydarnes advanced to the attack. But their spears were shorter

¹ xi. 4.

than those of the Greeks: linen tunics could avail little in an encounter with iron-clad men, and mere numbers were of no use in the narrow pass. On the other hand the Spartans by pretending to fly drew the barbarians into the pass where they turned upon them suddenly and slew great multitudes until they all fled back to their camp. Thrice the king leaped from his throne in terror for his army: but on the next day he sent them forth again, thinking that the enemy would be too weary to fight. The Greeks, however, were all drawn out in battle array, save only the Phokians; and these were placed upon the hill to guard the pathway. Again the Persians fared as they had done before, and Xerxes was sorely troubled until a Malian named Ephialtes in hope of some great reward told him of the path which led over the hill, and thus destroyed the Greeks who were guarding Thermopylai.¹ Xerxes now regarded the conquest of the pass as practically achieved. As the daylight died away, Hydarnes set out from the camp with the troops under his command. All night long they followed the path Anopaia along the ridge which bore the same name, with the mountains of Oita on the right hand and the hills of Trachis on the left. The day was dawning with the exquisite stillness which marks early morning in Greece, when they reached the peak of the mountain where the thousand Phokians, who had charged themselves with this task, were guarding the pathway. While the Persians were climbing the hill, the Phokians knew not of their coming, for the whole hill was covered with oak-trees: but they knew what had happened as soon as the Persians reached the summit. Not a breath of wind was stirring, and they heard at once the trampling of their feet as they trod on the fallen leaves. Instantly they started up; but before they had well put on their arms, the barbarians were upon them. The sight dismayed the Persians at first, for Hydarnes had not expected any resistance:

¹ This pass was well known to the people of Trachis, who had guided the Thessalians over it, when the Phokians had built their wall across the pass of Thermopylai. Leonidas may have been ignorant of its existence when he set out for Sparta; but it was his business to have made himself acquainted with the geography of a spot which he knew to be of supreme importance for the Greek cause. The Athenians, according to the story, showed the same culpable ignorance at Tempe: but Leonidas could not have remained long unaware of this path which the Phokians volunteered to

guard. These must therefore have pointed it out to him from the first. Indeed they could not fail to do so. Between them and the Thessalians there was an enmity so bitter that Herodotos does not hesitate to say that the Phokians would have taken sides with Xerxes if the Thessalians had ranged themselves with the Greeks. Like the stories of Demokedes and Histiaios, the introduction of Ephialtes or other traitors is altogether superfluous. There was no secret about the pathway; and Leonidas was guilty of grave neglect of duty in not guarding it more efficiently.

but learning from Ephialtes that these men were not the Spartans, he drew out his men for battle. The Phokians, covered with a shower of arrows, fell back to the highest ground, thinking that the Persians were coming chiefly against them,¹ and there they made ready to fight and die. But the Persians, taking no more heed of them, hastened down the mountain.

In the pass itself the soothsayer Megistias, as he looked upon the victims, had told them, the historian assures us, that on the next day they must die. Deserters also came who said that the Persians were coming round; and as the day was dawning, watchmen ran to tell them the same thing.² On receiving these tidings the Greeks took counsel, and some

¹ This statement may fairly be thought incredible. The Phokians had volunteered to guard this path, and they had done so as knowing that on its occupation and maintenance depended the salvation of the army in Thermopylai. They knew that if any force of the enemy ascended the hill, it could only be for the one purpose of taking Leonidas and his men in the rear, while the main body of the Persians attacked them in front. But no sooner do they feel the Persian arrows than without a thought of their allies they at once abandon the pathway, where their resistance would have been of the utmost value and might have insured a signal Hellenic victory, and then make ready to fight to the death a little higher up where their resistance was worth no more than the mimic campaigning of children. It is impossible to restore the true history of all these incidents: but we are none the less driven to the conclusion that the true history has not been handed down to us. What became of these Phokians when Hydarnes and his men had passed on? We can scarcely suppose that they remained on the top of the hill in fighting attitude, when there were none with whom they could fight. We are not told how many men were under the command of Hydarnes: but had they been ten times the number of the Phokians, the latter might have taken them in the rear and committed fearful havoc among

them. It is possible, but not very likely, that they might have been overpowered. English soldiers in such a position would withstand twenty times their own number: and the very point of the story is that the Phokians were prepared to fight till not a man of them should remain alive. The likelihood is that, had they followed Hydarnes at a moderate distance, they could have done so with perfect safety. These Persians would then have been caught both in front and rear; and not only would the scheme of Hydarnes have failed, but the destruction of his whole force would probably have been insured before the army of Xerxes could be made aware of what had happened, as it is obvious that when once Hydarnes had reached the base of the hill, no messenger could have escaped to tell the tale, if Leonidas himself opposed them in front and if the Phokians occupied the higher and therefore the safer ground in the rear. Either then the events are inaccurately related, or these Phokians were deliberate traitors: but this latter hypothesis is opposed to other facts which seem to be clearly ascertained. Their fidelity was sufficiently secured by the presence of the hated Thessalians in the camp of Xerxes.

² Herod. vii. 219. These, we must suppose, were scouts placed on the eastern slopes of the hill, beneath the level of the ground occupied by the Phokians.

urged flight and went away each to his own city, while others made up their minds to remain with Leonidas. Another story was told that Leonidas sent them away himself lest they should all be slain: and to this tale the historian gave credit, adding that Leonidas knew them to be faint-hearted and so suffered them not to stay, but that it was not seemly for himself to fly. So he tarried where he was, and left behind him a great name, and the happiness of Sparta failed not. The priestess of Delphoi had told the Spartans, when the war began, that either Lakedaimon must be wasted or their king must die; and Leonidas, remembering her words, sent them away that so the Spartans might have all the glory. The Thebans and Thespians alone remained. The men of Thebes Leonidas kept sorely against their will, as pledges for their people: but the Thespians would not save their own lives by forsaking Leonidas and his men.

When the sun rose, Xerxes poured out wine to the god, and tarried until the time of the filling of the market,¹ for such was the bidding of Ephialtes, because the path down the hill was much shorter than the way which led up it on the western side. Then the barbarians arose for the onset; and the men of Leonidas, knowing now that they must die, came out into the wider part of the path,² for thus far they had fought in the narrowest place. From the beginning of the battle the slaughter of the barbarians was great, for the leaders of their companies drove every man on with scourges and blows. Many fell into the sea and were drowned; many more were trampled down alive by one another. No thought was taken of those who fell, while the Spartans fought on with all their might. At length their spears were all broken and they slew the Persians with their swords, until at last Leonidas fell nobly, and other Spartans with him, whose names the historian learnt as of men

¹ Probably not earlier than 9 or 10 A.M. The precise time denoted by this phrase is a matter of some controversy: but it is unnecessary to enter into it, as no one will maintain that the market was considered full at an earlier hour than 9 o'clock. Taking it at the earliest, we shall thus have four, if not five, hours from the time when Hydarnes left the Phokians on the heights of Anopaia,—a time sufficient to cripple his detachment, if not to destroy it, if it had been assailed by the Spartans in front, and by the Phokians, who should have followed them, in the rear.

² On Anopaia the Phokians seek

what they suppose to be a stronger position, looking simply to their own interest, and in utter forgetfulness, it would seem, of the purpose for which they were on the mountain at all. Having made this blunder, or rather having exhibited this weakness, they fail to make the best of the splendid opportunity which still remained of falling on the Persians in their descent. Leonidas now gives up a strong position for a weaker, in order, seemingly, to make a greater display of personal valor. In either case the generalship, if the story be true, is little better than that of savages.

whose memory ought not to be lost. Over his body there was a hard fight in which many great men of the Persians were slain, and among them two brothers of the king: but the Spartans gained back his body and turned the enemy to flight four times, until the traitor Ephialtes came up with his men. Then the face of the battle was changed, for the Greeks went back into the narrow part within the wall, and there they posted themselves, all in one body except the Thebans, on the hillock on which in the days of the historian the lion stood over the grave of Leonidas. In this spot they who yet had them fought with daggers, and the rest as they could, while the barbarians overwhelmed them, some in front, some dragging down the wall, others pressing round them on every side. So fell the Thespians and the Spartans, the bravest of the latter being Dienekes, who, as the tale ran, hearing from a man of Trachis just before the battle that whenever the Persians shot their arrows the sun was darkened by them, answered merrily, 'Our friend from Trachis brings us good news: we shall be able to fight in the shade.' They were all buried where they fell; and over those who died before Leonidas sent the allies away the inscription recorded that four thousand men of Peloponnesos here fought with three hundred myriads. Over the Spartans by themselves there was another writing which said,

Tell the Spartans, at their bidding,
Stranger, here in death we lie.

Of these three hundred Spartans two, it is said, were lying sick in the village of Alpenoi, their names being Eurtytos and Aristodemos. The former, calling for his arms, bade his guide lead him into the battle, for his eyes were diseased, and plunging into the fight was slain. Aristodemos went back alone to Sparta where he was shunned by all. None would kindle a fire for him, none would speak to him; but every one called him Aristodemos the Dastard. Yet he got back his good name and fell fighting nobly at Plataiai. As for the Thebans, so long as they were with the Spartans in the battle, they were compelled, it is said, to fight against the king: but when Leonidas with his men hastened to the hillock within the wall, they got away and with outstretched arms went towards the barbarians with the truest of all tales, saying that not only were they on the king's side but that they were the first to give him earth and water and that they had gone into this fight sorely against their will. As the Thessalians bore out their words, their lives were spared: but some had the bad luck to be killed as they came near to the Persians, and most of the others, beginning from their chief Leontiades, were branded with the royal mark as unfaithful servants.

The issue of this battle set the despot pondering. Summoning Demaratos, he asked him how many Spartans might be left and whether they were all warriors like those who had fallen with Leonidas. The answer was that the Lakedaimonians had many cities, of which Sparta was one, and that Sparta had about eight thousand men all equal to those who had fought at Pylai. To the intreaty of Xerxes that he would tell him candidly how these men were to be conquered, Demaratos replied that there was no other way than to send a detachment of the fleet to occupy the island of Kythera, of which the wise Chilon had said that it would be better for the Spartans if it were sunk in the depths of the sea. This counsel, of which only an Eastern tyrant would need the suggestion, Achaimenes, the brother of Xerxes, ascribed to the envy and hatred which all Greeks felt for those who were better or more prosperous than themselves. They had already, he urged, lost four hundred ships in the storm; and if the fleet were further divided, the enemy would at once be a match for them. But Xerxes, though ready enough, according to the advice of his brother, to order his own matters without taking heed to the counsels, the doings, or the numbers of his enemies, bade Achaimenes beware how he spoke evil of Demaratos who, though less wise, was still his very good friend. This praise of the exiled Spartan king was followed by an order to behead and to crucify the body of the worthier Spartan king who had died in Thermopylai fighting for freedom and for law. Some time later, when the Greek fleet had retreated from Artemision and the Persian sailors were taking their ease on the shore of Histiaria, Xerxes arranged a sight for their gratification. Twenty thousand of his men had been slain at Thermopylai. Of these he left one thousand on the ground: the rest he buried in trenches under leaves and earth, so that they could not be seen. All being ready, he sent a herald who proclaimed that all who pleased might leave their posts and go to see how the king fought with those foolish men who sought to withstand his power. On this so many desired to go that there was a lack of boats to carry them. But even Persians were not so easily cheated as Xerxes thought that they might be. The trick was at once seen through, when they found the thousand Persians lying by themselves, and the four thousand Greeks gathered into a single heap. One other picture belonging to the struggle at Thermopylai exhibits some Arkadian deserters as seeking for work from the king, who asks them what the Greeks are doing. The answer is that they were keeping the feast at Olympia and beholding the contests of wrestlers and horsemen. On hearing this one of the Persians asked what the prize might be for which they strove, and was told that it was

an olive-wreath. 'Ah! Mardonios,' exclaimed Tritantaichmes, who could no longer keep silence, 'what men are these against whom thou hast brought us here to fight, who strive not for money but for glory?' and for this saying the king held him to be a coward.

Such is the traditional narrative of the battles within Thermopylai. It is impossible not to feel the beauty and grandeur of the epical form into which it has been thrown: but from first to last we must also feel that in many most important particulars the true history of these events has been lost, and that of the incidents recorded not a few involve difficulties which seem to be insoluble. Among these is the alleged total absence of the Athenians from a place the maintenance of which was not only essential to their safety but enjoined by the policy for which they pleaded all along with the utmost eagerness. The barbarian was not to be suffered to ravage the lands of Greek cities, if it should be possible to prevent it. Yet here they cannot spare the smallest force for the defence of a post which ten men might hold against a thousand. But even without any Athenians Leonidas brought with him from Peloponnesos, if we follow the traditional story, a force of 3,100 heavy-armed troops, whose numbers with the addition of the Phokians, Thespians, and Thebans were raised to 5,200 men. If we allow to each Spartan citizen the same number of helots as those which accompanied the force sent afterwards to Plataiai,¹ and take 1,000 as the lowest number of light-armed troops, there was assembled under the command of Leonidas an army of not less than 8,300 men. With these forces Leonidas succeeded for ten or twelve days in checking the advance of the whole Persian army and in inflicting on them a very serious loss. Nothing could prove more clearly the practicability of his position and the likelihood of success, if he kept his ground without lessening his numbers. But still more strangely, the Greeks at Thermopylai not merely forget the Aitolian passes, through which, as they must have known, an invader could force his way into southern Hellas, but guard most inefficiently a pass close at hand which might at any moment be used to turn their position. The existence of this pass is made known to Xerxes through the superfluous treachery of Ephialtes: but although the loss of this pathway owing to the absurd, if not incredible, conduct of the Phokians destroyed, it is said, all chance of ultimate success, it still left open the possibility of retreat. The men of Corinth, of Phlious, and Mykenai, with all the Arkadian forces (including, as it would seem, their light-armed troops), were at once dismissed by Leonidas, who

¹ Herod. ix. 10. If the text of this passage be authentic, the portion of hoplites to helots was one to seven.

retained along with his helots the troops furnished by Thespiæ and Thebes. The Thebans in the ensuing conflict did as little as they could; but even without their aid 20,000 Persians are stated to have been slain by the 300 Spartans and the 700 Thespians. If a loss so enormous was caused to the Persians by so scanty a band of antagonists, it is difficult to calculate the probable result, if Leonidas had kept his allies to share the danger and the glory of the struggle. Without lessening the force which he kept about himself to the last, he might have detached the whole body of his Peloponnesian allies to aid the Phokians in guarding Anopaiæ. Four thousand men on the summit of the hill could easily have kept back twenty or forty thousand disciplined troops; and from the nature of the land we may safely assume that the detachment of Hydarnes did not amount to anything like the lower of these two numbers, while their discipline was not to be compared with that of the Greeks. If, again, after deserting their post they had followed, as their duty bound them to follow, the descending Persians, this portion of the enemy's force must have been cut off long before the hour at which Xerxes had ordered that the troops of the main army should start from the camp. But as they failed to do this, it is hard indeed to imagine how the blunder of the Phokians still left time for the retreat of a body of perhaps 5,000 men along a narrow strip of ground which in some parts was scarcely wider than a cart track. Within an hour from the time of his leaving the Phokians on the top of the hill, Hydarnes with his men must have reached the eastern gates. When he had once come down on the more level ground, none could possibly have retreated from the Greek camp without fighting their way through his troops; and the narrative clearly speaks of a peaceable, or even a leisurely, departure, not of desperate efforts like those of an army struggling through a pass occupied by an overwhelming enemy.

Still less easy is it to understand the facts related of the Thebans whom Leonidas retained by his side against their will. Their presence cannot be explained by the admission that the motives of Leonidas and his allies. the Thebans and Boiotians, feeling little sympathy for either side, were passive instruments in the hands of their leaders, who judged it imprudent in this instance to refuse the request of Leonidas: nor can we safely adopt the conclusion that they were citizens of the anti-Persian party and so remained of their own free will, but that after the fall of the Spartan king they took credit for a Medism which they did not feel. We do not know that Diodoros or Pausanias had access to any information of which Herodotos was ignorant: and the latter distinctly contradicts any such supposition. He main-

tains that their profession of Medism was the truest of all pleas ;¹ and it is to the last degree unlikely that the Thessalians would have upheld the credit of men of whose Hellenic sympathies they must according to this hypothesis have been aware. If again they were thus kept wholly against their will, it is scarcely less surprising that they should remain quiet until the battle was at an end, when they might have either openly joined Hydarnes, or passively hindered the resistance of Leonidas. The care taken by the commanders of the Athenian fleet to obtain early tidings of the army at Thermopylai may imply that Athenian citizens were not lacking among the troops which defended the pass ; and if we admit, as we can scarcely avoid admitting, that the narrative, as we have it, is framed for the special purpose of magnifying the Spartans, we are almost justified in inferring that the resistance in Pylai was on a far larger scale than Herodotos has represented it. A compulsory retreat of the allies might be veiled under the decent plea that they were dismissed ; and if they were conscious of faint-heartedness, they would not care to hinder the growth of a story which covered their remissness in the Hellenic cause, while it enhanced the glory of Leonidas.

If the account of Herodotos is to be trusted at all, the Greeks on board their ships heard of the disaster which befell the Persian fleet off the Magnesian coast on the second day after the beginning of the storm ; and no sooner had they received the tidings than they set off with all speed to Artemision, which they would necessarily reach on that second day. Their crews were cheerfully prepared, if not vehemently eager, for conflict ; nor was there anything to damp their courage until the Persian ships hove into sight two days later. The invaders had heard already that the scanty Greek fleet was awaiting their arrival off Artemision ; and when on reaching Aphetai late in the afternoon they saw them near the opposite shore, they were deterred from attacking them at once only by the wish that not a single Greek vessel should escape. This result could be insured only by sending a detachment of two hundred Persian ships round the east coast of Euboia to take the Greek fleet in the rear at the Euripos. These ships the Persian commanders accordingly sent off that same afternoon ;² and on the same day, it would seem, the diver Skyllias of Skiônê came as a deserter from the Persian fleet with the news of the damage done by the recent storm,³ and of the mission of the two hundred ships to prevent the flight of the Greeks by way of the Euboian strait. Thus on the very same day on

The Greek fleet at Artemision.

¹ Herod. vii. 233.

² Herod. viii. 7.

³ This news cannot have been

fresh, as the Greeks had already received full tidings of the disaster, Herod. vii. 192.

which they first saw the enemy's ships, or at the latest on the morning of the next day, the Greek commanders were informed that they could not avoid a battle by retreating; and until the Persian fleet became visible off Aphetai, it is distinctly implied that they had no intention of retreating. It is not easy therefore to see what room is left for the circumstantial narrative that the Greeks on seeing the Persian ships resolved to retreat as they had come, and that the Euboians in their terror at being abandoned, as the Thessalians had been abandoned at Tempe, and having failed to obtain from Eurybiades a delay which might enable them to remove their families from the island, prevailed on Themistokles by a bribe of thirty talents to prevent this cowardly desertion. Of this sum it is said that he bestowed, as from himself, five talents on Eurybiades, while three sufficed to overcome the stouter opposition or more craven spirit of the Corinthian Adeimantos. The remaining twenty-two talents, we must especially note, he kept for himself, while the Spartan and Corinthian leaders both thought that they had been bribed with Athenian money. It must at least be said that the Euboian bribers kept their own counsel with astonishing secrecy and repressed by a silence not less wonderful the regret which they must have felt on learning, a few hours later, that their bribe had been a superfluous waste of money.

The tidings brought by Skyllias worked a sudden change in the minds of the Greek leaders. After a long debate they resolved to stay where they were until night came on, and then under cover of darkness to move down the strait and meet the squadron sent round Euboia to cut them off. Finding, as the day wore on, that the Persian fleet remained motionless, they determined with greater vigor to use the remaining hours of light in attacking the enemy and thus gaining some experience of their way of fighting. As the Greeks drew nigh, the Persians, as at Marathon, thought them mad, so it is said, and surrounded them with their far more numerous and faster sailing ships. But on a given signal the confederates drew their ships into a circle with their sterns inwards and their prows ready for the charge. On a second signal the onset was made, and a conflict ensued in which the Greeks took thirty Persian ships.

On the night which followed the battle the storm again burst forth with terrific lightning and deluges of rain. The wrecks and the dead bodies were carried by the waves to Aphetai, where they became entangled with the prows of ships and the blades of oars. But if the storm caused great distress to the main fleet off the Thessalian coast, it was utter ruin for the ships dispatched round Euboia to cut off the Greeks at Euripos. On these the tempest broke as

Indecisive
action off
Artemision.

Destruction
of the Per-
sian squad-
ron dis-
patched to
the Euripos.

they were passing the Hollows of the island. Not knowing whither they were going, they were dashed against the rocks, for thus, the historian adds, the Divine Nemesis had determined to bring their numbers more nearly to a level with that of the Greek fleet.¹

The morning brought no cheering sight to the barbarians at Aphetai. For the present they deemed it prudent to remain quiet, while the Greek fleet was strengthened not merely by the tidings that the squadron sent to intercept them had been destroyed but also by a reinforcement of fifty-three Athenian ships. Two days later the Persian leaders determined to begin the attack which should decide whether they or their enemies should remain masters of the Euripos.² The Persian ships were drawn out crescent-wise in order to surround and overwhelm the confederate fleet; but they failed, we are told, more from the mere multitude of their vessels, which dashed against and clogged each other, than from any lack of bravery or spirit in their crews. The battle was a fierce one; but although the Persians lost more both in ships and in men, the Spartans and their allies had been so severely treated and found themselves so seriously weakened that retreat once more appeared the only course open to them. Themistokles, it would seem, was unable to change their resolution, although possibly a few more of the Euboian talents remaining in his possession might have been not less potent than they had been some days before. But if there had been any hesitation thus far, all doubt as to the necessity of retreat was removed, when they heard that Xerxes was master of the pass which formed the gate of southern Hellas. At once the Greek fleet began to retreat, the Corinthians leading the way, the Athenians following last in order.

So ended the double conflict, which, we are told, was carried on at the same time, at Thermopylai and Artemision. The one thought of the Spartans and Corinthians was now, it would seem, fixed on the defence not of Boiotia or Attica but of the Peloponnesos alone; and their ships would, it is said, have sailed at once to the Corinthian isthmus, had not Themistokles, by words rather than bribes, persuaded them to make a stand at Salamis, and thus to give the Athenians time to remove their households from Attica and otherwise to form their plans.³ Here then the fleet remained, while the Peloponnesians

Second action off Artemision, resulting in the victory and retreat of the Greeks.

The fortification of the Corinthian isthmus.

¹ This statement, Herod. viii. 13, is in direct contradiction with the subsequent statement, ib. viii. 66, where Herodotos says that the numbers of the Persian fleet at Salamis

were pretty much what they had been when they reached the coast of Sepias before the great storm.

² Herod. viii. 15.

³ Herod. viii. 40.

were working night and day, breaking up the Skironid road and raising the wall across the isthmus. But the barrier thus completed imparted little confidence to its builders, and none, it would seem, to the Peloponnesian seamen in the ships at Salamis. We have, in fact, reached the time of the greatest depression on the side of the Greeks; nor can we doubt that this depression marks the moment at which the enterprise of Xerxes had been brought most nearly to a successful issue. The real strength of his army lay in the men whom Cyrus had led from conquest to conquest, and whose vigor and spirit remain unsubdued after the lapse of five-and-twenty centuries: and we can the better appreciate the character of the struggle and its issue, when we see that the Greeks were fighting against men little, if at all, inferior to themselves in any except the one point that the Eastern Aryan fought to establish the rule of one despotic will, while his Western brother strove to set up the dominion of an equal law.

Western freedom was, in truth, in far greater danger than it would have been but for this genuine element of strength in the Persian forces; nor was it necessary for the priestess of Athênê on the rock of Athens to announce that the sacred serpent had at last refused to touch its food. Migration of the Athenian people. The tidings may somewhat have heightened the terrors of the moment: but there was a need for prompt action more constraining than the vague warnings of a Delphian oracular response. Immediately after the arrival of the fleet from Artemision a proclamation, we are told, was issued, warning all Athenians to remove their families from the country in all possible haste; and the task of removal, to whatever extent it may have been carried, was accomplished in less than six days, for within that time after the retreat of the Greek ships Xerxes was master of Athens.

Meanwhile the Persian king was advancing in his career of conquest. To the north of Attica he had overcome practically all resistance. With the exception of the two small cities of Thespiæ and Plataiæ all the Boiotian towns had submitted to him, and the Thessalians are said to have professed a zeal in his cause which Herodotos ascribed wholly to their hatred of the Phokians. It was, therefore, not wonderful that the Phokians should now meet with a flat refusal the proffer of the Thessalians who pledged themselves on the receipt of fifty talents to insure the safety of all Phokian territory against the troops of Xerxes. At once the Thessalians led the Persians through that narrow little strip of Dorian land, barely four miles in width, which lay between the Malian and Phokian territories, and then let them loose on Phokis. The Phokian towns were all burnt, and among these Abai, the shrine of Apollon, which was

The devastation of Phokis.

despoiled of all its magnificent treasures without awaking the vengeance of the god. The invaders had now reached Panopeai, a town lying to the south of the Euênos, some ten miles to the west of the point where it empties itself into the lake Kopais near Orchomenos. Here the forces were divided. The larger and better portion, under orders to join Xerxes, went on through Boiotia. The rest, led by local guides, marched, it is said, towards Delphoi to bear thence for the Persian king, among other treasures, the offerings with which the Lydian Kroisos had enriched the shrine. Here they hoped to fare as they had fared at Abai. The tidings of their approach, as they came on burning and slaying everywhere, so dismayed the Delphians that they asked the god whether they should bury his holy treasures or carry them away. 'Move them not,' answered the god, 'I am able to guard them.' Then taking thought for themselves, they sent their women and children across the gulf into the land of the Achaians, while most of the men climbed up to the peaks of Parnassos and the Korykian cave and others fled to Amphissa. In Delphoi there remained only sixty men with the prophet Akeratos. As the barbarians drew nigh and were now in sight, Akeratos saw lying in front of the temple the sacred arms, which used to hang in the holy place and which it was not lawful for man to touch; and he went to tell the Delphians of the marvel. But there were greater wonders still, as the barbarians came up in haste to the chapel of Athênè which stood before the great temple, for the lightnings burst from heaven and two cliffs torn from the peaks of Parnassos dashed down with a thundering sound and crushed great multitudes, and fierce cries and shoutings were heard from the chapel of Athênè. In the midst of this din and uproar the barbarians in utter terror turned to flee: and when the Delphians on Parnassos saw this, they came down from the mountain and slew many more, while they who escaped hurried with all speed to the Boiotian land and told how two hoplites, higher in stature than mortal men, had followed behind, slaying and driving them from Delphoi. These, the Delphians said, were the two heroes of the land, Phylakos and Autonôos.

The inroad of the Persians on Delphoi is the turning point of the great epic of Herodotos. It is the most daring provocation of divine jealousy and wrath by the barbarian despot: The attack and while it precedes immediately his own humiliation, on Delphoi. it insures also the final destruction of the army which he was to leave behind with Mardonios. But the poetical handling of the tale has shrouded it with an uncertainty beyond that of most other incidents of the war. The words put into the mouth of Mardonios before the battle of Plataiai assert emphatically that the expedition

never took place at all ;¹ and in the lack of any satisfactory evidence that these words were ever uttered, we can but say that here also we are reading only another part of the great heroic legend, how the gods made the prime mover of all the evil believe a lie and utter words of more than mortal pride in the hour of his doom. The fall of the rocks at Delphoi cannot be separated from the other miraculous details—from the unseen arm which laid the sacred weapons before the temple doors and from the visible aid of the deified heroes of the place. The same supernatural intervention recurs in the story of the later attack on Delphoi by Bran (Brennus) and his Gauls.² In the narrative of Plutarch the Delphian temple was not only taken by the Persians but underwent the lot which befell the kindred oracle of Abai. On this point, however, the statement of Plutarch has little more weight than that of Ktesias. The splendid offerings of an earlier age, the magnificent gifts, bearing the names of Gyges and Kroisos, which were seen in the Delphic treasury by Herodotos himself,³ seem sufficiently to prove that the temple was not plundered, far less burnt, by the Persians. But how the expedition came to fail and why its failure was not followed up by an attack with forces far more overwhelming, are questions to which no answer can be given. On the other hand, the conclusion that in this miraculous narrative we have the popular version of a systematic but unsuccessful effort to pass into southern Hellas over the Aitolian roads seems to be not altogether unwarranted.

The wrong done to Phoibos, the lord of light, had been punished in part on the spot. The more signal vengeance of the god was reserved for the shores of Salamis, where the ships of those Hellenic cities which had not submitted themselves to the invader or chosen to be neutral in the contest were gathered together. The Persian fleet had not yet advanced so far to the Occupation of Athens by south ; and Xerxes was still moving on upon the path Xerxes. which, as he fancied, was to lead him to his final triumph. Four months had passed away since his army crossed the bridge over the Hellespont, when the tyrant set his foot on Attic soil. But we are told that he found the land desolate. The city was abandoned ; and there remained on the Akropolis⁴ only a few poor people and the guardians of the temples who, rather to

¹ Herod. ix. 42.

² It is, in fact, impossible to read the story of the Gallic overthrow as related by Pausanias, x. 23, without feeling that it is a mere repetition of the narrative of Herodotos.

³ i. 50.

⁴ The Athenian Akropolis rises

abruptly to the height of about 150 feet above the surrounding plain. The table-land on its summit, which has been graced by so many magnificent works of consummate art, has a measurement, according to M. Beulé, *L'Acropole d'Athènes*, of 900 feet by 400 feet.

carry out the letter of the oracle than from any serious notion of defence, had blocked with wooden palisades, planks, or doors the only side of the Akropolis which was supposed to lie open to attack. Behind these wooden walls this scanty garrison, besieged by Persian troops stationed on the opposite hill of Ares, underwent the dignity of a blockade. Arrows bearing lighted tow were discharged against the fence in vain : and Xerxes thus foiled gave himself up to one of his frequent fits of furious passion. But on the northern side there is a fissure in the rock, in part subterraneous ; and here some Persians managed to scramble up to the summit near the chapel of Aglauros the daughter of Kekrops. As soon as they saw their enemies, some of the poor men who occupied rather than defended the Akropolis threw themselves over the precipitous rock, while others took refuge in the temple of the goddess. They might, like the Roman senators seated in the forum, have met their fate with greater dignity : but the Persians were not more magnanimous than Bran and his Gauls, and as soon as they had opened their gates to their comrades, they hurried to the temple and cut down every one of the suppliants. Xerxes was now for the moment lord of Athens : and he lost no time in dispatching a horseman to Sousa with the tidings. The streets of the royal city rang with shouts of exultation when the news was received, and were strewn with myrtle branches. The fears of Artabanos were falsified, and the harems of the king and his nobles could now await patiently the advent of the Spartan and Athenian maidens whom Atossa had long ago wished to have as her slaves.

But Xerxes, though he was eager to take full revenge on Athens for the wrongs done to the shrines of his gods in Sardeis, was yet anxious to avert the anger of beings mightier than man. The temples on the Akropolis were burnt ; but he charged the Athenian exiles who had returned with him from Sousa to make their peace with Athênè. Only two days had passed since the capture of the rock : but when the exiles came to offer sacrifice, the sacred olive-tree of the goddess which had been burnt with the temple had already sent up from its roots a shoot of a cubit's height. The Peisistratidai might well interpret this as a sign of the greeting with which Athênè welcomed them home ; and probably they chose to give it this meaning when they reported the sign to Xerxes. But like many another prodigy, it might be read in more than one way ; and it was time that some cheering token should be vouchsafed to the Athenians in their exile at Salamis. The fleet of the confederates had been gathered at that island rather to cover the migration of the Athenians than with any

Intended
abandon-
ment of Sa-
lamiis by the
confede-
rates.

notion of making it a naval station ; and now not only was the Persian fleet drawn up before them in the harbor of Phaleron, but Athens itself had been taken. Hellenic alliances were at no time very firmly cemented ; and on the receipt of these tidings something like panic fear drove not a few of the Hellenic commanders to dispense even with the formality of an order. These hastened at once on board their ships and made ready for immediate flight. The rest assembled in council ; but their minds were already made up. A poor semblance of debate was followed by a decision to retreat on the following day and take up a permanent position off the Corinthian isthmus. Here in case of defeat by sea they might at least fall back on the help of the land-forces. One man alone felt that the abandonment of Salamis would be a virtual confession that common action could no more be looked for, and resolved that whether by fair means or by foul he would not allow this dastardly retreat to be carried out. But the narrative of the subsequent events must be given as it has been left to us in the pages of Herodotos.

The council was over, and Themistokles returned to his ship. Here an Athenian named Mnesiphilos, on hearing the result, besought him at all cost to bring every power of persuasion to bear on Eurybiades and thus to get the order rescinded. Mnesiphilos saw clearly that retreat meant utter dispersion, and that dispersion must bring after it the complete ruin of Hellas. Without answering a word Themistokles hastened back to the ship of Eurybiades and by many arguments of his own added to those suggested by Mnesiphilos prevailed on the Spartan leader to summon the chiefs to a second council. On their assembling Themistokles, too impatient to wait for the formal opening of the debate, began eagerly to address the commanders, until Adeimantos the Corinthian reminded him sharply that they who rise up in the games before the signal are beaten. ‘Yes,’ said Themistokles gently ; ‘but those who do not rise when the signal is given are not crowned.’ Then, turning to Eurybiades, he began in a different strain, not dwelling now on the certainty of further dispersion if the fleet fell back on the isthmus, but telling him plainly that the safety of Hellas was in his hands. At the isthmus, he insisted, they would have to fight in the open sea to the great disadvantage of their own heavier and fewer ships ; and there they would lose the aid of the men of Salamis, Megara, and Aigina, for these must look each to the protection of their own land, while the advance of the Persian fleet to the Peloponnesos would certainly be followed by the advance of the Persian army. On the other hand he urged that a combat in closed waters would probably end in their winning the victory, and that a victory at

The policy
of Them-
istokles.

Salamis would cover the Peloponnesos more effectually than a victory at the isthmus. At this point Adeimantos broke in again upon his vehement eloquence, and with savage rudeness told him that, as since the fall of Athens he had now no country, he could have no vote in the council, and that Eurybiades was debarred from even taking his opinion, much more from following it. To this brutal speech Themistokles answered quietly that he had a better city than Adeimantos so long as the Athenians had two hundred ships which were fully able to bear down the resistance of any Greek city, whatever they might do against the Persian power. For Eurybiades he had yet one more argument. It was couched briefly in the form of a warning that, if the allies abandoned Salamis, the Athenians with their families would at once sail away to Italy and find a new home in their own city of Siris. The Spartan chief saw at once that without the Athenians the confederates could not resist the Persians even for a day; and he issued the order for remaining. Thus instead of preparing for flight the allies now made ready for battle: but their formal obedience could not kill their fears. In their eyes Eurybiades was a madman; and when on the following day, after an earthquake by sea and land, they saw in the Persian fleet movements in manifest preparation for a conflict, their discontent broke out into open murmurs, if not into mutiny. It became clear that Eurybiades must give way: and Themistokles resolved to hazard everything on a final throw. With the Hellenic leaders there was nothing more to be done: it might be of more use to address himself to the Persians. Without losing a moment, Themistokles passed quietly from the council and dispatched Sikinnos, his slave and the tutor of his children, in a boat to the Persian fleet.¹ The

¹ The contemporary poet Æschylus represents Themistokles as sending his messenger not to the Persian generals but to Xerxes himself, and speaks of Xerxes as charging his officers on their lives to see that none of the enemy escaped them. If the message was sent (and of this there seems to be no doubt), the statement of the poet in this instance exceeds that of Herodotos in likelihood as much as his story of the passage across the Strymon passes beyond the region of fact into that of fiction. But throughout the narrative we are constantly obliged to resort to a balancing of probabilities. The orator Isokrates seems to know nothing of the stratagem of Themistokles: Herodotos seems to be as little aware of the

fact, which Plutarch states, that the ostracism of Aristides and other exiles had been revoked before the fight at Salamis at the urgent desire of Themistokles himself. The language of Herodotos even contradicts the supposition. He makes Aristides speak as a man still under sentence of ostracism, and represents the offer for the suspension of personal enmity as originating with himself and not with his more fortunate rival. It is impossible that he could talk of Themistokles as being still the bitter enemy of Aristides the exile, if he had known that the decree of banishment had been cancelled, and this at the prayer of Themistokles himself.

message which he charged him to deliver was that Themistokles really desired the victory not of the Greeks but of the Persians, and that on this account he now, without the knowledge of his colleagues, took this means of informing them that the Greeks were on the point of running away and that in their present state of utter dismay as well as disunion they could be taken and crushed almost without an effort. The Persian leaders, putting implicit faith in the message, at once landed a large force on the islet of Psyttaleia off the southeastern promontory of Salamis and precisely opposite to the harbor of the Peiræus, the object of this disposition being that they might save the wrecks of ships and slay such of the enemy as might in the battle be driven upon the islet. Towards midnight a portion of the fleet lying off Phaleron began to move along the Attic coast until the line extended to the northeastern promontory of Salamis. It was thus no longer possible for the Greeks to escape into the bay of Eleusis and so retreat to the isthmus without fighting. But of this fact they were still unconscious; and the hours of the night were being wasted in fierce dissensions, when Themistokles was suddenly summoned from the council to speak with his rival and enemy Aristeides, who had just crossed over from Aigina. In few words Aristeides said that the only rivalry now befitting them was that of determining which could most benefit their common country. As to the notion of retreat, it mattered not whether they said much about it or little. The thing was impossible. He knew from his own knowledge that the Greek fleet was surrounded beyond all chance of escape. The reply of Themistokles was not less terse. He rejoiced at the tidings, and informed his rival that the movements of the Persian leaders were the consequence of the message sent by himself through Sikinnos. He begged him further to repeat before the council news to which in all likelihood they would give no credit if they heard it from the lips of Themistokles. Even as coming from Aristeides, it was well-nigh rejected as false, when a Tenian vessel deserting from the Persian fleet established the fact beyond all doubt. Once more they made ready to fight; and as the day dawned, Themistokles addressed not the chiefs but the crews, laying before them all the lofty and ignoble motives by which men may be stimulated to action, and, beseeching them to choose the higher, sent them to their ships.

The die was cast. The command of the king had already gone forth for battle on the following day, when Sikinnos delivered to The battle of Salamis. him or to his generals the message of Themistokles. On the one side the Greeks put themselves under the guardianship of the Salaminian heroes Aias and Telamon, and sent a ship to Aigina to beseech the aid of Aiakos and his children.

On the other, a great throne was raised on one of the spurs of mount Aigaleos close to the sea, whence the Persian king might see how his slaves fought on his behalf.¹ The day was still young when the trireme came from Aigina which had been sent to fetch the children of Aiakos; and at once the Greeks put out to sea, while the barbarians came forward to meet them. According to the Aiginetan tradition it was this trireme which after some hesitation began the fight, the form of a woman having been seen which cried out in a voice, heard by all the army of the Greeks, 'Good men, how long will ye back water?' The Athenians had their story that one of these men named Ameinias ran his ship into the enemy, and that, as it was thus entangled and could not get free, the rest came up to help him. So began the conflict, in which the Athenians found themselves opposed to the Phenicians who had the wing towards Eleusis and the west, while the Ionians towards the east and the Peiraiæus faced the Lakedaimonians. Beyond this general arrangement and the issue of the fight the historian himself admits that of this memorable battle we know practically nothing. The event in his belief was determined by the discipline and order of the Greeks, while their enemies fell out of their ranks and did nothing wisely; but if the popular story may be trusted, it may have depended partly on the fact that the Persian seamen had been working all night, carrying out the movements for the complete circumvention of the Hellenic fleet, while the Athenians and their allies went on board their ships on the morning of the fight, fresh from sleep and stirred by the vehement eloquence of Themistokles. But in spite of his general lack of information Herodotos notes that the Persians as a whole fought far more bravely at Salamis than at Artemision, each man thinking that the eye of the king was upon him, and that few of the Ionians followed the advice of Themistokles by hanging back from the fight. Indeed many of the Greek ships, he adds, were taken by them, the Samians Theomestor and Phylakos being specially distinguished by their zeal for the king. Such action, if coming from Thessalians against Phokians, would be intelligible enough: in the case of the Ionians it would seem to show, if the facts be true, that the desertion of the Spartans and Athenians in the revolt of Aristagoras still rankled in their minds and blinded them to the shame of revenge taken at the cost of defeat and ruin to their common country. But that there existed a counter-tradition seems to be clear from the charge which in the tumult of the fight the Phenicians brought against these Asiatic Greeks. They had destroyed, it was said, the Phenician ships and betrayed

¹ Æschylos, *Persai*, 473. Herod. viii. 90.

the Phenicians themselves. Happily for the Ionians, the words were scarcely out of the mouth of their accusers, when a Samothrakian vessel ran into an Athenian ship and sank it, while one from Aigina ran into the Samothrakian, whose crew with their javelins drove the men of the conquering ship into the sea and took their vessel. With this conclusive proof of Ionic fidelity, Xerxes in towering rage commanded the heads of the Phenicians to be struck off that they might not lay their own cowardice to the charge of braver men. The general character of Phenician seamen may well warrant the suspicion that their charge against the Ionians, if really made, was not altogether groundless. In truth, there is scarcely a single alleged incident of the fight of which we have not accounts more or less inconsistent with, if not exclusive of, each other. The Athenians would have it that at the beginning of the fight the Corinthian Adeimantos fled in a terror which belied his name and that the rest of the Corinthians lost no time in following his example. They were opposite to the temple of Athênê Skiras—so the story ran—when a boat which no one was known to have sent met them, and the men in it cried out, ‘So, Adeimantos, thou hast basely forsaken the Greeks who are now conquering their enemies as much as they had ever hoped to do.’ Adeimantos would not believe: but when the men said that they would go back with him and consent to die if their words were not true, he turned his ship and reached the scene of action when the issue of the fight was already decided. This circumstantial tale the Corinthians met by the stout assertion that they were amongst the foremost in the battle; and their rejoinder was borne out, we are told, by all the rest of the Greeks.

Another circumstantial story is related of the conduct of Artemisia. A prize of ten thousand drachmas had been promised to the man who should take her alive, so great, we are told, being the irritation that a woman should come against Athens. As it so chanced, her ship was chased by the trierarch who, according to the Athenian story, had begun the battle and who, had he known whom he had before him, would never have stopped until he had taken her or been taken himself. But before Artemisia there were only ships of her own side; and as Ameinias came close upon her, she ran into a Kalyndian vessel commanded by the king Damasithymos. We are not told that the whole Kalyndian crew perished; but Ameinias, it is said, on seeing this action thought that her ship was a Greek one or else was deserting from the Persians, and so turned away to chase others, while Xerxes, who chanced to see what was done, cried out, on being assured that the ship was that of Artemisia, ‘My men are women, and the women men.’ Yet although the

historian represents her bravery or her good faith as by no means equal to her wisdom and foresight, it is almost incredible that such shallow selfishness should be successful. If we may not accept the grounds on which she is said to have urged her former advice to Xerxes, and if his remarks on her collision with the Kalyndian ship read like nothing but romance, little is gained by asserting that the story of her exploit has the air of truth. If again we reject the other parts of the tale, it seems impossible that even the total destruction of the ship and crew could have saved her from detection. We are expressly told that other friendly ships checked her flight no less than that of the Kalyndian king.¹ They were present to see what was done; and we cannot suppose that all were tricked by the selfish device of Artemisia, and that none would have the courage or the indignation to denounce it.

But, as at Marathon, whatever may have been the order and incidents of the battle, the issue was clear enough. The Persian fleet was practically ruined. On the Greek side not many were killed. Unlike the Greeks, the barbarians were for the most part unable to swim; and the greatest slaughter took place just when their ships first turned to flee. Those which were drawn up behind pressed forward to reach the front, and so became entangled with the vessels which were hurrying away. In the midst of the frightful confusion thus caused Aristeides landed a large number of hoplites on the islet of Psyttaleia and slew every one of the Persians who were upon it. So ended the battle. The Greeks drew up all the disabled ships on the shore of Salamis, and made ready for another fight, thinking that the king would order the ships still remaining to him to advance against them.

Their fears were not to be realised. The fancy of Xerxes that under his own eye the seamen would be invincible had been displaced by a conviction, which nothing now could shake, that no faith whatever was to be put in the subject tribes or nations which manned his navy, and that all hope of carrying on the war by sea was practically at an end. For such fragments of his fleet as might yet remain Xerxes had a more immediate and pressing task in guarding the bridges across the Hellespont. Like Dareios, he looked upon the safety of the bridges as the condition of his own return home; and he could brook no delay in the carrying out of the measures which might be needed to secure it. The messenger had already set out with the message which, like the torch in the feast of Hephaistos, was to be handed on from one horseman to another until the songs and shouts of triumph at Sousa should be exchanged for cries of grief for the king and of indignation against the stirrer-up of the mischief. This

¹ Herod. viii. 87.

issue Mardonios clearly foresaw ; and at once his mind was made up to carry on the war and either to succeed in it or die. For himself except as a conqueror there could be no return : and he might well suppose that his own chances of success would be indefinitely increased by the absence of a ruler so absorbed by the thought of his own personal safety as to be incapable of bearing up against reverses which still left him ample means of retrieving his fortunes. He pledged himself, therefore, to subjugate Hellas, if Xerxes would leave him three hundred thousand men, while he took all the rest away to Asia. Such a proposal was not likely to be rejected by a tyrant quaking in abject terror : but the historian adds that Xerxes submitted it to Artemisia, who urged him by all means to accept it. If Mardonios succeeded, the glory would go to his master : if he and his men were all slain, it would be but the loss of a horde of useless slaves. The safety of Xerxes and his house would more than make up for all ; and the Greeks would yet have, many times, to face a struggle for life or death with the power of Persia. Such is said to have been her counsel ; we may assure ourselves that it was never given. Xerxes knew well that in leaving with Mardonios his native Persian troops he was leaving behind the hardy soldiers on whom the very foundations of his empire rested ; and it is impossible that he should have rewarded with special praise and special honors the words of a woman who could speak of them as toys to be trifled with and flung aside without a thought.

That very night the fleet sailed from the scene of its disaster, to guard the bridge across the Hellespont for the passage of the king and his army. When the day dawned, the Greeks saw the Persian land-forces in the same position which they had occupied the day before, and made ready for an attack from their fleet which they supposed to be still off Phaleron. The discovery of its flight was followed by immediate pursuit. The Greeks sailed as far as Andros without catching sight even of the hindermost among the Persian vessels. At Andros a council was called. To the intreaty of Themistokles that they should sail at once to the Hellespont and there destroy the bridge Eurybiades replied by pointing out the folly of driving a defeated enemy to bay. Out of Europe Xerxes could do little mischief : but if hindered in his retreat, he might turn with something like the spirit of Cyrus and take an ample vengeance for his recent disasters, while his forces could be sustained with the yearly harvests of Hellas.¹ Silenced by this re-

¹ Herod. viii. 108. Eurybiades under permanent invasion refuse to must have been aware that this was till or sow their ground. impracticable. Nations suffering

joinder, if not convinced, Themistokles made a virtue of necessity, and repeating to his countrymen the advice of Eurybiades besought them to turn their minds to the more pressing need of rebuilding their houses and sowing the seed for the next harvest.¹ As to Xerxes he took up the strictly religious ground. The invader was an impious man who by his pride had wearied out the patience of the gods and provoked their utmost wrath by the profanation and the burning of their shrines; and his punishment had been inflicted not by the Athenians but by the gods and heroes. Having given this counsel, he dispatched Sikinnos on a second embassy: but this time his message was addressed to Xerxes, not to his generals. It informed him briefly that the Greeks had wished to pursue his fleet and break up the bridge at the Hellespont, but that Themistokles had turned them from their purpose and insured to the tyrant, if he wished to go home, a peaceful and leisurely retreat. The historian so far anticipates the future history of the great Athenian leader as to ascribe both his counsel to his countrymen and his message to Xerxes to a deliberate design of establishing a title to the favor of the Persian king, if the need of so doing should at any time arise.²

A few days later Mardonios chose out on the plains of Thessaly the forces with which he had resolved to conquer or to die. Here with an equal number of Persians and Medes and The flight of Xerxes. with the Sakian, Baktrian, and Indian troops, he took up his quarters for the winter, while Xerxes hurried onwards. But before they parted not to meet again, a messenger from Sparta had come to bid the king of the Medes stand his trial for the murder of Leonidas and make atonement for that crime. 'The

¹ Whatever else he may have said, it is clear that he could not have urged this duty upon them at a time when the Persian army was still in Attica, and when as yet he had no reason to suppose that the invaders had any intention of quitting it.

² So far as it affects the character of Themistokles, this charge cannot be examined here. But human nature is much the same in all ages; and the degree of faith which Xerxes would be likely to put in this second message may be measured by the caution of the child who has learnt to dread the fire by being burnt. The stupidest savage is not likely to be trapped twice in the same snare by the same man; and for Xerxes it is enough to say that he had already acted upon one message from Themistokles, and that the result had been the ruin of

his fleet. We are not, then, justified even in saying that the second message would have the effect of hurrying his flight. If he gave any heed to his words at all, he would assuredly interpret them by contraries, for the memory of his first deadly wrong would be fixed in his mind with a strength which no lapse of time could weaken. The message in truth is as superfluous as the stratagems of Histiaios. The tyrant had set his face like a flint against any further sojourn in Europe; and although this could not at the moment be known to Themistokles, we may safely assert that the idea of cutting off his retreat at the Hellespont could not so much as cross his mind, so long as the Persian host lay incamped upon Hellenic soil.

atonement shall be made by Mardonios,' answered Xerxes with a laugh, pointing to the general by his side ; and the Spartan taking him at his word went his way. The tale might be dismissed as theatrical bravado, if it be not regarded, rather, as springing from the religious sentiment which imparted to the narrative of the whole war a strictly epical character. Whatever may have been his losses by sea, his land-forces remained as formidable as ever : but the lord of this mighty host must be told that he is a criminal, and that the price of his crime must be paid. The summons of the Spartans is followed by a sudden plunge into utter misery. For five-and-forty days, we are told, the forces or rather the hordes rejected by Mardonios struggled onwards over their road to the Hellespont, thousands and tens of thousands falling as they went from hunger, thirst, disease, and cold. A few might live on the harvests of the lands through which they passed : but the vast crowds for which these lands could afford no sustenance were driven to feed on grass or the leaves and bark of trees. Disease came quickly in the track of famine ; and in Thessaly as well as in Makedonia Xerxes was constrained to intrust the sick whom he left behind him to the tender mercies of the natives. Humiliation followed on humiliation. The sacred chariot of Zeus, which he had left in the Paionian Siris, was now not forthcoming ; and when he reached the Hellespont just eight months after he had crossed over it to Sestos, the bridge over which he had passed in the plenitude of luxury and pride had been shattered by storms and rendered useless. Boats conveyed across the strait the lord of all Asia with the scanty remnant of his guards and followers : but the sudden change from starvation to plenty was not less deadly than the worst of the evils against which they had thus far had to struggle, and the multitude so fearfully thinned in Europe dwindled more rapidly away. Such, in the belief of Herodotos, was the true story of the retreat of Xerxes : but he mentions another account which asserted that, having reached Eion on the Strymon, he left Hydarnes in charge of his army and embarked with his bodyguard on board a Phenician ship. The vessel was soon overtaken by a heavy storm ; and the king in dismay asked the pilot if there was any hope of safety. 'None,' was the answer, 'unless we can ease the ship of the crowd within it.' Xerxes turned to his Persians, telling them simply that his life depended on them. In an instant they had done obeisance and leaped into the sea ; and the ship thus lightened reached Asia in safety. On landing, Xerxes gave the pilot a golden crown for saving the king's life and then cut off his head for losing the lives of his men. This story Herodotos without hesitation rejects on the ground that, even if the pilot had so spoken, Xerxes would assuredly have sent his

Persians down from the deck into the body of the ship and cast out into the sea a number of Phœnician sailors equal to that of the Persians. Nor could he bring himself to believe the story of the men of Abdera that Xerxes there loosed his girdle for the first time since he left Athens, as thinking himself at last in safety, although he regards the fact of his rewarding their hospitality with a golden dagger and turban as conclusive proof that he had not embarked at Eion. With equal decision probably he rejected, for we can scarcely suppose that he had not heard, the marvellous story of the crossing of the Strymon as related by Æschylos in his drama of the Persians. A frost unusual for the season of the year¹ had frozen firmly the whole surface of a river nearly two hundred yards in width; and on this frozen surface the army crossed in safety until the heat of the sun thawed the ice and the crowds were plunged between the shattered masses into the water. Ice capable of bearing tens of thousands for even two or three hours must be at least twelve or eighteen inches in uniform thickness: and the formation of such ice in a single night in the latitude and climate of the mouth of the Strymon is an impossibility. The story is simply the growth of the religious conviction that Zeus himself fought against Xerxes as the stars in their courses fought against Sisera. It implies further that the Persians were hurrying away in frantic haste from an enemy almost at their heels: but there was, in fact, no pursuit, and for many years later Eion at the mouth of the Strymon remained in the hands of the Persians and was wrested from them only after a severe struggle by Kimon.

If the account given by Æschylos is obviously impossible, there are difficulties fully as great in following the story of Herodotos. If we take his numbers as furnishing even a General credibility of the narrative. relative proportion, Xerxes must have led back from Athens a larger army than that which he left behind him with Mardonios. Yet his numbers were so far lessened that great suspicion is thrown on the tale of utter starvation and misery which his people are said to have endured from the time that he entered Makedonia. On his former march from Doriskos westward his men were fed, we are told, from the accumulated stores of three years as well as from the forced or voluntary contributions of the

¹ *χεμῶν, ἄωρον.* 496. If we follow the chronology of Herodotos, this could not have been later than November; but the poet may be allowed a wider license, and seemingly he places this incident after the battle of Plataiai. The expression that almost the whole army was destroyed in Boiotia can scarcely refer to any other event. The fleet, he

says, had made its escape from Salamis; and he adds,

στρατὸς δ' ὀλοῖπός ἐν τε Βοιωτῶν χθονὶ δῶλλυτο. 483.

Compare also line 187. But the fact, as he relates it, would be impossible, to whatever season of the year it may be assigned, even in places twenty degrees farther north.

inhabitants. Of these magazines the story of the retreat in Herodotus says nothing; nor are we told that their contents were all consumed on the march into Greece. Yet Xerxes, as he journeyed westwards, unquestionably contemplated a speedy return to his own land, and had his dreams of leading back a long line of Athenian and Spartan slaves in addition to the hosts which he was driving on to conquest. His need of food would be increased by the measure of his success; and his care to preserve and to extend these stores would be stimulated by his hopes of immediate victory. On the other hand, in proportion to the fewness of his attendants would be the ease of maintaining them from these unexhausted or replenished magazines. Yet, as though submitting to an ordinary necessity, he leaves his army to subsist by plunder or to die by famine, in a land where, as it would seem, not a single arm was raised against him in spite of all this robbery and pillage, and where we are told that he left his sick in the cities through which he passed, not without confidence in the kindly feeling of the inhabitants. Still, with this friendliness or at least neutrality of the people, perplexing though it be, his passage is more disastrous than that of Artabazos who, as we shall see, fought his way after the battle of Plataiai through the wild tribes of the Thracian highlands. The story of Herodotus would give some countenance to the Makedonian boast, of which probably he never heard, that they had slaughtered and almost cut off the whole army in its flight; and unless we assume some great hostility whether of Makedonians or Thracians, as accounting for the scanty numbers with which Xerxes is said to have reached the Hellespont, we might be tempted to draw the conclusion that he had brought with him into Europe not many more troops than those which he left under the command of Mardonios, and that he journeyed from Thessaly only with a moderate bodyguard. We have, however, the distinct assertion that he was attended as far as the Hellespont by 60,000 men commanded by Artabazos, whose conduct after the fight at Plataiai won for him a high reputation for decision and adroitness.¹ But however this may have been, the change which comes over the spirit of the narrative as soon as Xerxes is safely restored to the luxurious tyranny of his own land tends more than anything else to call into question the tale of misery and ruin which precedes it. From the moment that Artabazos has dismissed his master he appears as a man well able to hold his ground against all efforts of his enemies without calling on his troops to undergo any special privations. We hear no more of famine or disease, of men plucking grass and roots and then lying down to die. Instead of

¹ Herod. viii. 126.

this, we find him deliberately resolving to remain in Makedonia, until the return of spring should allow Mardonios to move his army in Boiotia. So completely is he master of his position and his movements that he determines to attack the Greek colonies which had dared to revolt after the king had passed them on his retreat and when they had heard of the hurried departure of the fleet from Salamis. In truth, the real source of weakness was gone with Xerxes : and thus Artabazos had no hesitation in laying siege to Olynthos and no compunction in slaughtering its inhabitants when it fell and in handing the place over to the Chalkidians of Torônê.¹ His next step was not that of a leader who, alarmed for his own safety or for that of his men, was anxious to fall back upon the main army. From Olynthos he turned his arms against Potidaia. During his siege of three months he was encouraged by the hope that Timoxenos the Skionaian general might succeed in betraying the town, as he had pledged himself to do. But the correspondence which by means of letters twined round arrows he had carried on with Timoxenos was discovered ; and he was glad to avail himself of an extraordinary ebbing of the sea to march across the ground which the waters had thus left bare between his camping-place and the walls of the city. But before they could reach the other side the sea came back with a flow as astonishing as its ebb, and all who could not swim were drowned, while those who escaped by swimming were slaughtered by the Potidaians who came in boats to complete the work of destruction. Of the extent of his loss by this disaster we are not informed : but as we find him after the battle of Plataiai with 40,000 men still under his command,² we must suppose that these were a portion of the 60,000 who escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont, and that 20,000 represent the losses sustained in the siege of Potidaia and perhaps in the fatal fight which destroyed the army of Mardonios. This loss can scarcely be considered out of proportion with the greatness of his efforts and of his disasters. But the history of Artabazos is, in truth, conclusive evidence that, however intense may have been the hatred of the native tribes for their Asiatic invaders, they were unable to place any serious hindrance in his path, and that though the Persians may not have enjoyed the luxuries of Sousa, they were not reduced to the hard lot of an Arabian caravan in lack of food and water. Whatever wretchedness the tyrant underwent was a wretchedness of his own causing ; and probably not even the ignominy of his retreat was allowed to interfere with his sensual enjoyments.

The alleged operations of the Greek fleet after the battle of

¹ Herod. viii. 127.

² Ib. ix. 66.

Salamis seem to show that the aim of the commanders was not to dissipate their strength by expeditions to the Hellespont (which, however, they refused to undertake solely on the score of their inutility) but to repair their losses whether by the forced or the voluntary contributions of Hellenic cities. Themistokles was acting as spokesman for the Greeks generally, when he told the Andrians that the Athenians had come to them under the guidance of two very mighty deities,¹ Faith and Necessity, and therefore pay they must. The rejoinder of the Andrians that they likewise had two deities, Poverty and Helplessness, which would never leave their island and made it impossible for them to pay anything, was followed by a blockade. The result verified the prediction of the Andrians that the power of Athens could never exceed their own impotence; and the Greeks, compelled to abandon the siege, ravaged the lands of Karystos at the southern extremity of Euboia and then sailed back to Salamis. This fact, if it took place, sufficiently refutes the story that Themistokles had already extorted large sums from the Karystians and Parians under the pledge, it must be assumed, that he would hold them scathless in person and property; but we are told further that while the siege of Andros was still being carried on, Themistokles by threatening the other islands with summary measures in case of refusal collected large sums of money without the knowledge of the other leaders and retained them for himself.² The charge is incredible. Themistokles and the agents of his extortions might keep the secret: but there was nothing to stop the mouths of his victims, and Athens was not so popular with the confederates as to make them deaf to charges which accused Themistokles of crippling the resources of the allies for his own personal advantage.

The work of a memorable year was now ended. It only remained to dedicate to the gods the thank-offerings due to them for their guardianship and active aid, and to distribute the rewards and honors which the conduct of the confederates might deserve. Their first act was to consecrate three Phœnician ships, one to the honor of Aias at Salamis, another at Sounion, and the third, which Herodotos³ himself had seen, at the isthmus. At the isthmus the question of personal

¹ Peitho, which is etymologically the English *faith*, is here the power which produces obedience or trust. The refusal of the Andrians to contribute to the expenses of the war was regarded, we are told, as so serious an offence against the welfare of Hellas that the confederates

besieged it with the deliberate design of destroying the city altogether. The further charge of Medism, Herod. viii. 112, would probably have been condoned, if the money had been paid.

² Herod. viii. 112.

³ viii. 121.

merit in the war was decided, it is said, by the written votes of the generals, each of whom claimed the first place for himself, while most of them (Plutarch says, all) assigned the second to Themistokles. But the incredibly silly vanity which thus deprived the Athenian general of his formal pre-eminence in no way lessened his glory or interfered with the honors paid to him. If an olive-crown was given to Eurybiades as the commander-in-chief, the same prize was bestowed on Themistokles expressly for his unparalleled wisdom and dexterity. The most beautiful chariot in Sparta, the gift of the citizens, conveyed him from that city, three hundred chosen Spartiatai being his escort as far as the boundaries of Tegea. No other man, it is said, ever received such honors from the Spartans. So ended the triumph of the confederates for that victory in which the names of Aigina and Athens were associated in pre-eminent lustre.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLES OF PLATAIAI AND MYKALÉ.

THE winter which followed the defeat at Salamis was spent by the Persian fleet at the Aiolic Kymè on the Elaiatic gulf, about ten miles to the east of the ill-fated city of Phokaia. Early in the spring it moved forwards as far as Samos under the command of Mardontes and Artañtes. There was no intention of renewing the struggle in the waters of Western Hellas. Their whole attention was fixed on the repression of revolt in Asiatic Ionia, if the people who had, as it was said, shown so much zeal in behalf of the king at Salamis should be disposed to renew the trouble which they had given in the days of Aristagoras. Of any attack from the fleet of the Western Greeks they had no fear. Any such danger had in their belief passed away when their enemies gave up the idea of pursuing them from Salamis; and they believed further that by land Mardonios would succeed in taking ample vengeance for the mishaps of the Persian navy.¹ The Greek fleet at the same time assembled at Aigina, 110 ships in all,—the Athenians under Xanthippos, and the Peloponnesians under Leotychides. They had scarcely taken up their station off the island, when an embassy

¹ Herod. viii. 130.

came from Chios praying them to hasten at once to the help of the Ionians. The confederates in compliance with their request sailed as far as Delos, beyond which they resolutely refused to advance. The waters which stretched away to the east were in their eyes, we are told, swarming with Persian or Phœnician cruisers; and Samos appeared to them as distant as the pillars of Herakles and the gates of the Atlantic ocean. Respecting this singular statement something has been said already:¹ it is unnecessary to say more here than that when, a few months earlier, these hostile ships were in the waters to the west of Delos, no such fears were expressed, if the story be true that Themistokles proposed an immediate pursuit of the retreating Persians as far as the Hellespont and that the proposal was rejected only as being impolitic. It is impossible that the history of fifteen years should obliterate the associations and traditions of ages, or that a state of feeling should have sprung up six months after the fight of Salamis which was not in existence when Xerxes sent away his fleet to guard the bridge over the Hellespont.

The occupation of Mardonios in his Thessalian winter-quarters consisted chiefly of attempts to ascertain the feelings of the Greek states towards himself and his master. The information which he received probably encouraged him to make the greater venture which betrayed a significant change in Persian policy. Mardonios had learnt that the aid of Thessalians and Boiotians was as nothing in comparison of the advantage which he would gain by an alliance with Athens: nor could he have failed to ascertain that, if the decision had rested with the Athenians, the decisive struggle between the two fleets would have been at Artemision, not at Salamis. It was Athens therefore which stood in the way; and until this hindrance should be removed, tribute, the true end of Persian conquest, would never flow from Western Hellas into the treasuries of Sousa. It was worth while then to sacrifice much to turn a people so resolute from an enemy into a friend; and if the proposal ascribed to Mardonios was really made, the sacrifice which he professed himself ready to make must have cost his master, if not himself, no slight struggle. Nor was it a scanty recognition of Athenian greatness when the Makedonian chief Alexandros came to tell them that the great king was willing not merely to forgive all their sins against him if they would become not his servants but his friends, but to bestow upon them in addition to their own land any territory which they might choose for independent occupation and, further, to rebuild all the temples which his followers had burnt.

¹ See note 1, p. 153.

The tidings of this change in Persian policy had reached Sparta and awakened there the liveliest alarm. The counter-proposal which they made through ambassadors hurriedly sent was that they would maintain the households of the Athenians as long as the war should last, if only they would hold out stoutly against Mardonios. The alleged reply of the Athenians to both their suitors is marked by that real dignity which springs from the consciousness of thoroughly disinterested motives. Whether it has been handed down as it was uttered, or not, we can well understand the glow of pride with which the Athenians of a later day recalled these utterances of exalted patriotism. To Alexandros they said, 'We know that the army of the Medes is much larger than ours, and there is no need to cast this in our teeth: but in the struggle for freedom we will beat them off with all our might. And now tell Mardonios what we say, "As long as the sun shall keep the same path in the heaven, we will never make peace with Xerxes: but we will face him, trusting in the help of gods and heroes, whom he has insulted by burning their homes and shrines."' Then turning to the Spartans they said, 'It was perhaps natural that you should dread our making peace with the barbarian; but you know little of the mind of the Athenians, for not all the gold throughout all the world could tempt us to take the part of the Medes and help to enslave Hellas. Even if we were willing to do so, there are many things to hinder us, and chiefly the shrines and dwellings of the gods which they have burnt and thrown down. Yet more, the whole Hellenic race is of the same blood and speech with us; we share in common the temples of our gods; we have the same sacrifices and the same way of life; and these the Athenians can never betray. Be assured now, if you knew it not before, that so long as but one Athenian shall remain, we will never make any covenant with Xerxes. For your goodwill to us we thank you: but we will struggle on as well as we can without giving you trouble. All that we pray you to do is to send out your army with all speed, for assuredly the barbarian will soon be in our land, when he learns that we will not do as he would have us; and we ought to meet him in Boiotia before he can advance as far as Attica.'

Beautiful, however, though these words may be, yet either they were put together at a later day, or the sequel of the narrative has been falsified. At the time of the embassy to Athens the Isthmian wall remained unfinished, as it had been when Xerxes began his homeward journey: but the pledges which they had received of Athenian steadfastness encouraged them to the most strenuous

Embassy of
the Spartans
to Athens.

Re-occupy-
tion of
Athens by
Mardonios.

efforts for its immediate completion. With its completion came back seemingly the old indifference; and the Persians were again in Attica before a single Spartan troop had advanced beyond the isthmus. Nay more, no sooner had the wall been finished, than Kleombrotos led the Spartan army hurriedly back to Sparta¹ because an eclipse of the sun had taken place. On his death, which happened almost immediately after, his son Pausanias was appointed general, and guardian of his cousin Pleistarchos the young son of Leonidas. Taken altogether, things looked better for Mardonios than ever they had looked for Xerxes. He was at the head of a more compact and manageable army; and his Hellenic allies seemed to be stirred by redoubled zeal in his cause.² But Mardonios, as Herodotos believed, was feverishly anxious to repossess himself of Athens, partly because he was suffering from divinely inflicted frenzy, and partly because he wished to send the tidings of his own glorification to Sousa. His caution in avoiding acts of violence on retaking the city sufficiently disproves these inferences. Mardonios was as steadily intent on winning over the Athenians as Xerxes had been on punishing them. There was yet the chance that their stubborn will might give way when they saw their soil again trodden by invading armies, while the care of the general in protecting their city might justify them in trusting to any covenant which they might make with him. To carry out this plan he crossed the frontiers of Attica. Once more the Athenians conveyed their families and household goods to Salamis; and ten months after the capture of the Akropolis by Xerxes Mardonios entered a silent and desolate city. Still hoping that his scheme might succeed, he dispatched a Hellespontian named Mourychides to Salamis with the same terms which he had already offered through Alexandros. The terms were rejected: but the Athenian people at once informed the Peloponnesians that, unless they received immediate aid, they must devise some means of escape from their present troubles. That these words indicate submission to Persia, is patent from the speech which at this point the historian puts into the mouth of the Athenian, Plataian, and Megarian ambassadors at Sparta. Here we have a recapitulation of the terms offered by Mardonios: but this is no longer followed by the impassioned declaration that the sun should fall from heaven sooner than Athens would submit to the enemy and that, if but one Athenian survived, that Athenian would rather die than make any paction with the tyrant. Instead of this, we have

¹ Such a fact as this shows how little reliance is to be placed on the words which, put into the mouth of Leonidas, represent retreat as an

impossibility for a Spartan leader. Herod. ix. 10.

² Herod. ix. 1.

the tranquil declaration that they heartily desire the welfare of Hellas, and that they will make no paction with the enemy, if they can avoid the so doing. The speech is a wretched bathos after the lofty protestations uttered in the hearing of the Makedonian chieftain, and the two traditions exclude each other.

The reproaches of the Athenians, so the story runs, fell for the present on deaf ears. The Lakedaimonians were keeping the feast of the Hyakinthian Apollon; and exactness of religious ceremonial was to them of greater moment than resistance to the barbarian. They could also comfort themselves with the thought that the Isthmian wall had all but received its coping stones and battlements. They could afford therefore to put off the Athenian ambassadors by specious excuses from day to day; and they succeeded in so putting them off for ten days until Chileos of Tegea, hearing from the ephors the substance of the Athenian demands, assured them that their wall would be of very little use, if by virtue of any covenant made with Mardonios the Athenian fleet should cooperate with the Persian land-army. As if this very obvious remark came with the merit of absolute novelty, the ephors, we are told, took the words of Chileos seriously to heart, and on that very night dispatched from Sparta five thousand hoplites under Pausanias, son of Kleombrotos, each hoplite being attended by seven helots—in other words, a force amounting to 40,000 men. Early the following morning the ambassadors of the extra-Peloponnesian cities informed the ephors in few words that they were free to remain at home and keep festival to their hearts' content, but that the Athenians would at once make with the Persians the best terms which could now be obtained. 'They are gone,' replied the ephors, 'and are already in the Oresteion on their march to meet the strangers.' 'Who are gone, and who are the strangers?' asked the Athenians in reply to these mysterious tidings. 'Our Spartans have gone with their helots,' they answered, 'forty thousand men in all, and the strangers are the Persians.' In utter amazement the ambassadors hastened away, accompanied by 5,000 picked hoplites from the Lakedaimonian Perioikoi.

The explanation of all this mystery is found in the simple statement that the Argives were under a promise to Mardonios to prevent by force, if force should be necessary, the departure of any Spartan army from the Peloponnesos.¹ If any part of the narrative deserve credit, it would be the unadorned and simple story of the conduct of Mardonios on the second invasion of Attica. Feeling that with the submission

March of the Spartans under Pausanias from Sparta.

Paction of the Argives with Mardonios.

¹ Herod. ix. 12.

or the independent alliance of Athens his task would be practically done, he saw further that the Athenians would be best won over if the pressure put upon them should stop short of the devastation of their country and the burning of their houses. But there would be no chance of preventing pillage and plunder, if Attica should be made a battle-field. Hence it became of the utmost importance to him that no Peloponnesian force should be allowed to advance beyond the Isthmus; and the pledge given by the Argives seemed to assure him that from this quarter there was no danger to be feared. That the agreement between the Argives and Mardonios should come to the knowledge of the Spartan ephors, is not very surprising. Argos had from the first stood aloof in the contest; and her sympathies were known to be rather with the Persians than with their opponents. But the knowledge of this secret covenant between the Argives and the Persian general imposed on the ephors the need of absolute secrecy on their side in any military plans which they might desire to carry out, and made it scarcely less necessary to keep these plans from the knowledge of the Athenians than to prevent their being discovered by the Argives. If the latter were under any such pledge, nothing but secrecy could enable the Spartans to leave the Peloponnesos without fighting their way through Argive territory; and when owing to this secrecy their plan succeeded and the Argives sent word to Athens to say that they had failed to prevent the departure of the Spartans, Mardonios felt that his own scheme had likewise become hopeless. At once the whole land was abandoned to his soldiers. Athens was set on fire; and any walls and buildings which had escaped the ravages of the first invasion were dismantled and thrown down. He could not afford to stay and fight in a country which was ill-suited for cavalry and from which in case of defeat he would have to lead his army through narrow and dangerous passes. The order for retreat was therefore given; and Mardonios in a little while found himself once again on the plain of Thebes.

The epical method of Herodotos is again disclosed as he approaches the great battle in which, according to the promise of Xerxes, Mardonios was to give to the Spartans satisfaction for the death of Leonidas. The pride and arrogance of the Persian leader are strengthened, while the hopes of his followers are represented as dying away. But the tale which tells how a blindness sent by the gods was on his eyes, while others foresaw the ruin, can be given only in the words of the historian.

The feast of
Attaginos.
479 B.C.

‘While the barbarians were working on their fortified camp, Attaginos the son of Phrynon, a Theban, called Mardonios, with fifty of the chief men among the Persians, to a great banquet

which he had made ready in Thebes. The rest of this story I heard from Thersandros, a great man among the Orchomenians, who told me that he had been invited to this feast with fifty men of the Thebans and that they lay down to meat, not separately, but one Persian and one Theban together on each couch. When the feast was ended, as they were drinking wine, the Persian who lay on the couch with him asked him in the Greek language who he was: and when he answered that he was a man of Orchomenos, the Persian said, "Thou hast sat at the same table and shared the same cup with me, and I wish to leave thee a memorial of my foresight, that thou mayest be able by wise counsel to provide also for thyself. Thou seest the Persians who are with us at this banquet, and the army which we have left encamped on the river's bank. Yet a little while, and of all these but a very few shall remain alive." As the Persian said this, he wept bitterly; and Thersandros, marvelling at him, answered, "Is it not right that Mardonios should hear this and the Persians who are of weight with him?" But the other replied, "O friend, that which Heaven is bringing to pass it is impossible for man to turn aside, for no one will believe though one spake ever so truly. All this many of us Persians know well, but yet we follow, bound by a strong necessity: and of all the pains which men may suffer the most hateful and wretched is this, to see the evils that are coming and yet be unable to overcome them." This story I heard from Thersandros himself, who also added that he had told the tale to many others before the battle was fought in Plataiai.

The sentiment put into the mouth of the Persian at the banquet of Attaginos seems to be not less distinctively Greek than those which are uttered by the seven conspirators against the usurpation of the Magians.¹ The expression of any foreboding however slight, of any remark on the uncertainty of life as vague and general as that which is ascribed to Xerxes when he surveyed his fleet in its glory,² would unconsciously shape itself in the mind of Thersandros into that moral or religious form which imparts to the tale its perpetual freshness. But if we may not, on such testimony, assume that this anticipation of utter ruin was present to the mind of the Persian leaders (and that it oppressed the Persians generally we have no evidence whatever), the anecdote from every other point of view becomes superfluous. In the ethical conception of the history Mardonios was already doomed from the hour when Artabanos warned him that from his westward journey there would for him be no return;³ and the parting words of Xerxes consecrated him

¹ See p. 124.² See p. 165.³ Herod. vii. 10.

afresh as the victim destined to expiate the slaughter of Leonidas. Nor can it be said that the remark of the Persian has force or meaning, if viewed in reference to the conduct or duty of Mardonios. To listen to vague presentiments of coming evil and in obedience to such presentiments to break up an army of overwhelming strength and fully supplied with the materials of war would in a general be an unpardonable offence. If the Persian who addressed Thersandros had any reasons or arguments to address to his chief, Mardonios would assuredly be bound to hear and weigh them; but it is of the very essence of the story that he had none, and it would be the duty of Mardonios to disregard presages and fears which to him must appear to have no other source than a diseased and unmanly mind.

The prophecy of the Persian at the feast of Attaginos is the prelude to the great fight which broke the power of the barbarian by land as the battle of Salamis had crushed his hopes by sea. But the narratives of the two battles stand by no means on the same level in point of trustworthiness. Of the engagement at Salamis we know practically nothing but its issue. The story of Plataiai, though not less graphic and vivid in details, not a few of which are suspicious or even incredible, brings before us a series of movements which explain themselves and which seem to be reported with tolerable accuracy. From the Corinthian isthmus the Spartans with their Peloponnesian allies advanced to Eleusis where they were joined by the forces of the Athenians who had crossed over from Salamis, and thence, cheered by favorable omens, resumed their march until from the slopes of Kithairon they looked down on the Persian camp near the northern bank of the Asopos.

Here, then, on the plain beneath the mighty mass of Kithairon, Mardonios with his host, it is said, of 600,000 men, awaited with impatience the attack which he trusted that the Greeks, numbering in all 110,000, would begin. If Persian boastfulness exaggerated his own numbers, those of his enemies were swollen not so much from carelessness of falsehood as from the desire that all the states which had not Medized should be represented as taking part in the final struggle with the servants of the Asiatic despot. But whatever their numbers may have been when Mardonios threw the die for battle, they were less formidable when they first incamped on the lower slopes of Kithairon. Still no time was to be lost in dislodging them from their vantage-ground: and on this errand the whole Persian cavalry was dispatched under Masistios, a leader noted for his bravery. Riding on a golden-bitted Nisaiian steed magnificently caparisoned, Masistios led his horsemen on; and the

Advance of
the confederates into
Boiotia.
479 B.C.

Attack of
the Persian
cavalry, and
death of
Masistios.

nature of the ground made their attack specially felt by the Megarians, who sent a message to Pausanias to say that, unless they could be speedily supported, they must give way. The rigidity of Spartan discipline would lead us to suppose that Pausanias issued an order and that this order was obeyed; but instead of this we have the mere intreaty for the help of volunteers. All, it is said, including, it would seem, the Spartans,¹ held back, although the Persian horsemen rode up and reviled them as women; and three hundred picked Athenians could alone be found to undertake the dangerous task. Aided by some bowmen, they moved to the Megarian ground, where presently the horse of Masistios struck by an arrow in its side reared and threw its rider. Throwing themselves upon him, the Athenians seized his horse: but his golden breast-plate protected him from his enemies until a spear was thrust into his eye. So died Masistios, unseen by his men who at the time were falling back to make ready for another charge. When on halting they learnt their loss, with a fierce cry they rushed back to recover his body, of which for a little while they gained possession; but the three hundred Athenians were now supported by the main body of their countrymen, and the Persian cavalry was definitely beaten back. All Boiotia, it is said, resounded with the Persian wail which went up for the loss of Masistios, while the body of the fallen general, stretched on a chariot, was carried along the ranks of the Greeks who crowded to see his grand and beautiful form.

To these the death of Masistios and the repulse of his cavalry brought great encouragement; and they resolved to move from Erythrai nearer to Plataiai, as a position far better both for incamping and for watering. Their road led them by Hysiai to ground stretching from the fountain of Gargaphia to the shrine of the hero Androkrates,² and broken by low hills rising from the plain.

Change of
the Greek
position.

Although the two armies were brought thus near to each other, the final conflict was delayed by the omens which were interpreted by the soothsayers on either side as unfavorable to the aggressor. But if a pitched battle was not to be thought of, Timagenidas the Theban warned Mardonios against wasting more time in addition to the eight days which had already passed away. There were other things which might safely be undertaken. Every day the Greeks were receiving fresh convoys through the passes of Kithairon; and it was easy by occupying these passes to enrich the Persians and

The counsel
of Timage-
nidas.

¹ See note 1, p. 214. We have here another incident, which, if true, contradicts the supposed inflexible practice of the Spartans.

² Thucydides, iii. 24, speaks of this shrine as being within a distance of six or seven furlongs from Plataiai on the road to Thebes.

starve their enemies. His advice was promptly acted upon. Night had no sooner set in than the Persian cavalry were dispatched to the pass of the Oak Heads; and there 500 beasts laden with corn were cut off with the men who had brought them from the Peloponnesos.

Two days more passed by, each adding to the numbers of the Greeks. On the morning of the eleventh Mardonios, wearied out with the delay, consulted Artabazos, who advised him, it is said, to fall back on Thebes and there to trust rather to money than to men. In open battle, he urged, they were no match for their enemies; but not a Greek was to be found who would not sell his freedom for money, and Persian gold freely scattered among the chief men of all the non-Medizing cities would soon make them hearty in the Persian cause. It is possible, of course, that Artabazos may have had other reasons for differing with Mardonios; but the latter was certainly justified in depending on the bravery of his countrymen and in deploring the inaction which was daily increasing the number and strength of his enemies.

From this point the narrative which Herodotos followed resolves itself into a series of pictures as vivid as, it is to be feared, they are untrustworthy. The council was ended, and the night came on, and the guards stood at their posts. When all was quiet through the camp and the men were in a deep sleep, the Makedonian Alexandros rode in the dead of night to the outposts of the Athenians and asked to speak with their leaders. When these had come, he briefly but earnestly besought them to keep the fact of his visit a secret from all except Pausanias. He had come only because he had the welfare of Hellas at heart, as being by lineage a Hellen himself; and his errand was to tell them that Mardonios had made up his mind to fight on the coming day and to leave omens and oracles to take care of themselves. But he added that even if any reason should still constrain Mardonios to inaction, it would be their wisdom to remain where they were, for his supplies were all but exhausted; and so he bade them farewell, saying, 'If the war end as ye would have it, then remember to deliver me also, for in my zeal for the Greeks I have run this great venture, because I wished to show you the purpose of Mardonios, that so he might not take you at unawares. I am Alexandros the Makedonian.' The picture is full of life: but Aristeides at least could not have needed the announcement of his name. He must surely have remembered the man who but a little while ago had come to Athens as the envoy of Mardonios and had then as earnestly besought them to submit to Xerxes as now he prayed them to hold out.

The infatuation of Mardonios.

The conference of the Makedonian Alexandros with the Athenian generals.

The next picture brings before us the Greek commanders in council. From Aristeides and his colleagues Pausanias learnt that the morrow would see the decisive struggle; and his request, urged without a moment's hesitation, was that they should change places. 'You,' he said, 'have encountered these Persians at Marathon and know their method of fighting. We have had no such experience, for no Spartan has yet been engaged with the Medes.'¹ The veracity of the historian can be maintained only on the supposition that he had really heard this tale, which adds that the Athenians eagerly carried out at the prayer of Pausanias an arrangement which they had as eagerly desired, yet scarcely dared to propose; that when Mardonios became aware of the change, he likewise altered the disposition of his troops; that Pausanias, seeing his device discovered, led his own men back again to the right wing; and that the Persians were thereupon brought back to their old position, and things were again put as they were before the conference with Aristeides. But that such a tradition could have come into existence without betraying its glaring inconsistency with the whole history of the war, is indeed astounding. If the narrative of the war be not a fiction throughout, Spartans had not only fought with Persians at Artemision, at Salamis, and at Thermopylai, but in each place they had conquered; for, if we adopt the traditional view, the struggle at Thermopylai was for them the most magnificent of victories. The heroism of Leonidas and his men had thrice made Xerxes leap from his throne in dismay; and yet this later story could assert with unblushing effrontery that no Spartan had ever yet fought with a Persian.² But whatever may be the amount of romance worked into the narrative, the fight at Thermopylai remains a fact; and whatever may have been the changes of arrangement before the fight at Plataiai, the conference of Pausanias with Aristeides and his colleagues remains a fiction. It is more over a fiction with a purpose; and this purpose the author of it sought with no mean adroitness to conceal. If Pausanias could be made to admit the superiority of the Athenian forces, the glorification of Athens would be insured: but if it had been

Changes of position in the Greek and Persian armies.

¹ Σπαρτηγίων οὐδείς πεπείρηται Μήδων. Herod. ix. 46. The words are an unqualified statement which becomes untrue if exceptions be made to it, and words may be made to mean anything, if, as some have asserted, Pausanias only meant to speak of the Spartans there present. Even with regard to them the statement would in all probability be untrue; but no such limitation

is found in the text of the historian. See note 1, pp. 153, 212.

² No one will seriously maintain that Pausanias wished to avoid not the Persians but the Medes. Xerxes is himself 'The Mede;' and although the bravery of the Medes is nowhere disparaged, still the Persians are always spoken of as the better soldiers.

asserted that the changed arrangement for the battle was also the real arrangement during the battle, this version would have found its way to Sparta and there roused an indignant protest for its falsification of fact. By bringing the Spartans back to their old position after the fashion of the shot exercise in military prisons, this danger would be avoided. Few Spartans probably would hear this tradition; and as it left untouched the fact which was of most importance to them, they would not much care to notice it. Hence it became necessary to represent the change of arrangement as begun before daybreak. As, further, the change is ascribed to the tidings that Mardonios intended to fight on the morrow, it became necessary to provide a bearer of this news: and thus the fictions of the conference and the change made it necessary to invent lastly the night-ride of Alexandros.

On the morning of the eleventh day the battle of Plataiai may be said practically to have begun, although the traditional narrative confines it to the day on which the infantry of the Persians came to close combat with the Hellenic hoplites. During the whole of the day preceding this final conflict, the Greek army was terribly pressed by constant charges of the Persian cavalry; and early in the day it became clear to the confederate generals that a change of position was indispensably necessary. The stream of Asopos in front of the Greeks had all along been useless for watering, as it was within range of the Persian bowmen. The whole army was forced, therefore, to obtain its supplies from the fountain or stream of Gargaphia, which is said by Herodotos to have been two miles and a half distant from the town of Plataiai. This fountain was now completely fouled and choked up by the trampling of the Persian horses: but about half-way between Gargaphia and Plataiai¹ was a spot of ground called the Island, as lying between two channels into which for a short space the little stream of Oëroë is divided in its descent from Kithairon. The ground thus inclosed between the points where the waters divided and again met was barely half a mile in width, and it may be supposed (for the measurement is not given) about a mile and a half or two miles in length. Here, however, they would have not only an abundant supply of water, for the Persian cavalry could not reach the channel in their rear, but they would be protected from their attacks by the stream in front. To this spot therefore the generals resolved that the army should be transferred on the coming night: but whether from confusion or from fear the Peloponnesian allies, when the time for retreat came, fell back not on this so-called island, but on

The resistance of Amompharetos to the orders of Pausanias.

¹ Herod. ix. 51, 52.

Plataiai itself, about a mile and a half further from the Asopos, and took up their position by the temple of Hêrê. Seeing these in retreat (and as he supposed, for the Island), Pausanias gave the order to the Spartans also : but he encountered an unexpected opposition from Amompharetos, the captain of the Lochos of Pitana. This officer complained that, not having been summoned to the previous council, he was now commanded to retreat not merely against his better judgment but in violation of duty which forbade retreat to all Spartans under any circumstances. The former plea might be valid : the latter has a somewhat ludicrous air, when we remember the conduct of Eurybiades at Artemision and Salamis and the retreat of Kleombrotos with his army from the Isthmian wall : but if this plea was urged, it furnishes additional evidence of the falsehood of the traditions which immediately precede the account of his resistance. If he objected now to fall back on Oëroê, with what fierce indignation must he not have resisted the ignominious change which was to leave Spartans face to face with Persian slaves ? Yet in that tradition Amompharetos offers no resistance to arrangements in the carrying out of which he must himself have taken part.

With this obstacle to retreat it became impossible for Pausanias to carry out the decision of the council ; and the Athenians, beginning to suspect, it would seem, that Spartan vacillation might end in open Medism, sent a herald to ascertain the state of affairs. He found the Spartan leaders in hot dispute with Amompharetos who, taking up a huge stone with both hands, placed it at the feet of Pausanias and said that thus he gave his vote against the dastardly proposal to turn their backs upon the enemy. Having bestowed on him the epithet of madman, Pausanias turned to the Athenian messenger, and bidding him to report to Aristides how matters stood urged the immediate union of the Athenian with the Spartan forces. Amidst these disputes the night had passed away ; and the sky was already lit with the dawn, when Pausanias, wearied out with the folly of Amompharetos, gave the order for retreat. The Spartans immediately fell back, keeping as near as they could to the heights of Kithairon in order to avoid the attacks of the Persian horsemen, while the Athenians, less cautious or less timid, moved along the plain.¹ Having gone about a mile and a half they halted to see whether Amompharetos would follow. The departure of the Spartans and Tegeatans had soon convinced him that he could do but little good by imitating the example of Leonidas ; and the Lochos of Pitana accordingly joined the main body. But their retreat had now

¹ Herod. ix. 56.

become known in the Persian camp; and the Persian cavalry at once advanced to harass them as they had done the day before. Hurriedly crossing the Asopos, Mardonios hastened with his Persians towards the higher ground where the Spartan troops might be seen winding along under the hillside, for from the river's banks he could not catch sight of the Athenians, who were hidden among the low hills which rose from the level plain. Without order or discipline, the hordes of the Persian subject tribes rushed after him, as though nothing more remained for them to do beyond the butchering of unresisting fugitives. The last momentous strife was now begun. Hard pressed by the Persian horsemen, Pausanias sent to beg instant succor from the Athenians on the lower ground. But the attack of the Greeks in the Persian army, who now flung themselves on the Athenians, rendered this impossible. To the Spartans and Tegeatans, thus cut off from their allies, it was a moment of supreme distress. Fifty-three thousand in all, they were opposed to the overwhelming numbers of Mardonios; and the sacrifices even now forbade any action except in the way of self-defence. This merely passive resistance enabled the Persians to make a rampart of their wicker-work shields, from behind which they shot their arrows with deadly effect. At last Pausanias, looking in agony towards the temple of Hêrê, besought the queen of heaven not to abandon them utterly. Scarcely had his prayer been offered, when the sacrifices were reported to be favorable; and the charge of the Tegeatans was followed by the onset of the Spartans. After a fierce fight the hedge of shields was thrown down, and the defeat of the barbarian host virtually insured. The Persians fought with almost more than Hellenic heroism. Coming to close quarters, they seized the spears of their enemies, and broke off their heads; but they wore no body-armor, and they had no discipline. Rushing forward singly or in small groups, they were borne down in the crush and killed. Still they were not dismayed; and the battle raged most fiercely on the spot where Mardonios on his white war-horse fought with the flower of his troops. But at length Mardonios was slain, and when his chosen guards had fallen round him the issue was no longer doubtful. The linen tunics of the Persian soldiers were of no avail in a conflict with brazen-coated hoplites. With the utmost speed the defeated barbarians made their way to their fortified camp, and took refuge behind its wooden walls.

Artabazos had awaited the battle with very definite resolutions. He despised with good reason the military arrangements of Mardonios; and he had no intention of allowing himself
The retreat of Artabazos. and his men to be slaughtered, if Mardonios should, as he foreboded, lose the day. His troops, therefore,—the forty

thousand still remaining to him of the six myriads who guarded Xerxes on his retreat to the Hellespont,—received strict orders to look only to him and to follow his movements with the utmost promptness; and no sooner had the battle begun, it is said, than, inviting his men verbally to follow him into it, he led them from the field. The flight of the Persians soon showed him that the day was lost; and putting spurs to his horse he hurried away with all speed into Phokis. Without pausing to answer the questions of the people, he rode on into Thessaly, where the chiefs insisted on having him as their guest at a banquet, and prayed for news of the army of Mardonios. But whatever faith he could put in the good will of the oligarchs, he had by no means the same confidence in the disposition of the people, and he felt that a true confession might seriously endanger the safety of his men. He told them, therefore, that he had been dispatched on an urgent errand into Thrace, and admitting, it is said, that he would soon be followed by Mardonios and his army, begged them to welcome him with their usual hospitality. In his onward march through Makedonia and Thrace he lost many men,—we must suppose, in conflicts with the wild mountaineers, as well as by hunger and disease. He had no time now to tarry and punish them as he had punished the Olynthians;¹ but in spite of all that his enemies could do, he brought the bulk of his troops safely to Byzantion, and thence crossed over with them into Asia. Mardonios was no longer alive to carry out the threat which he had uttered on the morning of the fight at Plataiai; and Artabazos succeeded so well in justifying his acts to his master that we shall find him satrap of Daskyleion in the later history of the Spartan Pausanias.

One body of men alone held their ground when on the death of Mardonios and the defeat of his Persians all the rest of his army fled in utter confusion. These were the Theban oligarchs. They felt doubtless that they had gone too far to leave any hope of making their peace with the Spartans and their allies, and we may do them the justice to say that without the tyranny which the victory of Xerxes might have enabled them to exercise, life was to them scarcely worth the living for. Three hundred of these patricians fell fighting on the field. The rest made their way as best they could to Thebes.

If the Persians on finding themselves within their fortified camp hoped that its wooden walls would keep out the enemy, they were soon to be disappointed. To the Spartans, whose incompetence in all siege operations was notorious, they opposed an effectual barrier; but Athenian skill and

Obstinate resistance of the Thebans.

The storming of the Persian camp.

¹ See p. 209.

resolution effected a breach after a terrible struggle. Headed by the Tegeatans, the allies burst like a deluge into the incampment; and the Persians, losing all heart, sought wildly to hide themselves like deer flying from lions. Then followed a carnage so fearful that of 260,000 men not 3,000, it is said, remained alive. On the side of the Greeks we are told that only 91 Spartan citizens had fallen, while the Tegeatans lost only 16, and the Athenians only 52. It may, of course, be urged that this list does not include those of the Lakedaimonians who were not Spartiatai; but all the figures seem alike unworthy of credit. The narrative has exhibited the Spartans as terribly pressed by the Persian horsemen on both days of the battle, especially during the time of passive resistance before the omens were pronounced favorable; and the Athenians were fighting with no contemptible enemies when they encountered the Theban oligarchs.

The next task of the Greeks was that of burying their dead. Of the disposal of the Persian bodies not a word is said, although The graves at Plataiai. the burial of nearly 400,000 corpses would be no light or easy task. For the Lakedaimonian dead there were three graves, while the Tegeatans, the Athenians, and the Megarians with the Phliasiens, had severally one. These, the historian adds, were real graves: but empty tombs bore the names of towns whose citizens were not present at the battle. The fact speaks volumes on the value of public monuments for which we cannot adduce further evidence from contemporary writings. The Plataians had well deserved the gratitude of the non-Medizing states for the zeal with which in spite of all obstacles they had clung to the Hellenic cause. For the present this gratitude was sincerely felt and largely manifested. The sacrifice of thanksgiving for the great victory over Mardonios was offered by Pausanias to Zeus the Deliverer in their Agora. The Plataians were declared autonomous, or, in other words, were freed from all connexion with the Boiotian confederacy, while from the spoil they received 80 talents, to enable them to celebrate fitly the yearly commemorative feast, to keep up the tombs, and to build a temple to Athênè. Finally, the allies bound themselves to regard the Plataian territory as inviolable themselves and to combine for the prevention of any invasions of that territory by others.

Eleven days after the battle the allied forces appeared before the walls of Thebes, and demanded the surrender of the citizens The siege of Thebes. who were responsible for the Medism of the country, and more especially of Timagenidas and Attaginos. The refusal of the Thebans was followed not only by a blockade but by the systematic devastation of the land. Nine days later Timagenidas urged his fellow-citizens to ascertain whether Pausanias

wanted money, and in this case to pay it to him out of the public treasury, inasmuch as the Medism with which they were charged was the common act of all the citizens (a statement, probably, strictly true); but he added that if this would not content the Spartans, he and the others who had been demanded were ready to surrender themselves. Attaginos, it seems, was of a different opinion. He made his escape; and his children were handed over in his stead to Pausanias, who refused to punish them for an offence of which they had not been guilty. The citizens surrendered relied, it is said, on their wealth: but Pausanias hastily dismissed his allies, and taking these Thebans to the isthmus, there put them all to death.

The Persian army had been destroyed, and no hope remained of retrieving the disasters which left them powerless on European ground. But the Persian fleet still watched the Ionian coasts, and Tigranes with an army of 60,000 men kept guard in Ionia itself.¹ That the Persian fleet had been seriously crippled, if not left unservice-
Movements of the Greek fleet to Samos and Mykalé.

able, by the defeat at Salamis, was well known to the Asiatic Greeks and to the islanders of the Egean. In the previous autumn, much as Themistokles may have wished to sail straight to the Hellespont and there to cut off the retreat of the Persians by a movement which might even throw the despot into his hands, there was an obstacle to this plan which both he and the allied commanders regarded as insurmountable. Mardonios still remained in Western Hellas with his huge army; and the Athenians might at any moment be compelled to quit their homes. But when after the second burning of Athens the Persian leader had withdrawn his hosts into Boiotia and had been followed by an adequate Hellenic force, the Greek fleet was no longer needed to co-operate with the army on land; and the commanders were free to comply with the prayers of the Asiatic Ionians for help against their barbarian masters. They sailed, accordingly, as far as Delos; and here for some time they remained, not certainly from the absurd fancy which the tradition of a later day assigned to them,² but from the more reasonable desire for information which might justify them in venturing further. If Mardonios had been victorious in Boiotia as Xerxes had been at Thermopylai, the fleet would at once be needed for the protection of the Peloponnesos, even if the task of guarding Athens should be given up as hopeless. It would be rash also to infer from the mere departure of the Persian fleet that its strength was permanently broken, or even that it might not reappear as formidable as ever. On this point they received

¹ Herod. ix. 96.

² See notes pp. 153, 221.

from a Samian embassy tidings which seemed to make their way sufficiently clear. The ambassadors, who had got off from Samos without the knowledge of the Persians, assured them that the spirit of the Persian troops was broken; that the mere sight of their western kinsmen would rouse the Asiatic Greeks; that in all likelihood the barbarians would not remain to be attacked, and that, if they should remain, the allies could never hope to have hereafter a more favorable opportunity for crushing them utterly; that the Persian fleet was scarcely seaworthy, and at best was no match for that of the Greeks; and, finally, that they were perfectly willing to surrender themselves as hostages for the good faith of their report. Turning round to the speaker, Leotychides asked his name. 'I am called Hegesistratos (the leader of armies),' was the reply. 'I accept the omen of your name,' cried the Spartan, 'and I ask only for your pledge that the Samians will deal truly by us.' The promise was eagerly given, and the allied fleet, sailing to Samos, took up its position in battle array off Kalamoi, the southern point of the island facing a temple of Hêrê. The challenge was deliberately declined by the Persian admiral. The result of the fight at Salamis left him but slight hope of victory by sea; and he determined to disembark his men and join Tigranes for operations on land. Sailing therefore to the mainland barely ten miles distant, he drew up his ships on the shore beneath the heights of Mykalê. Here behind a rampart of stones, strengthened by stout stakes, which he cast up round his ships, he made ready at once to sustain a siege and to win a victory, for on the latter, it is said, he counted as surely as on the former.

The withdrawal of the Persians perplexed the Greek commanders: but the doubt whether they should return home or sail The battle to the Hellespont was solved by a speedy decision to of Mykalê. land their forces and decide the quarrel on shore. Each step, which showed that their enemies thought more of defence than attack, naturally raised their hopes and their courage; and with their gangways ready for landing their men they sailed towards Mykalê. On nearing the promontory they saw the Persian ships stowed away behind the rampart and the shore lined with troops. Repeating the device of Themistokles off the Euboian coast, Leotychides, it is said, ordered a loud-voiced herald to sail as near the shore as he could and pray the Ionians in the coming fight to strike boldly not for their Persian oppressors but for their own freedom and for the aid of their kinsfolk. The device was scarcely needed to rouse the suspicions of the Persians. The charge brought against the Ionians by the Phenicians at Salamis had probably a fair foundation in fact; and it would be rash to look to them for faithful service in the scene of their old revolt. The Samians at

best were not to be trusted.¹ These were accordingly disarmed, while, to get them out of the way, the Milesians were sent to guard the paths leading up to the heights of Mykalè. Thus having taken precautions against dangers on their own side, they awaited the attack of the Greeks behind the hedge of wicker shields on which Mardonios and his men relied at Plataiai. Their enemies were now fast advancing against them: but the Athenians with the allies who came next to them, moving along the more level ground near the sea, were able to begin the fight, while the Spartans were making their way with difficulty on the rugged slopes of the mountain. Here, as elsewhere, the Persians fought as they had fought in the days of Cyrus. But the conditions of the conflict were changed. They had now to face the orderly ranks of the Athenians, and of Athenians spurred to redoubled efforts by their eagerness to decide the day before the Spartans could come up and share the fight. After a desperate struggle the shield-wall of the Persians shared the fate of the English shield-wall at Senlac:² nor is it any disparagement to the countrymen of Harold to compare them with men whose bravery would have won them lasting fame in a better cause. The rampart of shields was broken, and the mighty mass of the Athenians burst in: but the Persians still fought on, until they were borne back to the wall of wood and stone which sheltered the ships of the fleet. The issue of the fight was now virtually decided. Behind this last rampart the Persians again made a stand: but Athenian determination and discipline burst this barrier also, and the main body of the barbarians fled in dismay. Still the Persians maintained the conflict, and in small knots strove as they might to stem the iron torrent which was bursting through the breached wall. But the Spartans had now joined in the fight. The disarmed Samians, probably seizing the weapons of the dead, took part with the Western Greeks, and with the Asiatic Ionians openly fell upon the barbarians. These, it is said, had intended in case of defeat to intrench themselves on the heights of Mykalè, a perilous post for men who could obtain no supplies while their enemies held the land beneath them: but to such straits they were never to be put. The Milesians, to whom they had trusted for guidance to these mountain strongholds, led them by paths which brought them down among their enemies, and at last, turning fiercely upon them, massacred them without mercy.

The victory was achieved, and, as the story runs, achieved on

¹ They had set free and sent back to Attica the Athenians who had been found by Xerxes in Athens or Attica and who had been sent by

him as prisoners to Asia. Herod. x. 99.

² Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, iii. 492.

the evening of the very day which had seen the destruction of Mardonios and his people at Plataiai. The glory of the fight belonged chiefly to the Athenians. The Persian ships were all burnt; and with the booty, which included some hoards of money, the allies sailed to Samos. Here a grave question demanded their care. Ionia was again in revolt against the Persians: how were the Western Greeks to defend their kinsfolk on the Asiatic continent? Insisting that such a task was beyond their power, the Peloponnesian commanders strongly urged the adoption of an Eastern fashion and the transference of the Asiatic Greeks bodily to the lands which the Medizing Greeks had righteously forfeited. Whatever might be the difficulty of carrying out so vast a plan, the Athenians expressed an invincible repugnance to the plan itself. They could not bear that Ionia should be abandoned to barbarians; and they denied the right of their allies to arrange the affairs of Athenian colonists. Delighted to be thus armed with a valid excuse for withdrawing from all interference in the matter, the Spartans at once gave way; and the oath of faithful and permanent alliance immediately given by the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and other islanders, laid the foundation of the maritime empire of Athens.

Having finished its work at Mykalê, the Greek fleet departed on the main errand which had brought it eastwards,—the destruction, namely, of the bridges across the Hellespont. The mere statement of this fact is enough to show that they had not been deterred from undertaking the same task immediately after the battle of Salamis by any fear that Xerxes, thus cut off from retreat, might become dangerous like a stag at bay. So far as they knew, the army of Mardonios still retained its power of mischief in Boiotia; but yet there was no hesitation in depriving his forces of the means of escape from Europe into Asia.¹ It seems clear that they had been deterred from the work then, solely by their inability to leave the Attic coast, while Mardonios still remained master of the country as far as Peiræus and Phaleron. On reaching the Hellespont they learnt that winds and storms had shattered the bridges and rendered them useless before the Persian king presented himself on its western shore; and Leotyichides felt that here he had nothing more to do. But the Athenians could not thus abandon the Chersonesos. The heirs of its former Athenian occupants would be anxious to recover the possessions of which Persian conquest had deprived them; and the Athenians generally would need no arguments to convince them that they would do well to make themselves masters of the

¹ See note 2, p. 205.

highway of trade between Western Hellas and the corn-growing lands of the Danube and the Euxine.

A few of the Persians succeeded in reaching the heights of Mykalè after the battle; and these escaped afterwards to Sardeis, where Xerxes was still sojourning after his retreat from Attica. As they marched on, Masistes, the son of Dareios and brother of Xerxes, bitterly reviled the general Artaÿntes as worse than a woman for bringing this disaster upon the king. Artaÿntes had listened patiently for some time; but these words exhausted his forbearance, and he had drawn his dagger to kill Masistes, when he was dashed to the ground by the Halikarnassian Xeinagoras.¹ Yet one more picture completes the wonderful narrative in which Herodotos has given to us the history of the world down to his own day. In Sardeis Xerxes saw and sought to gain possession of the wife of Masistes. Failing in this, he betrothed the daughter of Masistes to his own son Dareios and then departed to Sousa, where he brought the bride into his palace. The despot's lust was now turned from the mother to the child, the wife of his son: but the Sultana Amestris, happening to see the girl with a robe which she had made and given to the king, determined to destroy not the young bride but her mother. On the birthday of Xerxes, when her request could not be refused, Amestris demanded the wife of Masistes; and Xerxes after a long dispute had to give way. Sending for Masistes, he requested him to yield up his wife and take the daughter of Xerxes in her stead. 'My wife,' answered Masistes, 'is the mother of my sons and of my daughters, one of whom thou hast given in marriage to thine own son. Why then should I give up my wife whom I love? There are others who deserve thy daughter better: leave me to dwell with my wife in peace.' 'Then,' cried Xerxes, bursting into rage, 'thou shalt neither marry my daughter nor keep thy wife.' Before Masistes could reach his home, Amestris had seized and mutilated his wife and sent her back shamefully mangled. Taking hasty counsel with his sons, the unhappy man, whose zeal in his brother's service had received this rich reward, set out for Baktra; and Xerxes, well knowing that this journey was only a prelude to war, sent after him and slew him with his children and all his army. So fared it with the loves of king Xerxes. Unhappily, we have but little reason for calling into question, at least in its general outlines, this disgusting tale of miserable weakness and loathsome brutality; but whatever be the measure of its truth, the scene is a striking close to the chronicle of a man who had sought

¹ In requital for this service from Xeinagoras, Herodotos, like Xerxes made Xeinagoras satrap of him a Halikarnassian, obtained the Kilikia. It is not unlikely that narrative of these incidents.

to repress in the deadly bonds of Persian thralldom the intellect and freedom of the world. The contrast must likewise have presented itself to the mind of the historian unless, on little evidence or none, we hold that he did not intend here to end his narrative. If we cannot so believe, then we may think that Herodotos did well to portray in his last picture the physical and moral degradation of the despot who had sought to decide the long quarrel which began with the wrongs of Io and Medeia, of Eurôpê and Helen, and who decided it to his own cost.

Thus in this history of the Persian wars we have the narrative of a struggle, the general features of which stand out with sufficient clearness. But it is a tale in which the most plausible statements will not unfrequently be found the least trustworthy. From the beginning to the end we trace an ethical or religious purpose overlying or putting out of sight all political causes and motives, and substituting appeals to exploits done in the mythical ages for less fictitious but more substantial services. Throughout we find narratives constructed to meet a popular saying or illustrate a popular belief. We find national struggles which are beyond doubt historical enlivened by imaginary combats of well-chosen champions, and momentous national changes in which a contradiction runs through the most important features. We find a sequence of events in which every step and every turn is ushered in by tokens and wonders or by the visible intervention of gods and heroes. But we find also in the great men of that city in which was centred the salvation of the Hellenic world a distinct and deliberate policy which neither sign nor portent, seer nor soothsayer, dream nor marvel, can avail to crush or even to turn aside,—a foresight which takes the true measure of their enemy's power and their own,—a character as real and as tangible as that of any of the great men who have done good service to our own country or to any other land in Christendom.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CONFEDERACY OF DELOS.

THE destruction of the Persian power in Europe was followed by the rapid growth of Athenian empire; and in the events which led to the aggrandisement of Athens the most prominent actor is Themistokles. He had made up his mind that Athens should be great; and he knew that she could not be great unless she were also wealthy. For the sake of her trade and commerce, it was indis-

The re-
building of
Athens and
the fortifica-
tion of the
Peiræus.

479 B.C.

pensably necessary that Athens should be itself fortified and should also possess an impregnable harbor; and Themistokles set himself to supply both these wants with a quiet resolution which carried him over all obstacles. Of the Spartan request, that the Athenians should not only abstain from rebuilding their own walls but should join them in dismantling the walls of all other cities to the north of the Corinthian isthmus, he took no notice: and by his advice the Spartans were dismissed with the promise that the Athenians would send their own ambassadors to discuss the matter. No sooner had they departed than Themistokles at his own wish was intrusted with the mission, his colleagues being Abro-nychos, the son of Lysikles, and Aristeides the victorious general of Plataiai. Themistokles set out at once on his errand, charging his countrymen to strain every nerve in rebuilding the walls, and not to dispatch his colleagues until the walls had reached a height which would enable them to bid defiance to attack. Young and old, women and children, must all take part in the great work, and hand down to coming generations the memory of efforts which were needed to secure not merely their power but their very existence as a state. For the accomplishment of this task nothing was to be spared. The gods themselves would not grudge the stones of their temples for a work without which they might lack both worshippers and offerings. In short, to raise these walls as if by the speed of magic, everything else might be thrown down. But while at Athens the people outdid themselves in their eagerness to achieve the task, Themistokles at Sparta declined all official audiences until he could be supported by his colleagues, of whose early arrival, whatever might be the cause of their delay, he professed to have no doubt. The feeling of friendship for the victor of Salamis was still strong at Sparta. But it underwent a severe strain when tidings came (in all likelihood, if not certainly, from the Aiginetans), that the walls of Athens had already been raised to a formidable height; and Themistokles felt that he must take one step further. To the charge brought against the Athenians he gave a positive denial; but he urged the Spartans, if they doubted his words, to send ambassadors to ascertain the facts. These messengers lost no time in making their way to Athens: but before they could reach it, the Athenians had received from Themistokles the charge to detain these Spartans until his colleagues who had now reached Sparta should with himself have returned home. No sooner was he assured that his countrymen held these men as hostages for his safety than he made to the Spartan ephors a full confession of his motives and his plans. The walls of Athens, he told them, had been raised to a height which would enable the Athenians to undergo a blockade without fear: and Athens, he insisted, had a full right to be girt about

with walls, unless this right was to be denied to every city in the Peloponnesos. Anything like freedom of speech and independence of action would be impossible, if any one member of the confederacy stood on a vantage-ground with respect to the rest; and if Athens now happened to be without walls, it was only because she had chosen to suffer all that could befall her rather than abandon the common cause. In short, the work of Themistokles was done. If the Spartans had dreamed of hoodwinking the Athenians, they were fairly caught in their own trap. They had professed to offer only friendly advice; and they could not in decency express anger when that advice was rejected. But they felt keenly the vexation to which for the time they dared not give vent; and the ambassadors on each side returned to their several homes without a formal recall.

Athens had been saved by her wooden walls; and Themistokles, who had insisted that they could effectually withstand the barbarians only within these floating bulwarks, now insisted that nothing must be left undone to make her navy irresistible. We cannot doubt that in his eyes the most judicious plan would have been the total abandonment of Athens. Between the city and its nearest sea-coast lay a space of more than four miles; and twice within the limits of a single year the inhabitants had been compelled to leave their homes and seek a refuge elsewhere. During his year of office, shortly before the Persian invasion, he had begun to fortify the harbor of Peiraieus, a safe haven on the western side of the promontory which on its eastern side is indented by the two basins of Mounychia. The open waters of Phaleron he regarded as practically useless for his purpose; but in the three harbors of Peiraieus and Mounychia he discerned the stronghold of a greater maritime power than any which the world had yet seen, and these were now by his advice inclosed within a wall nearly seven miles in circuit. As regards its height, the design of Themistokles was only half carried out; but even thus his purpose was effectually achieved.

The Spartans were not more likely for the present to protest against the fortification of the Peiraieus than against the alleged annual addition of thirty ships to the Athenian navy.¹ Whether with such additions or without them, this fleet had yet more work to do before it could be said that the barbarians had been fairly driven back into Asia. Sestos had fallen: but Byzantion and the Thracian Doriskos, with Eion on the Strymon and many other places on the northern shores

The public works of Themistokles.

Change in the conduct of Pausanias.

¹ Diod. xi. 43.

of the Egean,¹ were still held by Persian garrisons, when, in the year after the battle of Plataiai, Pausanias, as commander of the confederate fleet, sailed with 20 Peloponnesian and 30 Athenian ships to Kypros (Cyprus) and thence, having recovered the greater part of the island, to Byzantion. The resistance here was as obstinate perhaps as at Sestos; but the place was at length reduced, and Sparta stood for the moment at the head of a triumphant confederacy. It was now in her power to weld the isolated units, which made up the Hellenic world, into something like an organised society, and to kindle in it something like national life. But to do her justice, her present position had been rather thrust upon her by circumstances than deliberately sought. Her systematic discipline and the stability of her constitution, which, though rigidly oligarchical, presented a striking contrast to the tyranny of Peisistratos or Polykrates, pointed her out as the one city in which the Hellenic states might find an efficient aid against a common enemy. But she had no statesman capable, like Themistokles, of seizing on a golden opportunity, while in her own generals she found her greatest enemies. Pausanias had already roused the indignation of his own people by having his name inscribed, as leader of all the Greek forces, on the tripod which was to commemorate the victory of Plataiai:² and now his arrogance and tyranny were to excite at Byzantion a discontent and impatience destined to be followed by more serious consequences to his country as well as to himself. On the fall of Byzantion he sent to the Persian king the prisoners taken in the city, and spread the report that they had escaped. He forwarded at the same time, it is said, by the hand of the Eretrian Gongylos a letter in which he informed Xerxes that he wished to marry his daughter and to make him lord of all Hellas, adding that with the king's aid he felt sure of success, and requesting that some trustworthy agent should be sent down to arrange the details of the scheme. The spirit of Cyrus or Dareios would have been roused to rage at the presumption of the petty chief who aspired to an alliance with the royal house of Persia on the score not of what he had done but of what he hoped to be able to do by and by. But the spuriousness of the letter may not necessarily discredit the fact that some message was sent to which Xerxes returned an answer telling Pausanias that his name was enrolled in the list of his benefactors for his good deed in freeing the Byzantian pris-

¹ Herod. vii. 106. Herodotos here asserts that down to the time when he wrote this portion of his history Doriskos still remained a Persian fortress.

² His name was erased; and in place of it were substituted the names of the cities whose troops had taken part in the battle. Thuc. i. 132.

oners and beseeching him to spare neither time, men, nor money for the immediate accomplishment of his schemes. The head of this miserable man was now fairly turned. Clad in Persian garb, he aped the privacy of Asiatic despots; and when he came forth from his palace it was to make a royal progress through Thrace, surrounded by Median and Egyptian life-guards, and to show his insolence to men who were at least his equals. The reports of this significant change in the behavior of Pausanias led to his recall. He was put on his trial; but his accusers failed to establish the personal charges brought against him, while his Medism also was dismissed as not fully proved. The suspicion, however, was so strong that he was deprived of his command.¹ But, like Demaratos, Pausanias, although not king, could not brook degradation from a power which Spartan kings had rarely enjoyed. We soon find him again at Byzantion which he had reached in a Hermonian ship. Here it would seem that he took up a fortified position from which he was forcibly dislodged by the Athenians; and crossing the strait, he carried on at Kolônai in the Troas his traitorous dealings with the Persian satrap.

All these events were tending to alienate the Asiatic Greeks and the islanders of the Egean from a state which showed itself incapable of maintaining its authority over its own ser-
Formation of the confederacy of Delos. vants. In short, it had become clear that all Hellas was divided into two great sections, the one gravitating as naturally to Sparta, the great land power, as the other gravitated to Athens with her maritime preponderance.² When therefore a Spartan commission headed by Dorkis arrived with a small force to take the place of Pausanias, they were met by passive resistance where they had looked for submission; and their retirement from the field in which they were unable to
477 B.C. compel obedience left the confederacy an accomplished fact.

It now fell to the lot of Aristеides to regulate the terms of the new confederacy. The work before it was not merely that of self-defence. The mischief done to Hellas was to be
The assessment of Aristеides. requited upon the barbarians. It became necessary, therefore, to determine the proportions in which the allies should contribute men, ships, and money for the common cause. The sum total of this assessment on the allies amounted to 460 talents; but the items are not given. As the management of this fund was intrusted to Hellenotamiai, treasurers elected by the allies generally, and as they met on terms of perfect equality in the sacred island of Delos, we must suppose that the distribution

¹ Thuc. i. 95.² Thuc. i. 19.

of burdens was accepted by all as just and equitable. In truth the fairness of the arrangement is conclusively proved by the mere fact of its acceptance. Athens had not at this time means of compulsion more formidable than those of Sparta, while the help which she was able to afford told more immediately for the benefit of the exposed members of the confederacy than for herself. But as only union could enable them to hold their own, so union implied some sort of central government, and such a government involved subordination. The allies were free; but their circumstances differed indefinitely. Some who could not contribute ships or men would have escaped all burdens if they had not been called on for contributions in money; and the option of refusal would have secured to those who gave nothing all the advantages enjoyed by the most earnest and self-sacrificing of the allies.

Meanwhile Pausanias was busy at Kolônai, thwarting the plans of Aristides. The constant complaints brought against him at length wearied out the patience of the Spartans, who charged him to follow their messenger on pain of being declared the enemy of the people. If he put little trust in their kindly feeling, he had more confidence in the power of money; and relying on the effects of bribes, he returned to Sparta where the ephors threw him into prison. But on these magistrates he so pressed their lack of evidence against him that he was set free: and his next step was an instant challenge to his accusers to prove their charge. No proof, it would seem, was forthcoming, for a descendant of Herakles and the regent for the young son of Leonidas was not to be condemned except on testimony beyond suspicion. All that could be ascertained amounted to presumption and no more, for Spartan law could trust nothing less than the actual confession of the prisoner. Helots came forward who said that Pausanias had been tampering with the whole body of their fellow-slaves, promising them not freedom merely but the rights of citizenship, if they would only give their help in making him a despot: but he had not been heard to tempt them, and their testimony went for nothing. These were followed by an Argilian slave, a man who had won such affection as Pausanias had to offer in an utterly infamous relationship, and to whom he intrusted his latest letters for Artabazos. This slave remembering, it is said, that no previous messenger (Gongylos, it would seem, excepted) had ever come back, opened the letter, intending to close it again with a forged seal and to carry it to its destination if it involved no danger to himself. But the letter contained a strict charge to kill the bearer, and the Argilian carried it not to Artabazos but to the ephors, who, staggered though they were by this further evidence of his treachery, could not rest

The treason
and death of
Pausanias.

content until they had the testimony of their own ears. By their advice the slave took refuge as a suppliant in the Temenos of Poseidon at cape Tainaron in a hut with double walls between which some of the ephors hid themselves. No long time had passed before Pausanias came to ask what had led the Argilian to a step so strange. Then recounting all his services, the slave asked in his turn what he had done to deserve the treachery with which Pausanias had sought his death for adding yet one more to the boons which he had received from him. Soothing him as well as he could, Pausanias admitted his offence, but assuring him solemnly that no mischief should happen to him begged him to lose not a moment in setting out on his errand. The ephors departed, all of them satisfied of his guilt and some of them with their minds made up to arrest him in the city. The rest were not so earnest in the matter; and as they approached Pausanias in the street, one of them contrived by a glance or sign to apprise him of his danger and then pointed to the shrine of Athènè of the Brazen House (Chalkioikos.) Their kindly offices, it would seem, could be carried no further. Pausanias had taken refuge in the little cell of the temple; but he was absolutely without the means of sustaining life, and his partisans could not withhold the magistrates from taking off the roof, walling up the doors, and then waiting patiently until thirst and hunger should have done their work. As the end drew near, he was taken, still breathing, from the sanctuary. Their first intention was to hurl his body into the Kaiadas or chasm into which the bodies of criminals were cast: but they changed their mind and buried him not far from the sanctuary. The ephors, however, had now placed themselves in the wrong by removing a suppliant of the gods; and the order came from Delphoi not only that the body of Pausanias must be taken up and buried where he died, but that the deity of the Brazen House must be appeased with two bodies in place of one. At an earlier time this would have been followed by the slaughter of two human victims. The scruples of a more merciful age were satisfied by offering two brazen statues.

At Sparta Themistokles after the victory of Salamis had been welcomed with such honors as in that city no stranger whether before or after him ever received. The determination with which he maintained the right of the Athenians to fortify their city and to manage their own affairs turned the admiration of the Spartans into hatred; and their diligence in spying out the weak points in his character and conduct was not surpassed by that of some who were watching him in Athens. He was accused by the Spartans of complicity in the schemes of Pausanias, because they could not endure that,

Traditional narrative of the later history of Themistokles.

while one of their generals was charged with Medism, the Athenians should be free of the same disgrace, and because they bribed some Athenians to bring the charge.¹ The time, however, was not yet ripe for his conviction; and for the present he not only escaped but was more popular than ever. The next incident in his life is his ostracism, which, it must be remembered, points not to personal accusations but to a mere trial of strength ^{471 B.C.} in which the partisans of Themistokles may have fully counted on a majority over those of Aristeides. After his ostracism, while he was living in exile at Argos, he was again charged by the Lakedaimonians with having shared the treasons of Pausanias. Themistokles, learning that the Athenians had issued orders for his arrest, fled to Korkyra, an island over which ^{466 B.C.} he is said to have had the claims of a benefactor. Unwilling to give him up but afraid to defend him, the Korkyraians conveyed him over to the mainland, where in his perplexity he found himself driven to enter the house of the Molossian chief Admetos, to whom at some previous time he had given just cause of offence. Admetos was not at home; but his wife placed her child in his arms, and bade him take his place as a suppliant at the hearth. When the chief returned, Themistokles put before him candidly the exact state of his fortunes, and appealed to the generous impulses which restrain brave men from pressing hard on fallen enemies. Admetos at once forgave the old wrong, and then conveyed him safely to Pydna, a stronghold of the Makedonian Alexandros. Here he took passage in a merchant-ship going to Ionia; but a storm carried the vessel to Naxos which was then being besieged by an Athenian force. Themistokles at once revealed himself to the captain, and said that he would charge him with shielding traitors for the sake of a bribe, unless he kept his men from landing until the weather should suffer them to proceed on their voyage. In about thirty-six hours the wind lulled; and the ship made its way to Ephesos, where Themistokles rewarded him liberally out of moneys which his friends had sent over to him from Athens. Journeying on thence into the interior, he sent to Artaxerxes, who had just succeeded the murderer of Masistes, a letter, it is said, thus worded, 'I, Themistokles, have come to thee,—the man who has done most harm to thy house while I was compelled to resist thy father, but who also did him most good, by withholding the Greeks from destroying the bridge over the Hellespont while he was journeying from Attica to Asia: and now I am here, able to do thee much good, but persecuted by the Greeks on the score of my goodwill to thee. I wish to tarry a year and then to talk with thee about

¹ Diod. xi. 54.

mine errand.' The young king, we are told, at once granted his request; and when Themistokles, having spent the year in thoroughly learning Persian, went up to the court, he acquired over the monarch an influence far surpassing that which Demaratos had exercised over Xerxes. This influence rested, it is said, on the promise that he would make the Persian ruler monarch of all Hellas. After a time, we know not how long, he returned to Asia Minor, to do what might be needed to fulfil his promise to the king. Here he lived in great magnificence, having the three cities, Magnesia, Lampsakos, and Myous, to supply him with bread, wine, and vegetables. At Magnesia, so the story runs, he died, whether

from disease or from a draught of bull's blood which
 449 B.C. (?) he drank because he knew that he could not accomplish what he had undertaken to do for the king. His bones were brought away by his kinsmen and buried secretly in Attica, because the bones of a traitor had no right to the soil which he had betrayed: but the Magnesians asserted that they still lay in their market-place, in the splendid sepulchre which they exhibited as the tomb of Themistokles.

Such was perhaps the most popular form of a story of which other versions related that, far from regarding him as a benefactor to the royal house, the Persian king had put a price of
 Alleged journey of Themistokles to Sousa. two hundred talents upon his head; and that when Themistokles reached Ionia, he found it impossible to get to Sousa except by availing himself of the offer of Lysitheides who, pretending that he was conveying to Sousa a stranger for the king's harem, brought thither in this strange disguise the conqueror of Salamis and the founder of the maritime empire of Athens.

Of these versions of the popular tradition the one is perhaps as trustworthy as the other. The absence of all evidence which may tend to show that the people generally approved the
 Uniform policy of Themistokles. judgment passed upon Themistokles is especially striking. In all the accounts preserved by the several writers there is not a word to show that the common people shared the opinions of the knot of his persecutors, while expressions are not lacking which show the strength of their affection for him. But for the life of Themistokles we have no strictly contemporary history; and when Thucydides was old enough to form a judgment upon it, nearly a quarter of a century had passed from the time of his ostracism, a period during which his opponents had done their best to heighten the prejudice which delights in exaggerated contrasts. Themistokles began life in poverty: he closed it in wealth and dishonor. Aristeides was pre-eminent for the purity of his motives: and his justice was proved by the absolute want which left his family dependent on the public bounty. A bribe

had for Aristeides no temptation : but the lust of gold served to account in Themistokles for a simultaneous action of contradictory motives such as no other man ever exhibited. The absence of a pure and lofty unselfishness, to which perhaps he never laid a claim, made his political opponents, not the people, ready to believe of him any degree of personal corruption ; and the charge of such corruption was taken, without evidence, as proof that he was prepared to undo the work of his whole life for the sake of that of which he had already an abundance. Yet nothing less than this are we called upon to believe with regard to a man who displayed a fixity of purpose and a concentration of will, which a few perhaps may have equalled but none certainly have surpassed. So mighty had been the impulse which he gave to Athenian enterprise, so completely had it strengthened the Athenian character, that his great rival gave his aid in the working of that maritime policy, the introduction of which he had opposed. In this business of his life he had displayed wonderful powers,—a rapidity of perception which gave to his maturest judgments the appearance of intuition,—a fertility of resource and a readiness in action which were more than equal to every emergency. He had shown a courage rising in proportion to the dangers which he had to face, a calmness of spirit which turned to his own purpose the weakness and the selfishness of other men. He had kept those about him in some degree true to the common cause, when a blind and stupid terror seemed to make all possibility of union hopeless. These were great qualities and great deeds : they argued much love of his country and more appreciation of her real interests. They were the virtues and exploits of a man who discerned all the strength and flexibility of her political constitution and the mission which his city was charged to fulfil. But this indomitable energy in her service implies no fastidious integrity of character. His patriotism was not hostile to his self-love. His political morality allowed him to make use of the fears or the hopes of others to increase his own wealth while they furthered the interests of his countrymen. He was a great leader, but not the most uncorrupt citizen : a wise counsellor, but no rigid and impartial judge : a statesman formidable to the enemies of his country, but not especially scrupulous in the choice of the weapons to be employed against them. And yet of this man we are asked to believe, not that he yielded to some mean temptation,—not that he began his career in poverty and ended it in ill-gotten wealth,—not that he made use of his power sometimes to advance his own fortune and sometimes to thwart and oppress others ; but that from the beginning he distinctly contemplated the prospect of destroying the house which he was building up, and of seeking a home in the palace of the king on

whose power and hopes he was first to inflict a deadly blow. We are told that at the very time when by an unparalleled energy of character and singleness of purpose he was driving the allies into a battle which they dreaded, he was sending to the Persian king a message which might stand him in good stead when he should come as an exile to the court of Sousa; that he deceived his enemy to his ruin in order to win his favor against the time of trouble which he knew to be coming; that he looked indulgently on the guilt of Pausanias, although he despised the weakness of his intellect; and that on the death of the Spartan regent he took up, or carried on, the work of treachery which in his hands had come to nothing. We are asked further to believe that in the Persian palace he actually found the refuge which he had contemplated,—that his claim to favor was admitted without question,—that he pledged himself to enslave his country, and for twelve or fourteen years received the revenues of large towns to enable him to fulfil his word; and yet that he died, not having made a single effort to fulfil even a part of the promise which he had made to the Persian king. It is a conclusion which cannot be admitted without satisfactory evidence.

If after sweeping away the tales which fall before the ordinary tests of historical criticism a scanty foundation seems to be left for so great a charge of long-planned yet ineffectual treason, it has nevertheless sufficed to establish a general conviction of his guilt. In some minds this conviction is deepened by reflexions on the common tendency of Greek leaders and statesmen to yield to temptations of wealth and power. So strong and so common was this miserable tendency that a reputation for personal integrity served to keep up public confidence in men who were in every other respect quite undeserving of it: and in Themistokles there was unquestionably a self-consciousness and an eager love of money, perhaps also an ostentation, which it is unnecessary to palliate and which makes it ridiculous to speak of him as a man of strict and discriminating equity. On the other hand, his whole career exhibits an unbroken and uniform line of conduct to the time of his expulsion by the vote of ostracism. In spite of the wealth which he amassed and the acts of personal injustice which are laid to his charge, there is no proof that he had abandoned the policy of his life, not a shade of evidence that he had given to his countrymen any counsel which he believed likely to do them harm: and the problem which remains to be solved is not that such a man, thus driven into banishment, should fall indefinitely lower in his personal morality, but that, without an effort to resist it, he should yield to the temptation to undo that which had been thus far the aim and the passion of his life, nay that

years before, when he had scarcely more than begun that work, he foresaw that temptation and calmly made his preparations for yielding to it.

Yet the facts of his exile and of his flight into Asia cannot be called into question. It is possible that his ready wit might devise some plan of winning the favor of Artaxerxes : nor is it altogether unlikely that the revenues bestowed upon him, if they were bestowed at all, may have been granted on no other profession than that of a general desire to further the Persian interests. His voluntary submission might stand in the place of defeat in war : his very banishment was something like a sign that the temporary union of Hellas and the confederacy of Delos would soon be broken up. For the rest, his mere presence at Sousa, if ever he went thither, was no slight honor to the Persian king who might well suppose that other Hellenic leaders might be led to follow his footsteps. If this may be taken as sufficiently explaining his welcome in Persia, the idea of a deeper and more deliberate treachery must be modified or abandoned. The charges of mean and undignified selfishness, of unscrupulous equivocation or even lying, may yet remain : but there will be no need to suppose that while he arranged the positions of the ships at Salamis he was looking forward to the day when he should befriend the barbarian king as heartily as he was then aiding the free land of his birth.

Relations of Themistokles with the Persian king.

If the evidence before us fails to warrant a harsher judgment, it appears without difficulty to fall in with this one. In the first message which he is said to have sent by Sikinnos to the Persian generals or to Xerxes himself no one professes to see a double motive. The stratagem seems at first sight a masterly device for bringing about the destruction of the Persian fleet ; but its value is not a little impaired, when we see that it is practically superfluous. Nothing in the previous history of the war justifies the supposition that Xerxes was likely to retreat from Salamis without fighting or that he intended to delay the battle. Still the disposition of Adeimantos and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta may have made it indispensably necessary to deprive them at once of all chances of escape ; and the message of Themistokles was admirably framed to effect this purpose. For the second message the several accounts assign different objects, the most circumstantial affirming that for himself Themistokles sought by means of it to win the gratitude of the king and a refuge in the time of trouble which even then he anticipated. Assuredly, such a fact, if proved, would be one of the most astonishing in all history ; for we are asked to believe that a man, engaged in saving his country from dangers apparently over-

Alleged personal corruption of Themistokles.

whelming, and struggling with the jealousy, or selfishness, or disaffection of his confederates, was actuated at one and the same moment by two entirely distinct and conflicting motives. With his whole soul he was bent on setting his country free: and yet not less earnestly was he bent on securing a place of retreat among the very enemies whom he was driving out. Such a condition of mind could, assuredly, have produced nothing but distraction of purpose and utter weakness in action, a turmoil of contrary desires with which the calm judgment and profound energy of the man stand out in incomprehensible contrast. Such treachery it is beyond our power to realise. Some notion of it may be formed if we should suppose that when Nelson before the fight at Trafalgar warned every man that England looked to him to do his duty, he had already done his best to secure the future good-will of the tyrant Bonaparte whose fleets he was advancing to encounter. But if Herodotos represents Themistokles as holding out to Xerxes the prospect of an unmolested march, there were other, and seemingly more popular, versions which spoke of him as terrifying the king by a warning that he might be intercepted on the road. With statements so inconsistent, the double meaning which is said to lie in the message must be rejected. It may indeed be said that the sending of this second message may be accounted for by the love which a man like Themistokles would feel for the arts in which he excelled, for their own sake, and that the delight of conducting an intrigue might be in itself a sufficient motive for action. Such a supposition would impute to him a childishness scarcely less than that which he is said to have shown in his inordinate vanity: but here again it is needless to say more, for with almost complete assurance it may be asserted that this second message was never sent.¹

But while he sojourned near the coast, he is said to have sent to the despot of Persia a letter couched in terms of intolerable insolence. This letter, as we have seen, is a manifest forgery; and it is therefore scarcely necessary to say that, if the epistle which the Eretrian Gongylos conveyed from the Spartan regent was too presuming and boastful to be altogether palatable to an Eastern king, it was yet free from the falsehoods which form the substance of this letter of Themistokles. The plea that the instinct of self-preservation alone had led him to resist and repel the invasion of Xerxes must to his son, who was not altogether ignorant of the phenomena of Medism, have appeared not less ridiculous than false: the boast that as soon as he could safely do so he had compensated his injuries with

Extent of
the guilt of
Themisto-
kles.

¹ See page 205.

greater benefits must have seemed an extravagant and shameless lie. But whether this letter was sent or not, the details of his journey to Sousa as well as of his sojourn in the palace are purely fictitious; and hence we cannot venture to determine the motives which led Artaxerxes to befriend the Athenian exile, or the terms on which he extended to him his lavish bounty, if lavish it was. The mere fact that during his long residence at Magnesia he made no effort to fulfil the promise which he is said to have given, must go far to prove that no direct enterprise against the freedom of the Hellenic world could have been involved in it. The supposition of such an engagement gave rise to the tale that his death was caused by taking poison; but this story obtained no credit with Thucydides whose account would seem to justify the inference drawn from his inactivity at Magnesia. By a version scarcely less extravagant than his tale of the rebuilding of the Athenian walls, Diodoros represents his death as a crowning stratagem to preclude all further attacks from Persia on the liberty of his country.¹ There can be no doubt that if he had entered into any such compact with the Persian king with any intention of fulfilling it, he had it in his power to inflict enormous damage on the growing empire of Athens. That not a single injurious act can be laid to his charge would seem to prove, not that he cheated the king by a series of gratuitous falsehoods, but that Artaxerxes imposed no such obligations as the price of his hospitality. His degradation was great enough already without adding to it a larger measure of infamy. But it is no light thing to have solid grounds for believing that Themistokles was not guilty of the inveterate treachery which has given to the story of his life a character of inexplicable mystery; that, with much to mar its ancient strength, he yet carried the love of his country to the grave; and that no pledge to work the ruin of that country laid on him the guilt of superfluous hypocrisy towards the despot who is said to have given him a home in his dishonored old age.

Long before the life of Themistokles had reached its close in his splendid Magnesian retreat, Aristeides the righteous had died in poverty, either at Athens or in battle somewhere on the coasts of the Black Sea—in short, where or ^{The death of Aristeides,} how, we know not. Stories were not lacking which ^{468 B.C. (?)} called even his incorruptibility into question; and it was maintained that he too, being unable to pay a heavy fine on a conviction for bribery, took refuge in the land where Themistokles had found a shelter, and that there he died.

¹ Diod. xi. 58.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE GROWTH OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

A PERIOD of less than half a century separates the close of the struggle with Persia from that disastrous strife between the two foremost states of Hellas which prepared the way first for Makedonian and then for Roman conquest. Nay, although that brief period saw the rise and culmination of Athenian empire and even the first stages of its downward course, we cannot speak of the beginning of it as marking the close of the struggle with Persia except in so far as the issue of it was virtually decided in the waters of Salamis and under the heights of Kithairon and Mykalè. Persian garrisons still remained in towns along the Thracian coasts: Persian fleets still threatened to renew the contest by sea; Persian armies still hung behind the scanty strip of land which had been the brightest jewel in the empire of Kroisos. Whether on the Asiatic continent or in the Egean islands the Hellenes looked to Athens for the further conduct of a war in which they were ready to give such help as might be in their power. But it can scarcely be said that the brilliant vision of Athenian empire, as contrasted with the headship of a free confederacy, had yet dawned on the minds of Athenian statesmen. The most far-seeing of these, beyond doubt, was Themistokles: and the whole policy of Themistokles was shaped by the conviction that, if Athens was ever to be great, she must be great by sea. When he told his fellow-citizens that with their ships they might bid defiance to all assailants, but that in such struggles their old city under the rock of the Virgin Goddess would be of little use or none,¹ we cannot suppose that he was looking forward to a time when the dominion of Athens should stretch from Megara and its harbors to the pass of Thermopylai, or that he would have failed to deprecate efforts designed to bring about such a result as mischievous, if not fatal, to her real welfare.

Yet within a few years Athenian energy brought about results which, while the victories of Salamis and Plataiai were fresh, would have been set down as extravagant dreams. The events which led to these results were shaped by circumstances which could not have been anticipated; and of the course of these events we have unfortunately a singularly bare and meagre record. It is not that the history of this most important time has been lost, but that it never

Change in the relations of Athens with her allies.

¹ See p. 234.

was written; and our knowledge of the course of events must be derived from a comparison of the statements of Thucydides with those of Herodotus. From the former we learn that the confederacy of Delos was at first an association of independent states whose representatives met in the synod on a footing of perfect equality. By the latter we are told that, when Sestos and Byzantion had fallen, a vast amount of work still remained to be done before Europe could be rid of the barbarian. Lastly we learn from Thucydides that at the end of this time a change became manifest in the attitude of Athens towards the other members of the confederation; that at first all contributed ships and men for the common service, whether with or without further contributions in money; and that the change in the relative positions of Athens and her allies was brought about wholly by the acts of the latter. It may be true, as Thucydides asserts, that Athens was firm, even to harshness, in insisting that all should discharge to the full their duties as confederates. But with the Ionians it was the old story. The demands of Athens seemed hard only because they loathed the idea of long-continued strenuous exertion.¹ But they were dealing now with men who were not to be trifled with; and as in some shape or other they must bear their full measure of the general burden, the thought struck them that their end might be gained if they paid more money and furnished fewer ships and men, or none. Their proposal was accepted; and its immediate result was to enhance enormously the power of Athens, while in case of revolt they became practically helpless against a thoroughly disciplined and thoroughly resolute enemy.

Sestos and Byzantion had fallen: but Boges the governor of Eion on the mouth of the Strymon offered to the assaults of the allies a desperate resistance. The capture of Eion was either preceded or followed by the reconquest of Lemnos; and probably the convenience of Skyros as a station on the voyage to Lemnos led to the attack of that island and the reduction of its people to slavery.² From Skyros Thucydides takes us to the Euboian Karystos which was treated with the same severity. The fleet of the Naxians, who revolted at this time and were subdued, went to swell the numbers of the Athenian navy, which was now to strike another great blow on the maritime power of the Persian king. The victory of Kimon destroyed, it is said, on one and the same day the Phenician fleet of 200 ships at the mouth of the

¹ Ἀθηναῖοι . . . λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, οὐκ εἰσθόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν 91, 1. ² Thuc. i. 98.

Athenian operations to the battles of the Eurymedon. 476 B.C.

Eurymedon, in Pamphylia, and the land-forces with which it was destined to co-operate.

The history of the Delian confederation was determined by the character of the Asiatic Greeks. The continued struggle with Persia after the battle of Mykalê involved the need of strenuous exertions : and for this the Ionians were not prepared. The Athenians on the other hand were not less resolved that the effort should be made ; and as soon as this radical difference of view began to find expression, the Delian synod was doomed. The days of Athenian Hegemonia, or leadership, were now ended : the empire or tyranny of Athens had begun, and whether in laying its foundations or in raising the fabric the Athenians assuredly cannot be charged with any lack of promptitude. Not many months after the conquest of Naxos and

the victories of the Eurymedon a quarrel with the Thasians about their mines and trade on their Thrakian settlements was followed by open war. Not content with blockading Thasos, the Athenians, to make all further rivalry impossible, sent 10,000 men as settlers to the spot called the Nine Roads, the site of the future Amphipolis. This post they succeeded in occupying ; but in an evil hour they were tempted by the hope of large profits from mines to advance further inland towards the northeast, and at or near Drabeskos their whole force was practically swept away by the Edonian Thrakians. This terrible disaster brought no relief to the Thasians. The Athenians still blockaded their port, and maintained their lodgement on the island ; but although the siege had lasted for two years, the spirit of the Thasians was not yet broken. They saw that the quarrel between themselves and the Athenians was one which must be decided in a struggle between Athens and Sparta. From Sparta therefore they besought aid in their distress ; and the Spartans entered into a secret engagement to invade Attica, which proved that, apart from specific causes of offence, the mere greatness of Athens was a wrong which they could not forgive. To this fear of Athens and to this alone we must trace the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war.

While the Thasians were holding out against the fleet and army of Athens, their Spartan friends were busied in blockading Ithômê. A terrible earthquake, which had shaken the city of Sparta and its neighborhood, was ascribed to the vengeance of Poseidon for the impious withdrawal of the dying Pausanias from his sanctuary ; and to the Helots it seemed a call to rise against their masters. Breaking out into open revolt, they marched or were gradually pushed back, with a large body of Perioikoi who had

The Delian Synod ; and the revolt of Thasos.

465 B.C.

The revolt of the Helots ; and the alliance of Athens with Argos.

464 B.C.

joined them, to the old Messenian stronghold, and were there blockaded by the Spartans. Fearing that the siege might in length rival that of Eira, the Spartans besought help from the people against whom they had made a secret pact with the Thasians. Their application at Athens, opposed, it is said, by Perikles and Ephialtes, was warmly seconded by Kimon who was himself sent with a large force to take part in the reduction of Ithômê. But the place was too strong to be carried even by the most skilful of the Greeks in the conduct of blockades : and the consciousness of their own premeditated treachery led them to ascribe the like double-dealing to the Athenians and the Plataians who accompanied them, and to dismiss them on the plea that their services were no longer needed.¹ The indignation stirred up in the Athenians by this manifest falsehood was no mere feeling of the moment. The policy of Kimon and his philo-Lakonian adherents was cast to the winds : and proposals for a treaty of alliance were at once made to Argos, the ancient rival and enemy of Sparta. The Argives welcomed the alliance as one which might go far towards the recovery of their old supremacy. The fire thus kindled spread swiftly. The Thessalians were brought into the new confederacy ; and Megara, ^{461 B.C.} tired out with Corinthian incroachments on her boundaries, flung herself into the arms of Athens. Her friendship was eagerly welcomed, for the Athenians thus became possessed of the two Megarian ports, Nisaia on the Saronic gulf and Pegai on that of Corinth, while their occupation of the passes of Gerancia rendered Spartan invasions of Attica practically impossible. Still further to strengthen their hold on Megara, they joined the city by long walls to its southern port of Nisaia, and within the fortress thus made they placed a permanent garrison. These walls probably suggested the greater enterprise which was soon to make Athens, so far as she could be made, a maritime city. Meanwhile the siege of Ithômê went on ; but at length the Helots and Perioikoi came to terms with their besiegers. They were to leave the Peloponnesos, under the pain of becoming the slaves ^{455 B.C.} of any who might catch them if they dared to set foot there again. On these terms men, women, and children all departed in peace and found a refuge in Naupaktos, which the Athenians had lately taken from the Ozolian Lokrians. Thus at the northern entrance of the Corinthian gulf a population was established bitterly hostile to Sparta and devoted to the interests of Athens.

The Aiginetans now resolved to measure themselves in earnest

¹ Thuc. i. 102, 4.

with the men who had robbed them of their ancient maritime supremacy. They went into battle, relying probably on the tactics which had destroyed the Persian fleets at Salamis and Mykalê: they came out of it, utterly ruined as a maritime power. Seventy of their ships were taken, and Aigina itself was blockaded by sea and land.

Siege of Aigina. Building of the Long Walls of Athens. 459-8 B.C.

Meanwhile a large Athenian fleet and army had gone to aid the Egyptians in their revolt against Artaxerxes; and Megabazos, as the envoy of the great king, had come to Sparta, to in-force with large bribes the immediate invasion of Attica. His money was spent in vain;¹ but the Corinthians by an attack on Megara and by occupying the heights of Gerancia thought to achieve that which the Spartans had not been able to attempt. To their surprise no forces were withdrawn from Aigina; but an army consisting of the oldest and the youngest men who had been left to guard the city marched from Athens to Megara under the command of Myronides. The battle which followed was indecisive; but the Athenians set up a trophy on the departure of the Corinthians who were received at home with jeers for retreating from a rabble of old men and boys. Smarting under the abuse, they hastened back to the field, and there as they were setting up a trophy on their side they were attacked by the same force and defeated. Unhappily in their retreat a large body found their way by the only entrance into a piece of private ground inclosed by a deep trench. Myronides instantly blocked up the entrance with his hoplites, while his light-armed troops shot down all who had fallen into this fatal snare till not a man remained alive. The day was a black one for the Corinthians, although the bulk of their army returned home in safety. On the Athenian side the history of this time with its rush of events and its startling changes exhibits a picture of astonishing and almost preternatural energy. One Athenian army was besieging Aigina; another was absent in Egypt. Yet this was the time chosen by Perikles for carrying out at home the plan which on a very small scale had been adopted at Megara. To join Athens with Peiraieus on the one side and Phaleron on the other, one wall was needed of about 4½, and another of about 4 English miles in length. Such an enterprise could not fail to excite to the utmost the jealous fears of the Peloponnesian cities. It became evident to the Spartans that if the growth of Athens was to be arrested, it could be done only by setting up a counterpoise to her influence in northern Hellas. Hence for the sake of checking her they overcame their almost invincible dislike of regularly organised federations, and set to

¹ Thuc. i. 103.

work to restore the supremacy of Thebes which had been most disgracefully zealous in the cause of Xerxes.

The fortress of Ithômê had not yet fallen when the Spartans sent across the Corinthian gulf a large force under the command of Nikomedes who was then acting as regent for the young king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias. Their nominal errand was to rescue from the Phokians one of the three Dorian towns which formed the Lakædaimonian metropolis.¹ The task was easily accom-

Battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta. The fall of Aigina. 457 B.C.

plished, and we are told that they had already begun their homeward march when they found that an Athenian fleet was stationed in the Krissaian gulf to prevent their crossing by sea, while an Athenian garrison occupied the passes of Gerancia. Hither also hastened the unwearied Demos, aided by a thousand Argives as well as by other allies. The battle was fought at Tanagra, within sight of the Euripos: and the Athenians were defeated after a severe and bloody fight. On the sixty-second day² after the battle (the exactness of the chronology shows how firmly these incidents had fixed themselves in the memory of the people) Myronides marched into Boiotia, and by his splendid victory among the vineyards of Oinophyta raised the empire of Athens to the greatest height which it ever reached. Utterly defeated, the Boiotians and Phokians became the subject allies of the Athenians who set up democracies everywhere, taking a hundred hostages from the Lokrians of Opous as pledges of their fidelity. Thus from Megara and its harbors to the passes of Thermopylai Athens was supreme; and this great exaltation was followed almost immediately by the humbling of her ancient foe Aigina. The walls of this ill-fated city were razed, her fleet was forfeited, and the conquest crowned by the imposition of the tribute for maintaining the Athenian confederacy. Nor was this all. Great success was followed in some instances by failure: but failure did not leave them without spirit for further enterprise.

Of these reverses the most terrible was the disaster which befell the fleet dispatched to the aid of the Libyan Inaros, the son of Psammetichos, who had, on the death of Xerxes, excited the greater part of Egypt to revolt against the power of Persia.³ Two hundred Athenian triremes happened at the time to be on their way to Kypros (Cyprus); and these were ordered to make their way at once to Egypt. The fleet was lost; and of the crews a few only made their way through Libya to Kyrênê. The Libyan chief was betrayed to the Persians and crucified; and a reinforcement of

Disasters of the Athenians in Egypt. 455 B.C.

¹ Thuc. i. 107.

² Thuc. i. 103, 2.

³ Ib. i. 104. Diod. xi. 71.

fifty triremes from Athens, having reached the Mendesian mouth of the Nile, was attacked and almost wholly destroyed by a combined attack of the Phœnician fleet and the Persian land-forces.

Still Athens was resolved to carry on the war against Persia, and Kimon was sent to Kypros with 200 ships. Here Thucydides tells us that, while the blockade of Kition was still going on, Kimon died; that the Athenians were then from lack of food compelled to withdraw from Kition, and that, sailing to Salamis about 70 miles further to the east, they there obtained a victory both by sea and land over the Phœnicians and Kilikians. According to Diodoros¹ Kimon not merely blockaded but succeeded in taking both Kition and Malos, and then engaging the combined Phœnician and Kilikian fleets chased to the Phœnician coast the ships which escaped from the conflict, while in another battle the Athenian commander Anaxikrates fell fighting bravely against the Persians. Nay more, in the following year, Kimon resolved to strike a more decisive blow by besieging Salamis, where the Persians had stored their corn and their munitions of war. Unable to stand out against this series of disasters, Artaxerxes sent to Athens ambassadors charged with proposals for peace, and the Athenians, dispatching their own envoys to Sousa headed by Kallias the son of Hippo-nikos, concluded the treaty which bears his name. By this convention the Persian king bound himself to send no ships of war westward of Phaselis or the Chelidonian islands, in other words, beyond the eastern promontory of Lykia, and to respect the Thracian Bosphoros as the entrance to Hellenic waters; nor did the death of Kimon take place, if we may follow Diodoros, until after this treaty had been ratified.

Thus had Athens reached the zenith of her greatness, not by an unbroken series of victories such as may be recorded in the career of mythical conquerors, but by the persistent resolution which will draw from success the utmost possible encouragement, while it refuses to bend even beneath great disasters. On a foundation of shifting and uncertain materials she had raised the fabric of a great empire, and she had done this by compelling the several members of her confederation to work together for a common end,—in other words, to sacrifice their independence, so far as the sacrifice might be needed; and refusal on their part had been followed by prompt and summary chastisement. In short, she was throughout offending, and offending fatally, the profoundest instinct of the Hellenic mind, that instinct which had been impressed on it in the very in-

Final vic-
tories and
death of
Kimon.
455 B.C.

Evacuation
of Boiotia by
the Athe-
nians.

fancy of Aryan civilisation. Whatever might be the theories of her philosophers or the language of her statesmen, Athens was doing violence to the sentiment which regarded the city as the ultimate unit of society : and of this feeling Sparta availed herself in order to break up the league which threatened to make her insignificant by land as it had practically deprived her of all power by sea. The designs of Athens were manifested by the substitution of democracy for oligarchy in the cities subjected to her rule. These democracies, it is clear, could not be set up except by expelling the Eupatrid citizens who might refuse to accept the new state of things ; and as few were prepared to accept it, a formidable body of exiles furious in their hatred of Athens was scattered through Hellas, and was busily occupied nearer home in schemes for upsetting the new constitution. Nine years after the battle of Oinophyta the storm ^{447 B.C.} burst on the shores of the lake Kopais. The banished Eupatrids were masters of Orchomenos, Chaironeia, and some other Boiotian cities : and against these an Athenian army, aided by their allies, marched under Tolmides, a general whose zeal outran his discretion. He had taken Chaironeia, and having left a force to guard it, was marching southwards when he was attacked in the territory of Koroneia. The result was a ruinous defeat for the Athenians, those who survived the battle being for the most part taken prisoners. Roman feeling would probably have left these unhappy men to their fate, as it refused to ransom the prisoners taken at Cannæ. The Athenians could not afford thus to drain their strength, and to recover them they made no less a sacrifice than the complete evacuation of Boiotia.

The land-empire of Athens was doomed to fall as rapidly as it rose. The revolt of Euboia was the natural fruit of revived oligarchy ; but scarcely had Perikles with an Athenian army landed in the island, when the more terrible tidings reached them that Megara also was in revolt, ^{The revolt of Euboia and Megara.} and that the Athenian garrison had been massacred, ^{The thirty years' truce.} a few only making their escape to Nisaia. ^{446 B.C.} A Peloponnesian army was already in Attica and was ravaging the fruitful lands of Eleusis and Thrious, when Perikles returned in haste with his army from Euboia. For whatever reason, the king Pleistoanax advanced no further. It is more than possible that he found his force inadequate to the task before them ;¹ but at Sparta the belief was that he had been vanquished by Athenian bribes, and he atoned for his sin or his misfortune by years of banishment at

¹ Archidamos was compelled to be equally cautious in his invasion of Attica at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Thuc. ii. 18 *et seq.*

Tegea. The retreat of the Peloponnesians left Perikles free to deal with the Euboians as he thought fit. The whole island was subdued, and definite treaties were made with all the cities except Histiaia. The inhabitants of this town were all expelled, and Athenian Klerouchoi, or settlers,¹ introduced in their place. But although it was thus made clear that Athens had lost nothing of her ancient spirit, it was not less certain that the idea of an Athenian empire by land must take its place in the ranks of dreams which are never to be realised. Her hold on the Peloponnesos was to all intents already gone; and hence, like the so-called treaty of Kimon and Kallias, the thirty years' truce between

445 B.C.

Sparta and Athens which followed the re-conquest of Euboia gave only a formal sanction to certain accomplished facts. As things had now gone, the Athenians gave up little when they surrendered Troizen and Achaia together with the Megarian harbors. But it was easier to evacuate Megara, as Boiotia had been evacuated already, than to forgive the Megarians to whom ten years of friendship had given the power of inflicting a deadly blow on the imperial city with which of their own free will they had allied themselves.

In the days of the old Eupatrid tyranny as well as under the despotism of the Peisistratidai the most marked characteristic of the Athenians generally was a political indifference almost amounting to apathy. This besetting sin Solon had denounced by his law or proclamation against neutrality in times of sedition; but it was not until the tyrants had been driven out from the Akropolis that the sudden outburst of energy in the Athenian demos showed the wholesome and bracing effects of freedom.² This impulse was greatly strengthened by each fresh departure from that exclusive Eupatrid polity which derived its spirit from the days when the primitive Aryan was little better than the wild beast in his den.³ The struggle with Persia had supplied a fresh impetus, and the spur thus given led to an activity still more marvellous, when the formation of the Delian confederacy insured to Athens the supremacy of the sea. Hence the periods in which Athens was most aggressive abroad were the periods in which the principles of democracy were being most rapidly developed at home. The first great blow was struck on the religious exclusiveness of the ancient Eupatrid houses when Solon gave to the peasant cultivators a permanent interest in the land,⁴ and when he followed up this momentous reform by introducing a classification of citizens based not upon religion and blood but upon property. The stone had been set rolling, but it had not yet

¹ See p. 94.

² Herod. v. 78. See p. 94.

³ See p. 6.

⁴ See p. 79.

moved far. Hence Kleisthenes found himself summoned to a warfare in which he had still to fight against the old enemies. If only members of the religious tribes could fill the public offices, Athens must remain as insignificant as she had been before the days of Solon. Kleisthenes cut the knot by inrolling all the citizens into ten new tribes,¹ against the local aggregation of which he made most careful provision. But although the religious exclusiveness of the old Eupatrids could no longer be maintained, another oligarchic influence remained in the preponderance of wealth. As a matter of fact, it was unlikely that even if all restrictions were removed poor men would except in rare instances be chosen to fill high public offices: but by the constitution of Kleisthenes the members of the fourth class,—in other words, the main body of Athenian citizens,—were declared ineligible for the Archonship, and it was reserved for the conservative Aristides to propose the removal of this restriction, when the growth of a large maritime population at the Peiraieus, animated by a hearty obedience to law, and exhibiting a marked contrast to the turbulence of the wealthier Hoplites, proved the wisdom of abolishing it.² The result showed that eligibility was not always or often followed by election, while the course of events continued to bring the functions of the archon more and more to the level of the capacities of ordinary Athenian citizens. It was certain, therefore, that the party of progress would seek to devise some means for securing to the poorer citizens the privileges and powers of which they had shown themselves deserving, while the conservative statesmen would seek to keep things as they were. The former party was headed by Perikles and Ephialtes; at the head of the latter stood Kimon, the son of the victor of Marathon.

Of Perikles it may be said that he was endowed with all the wisdom and foresight of Themistokles, and with a personal integrity of which we should be saying little if we spoke of it as altogether beyond that of his great master. ^{The rivalry of Kimon and Perikles.} If the smallest chink had been left in his armor, his enemies would not have failed to pierce it. Having little in common with the political temper of Kimon, he had about him even less of the spirit of the demagogue. A dignity somewhat cold and repellent might with more reason be ascribed to a man whose time and thoughts were given chiefly to his work as a statesman and whose leisure was reserved for the pleasures of philosophy and art. Seeing clearly from the first that Themistokles had taken the true measure of the capabilities of his countrymen, and that he had turned their energies in the right direction, Perikles set himself to the task of carrying out his policy with an unflinching and unswerving zeal; and thus when the conqueror of Salamis

¹ See p. 88.² Xen. *Mem.* iii. 5, 18.

was ostracized, a younger statesman was at hand to take up his work and complete the fabric of which he had laid the foundations, and gone far towards raising the superstructure.

The form of Ephialtes is overshadowed by the commanding figure of Perikles : but it is no light praise to say of him that he was both poor and trustworthy. With an earnestness equal to that of his great ally, he joined a keener sense of political wrongs and a more vehement impatience of political abuses. The legislation of Aristeides had made all citizens eligible for the Archonship : but the poorer citizens were little the nearer to being elected archons, and the reforms both of Aristeides and of Kleisthenes had left in the large judicial powers of public officers a source of evils which became continually less and less tolerable. The Strategoi, as well as the archons, dealt with all cases of disobedience to their own authority ; and the practically irresponsible Court of Areiopagos, while it possessed a strictly religious jurisdiction in cases of homicide, exercised also a censorial authority over all the citizens, and superseded the Probouleutic council by its privilege of preserving order in the debates of the Ekklesia. This privilege involved substantially the determination of the subjects to be discussed, as inconvenient questions might for the most part without difficulty be ruled to be out of order. To Ephialtes first, and to Perikles afterwards, it became evident that attempts to redress individual cases of abuse arising from this state of things were a mere waste of time. The public officers must be deprived of their discretionary judicial powers ; the Areiopagos must lose its censorial privileges and its authority in the public assembly of the citizens, while the people themselves must become the final judges in all criminal as well as civil causes. To carry out the whole of this scheme they had a machinery ready to hand. The Heliaia in its Dikasteries had partially exercised this jurisdiction already ; and nothing more was needed now than to make these Dikasteries permanent courts, the members of which should receive a regular pay for all days spent on such service.¹ The adoption of these measures would at once sweep away the old evils ; and Ephialtes with the support of Perikles carried them all. The Athenian constitution thus reached its utmost growth ; and the history of the times which follow tells only of its conservation or of its decay.

These measures were preceded, as we might expect, by the ostracism of Kimon ; and all hindrances were removed from the path of Ephialtes. The formidable jurisdiction of the archons was cut down to the power of inflicting a

¹ For the method by which these Dikasteries were annually supplied with Jurymen, see p. 89.

small fine, and they became simply officers for managing the preliminary business of cases to be brought before the Jury Courts. The majesty of the Areiopagos faded away, and, retaining its jurisdiction only in cases of homicide, it became an assembly of average Athenian citizens who had been chosen archons by the lot.¹ In short, the old times were gone; and the rage of the oligarchic faction (for such it must still be termed) could be appeased only with blood. Ephialtes was assassinated,—by a murderer hired, it is said, from the Boiotian Tanagra. Kimon was in banishment: and it is pleasant to think that this brave and able general had no hand in a dastardly crime, happily rare in Athenian annals.

¹ See p. 90.

BOOK III.

THE EMPIRE OF ATHENS.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ATHENS AND SPARTA.

CHAPTER I.

THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE.

EPHIALTES was dead; but the opposition, which had not shrunk from employing the weapon of assassination, became even more intense, as Perikles matured his designs for the embellishment of the imperial city. The place of Kimon was now filled by his kinsman Thoukydides the son of Melesias, who, like Kimon, held that the revenues of Athens should still be used in distant enterprises against the power of Persia. This policy was resisted by Perikles, whose influence with the people was probably strengthened by the remembrance that he had likewise opposed the rash expedition of Tolmides into Boiotia. The political atmosphere at Athens was now again so far clouded and threatening that both parties turned instinctively to the remedy of ostracism. Like Kimon, Thoukydides fully thought that the vote would send his great rival into exile. The result was 443 B.C. (?) his own banishment; and the way was cleared for the carrying out of the vast public works on which Perikles had set his mind. The long walls which joined Athens with her harbors inclosed between them a large space of ground, which, if occupied by an enemy, might be a source of serious danger as well as of annoyance. Hence a third wall was carried from the city parallel to the western or Peiraic wall, at a distance of 550 feet, turning to the south about 400 yards before it reached Mounychia, for the purpose of defending that harbor. But the costliest works of Perikles were confined within a much narrower circuit. A new theatre, called the Odeion, rose in the city, as a worthy home for the drama in the great Panathenaic festival, while under the name Propylaea gigantic portals guarded the entrance to the summit of the rock on which art of every kind achieved its highest triumphs. The Erechtheion, or shrine of

Athênê Polias, which had been burnt during the Persian occupation of the city, rose to more than its ancient grandeur, in spite of the vow that the ruined temples should be left as memorials of the invader's sacrilege. But high above all the surrounding buildings towered the magnificent fabric of the Parthenon, the home of the virgin goddess, whose colossal form, standing in front of the temple, might be seen by the mariner as he doubled the Cape of Sounion. The worshipper, who passed within its massive walls, saw before him a statue of the goddess still more glorious, the work of the great sculptor, Pheidias, whose genius embodied in gold and ivory at Olympia the majesty of Zeus himself.

The great aim of Perikles was to strengthen the power of Athens over the whole area occupied by her confederacy. The establishment of settlers or *Klerouchoi*, who retained their rights as Athenian citizens, had answered so well in the Lelantian plain of Euboiá¹ that it was obviously good policy to extend the system. The territory of Hestiaia in the north of Euboiá, and the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, were thus occupied; and Perikles himself led a body of settlers to the Thracian Chersonesos and even to Sinôpê which now became a member of the Athenian alliance. A generation had passed from the time when Athens lost 10,000 citizens in the attempt to found a colony at the mouth of the Strymon.² The task was now undertaken successfully by Hagnon,³ and the city came into existence which was to be the cause of disaster to the historian Thucydides and to witness the death of Brasidas and of Kleon. Of less importance to the interests of Athens, yet notable in other ways, was the revival of the ruined Sybaris under the name of Thourioi, about seven years before the founding of Amphipolis. Among its citizens was the rhetor Lysias, and one far more illustrious man. Here Herodotos found a home for his latter years; here he wrote much, if not all, of his invaluable history; and here, after a life spent in the honest search of truth, he died.

Two years before the founding of Amphipolis Samos revolted from Athens. In one sense it is true to say that this revolt was caused by a feeling of impatience under Athenian supremacy, and quite true also that Athenian citizens sometimes spoke of their relations with their allies as those of a tyrant with his subjects, and even made a parade of exercising over them a despotic authority. But it is not the less true that this radical opposition of feeling and interest was confined for the most part to a small, although always powerful and

¹ See p. 94.² See p. 248.³ Thuc. iv. 102.

sometimes preponderant, party in the subject cities. But there was also in every city a class which had not only no positive grievance against Athens, but a strong community of interest with her : and this class, necessarily, was the Demos. In almost every case, therefore, we shall find the people passive or indifferent under Athenian supremacy, so long as there was no opposition between the subject city and its mistress ; but we shall also see that when the oligarchy broke out into open rebellion, the demos not unfrequently took the first opportunity of going over to their natural protectors.¹ The tidings that Byzantion had joined in this revolt left to the Athenians no room to doubt the gravity of the crisis. A fleet of sixty ships was dispatched to Samos under Perikles and nine other generals, of whom the poet Sophokles is said to have been one ; and the Samian oligarchy were compelled to submit in the ninth month after the beginning of the revolt, the terms being that they should raze their walls, give hostages, surrender their ships, and pay the expenses of the war. Following their example, the Byzantines also made their peace with Athens.² The Athenians escaped at the same time a far greater danger nearer home. The Samians, like the men of Thasos,³ had applied for aid to the Spartans, who, no longer pressed by the Helot war, summoned a congress of their allies to discuss the question. For the truce which had still five-and-twenty years to run Sparta cared nothing : but she encountered an opposition from the Corinthians which perhaps she now scarcely expected. In the synod at which Hippias had pleaded his cause the Corinthians had raised their voice not so much against the restoration of the despot, as against the principle of interference with the internal affairs of an autonomous city. They now insisted in a like spirit on the right of every independent state to deal as it pleased with its free or its subject allies. The Spartans were compelled to give way ; and there can be no doubt that when some years later the Corinthians claimed the gratitude of the Athenians for this decision,⁴ they took credit for an act of good service singularly opportune. Had they voted as Sparta wished, Athens might by the extension of revolt amongst her allied cities have been reduced now to the condition to which, in consequence perhaps of this respite, she was not brought until the lifetime of a generation had been spent in desperate warfare.

¹ This is emphatically asserted by Diodotos, whose argument, Thuc. iii. 47, is that the proposal of Kleon is not only unjust but most impolitic, as it confounds friends with foes. At present, Athens, he urges, may in every case of revolt count on having the Demos strongly in her fa-

vor. If innocent and guilty be alike punished, they must expect to find their friends converted into enemies.

² Thuc. i. 117.

³ See p. 248.

⁴ Thuc. i. 40.

When the Corinthians asserted that the Athenians had an absolute right to punish the Samians or any other allies who might be in revolt, it is possible that their motives may have been more selfish than when they protested against interference with the affairs of autonomous cities in the days of Hippias. They had important interests to guard on the coasts of Epeiros,¹ Makedonia and Thrace; and they were fully aware that their own navy in point of efficiency remained where it had been two generations ago, while the Athenians had by long experience attained a skill in naval war which no Peloponnesian state had yet put to the test of experience. The dread of such an ordeal averted for a time the inevitable conflict: but unhappily this fear was at length overpowered by feelings which left little room for the exercise of sober reason. We have seen some results of oligarchical intrigues amongst the Athenian allies in the East: we have now, as the scene shifts to Western Hellas, to follow the actions of states which exhibit the worst features of the Greek character. The tradition which asserted that the first sea-fight among Greeks was a battle between the Corinthians and their colonists of Korkyra forecasts exactly the relations of these two great maritime states. The fierce hatred which divided them may have sprung from jealousies of trade;² but it certainly cannot be traced to any deep political convictions. The city of Epidamnos had been founded by settlers from Korkyra: but even hatred for the mother city could not embolden them to dispense with the rule which compelled them to go to her for the Oikistes or leader of the colony. Corinth had thus certain parental rights over the Epeirotic city; but Corinth was now ruled by an oligarchy, while the Demos was supreme at Korkyra. Whether the constitution of Korkyra had undergone a change since the foundation of the colony, we know not; but if the Korkyraian oligarchy had been put down before that time, then either the oligarchic families of the island welcomed the opportunity of finding a more congenial home elsewhere, or colonists belonging to the demos in Korkyra became an oligarchy in their new abode. With a people notorious for their political immorality there is in this nothing surprising. Certain it is that the demos of Epidamnos could point to no evidences of kinship with the demos of Korkyra; and thus it may have grown up from a concourse of aliens from many lands. At first the colony seems to have been prosperous; but some defeats sustained in a struggle with their barbarous neighbors the Taulantians broke the strength of the oligarchic faction, and the demos rising to power drove many of

The quarrel
between
Corinth
and Kor-
kyra.

¹ See p. 61.

² See p. 61.

their opponents into banishment. These exiles took their revenge by allying themselves with the Taulantians and ravaging the lands of the rival faction. The mischief done was so great that the Epidamnian demos sent ambassadors to Korkyra to beg for aid in their distress. But they could point to no tombs of common ancestors; and their prayer was contemptuously rejected. To remain without help was to be ruined: and the question put to the Delphian god whether in this strait they might betake themselves to the Corinthians drew forth his distinct permission. A Corinthian army marched by land to Apollonia, to avoid the risk of an encounter with the Korkyraian fleet, and thence made its way to Epidamnus. In great wrath the Korkyraians sailed thither with a fleet of five-and-twenty ships, and by a message couched in terms of studied insult insisted on ingress for themselves as well as on the expulsion of the Corinthian garrison. On the refusal of the Epidamnians the Korkyraians prepared to blockade the isthmus on which the city was built, at the same time sending word that any Epidamnians or strangers who might wish to leave the place should be suffered to depart in peace, but that all who remained should be treated as enemies. The Corinthians by way of retaliation invited a fresh emigration to Epidamnus, and a fleet of 40 Corinthian ships with 3,000 hoplites, supported by 38 ships of their allies, made ready to convey or escort the new colonists to their homes. To avert the storm gathering over their heads, the Korkyraians now sent envoys to Corinth, insisting on the withdrawal of the Corinthian garrison from Epidamnus and expressing their willingness to submit matters to arbitration. To the reply of the Corinthians that they could not even debate the point unless the siege of Epidamnus were first raised, the Korkyraians answered that the siege should be raised if the Corinthians would themselves quit the place, or that, failing this, they would leave matters as they were on both sides, a truce being entered into until the arbiters should decide whether Epidamnus should belong to Corinth or Korkyra. However unprincipled the conduct of the Korkyraians may have been, they had now, technically at least, put themselves in the right: and the Corinthians were without excuse in the declaration of war by which they replied to these proposals. Their armament had already reached Aktion¹ when a Korkyraian herald, sent in a small skiff, forbade them to advance further. This command was, of course, unheeded; and the Korkyraian fleet of eighty ships, advancing to the encounter, put the enemy to flight with the loss of fifteen vessels. The retreat of the Corinthian fleet had left the Korkyraians masters of the sea; and these now took their revenge

¹ See p. 61.

by ravaging the Corinthian colony of Leukas and burning Kyllene, the port and dock of the Eleians who had taken part in the recent expedition. Two years had passed away without any decisive or important operations, when they found that the Corinthians had enlisted as mercenaries a large number of seamen from cities belonging to the Athenian confederacy. The gathering of a force which must crush them could be arrested only by an alliance with Athens; and there accordingly Korkyraian envoys appeared to plead the cause, not of justice or truth, but of expediency and self-interest. But the Corinthians had been well informed of what was going on, and their ambassadors also hastened to Athens in the hope of turning the scale against their enemies.

The quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra was no work of the Athenians; nor can these be blamed if, on resolving to act at all, they resolved to act wholly with regard to their own interests. Korkyra, again, was free to take such measures as the instinct of self-preservation might suggest: and to the credit of her envoys it must be admitted, that their speech, if the historian faithfully gives its substance, is confined solely to the principles of commercial exchange. To any gratitude for benefits done to the Athenians they could lay no claim. They had carefully kept out of the way when their fleet was sorely wanted at Salamis;¹ and since the flight of Xerxes they had not less carefully avoided all alliances. The result of this policy, they admitted, was not pleasant. They had drawn down on themselves the full power of the Corinthians and their allies aided by a large force enlisted in cities belonging to the Athenian dominion; and with these enemies they were wholly unable to cope single-handed. On the other hand, the Athenians would do well to seize the opportunity of alliance with a state whose navy, second only to that of Athens, would otherwise, in the immediately impending war, be found in the ranks of their enemies.

In their reply the Corinthians naturally tried to blacken their enemies and to whitewash themselves. In the latter task they achieved at best a very partial success. By rejecting arbitration under conditions which were undoubtedly fair they had put themselves in the wrong; and to get rid of this difficulty they could only resort to hair-splitting. The arbitration, they urged, was proposed too late; it should have been offered before the Korkyraian blockade of Epidamnos was begun. This plea might have been reasonable if arbitration were a means for preventing the commission of wrongs rather than of

435-433 B.C.

433 B.C.

Proposals for an alliance between Korkyra and Athens.

Counter-arguments of the Corinthians.

¹ See p. 177.

redressing them when committed. With more of truth they painted the Korkyraians as men who had kept aloof from all association with other Hellenic states because their geographical position favored the course of piracy and plunder which was most congenial to them. Ungrateful as colonists, and treacherous in their friendships, they were now tempting the Athenians to a direct breach of the Thirty Years' Truce, the terms of which were never intended to include the case of states who sought admission into one confederacy for the deliberate purpose of injuring a city belonging to the other. To their own conduct, as showing a friendly spirit to Athens, they appealed without fear. They had aided the Athenians in their war with Aigina.¹ They might have turned the scale in favor of the revolted Samians. They had not only refused to do this, but had grounded their refusal on the broad principle that there ought to be no interference between an imperial city and her free or subject allies; and all that they demanded now was that this principle should be observed by the Athenians in their turn.

Such was the great question submitted to the general assembly of Athenian citizens who, for two days, debated a point which modern custom reserves for the decision of the sovereign or the executive government. Their decision was determined by Perikles who saw as clearly as the Korkyraians that the great struggle with Sparta could not now be very far off. But although Korkyra became the ally of Athens, the force sent to her aid was confined to the small number of ten ships, for the express purpose of making it clear to the Corinthians that no aggressive measures were intended; and the generals received precise instructions to remain strictly neutral unless the Corinthians should attempt to effect a landing either on Korkyra or on any Korkyraian settlements.

The Corinthians lost no time in bringing the quarrel to an issue. With a fleet of 150 ships, of which 60 were furnished by their allies, they sailed to the harbor of Cheimerion near the lake through which the river Acheron finds its way into the sea about thirty miles to the east of the southernmost promontory of Korkyra. The conflict which ensued exhibited a scene of confusion which the Athenian seamen probably regarded with infinite contempt. After a hard struggle the Korkyraians routed the right wing of the enemy's fleet, and chasing it to its camp on shore, lost time in plundering it and burning the tents. For this folly they paid a terrible price. The remainder of the Korkyraian fleet, borne down

Defensive
alliance
between
Athens and
Korkyra.

432 B.C.

Battle be-
tween the
Corinthian
and Korky-
raian fleets
off the island
of Sybota.

¹ Herod. vi. 89.

by sheer force of numbers, was put to flight, and probably saved from utter ruin only by the open interference of the Athenians, who now dashed into the fight without scruple, and came into direct conflict with the Corinthians. The latter were now resolved to press their advantage to the utmost. Sailing through the enemy's ships, they applied themselves to the task not of taking prizes, but of indiscriminate slaughter, to which not a few of their own people fell victims. After this work of destruction, they conveyed their disabled ships with their dead to Sybota, and, still unwearied, advanced again to the attack, although it was now late in the day. Their Paian, or battle cry, had already rung through the air, when they suddenly backed water. Twenty Athenian ships had come into sight, and the Corinthians, supposing them to be only the vanguard of a larger force, hastily retreated. The Korkyraians, ignorant of the cause of this movement, marvelled at their departure: but the darkness was now closing in, and they also withdrew to their own ground. So ended the greatest sea-fight in which Hellenes had thus far contended not with barbarians but with their own kinsfolk.¹ On the following day the Korkyraians sailed to Sybota with such of their ships as were still fit for service, supported by the thirty Athenian ships. But the Corinthians, far from wishing to come to blows with the new-comers, were anxious rather for their own safety. Concluding that the Athenians now regarded the Thirty Years' Truce as broken, they were afraid of being forcibly hindered by them in their homeward voyage. It became necessary therefore to learn what they meant to do. The answer of the Athenians was plain and decisive. They did not mean to break the truce, and the Corinthians might go where they pleased, so long as they did not go to Korkyra or to any city or settlement belonging to her. This declaration implied that the Corinthians were free to return home unmolested; and they were not slow to avail themselves of the permission. For the present the conflict was at an end; but it was to be followed by terrible consequences at a later time. Upwards of a thousand prisoners had fallen into the hands of the Corinthians. Of these 250 were conveyed to Corinth, and treated with the greatest kindness and care. Like the Athenians, the Corinthians were acting only from a regard to their own interests. Their object was to send these prisoners back to Korkyra, nominally under pledge to pay a heavy ransom for their freedom, but having really covenanted to put down the Demos, and thus to insure the hearty alliance of Korkyra with Corinth. These men returned home to stir up the most savage seditions that ever disgraced an Hellenic city.

From this time the Corinthians regarded the Peloponnesian

¹ Thuc. i. 50, 2.

truce with Athens as virtually at an end. At Korkyra their schemes had failed ; but they might strike perhaps a still heavier blow at her dominion elsewhere. The Corinthian town of Potidaia,¹ although now a tributary ally of Athens, had still some connexion with the mother city, and the Makedonian Perdikkas was courting the friendship of Corinth in order to bring about the revolt of this city, while he stirred up the Spartans to an invasion of Attica in order to keep the Athenians busied at home, and strove to sow the seeds of revolt among the Hellenic cities generally on the northern shores of the Egean. To

foil these plots, a fleet was sent from Athens with orders to insist on obedience to commands by which the Potidaians had been already ordered to pull down their seaward walls and to give hostages for their good behavior. An embassy was at once sent from Potidaia to Athens. At Athens, of course, they failed. From the Spartans they received a positive promise that any attack made on Potidaia should be followed by an immediate invasion of Attica ; and thus for the third time Sparta either pledged herself to break the truce with Athens or showed her readiness to do so.² This pledge was followed by the immediate revolt not only of Potidaia, but of the Chalkidians and Bottiaians. Against this combined revolt the Athenian commanders felt that until reinforcements should reach them they could do little ; but their resolution to transfer the war to Makedonia involved the imprudence of leaving Potidaia unguarded. Nor did the Corinthians fail to seize the opportunity of throwing into it a powerful force under the command of Aristeus, the son of Adeimantos,³ a man especially popular with the Potidaians. Some little time afterwards, the arrival of Phormion with fresh troops from Athens supplied the force which was needed for the complete investment of the place ; and Aristeus saw at once that the safety of Potidaia could be insured only by the departure of all who were not absolutely needed for its defence. His proposal to remain himself with the 500 chosen for this service was set aside ; and watching his opportunity, he succeeded in making his escape from the harbor. This lessening of their numbers enabled the

Potidaians to stand out for two years ; and before its fall Athens and Sparta had begun the fatal war which was to end in the ruin of the great imperial city.

¹ See p. 64.

² We do not know what Sparta did in the congress summoned to consider the application of the Samians, p. 260 ; but in all likelihood the opposition of the Corinthians made any decision on her part superfluous, and the mere summoning

of the congress is sufficient proof of her disposition in the matter. To the Thasians they made a distinct promise of help, which the Helot war prevented them from fulfilling. See p. 248.

³ Probably the doughty Adeimantos of the days of Themistokles.

In truth, men's minds were becoming exasperated on both sides. The Corinthians, far from interfering between Sparta and Athens, as they had done before the Korkyraian troubles, were now doing all that they could to hurry the Spartans into war; and the Megarians were smarting under the chastisement inflicted by the Athenians on enemies who had once been friends. Runaway slaves from Athens found, it was said, an asylum at Megara: and the Megarians had dared to till the pasture land which was sacred to the Eleusinian goddesses, and which formed also a common or neutral ground between the two states. For these offences a decree was passed excluding the Megarians from all Athenian ports; and so keenly was this prohibition felt by them that they insisted upon it at Sparta as a direct breach of the truce. But although in this matter Athens may have shown not much of forbearance or generosity, she had done nothing which she had not a full right to do. Sparta banished strangers summarily at her will; and the morality of the ancient world had not reached a stage in which it could fairly profess to be shocked by acts not in accordance with modern theories of free trade. Nor can it with any justice be said that Athens had done any wrong to the Peloponnesian confederacy in any of the other matters laid to her charge. The quarrel between Korkyra and Corinth was a quarrel between two single cities, and affected the Spartan league by the mere accident that Corinth happened to belong to it; and whether by the terms of the truce or by the international morality of the time, Athens was justified in making a strictly defensive alliance with a state not included in the Spartan confederacy. On the other hand, by bringing about the revolt of Potidaia the Corinthians had done to Athens a wrong which came directly within the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce. They had interfered between her and a city which had been included in the Athenian alliance, and had striven to detach from her the other allied cities on the northern shores of the Egean. In other words, they had made a deliberate effort to break up the Athenian empire; and thus in the council summoned by the Spartans for the purpose of ascertaining the grievances of their allies, they could only slur over the injustice done by themselves and misrepresent the conduct of the Athenians. This they did in one short sentence which affirmed that the Athenians had seized Korkyra for the sake of its fleet, and were holding it by force, while they had blockaded Potidaia as being a most useful station for their dealings with the Thrace-ward settlements. The statement clearly implied that in both cases the action came from the Athenians, and that Potidaia

in particular had done nothing to provoke the blockade. The rest of their speech resolves itself into a series of pictures vigorously contrasting Athenian energy, versatility, and foresight with Spartan dilatoriness, obstinacy, and stupid self-complacency. It painted in strong colors the courage of a people whom no defeats could render submissive, and who, while they looked on their high mental powers as endowments to be used in the interests of their country, regarded their bodies as things to be flung away, if need be, in her service. Unwearied in enterprises from which they felt sure of reaping substantial fruits, they could afford to look with contempt on the laborious idleness of the Spartans ; and thus they fulfilled the purpose of their birth by never resting themselves or leaving their neighbors at peace. Whatever might be the truth of the picture thus drawn, the speech, so far as the existing truce was concerned, was invective, not argument. Hence the Athenian envoys, who happened to be present on some other errand, having received permission to speak, pointedly disclaimed the intention of defending Athens against the accusations of the Corinthians, and addressed themselves to the task of explaining her real position and the motives of her policy. Passing briefly in review the history of the last sixty years, they asserted that in the invasions whether of Datis or of Xerxes the safety of Hellas had been mainly insured by the resolution and energy of Athens, and that the flight of the Persian king immediately after the fight at Salamis showed the wisdom of hazarding everything on the issue of a battle by sea. But they reminded the Spartans that after Salamis, Plataiai and Mykalè, there was still much work to be done, and that they had deliberately declined the task which the Asiatic Hellenes had of their own free will besought the Athenians to undertake. They bade them remember that great schemes begun in pure self-defence cannot always be laid aside when their immediate purpose has been attained. But they insisted more particularly that, although the states belonging to the Athenian alliance must feel in greater or less degree the pressure of a common burden, yet the solid benefits secured to them far outweighed this annoyance. It was, of course, true that the allies had been constrained to sacrifice in some measure their independence. This was inevitable if the confederation was to be preserved at all. The subjects of Athens might chafe now at the slight constraint imposed on them as her allies : but the yoke was light indeed in comparison of that which they had borne as subjects of the Persian king, or of that which would be laid upon them, if Sparta should succeed in ruining her rival. They would then feel how vast was the difference between the system which allowed to all the allies whether against each other or against their rulers an appeal to a common law, and a

system which, like that of Sparta, placed every city under the iron rule of an autocratic oligarchy.

This speech, it must be admitted, stands out in striking contrast with the malignant sophistry of the Corinthians. But if we may take these speeches as fairly representing what was actually said in this open debate, we must feel greater hesitation in accepting the speeches which follow as a

Secret debate of the Spartans.

substantially correct report of the secret council from which not merely all strangers but even the allies were excluded. In any case the fact would become known that Archidamos had earnestly deprecated the course on which the Corinthians had set their hearts; and the arguments by which he sought to postpone, if not to avert the struggle, were those which would be used by a man whose political life began about the time when Themistokles was ostracised, and who had not allowed the military conceit of his countrymen to blind his eyes to the real state and tendency of things. Without noticing the accusations and arguments of the Corinthians, this wise and sober-minded prince is said to have placed side by side the strong and the weak points in the system and resources of Sparta. In ships, in money, in population and extent of empire, she was no match for her great rival; and the preparation which might place her on a level with Athens must be a work of time. Unless her maritime empire could be put down, it would be mere folly to look for the speedy ending of a war which in all likelihood they would leave as a legacy to their children. Prudence, therefore, would dictate delay until they could begin the struggle with a reasonable hope of soon winning the victory. In the meanwhile, the Athenians had offered to submit all disputes to arbitration; and to that tribunal it would be wise for the present to leave the issue. The effect of this wholesome advice, if the account of the historian may be trusted, was at once neutralised by a speech of the ephor Sthenelaidas, who did his best to hound on his countrymen to take a leap in the dark. Sneering at the Athenians as praisers of themselves, he charged them with making no defence against the charges of wrongs done to the Peloponnesian confederacy, although he knew that these were topics on which the envoys who were present on other business had no authority to enter. It was no part of his purpose to suggest that it might be well to learn what the Athenian people had to say in the matter. Assuming that the wrongs had been committed, he insisted that the good behavior of the Athenians during the Persian wars was only a reason for visiting their recent iniquities with double chastisement. It was for wrongdoers to consider beforehand the effect of the crimes which they intended to commit: it was for the Spartans to decree without further thought a war in which the

gods would defend the right. This doughty speech was followed by the cries of Aye and No by which, like the English House of Commons, the Spartans pronounced their decision on the questions submitted to them. Feeling or affecting inability to determine whether the Ayes or Noes had it, Sthenelaidas ordered a division. Possibly some who had cried out in the negative did not care to be known personally as opposing the popular sentiment; and a large majority went over to the side of the chamber assigned to those who approved of war.

Sthenelaidas had turned the scale in favor of war, and it now became competent for the allies to say whether they would have war or not. The debates in this synod seem to have been protracted; but Thucydides takes no notice of any speech except that of the Corinthians, beyond saying that the greater part were for war. The speech of the Corinthians was intended to encourage them with convenient hopes and to quicken their energies by wholesome terrors. The Delphian god had promised that if they went to war vigorously they would be conquerors, and that he himself would aid them with all his might;¹ and lastly, they had a sacred mission to fulfil, nothing less, namely, than the liberation of Hellas from an all-embracing despotism. It was needless to say more. The spirit and the fears of the representatives had been excited to the necessary point; and the decree of the Spartan assembly was accepted by a large majority.

But neither the Spartans nor their allies were yet ready to go to war; and the time during which they were making ready for the struggle was further occupied in efforts to introduce disunion in the Athenian councils, and, if possible, to deprive them of their master-spirit, Perikles. No formal declaration of war had been yet sent to Athens. Indeed, it was never sent at all; but the Athenians must have been more or less fully informed of what had taken place at the last congress in Sparta, when the first blow was struck against the ascendancy of the great Athenian leader. Perikles was an Alkmaionid; and the curse of Kylon, as the Spartans chose to say, still clave to that illustrious family.² This curse they now called on the Athenians to drive out: in other words, Perikles must be banished. The demand was met by the rejoinder that the Spartans must first drive out the curse which brooded over Tainaron for the murder of some Helots torn from the sanctuary of Po-

¹ Thucydides, i. 118, 4, carefully guards himself against the conclusion that this answer was delivered at all. If it was given, it was not

the first instance of a response extorted by political influence or bribery. See p. 86.

² See p. 92.

seidon, and more especially the curse which rested on them for the removal of Pausanias from the Brazen House of Athênê.¹ A second embassy insisted that the Athenians should raise the blockade of Potidaia, leave Aigina independent, and withdraw the decree of exclusion passed against the Megarians. To the last of these three requests the Athenians replied by specifying the grounds on which the Megarians had been thus punished; the other two they peremptorily refused. A third embassy demanded briefly the autonomy of all Hellenes now included in the Athenian confederacy: and on the receipt of this sweeping demand, to which was added the expression of a wish on the part of the Spartans for the maintenance of peace on this one indispensable condition, a general assembly was convened for the final reconsideration of the whole question. The issue of the debate was determined by Perikles. He simply expressed his unshaken conviction that the withdrawal of the decree against the Megarians would not have the slightest effect on the controversy, far less, as some supposed, that it would remove all risk of war. Sparta was at best no more than the equal of Athens, and the concession of even the slightest demand from an equal not on the score of justice but at his arbitrary fiat involved a subjection as complete as if they surrendered everything at once.² But although he sought to encourage a confident and even a fearless temper, Perikles was to the last careful that no provocation should come from Athens; and by his advice an answer was given to the Spartan demands as moderate as it was dignified. The Athenians were as fully justified by Hellenic interpolitical law in excluding the Megarians from their ports, as were the Spartans in intrusting to the ephors the power of driving all strangers from Sparta at their will without assigning any reason for their decrees. If they would give up these Xenelasiai or expulsions of strangers, the decree against the Megarians should be withdrawn. The allies of Athens should also be left wholly free or autonomous, if they were in this condition at the time when the Thirty Years' Truce was made, and also if the Spartans would leave to their own allies generally the power of settling their internal affairs after their own inclinations; and lastly, Athens was as ready now, as she had ever been, to refer the whole dispute to the judgment of arbiters approved by both the cities.

In the conduct of Perikles at this decisive crisis it is difficult to determine whether we should admire most the determined energy with which he prepared to meet a conflict assuredly terrible in its course even if it should be happy in its issue, or the generous and unselfish patriotism which could stir him to efforts thus sus-

Prosecutions of Anaxagoras, Pheidias, and Aspasia.

¹ See p. 238.

² See p. 253.

³ Thuc. i. 141, 1.

tained in spite of personal wrongs not easily to be forgotten. His own integrity was beyond attack;¹ but he might be assailed through those whom he honored or loved. Among these friends were the philosopher Anaxagoras, the rhetor Damon, the sculptor Pheidias and the beautiful Hætaïra who became the mother of his son Perikles. The traditions relating to the first of these are so inconsistent that little can be gathered from them beyond the facts of his prosecution and his exile. Nor have we any surer evidence in the case of Pheidias, who on his return from Olympia after finishing his splendid statue of Zeus was thrown into prison on the charge of defrauding the public, and there died before the time of trial came on. In the union of Perikles with Aspasia the comic poets found a fruitful source of slander, which exhibited her as an accomplice of Anaxagoras in undermining the faith of the people. She was put upon her trial, and Perikles defended her with a vehement earnestness which attested the depth of his affection. So far as we may judge from the vague and contradictory statements which have come down to us, the evidence was worth little; and in this instance Perikles was enabled to secure a verdict of acquittal.

When a man who has thus suffered from the attacks of his political antagonists can devote himself to the interests of his country with the single-minded generosity of Perikles, we can understand in some degree the fulness with which Athens satisfied the highest aspirations of her most gifted children. With a man like Perikles we may safely say that she could not have satisfied them, if devotion to her service had involved the sacrifice of truth. We have seen the Corinthians resorting to systematic misrepresentation of facts; we have seen the ephor Sthenelaidas plunging, or blundering, into positive falsehood; but in the case of Athens we can trace no actual wrongs done to the Peloponnesian confederacy, nor can we impute to her the shuffling and disingenuous conduct of her adversaries. Beyond all doubt, she had at no time entertained any desire of reducing Sparta or her confederate

General policy of Athens in reference to the alleged causes of the Peloponnesian war.

¹ Plutarch in his *Life of Perikles* mentions a proposal made by Drakontides that the great statesman should be put upon his trial for embezzlement of public moneys, but he says nothing of the result of the trial or of its taking place at all. If he was brought before the Dikastery, he must have been acquitted; but Thucydides could not have ventured to speak as he has spoken of the incorruptibility of Perikles, if

he knew that such a charge had been brought against him; and the accusation is virtually set at naught by Aristophanes himself, who tells us that Perikles precipitated the war with Sparta in order to escape being put upon his trial, and who also treats the notion that Perikles 'blew up the war' from such personal motives, as mere gossip which must be taken for what it may be worth. *Peace*, 614, 618.

cities to the condition of her own subject allies. Her maritime empire in no way endangered the position of Sparta; nor could it be said that it had either directly or indirectly done her any harm. The real breach of the peace had come not from Athens but from Corinth; and the revolt of Potidaia, stirred up by Corinthians, was a formal violation of the terms of the Thirty Years' Truce. The Athenians might therefore enter on the war with a good conscience; and after the disaster at Sphakteria the Spartans were ready to admit that in the controversy which preceded the outbreak of the strife Athens was in no way to blame.¹ Her strict, perhaps even her fastidious, moderation was shown by the steadiness with which to the last she refrained from doing anything which might be construed as an act of war. Between the gathering of the second Congress at Sparta and the first act of open conflict nine or ten months, perhaps, passed away. During these months Athens might have anticipated matters with her unprepared enemies, and crushed them when they were comparatively powerless. She could not do this without making herself as unjust as her rival; and this she would not do. Sparta had promised repeatedly to aid the enemies of Athens if she could; and one of these promises she made while Athenian citizens were helping her against the revolted Helots.

CHAPTER II.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE SURPRISE OF PLATAIAI TO THE CLOSE OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PERIKLES.

The special danger of Athens lay everywhere in the virulent opposition of the oligarchical factions. Even in Plataiai² which had now for nearly eighty years been in the closest friendship with Athens this party was on the look-out for any means of escaping from the alliance: and Plataiai was little more than eight miles distant from Thebes, the stronghold of that reckless oligarchy which after the fall of Mardonios had deliberately preferred death to the abandonment of the cause of despotism. Such an opportunity these Plataian oligarchs now discovered in a month of festival during which even usual precautions were disregarded;³ and a force of about three hundred Thebans was admitted on a dark and rainy night into

¹ Thuc. iv. 21; vii. 18.
12*

² See p. 93.

³ Thuc. iii. 56.

Plataiai. The citizens were asleep, and the invaders encountered no resistance on their way to the Agora, where they grounded their arms and by the proclamation of a herald invited the Plataians to arm themselves and take their stand by the side of their ancient allies according to the good old Boiotian customs. Roused from their slumbers to learn that an armed force was in possession of their city, and thinking that all opposition would be useless, the chief Plataian citizens accepted these terms, or in other words renounced the alliance of Athens. But the course of the negotiation showed the scanty numbers of the assailants; and the Plataian demos, loathing the convention which had been made, set to work to barricade with waggons their narrow and crooked streets and then by piercing the internal walls of their houses to provide the means of combined action without rousing the suspicions of the Thebans. The town was wrapped in that blackest darkness which goes immediately before the dawn, when the Plataians burst upon them. The Thebans resisted stoutly, and even gained some small advantage over their enemy; but showers of stones and tiles hurled on them from the roofs by screaming women and howling slaves filled them with dismay, and their want of acquaintance with the town left them like a flock of routed sheep. If any made their way to the gate by which they had entered, it was only to find it barred by a javelin pin which closed it as effectually as a nail spikes a gun. Others in their terror rushed to the walls and threw themselves over, mostly to an instant death. Meanwhile the reinforcement which was to support the assailants had been detained on the road partly by the darkness and the rain and still more by the swollen stream of the Asopos, and they arrived before Plataiai only to learn that their scheme had utterly miscarried. Their first impulse was to seize every Plataian found without the walls: but giving them no time for deliberation, the Plataians sent a herald to warn them that if they did any harm to person or property in Plataian territory, the prisoners should be instantly slain, but that, in spite of their shameful breach of the truce, their departure should be followed by the restoration of their countrymen.

On this promise, ratified, as they declared, by a solemn oath, the Thebans returned home. The Plataian version of the story was that they made no positive pact, but merely said that the prisoners should not be killed, until negotiations for a fitting settlement should have failed. The equivocation was contemptible; but the Plataians even thus stand convicted out of their own mouth. They entered into no negotiations; and no sooner had the Theban reinforcement turned their backs on the city, than every man who had been seized within it was put to death. The Plataians had lied on their own showing,

Slaughter of
the Theban
prisoners.

and the flood-gates were opened for that exasperated warfare which was, it might almost be said, to leave Hellas little rest so long as it continued to have any history at all.

One messenger had been sent to Athens when the Thebans entered the town. Another had followed when the surprise had failed and the surviving Thebans had been made prisoners. On receiving these tidings the Athenians at once issued orders for seizing all Boiotians found in Attica, and sent a herald to the Plataians begging them to do nothing with their prisoners until they could well consider the matter with their old allies. Perikles, it cannot be doubted, saw at once that these prisoners furnished a hold on Thebes and through Thebes on Sparta which was worth far more than their weight in gold. The Athenian messenger reached Plataiai only to find that the Plataians had thrown away a splendid opportunity to satisfy a savage rage. The mischief could not be undone; and the Athenians, taking away all Plataians unfit for military service together with the women and children, left the town provisioned simply as a fortified post.

The die was now cast: and both sides prepared vigorously for the conflict. Not content with their Hellenic allies, the Spartans did not shrink from inviting the aid even of the Persian king. So thoroughly had the self-sacrificing energy of Athens during the Persian wars failed to make any permanent impression on the Greek mind, that a feeling of regret may almost be pardoned for the refusal of the Athenians to accept the proffered alliance of Mardonios. But in this step of the Spartans we have at the least further evidence of the selfishness and the lack of patriotism which characterise the rule of oligarchical bodies. Had Athens chosen, she might long ago have enslaved the whole Hellenic world; but her warfare was not with the constitutions of individual states, but against a common enemy, and she could not do that which Spartans felt that they might do without shame.

On both sides it was a time of fierce excitement. The Corinthians at least had shown that they were acting from the impulse of an unreasoning fury; and at Athens a large population had grown up which knew nothing of warfare and carried on at their own doors. But the historian admits that the general feeling of the Hellenic states ran against Athens. The mere desire for change made them willing victims of Spartan claptrap, and led them to indulge in golden visions of the time when Hellas should be really free, in other words, should find itself under the paternal rule of Eupatrid oligarchs. At the outset, the Spartan alliance included all the Peloponnesian states,

except the neutral Argives and Achaïans, Pellênê being the only Achaïan city which joined them at first. Among their allies beyond the isthmus were the Megarians, Phokians, Lokrians, Boiotians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians and Anaktorians. The Athenians could reckon on hearty co-operation from the Korkyraians and the Helots of Naupaktos;¹ but Plataiai was now rather a burden than a help. The efforts of Athens against Peloponnesos would be seconded further by the Akarnanians and Zakynthians. But her main strength lay in the great body of allies which had formed the Delian confederacy. Of these the Chians and Lesbians were still free; but Samos had since her revolt been reduced to the ranks of those which were merely tributary, her fleet having been forfeited to Athens.² Kypros (Cyprus) had been abandoned to the Persians by the convention of Kallias;³ but over the Karians, Dorians, and Ionians of the Asiatic coast, and over all the Egean islands to the north of Krete, except Melos and Thera, Athens was still supreme.

At length a force consisting of two-thirds of the contingents demanded from the Peloponnesian allies was gathered at the isthmus; and Archidamos in a short speech sought to moderate the high-wrought expectation of the men who served in it. He was leading them forward, he said, in the firm conviction that they would meet with a terrible resistance in the open field, for, if he knew the Athenians at all, they were not men who would look on tamely while their highly cultivated lands were being turned into a desert. His general estimate of Athenian valor and perseverance was right: in this particular anticipation he was wrong. But it needed all the influence of Perikles, supported by the most impassioned eloquence, to falsify the hopes or the fears of the Spartan king. It had been his great effort to induce the Athenians to adopt the one settled plan, the old plan of Themistokles, of resisting the enemy by sea, and leaving him to do much as he might choose on land. By bringing within the Long Walls which joined Athens with Peiraieus and Phaleron their women, their children, their movable goods, and even the wooden framework of their farmhouses, and by sending away their beasts and cattle to Euboa and the neighboring islands,⁴ they might weary out any enemy. But in spite of all grounds for confidence it was with a heavy heart that the dwellers in the country broke up their pleasant homes. Fifty years before, their farms had been left desolate by the Persians; since that time, their skill and energy had again converted them into a garden such as could be seen perhaps nowhere else. These

¹ See p. 249.

² See p. 260.

³ See p. 252.

⁴ Thuc. ii. 14.

must now be left to the mercies of enemies more unpitiful than even Persians, while they sought a shelter in the houses of friends within the city, if they were lucky enough to have any, or in vacant spaces within the walls as well as in the temples and shrines of the heroes, except only in those which, like the Akropolis and the Eleusinion with a few others, were carefully guarded from all profanation.

This mournful and irksome task was not yet finished, perhaps it was not far advanced, when Archidamos made a last effort to avert war by dispatching to Athens a herald who by the advice of Perikles was sent back without an audience, under strict orders to be beyond the Attic border before sundown, and attended by an escort of men who were to see that he spoke to no one by the way. The return of the herald convinced Archidamos that nothing further could be looked for from negotiation; and he at once advanced to Oinoë near the little stream of Kephisos and beneath the great mass of Kithairon. This place, as being on the border, had been strongly fortified; and Archidamos spent many days before it in vain attempts to carry it by assault. Eighty days had passed from the night attack on Plataiai, and the corn was fully ripe, when Archidamos led his men on to ravage Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. Close to Eleusis lie the lakes called Rheitoi through which some streams of salt water find their way to the sea. Here, hard by the Sacred Road which ran at the head of the lakes, the first conflict of this war on Athenian soil ended in the defeat of a small body of Athenian horsemen sent out to check them. Archidamos now moved northwards, and at once put to the test the endurance of the Acharnians, the sturdiest and most excitable of the Athenian Demoi;¹ and the Spartan king felt assured that a demos which furnished 3,000 hoplites would never remain passively within the walls of Athens while their luxuriant fields were being made a desert. They did so remain, but only at the cost of a terrible struggle which taxed the influence and the powers of Perikles to the utmost. The city was in a state of fierce tumult. For the moment the sceptre seemed to have fallen from his hands, and he became to them the cause of all the evils which had befallen them. Still Perikles would not swerve from the course which he had marked out for himself. His office as Strategos gave him, it seems, the power of prohibiting the assemblies of the people which in times of peace were convened by the Prytaneis of the Probouleutic Council;² and he hesitated not to avail himself of it. But

¹ According to Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 180, the Acharnians are men made of ilex and maple,—tough as oak. ² See p. 89.

the time at length came when Perikles could furnish elsewhere an outlet for the pent-up energies of his countrymen. The Spartans were moving to the coast-land of Oropos, when an Athenian fleet of a hundred ships sailed from Athens to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesos. Joined by 50 Korkyraian vessels, the Athenians, having reached Methônê on the southwesternmost promontory of Messênê, landed in order to carry the place by storm. Not only were the walls weak, but men were lacking to guard them; and the town must speedily have been captured, had not Brasidas, who held a Spartan outpost in the neighborhood, dashed through the Athenian force and with some little loss to his men thrown himself into the city. The Athenians were scattered carelessly about the place, not looking for such sudden and impetuous movement; but the promptitude now displayed by this young officer was an earnest of military exploits such as no other Spartan general ever equalled. Of men like Leonidas and Archidamos there had never been any lack; Brasidas was perhaps the first Spartan in whom a rigid discipline had sharpened instead of repressing genius of no mean order.

But the Athenians were bent on doing sterner work before the summer should draw to its close. Aigina had long been called the eyesore of Peiraiæus; and so long as its old people were suffered to dwell in it, it would remain an eyesore still. The decree went forth for their banishment; and the wretched inhabitants, powerless after the forfeiture of their fleet and the dismantling of their walls, were cast out upon the Peloponnesian coast, to find such refuge as the Spartans might give them in gratitude for their help in the war which had ended in the settlement of the Helots at Naupaktos. This refuge some of them found in Thyrea; and thus it came to pass that the Spartans had a bitterly hostile population at the mouth of the Corinthian gulf, and the Athenians a population not less resentful on the march lands of Lakonia and Argolis. Lastly, their hand fell without compunction on the Megarians who had done so much first to help and then to thwart them. The work of devastation had already begun, when the fleet which was on its homeward voyage from the Corinthian gulf effected a junction with the land army, and thus exhibited the largest Athenian force ever brought together before the outburst of the terrible plague which saddened the last years of the life of Perikles.

It was now obvious that a struggle had begun which might bring either side to desperate straits before it came to an end. Hence the Athenians determined not only to take effectual measures for guarding Attica by land and sea, but to put aside a large reserve fund not to be touched before they found themselves face to face with a supreme

The expulsion of the Aiginetans.

Measures for the safety of Attica and Athens.

necessity. The form under which they chose to set apart this fund of 1,000 talents in the Akropolis was a solemn sentence that any citizen, asking a vote to dispose of this money for any other purpose than that of resisting a maritime attack by the enemy on the Peiræus itself should be punished with instant death. Much pains have been spent in the effort to convict the Athenians of barbarism for so much as thinking of such a measure. To this charge we have a sufficient answer in the fact that it was a mere form and that it was known to be nothing more. Probably of those who passed the decree there was not a man who dreamed that a day would come when Spartan ships should be anchored, except as prizes, in the Peiræus; and certainly none was ignorant that if anyone should at any time wish to divert the fund to other uses, he had nothing more to do than to propose the repeal of the existing Psephisma, or decree. In the meanwhile the effect of the anathema, even though confessedly it could not be carried out, would be to mark with the strongest condemnation of the state anyone who might even dream of using the money except as a resource in the last resort for the salvation of the city. The act was one not of barbarism, but of the clearest foresight and of the most judicious adjustment of means to ends.

But there were other dangers to be provided against on the Thracian and Chalkidian shores. Perdikkas was still the enemy of Athens because Philip and Derdas were her friends; and Potidaia still held out obstinately. Hence the Athenians embraced eagerly an opportunity for securing the alliance of the powerful Odrysian chief Sitalkes, which now offered itself through a citizen of Abdera named Nymphodoros, who pledged himself to use his utmost influence with the Thracians so as to bring the Chalkidian war to an immediate end. He succeeded so far as to bring back Perdikkas to the alliance of Athens and to secure the more trustworthy friendship of Sitalkes.

Alliance of the Athenians with the Thracian chief Sitalkes.

The first year of the fatal struggle between Athens and Sparta was now drawing towards its end. To the Athenians, apart from the disaster of war itself, it had been a year of no great reverses and no great victories; but some of her citizens had already fallen in the service of their country, and these deserved the honors of a public funeral as much as if they had fallen at Marathon or Salamis. According to the usual custom in times of war the bones¹ of the

Public burial at Athens, and funeral oration of Perikles.

¹ The word *ὀστᾶ*, bones, can scarcely mean more than the residue of bones remaining after burning. No one chest or coffin would con-

tain the whole skeletons of large numbers of men slain in a battle in which the losses were serious.

dead, placed in ten chests, one for each tribe, with one empty bier for those of the slain whose bodies could not be found, were carried in procession to the Kerameikos, the most beautiful suburb of the city; and there in sight of the precipitous rock from which the Virgin Goddess in her gleaming armor seemed to extend her protecting spear over the land, the citizen chosen for the purpose addressed to the assembled throng such words of encouragement and comfort as the time and the circumstances of the mourners seemed to call for. The citizen chosen on this occasion was Perikles: and Perikles determined to speak to them as he would have spoken if they had been fresh from battles as momentous as those of Plataiai and Mykalè. If ever there was a time when the Athenians needed to be reminded of the efforts of their forefathers in order that they might be spurred on to fresh efforts for themselves, that time was the present: and accordingly Perikles passed in rapid review the course by which the Athenians had created their empire, and the results which had been thus far achieved. In all likelihood, as with an eloquence all the more impressive from its lack of rhetorical ornament Perikles drew a picture which almost astonishes us in its splendor, he thought that the children's children of those who now heard him would be able to look back upon a history still more magnificent. But Athens had reached her highest point; and his description, as it would not have been true of the Athens of Themistokles, can be applied with no greater truth to the Athens of Demosthenes. Not eighty years had passed since the tyrant Hippias had departed with his followers into exile: and the reforms of Kleisthenes, although they insured the growth of the commonwealth, did little at first towards breaking the apparent ascendancy of the oligarchical houses. Within the space of fifty years Athens had pushed back the power of Persia beyond the limits of Asiatic Hellas, had raised up against the barbarian the permanent barrier of her maritime empire, and had developed at home a genius in art, in science, and in government such as the world had never seen. Fifty years before, this developement was a thing of the future; but the Athenian people were animated by the nerve and energy which rendered it possible. Fifty years later, the fruits of this developement in the many phases of Athenian civilisation were almost as splendid as ever; but the old spirit of indomitable perseverance was gone. In the age of Perikles alone could the union of the two be found: and thus his funeral oration becomes an invaluable picture of a state of things, realised for a few years, which would in some respects at least be well for us if we could realise now. If the ideal happiness of man is to be found in a polity which with a strict enforcement of the laws gives the fullest scope to the tastes, fancies, and peculiarities

of each citizen, then, unless the historian has wholly misrepresented the orator, Athens in the days of Perikles approached nearer to this ideal than we approach it now; and we can well understand the high-strung enthusiasm which the speaker unquestionably felt, and which most of his hearers probably shared with him, as he dwelt on the real freedom and splendid privileges of Athenian citizens. If it was worth while to die for such a state, the sacrifice was altogether more costly than that of the Spartan who gave up nothing more than the dull monotony of a monastic barrack, and who knew nothing of the larger sympathies and wider aims developed by the extended empire and trade of a power like Athens. Perikles therefore might well rise to a strain of enthusiasm when, after his sketch of their political and social life, he addressed himself to those who were mourning for brothers and kinsfolk fallen in battle. These had shown themselves worthy of the men by whose efforts the fabric of Athenian empire had been reared, and had left to their survivors the task of following their example, or, if age had ended their active life, a memory full of quiet and lasting consolation.

With this picture of Athens assailed by vehement enemies, and confronting them with the sober resolution arising from the consciousness of a substantially righteous cause, the history of the first year in this momentous struggle comes to an end. The plague at Athens. 430 B.C. The narrative of the second year opens with the story of disasters utterly unlooked for, and of miseries after which Athens was never to be again quite what she had been before. Immediately after the vernal equinox the Spartan army again appeared in Attica, and after ravaging the Eleusinian plain passed on to the Paralian or southeastern portion of the land as far as the silver mines of Laureion. But they had not been many days in the land when they learnt that their enemies were being smitten by a power more terrible than their own. For some time, we are not told how long, a strange disease had been stalking westwards from its starting-post in Nubia or Ethiopia. It had worked its way through Egypt and Libya; it had ranged over a great part of the Persian empire, and now just as the summer heats were coming on, it broke out with sudden and awful fury in the Peiraieus. In the general state of the city there was little to check, and everything to feed it. The houses in Athens itself were filled with country folk to whom their owners had given hospitality; and in the empty spaces within the walls a vast population was crowded with no shelter beyond tents and stifling huts. Happily the cattle and horses belonging to the country estates had been removed not to Athens but to Eubœia. Had they been brought into the city, the

¹ Thuc. ii. 17, 1.

triumph of the Peloponnesians might have been assured in six months. Thus far their efforts had been rewarded by no substantial results ; but the Athenians had now to cope with a foe against which skill and courage furnished no protection. The physicians hastened to the aid of the sufferers : and they were the first to fall victims to the plague. Friends and kinsfolk who tended the suffering caught and carried about the contagion, until all learnt to accept as their death-warrant the first sensations of sickness. Then followed scenes such as no Hellenic city had ever witnessed before. In the crowded space between the walls lay men, women, and children, some in a state of passive stupor, others racked with the fearful pains which attended the early stages of the disease, others whom an intolerable thirst had fevered into madness. Entangled with the dying and the dead, these wretched sufferers fought their way with frantic vehemence to the rain-water tanks, into which they flung themselves. The dead were indeed to be envied by comparison with the wretched men who survived with memory so effectually destroyed that henceforth they retained no longer the sense of personal identity. In the midst of all this suffering there were not wanting, as there never are wanting, some who carried out with a literal zeal the precept which bade them eat and drink, because on the morrow they should die. It is right, however, to remember that of some of the worst horrors which have attended plagues of modern times we hear nothing during this terrible summer at Athens. At Milan or in London human nature was disgraced by the cruelty which hunted men to death on the groundless suspicion that they had anointed doors and walls or smeared benches in order to spread the pestilence. At Tyre or at Carthage human victims would have been roasted by hundreds in order to appease the angry gods. At Athens some, it is said, thought, when the sickness began, that the Spartans had poisoned the tanks ; but it is not added that the charge was urged against anyone within the city walls. In the midst of all these horrors there was but one alleviation. Those who had recovered from the plague were safe from a second attack ; but we could not be over-severe in our condemnation, if after thus passing through fire and water they had abandoned themselves to an inert selfishness. Far from doing this, they exhibited a noble rivalry in kindly offices ; and unwearied in their tender care for those who were less happy than themselves, they showed that consciousness of good already attained may be a more powerful stimulus to well-doing than the desire of conquering a crushing evil.

For forty days Archidamos with his troops ravaged the soil of Attica ; and although some would have it that he hastened home sooner than he would have done if Athens had been free from

plague, still during the remainder of the war no Spartan army remained in the country so long. But even before he could reach the Paralian land, Perikles had a fleet of one hundred ships made ready for another expedition against the Peloponnesos. Returning to Athens, the men who had thus far served under Perikles and who during their voyage round the Peloponnesos had lost many of their number from the plague were dispatched under Hagnon and Kleopompos to aid in the reduction of Potidaia. The result was disastrous. In spite of all the appliances which even Athenian skill could bring against it, the city still held out, while the infection brought by the troops of Hagnon spread with terrific speed amongst the Athenians who had preceded them in besieging the place. In less than six weeks 1,500 died out of 4,000 hoplites, and Hagnon returned with his crippled force to Athens. Here the old energy which had been ready to encounter the severest hardships and to make the most costly sacrifices seemed to be gone utterly. While envoys were sent to Sparta on a vain errand to sue for peace, the people with vehement outcries laid all their sufferings at the door of Perikles. Whether the disease had already begun to desolate his own home, we cannot say; but if he was at this time bearing the burden of personal grief, his firmness under this outcry becomes more wonderful. Summoning the assembly by the authority which he possessed as general, he met the people with a more direct rebuke of their faint-heartedness and a more distinct assertion of his own services than any to which he had in more prosperous times resorted. In a few pointed sentences he showed them that they were committing themselves to a false issue. It had been beyond their power to avert the war; and as soon as the struggle became inevitable, the safety of the state became by the conditions of ancient warfare the one object to be aimed at, whatever suffering the task might involve for individual citizens. For these defeat or submission meant the loss of freedom, of property, or of life, while victory would give them the means of more than repairing all their losses.¹ To a certain extent he had foreseen this outburst of anger. He knew that the dwellers in the country would be sorely chafed by being compelled to exchange their pleasant homes for a cramped and wretched hut within the city walls: but he had not foreseen the terrible disease whose ravages were worse than those of hostile armies, and he could take no blame for this disaster unless they were ready to give him credit for every piece of unexpected good luck which might befall them during the war.

Depression
of the Athenian
people.

¹ Thuc. ii. 60. Macaulay, *Essays*, i. 47.

The Athenians had listened probably to many embittered harangues against Perikles before he opened his mouth; but neither the arguments of the speakers nor their own feelings of anger could withstand the reasoning of the great statesman. They resolved at once to make no more proposals to the Spartans, and to carry on the war with vigor; but Thucydides adds that his enemies were still powerful enough to induce the people to fine him. Their irritation against him was not long continued. The plague had now laid its hand heavily on his house. His sister and his two sons Xanthippos and Paralos were dead; and his grief when he had to place the funeral wreath on the head of his younger son showed that at length the iron had entered into his soul. There remained still the son of Aspasia who bore his own name; and the people, impressed more than ever by his firmness and his wisdom, not only chose him again as one of their Strategoi, but allowed him, in contravention, it is said, of a law passed by himself,¹ to enroll this surviving child amongst the number of Athenian citizens. Thucydides merely mentions his re-election as Strategos, and adds that he lived for two years and a half after the attack of the Thebans on Plataiai. But his work was now done, and from this time we hear no more of the statesman who more than any other man saw what the capabilities of his countrymen were, and seized the best means for bringing out their best qualities. Thus ended amid dark shadows the life of a man, the key-note of whose policy was the indispensable need of sweeping away all private interests, if these should clash with the interests of Athens in this great struggle. The resources of the state were not to be wasted or risked in enterprises which at best could tend only to the benefit of individuals, and enterprises to which the state was committed were not to be starved or mismanaged in order to further the purposes of factious politicians. Nothing can be more severely simple and emphatic than the few sentences in which Thucydides insists that on these two rocks the Athenians made shipwreck. Perikles had worked for the welfare of Athens and for that alone. Those who came after him were bent on securing each the first place for himself; and the inevitable consequences followed. Their powers and the resources of the city were not concentrated on great tasks which without such concentration could never be

¹ This law restricted Athenian citizenship to the children born of parents who both were Athenians. The law was bad; but it shows the strength of that ancient exclusiveness which thus survived the blows inflicted on it by the reforms of

Solon, Kleisthenes, Ephialtes, and Perikles himself. In short, there could be no remedy for this deep-seated and deadly disease until the notion of Poleis or cities with their interpolitical law, see p. 12, should be displaced for our idea of a nation.

accomplished. The expedition to Sicily ought, according to the policy of Perikles, never to have been undertaken. When once undertaken, it ought to have been carried out manfully. Instead of this the interests of the fleet and army were put out of sight by factious generals at home; and the great catastrophe of Nikias and Demosthenes availed nothing to check these miserable rivalries. But in spite of all this wretchedness Athens held out for nine years longer against the whole confederacy of Sparta, against the determined rebellion of her own allies, against lavish subsidies from Persia to her enemies; and even in these dire straits it is the conviction of the historian that Athens would not have fallen, if her very heart had not been riven by the desperate feuds of her own children.¹ If then the true greatness of Athens began with Themistokles, with Perikles it closed. Henceforth her course was downward.

CHAPTER III.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE CLOSE OF THE PUBLIC LIFE OF PERIKLES TO THE DESTRUCTION OF PLATAIAI.

THE usages of Greek warfare were at all times cruel. In this internecine struggle between the two great Ionian and Dorian states of Hellas exasperation of feeling on both sides had its fruit in a horrible inhumanity. That private Execution of Spartan envoys at Athens. teers issuing from Megara² and from the Peloponnesian ports generally should strive to cripple Athenian commerce to the utmost, is no more than we should look for. But to lawful captures of property the Megarians and Peloponnesians added the crime of wholesale murder. Not merely were all merchants whether belonging to Athens or to her allies, who might be seized in ships sailing round Peloponnesos, slaughtered without distinction; but the Spartans acted on the sweeping rule of killing all whom they might seize, even if these were citizens of states taking no part in the war, and hurling their bodies into clefts or gulches near the shore.³ It was not long before Spartan shortsightedness furnished Athens with the means of making terrible reprisal. Dead to all care for Hellenic freedom, the Spartans were now bent on securing the aid of the barbarian who fifty years ago had been beaten back chiefly by Athenian energy. On this disgraceful

¹ Thuc. ii. 65, 13.

² Thuc. iii. 51.

³ Ib. ii. 67.

mission they dispatched Nikolaos the son of Boulis and Aneristos the son of Sperthias.¹ With them was joined a more notorious and probably a much abler man: but even the foresight of the Corinthian Aristeus failed to calculate fully the risks which they might run by the way. Betaking themselves to the court of Sitalkes they placed themselves in the lion's jaws. They were making their way to the ship which was to carry them over to Asia, when at Bisanthê they were seized and handed over to the Athenian envoys Learchos and Ameiniades who took them to Athens, where, without listening to what they wished to say in their behalf, the Athenians put all three to death.

By the death of Aristeus the Potidaians lost a man whom they knew to be unwearied in his efforts to relieve them. The knowledge that they could look for nothing more from him weighed heavily on men who had been reduced by famine to straits so frightful that they had even eaten the bodies of their dead. It was impossible to hold out longer; and a little more firmness on the part of the besiegers would have insured an unconditional surrender. Happily for the Potidaians the full extent of their sufferings was not known to Xenophon and his colleagues, and they were allowed to leave the place under a convention that the men should depart with one garment and the women with two, and a fixed sum of money to enable them to reach some refuge. The tidings of this surrender were received at Athens with very mingled feelings. The savage instinct latent in the Greek mind might have chafed at being balked of an opportunity for wholesale slaughter; but the more prudent Athenians felt specially indignant at the loss of so many men, women, and children who might have been sold to defray the costs of the siege on which 2,000 talents had been expended. For a time Xenophon was in disgrace; but the property seized within the place made up in some measure for the money spent on the blockade, and Potidaia further furnished a home for the 1,000 Athenian settlers who were sent to occupy it.

Two invasions of Attica had failed thus far to bring about the end aimed at by Sparta and Corinth. At the beginning of the third year of the war the invading force was sent not into Attica but into the little strip of Plataian territory which even Spartan sentiment regarded as in some sense sacred ground. The Plataians were, in fact, offered up as victims on the altar of Theban

Attack on Plataiai by the Spartans under Archidamos.

429 B.C.

¹ Sperthias and Boulis were the ambassadors who, as it is said, were sent to Xerxes to be put to death by him by way of compensation for the

ill-treatment of the Persian heralds at Athens and Sparta (p. 147). The office of herald was hereditary at Sparta.

hatred and cruelty; and the tragedy began when Archidamos encamped with his army on the territory which the Spartans had sworn to protect against all assailants. In a few words the Plataian heralds who were at once sent out to him bade him remember the oaths solemnly sworn after the rout of the Persians under Mardonios. In reply the Spartan king told them that he was come only to set them free. Athens had built up a tyranny in Hellas; and her subjects, rescued from her clutches, must be made to feel the blessings of oligarchic liberty. If the Plataians could not duly appreciate these blessings and take part in the good work, they must remain neutral, and a promise of neutrality would be followed by the departure of the invaders. But neutrality as defined by Archidamos meant the reception of both sides as friends, and the Plataians felt that the gates of their city were thus practically thrown open to their worst enemies. To the fears thus expressed Archidamos replied by pledging himself and the Spartan confederation to restore to the Plataians without loss or damage at the end of the war their houses, their lands, their fruit trees and all other property which might be numbered, if in the meantime the Plataians would leave them in trust to the Spartans,¹ and themselves find a refuge elsewhere. The proposal was one with which under the circumstances it would be wise to close, and the Plataians were inclined to accept it. But since the night attack on the city their wives and their children had been transferred to Athens, and without the consent of the Athenians they could do nothing. Plataian envoys were accordingly sent under truce to Athens, and brought back the simple message that the Athenians had never yet betrayed Plataiai and that they would never abandon her to her enemies. It was an unfortunate answer. The doom of the Plataians was sealed when, with a solemn invocation of the gods and heroes of the land and a solemn protest that he was acting against his will, Archidamos on learning their decision gave orders for surrounding the town with a stockade made from the fruit trees which were cut down. Probably he would never have undertaken the task, had he not felt assured that a place containing less than 600 in all could not long hold out against a force overwhelming in numbers. But the attempts made to breach or undermine the walls were useless: and as the summer wore on, orders were given, it is said, for the complete circumvallation of the city, a sufficient Spartan force being left to guard half the circle, while the Boiotians undertook

¹ This proposition may be compared with the proposal made by the English envoy at Copenhagen in 1807 that the whole Danish fleet

should be given up to the British government, to be retained in trust, and restored, as soon as this could be done with prudence and safety.

to guard the other half. This blockading wall was finished, we are told, shortly before the autumnal equinox, and the main body of the besiegers returned home.

While the Spartans were thus engaged at Plataiai, the Athenian general Xenophon who had been pardoned for his generosity to the Potidaians was dispatched with two colleagues at the head of a force intended to advance the interests of Athens in the Chalkidic peninsula. Their first step was to ravage the lands of the Bottiaian Spartolos, within which an Athenian party was working for the surrender of the city to the invaders. But there were others who would not hear of this plan, and these summoned aid from Olynthos. The battles which followed showed the superiority of the Athenian hoplites on the one side and of the Chalkidian light-armed troops on the other. In the end the Athenians fled to Potidaia, leaving 430 men with all their generals dead upon the field.¹

These disasters were compensated by brilliant successes elsewhere. During the preceding winter Phormion had been stationed with 20 triremes at Naupaktos to block the entrance of the Corinthian gulf.² The events of the following year showed that in him the Athenians had found the ablest of all their naval commanders. Aided by the Chaones and other wild tribes of the neighboring country, the Ambrakiots undertook, with the help of an adequate Peloponnesian force, to reduce the whole of Akarnania and to insure the conquest of Zakynthos and Kephallenia. The execution of this plan was intrusted to the Spartan admiral Knemos, who managed to cross the gulf with his thousand hoplites without the knowledge of Phormion. The main object of the expedition was the town of Stratos on the right bank of the Achelôos and about twenty miles from its mouth. The reduction of this place, it was thought, would be followed at once by the submission of the Akarnanians generally. With the forces of Knemos were combined the troops of the Chaonians and Thesprotians and the clansmen of the Orestai and Parauaioi. The ever-shifting Perdikkas sent 1,000 Makedonians without the knowledge of the Athenians. The tidings of their approach at first struck terror into the Stratians who sent to Phormion an urgent message for aid. But that general answered that he dared not leave Naupaktos unguarded, and the Stratians made ready to defend themselves as best they might. Their enemies were moving in three parallel columns, so far separated from each other as often to be out of sight, the Leukadians and Anaktorians being on the

¹ Thuc. ii. 79.

² Ib. ii. 69.

right, the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots on the left. These marched warily and in good order, taking all precautions when they incamped at night. The Chaonians, hurried on by their habitual impetuosity, thought of nothing but a headlong onset which should carry Stratos by storm. To the Stratians their disorderly haste suggested the idea of ambuscades to take their assailants in flank while their main body should sally forth from the city gates. The plan was crowned with thorough success, and the Greeks saw nothing of their friends until they beheld them rushing back in wild confusion. Night had no sooner closed in than Knemos fell back on the Anapos, a stream flowing into the Achelôos about ten miles below Stratos. Thence, retreating first into the land of the friendly Oiniadai, he made the best of his way home.¹

Meanwhile a far heavier disaster had befallen the reinforcement which should have reached him from Corinth and other cities of the allies. The narrow strait barely one mile in width which forms the entrance to the Krissaian or Corinthian gulf is locked in by two promontories, the southern known simply as Rhion or the Ness, and the northern as the Rhion of Molykreion, a town about three miles to the west, facing Patrai which lies about five miles to the southwest of the Achaian Rhion. At about equal distances from the northern Naze or Ness lay Naupaktos on the east and the little territory of Chalkis near the mouth of the river Euênos to the west. Hence it is obvious that a leader who wished to avoid a fleet stationed at any point between the Molykreian Rhion and Naupaktos would keep his ships on the southern coast of the gulf and having doubled the cape would strike from Patrai for Chalkis. This course, accordingly, the Corinthians took in full assurance that with five-and-forty ships they needed to fear no attack from Phormion who had only twenty. Hence, although on doubling the southern cape they saw that Phormion also had passed the entrance of the gulf on the northern side, the Corinthians still thought that their way would be undisputed. But no sooner had they moved from Patrai than they saw the Athenian triremes bearing directly upon them from Chalkis. The day was drawing to an end, and the Corinthians, to put their enemy off his guard, pretended to take up their station for the night off the Achaian shore, their intention being to steal across the passage under cover of darkness. But Phormion was not to be thus cheated. The Corinthians had hoped that when they had come to anchor he also would fall back to his own ground; but

Victory of
Phormion
over the Co-
rinthian
fleet.

¹ Thuc. ii. 81-82.

Phormion kept the sea all night, and at break of day his triremes confronted the Corinthian ships which were then creeping across the gulf. The conditions of the conflict were precisely those which he could most desire. The Corinthian fleet consisted of vessels awkwardly built, poorly equipped, and manned by crews with little or no experience in rowing; and when these ships formed themselves into a circle with their prows outward, leaving just space enough for five of their best ships reserved within the circle to dart out upon the enemy, but not enough to give room for the terrible manœuvre known as the *Diekplous*,¹ Phormion saw that the issue of the day was in his own hands. Soon after sunrise the breeze blows strongly from the gulf, and he knew that this alone would render impossible the task of keeping a steady position which even in still water is full of difficulty for unskilful seamen. To distress the enemy yet more, he sailed round their fleet with his ships in single line, gradually contracting his circle, and threatening attack from moment to moment. The Corinthians, thus confined within a narrowing space, were already in great confusion when the wind came down upon them and dashed their ships against each other. In the midst of this dreadful disorder Phormion gave the order for attack to his crews who knew well the vast advantage of keeping strict silence² during naval engagements. What followed was not battle but rout. At every onset from an Athenian trireme a Peloponnesian ship went down. Twelve were taken with most of their crews. The few which were not taken or sunk fled to the Eleian docks at Kyllene. The Athenians sailed with their prizes to Molykreion and there set up a trophy for the victory.

The tidings of this exploit were received at Sparta with unmingled indignation. Peremptory orders to bring on at once a fresh engagement were sent to Knemos by three Athenian commissioners, Brasidas, Timokrates, and Lykophon, who were to form his standing council. Phormion on his side added to the dispatch announcing his success an earnest request for immediate reinforcements. Perikles was now dying, and the Athenians had already brought themselves to think that

¹The excellence of Athenian naval tactics lay in extreme rapidity as well as precision of movement: and the special work of the trireme was to strike the enemy's ship in some weak or dangerous part, avoiding all contact with the armed prow or beak. Hence wherever there was room, the triremes darted through gaps in the enemy's line, and then turning suddenly round

struck his ship in the stern or the side, thus instantly disabling or sinking her. For this operation free space was indispensable; and thus the revolution in Athenian naval warfare since the days of Salamis and Mykalê is fully explained.

²This fact alone exhibits in a striking light the consummate discipline of the Athenian navy at this time.

they were doing rightly by sending this force first on a contemptible errand to Krete. In Krete, nothing, it seems, was done, beyond the ravaging of the land around Kydonia; and when this was over, the winds would not allow them to pursue their voyage.

Phormion was thus left with his twenty triremes to take his chance against any fleet which the Spartans might send against him. In hourly expectation of being reinforced he kept his ships off the Ness of Molykreion while seventy-five Peloponnesian triremes watched him from the opposite promontory of Achaia. The battle of Naupaktos, and second victory of Phormion. The Spartans knew now the dangers against which they had to guard; and for six or seven days not a movement was made on either side. On the seventh or eighth day the Peloponnesian fleet began at daybreak to move in lines four deep from Panormos to the northern coast of the gulf, the right wing leading the way, headed by twenty of the swiftest and stoutest of their ships, which were to turn sharply round and pin the fleet of Phormion to the shore if, thinking that the movement was against Naupaktos, he should enter the gulf. Their plan was successful. Phormion felt that he dared not suffer so large a force to attack Naupaktos, and hastened to the defence of that city. But he had advanced only a little way to the east of the Molykreian Rhion when the whole Peloponnesian fleet faced about, their vanguard hurrying to cut off retreat in the direction of Naupaktos, while the main body of the ships sufficiently blocked escape to the west. The safety or destruction of the Athenian triremes depended wholly on the rapidity of their movements: and such was the promptitude of the trierarchs and so great the swiftness of their vessels that eleven ships escaped even from this supreme peril, and outstripping the enemy hastened towards Naupaktos. The remaining nine were driven ashore, such of their crews as could not swim being all slain. The battle seemed to be ended by a decisive victory, for the rescuing of some of the ships by Messenian hoplites who dashed into the sea and leaped upon their decks was a matter of not much moment. But another turn was to be given to the day by the Athenian triremes who had outsailed the Spartan vanguard. Ten of them, having reached the Apollonion or temple of Phoibos near Naupaktos, took up a defensive position. One was sailing up in the rear, chased by a single Leukadian vessel far in advance of the rest of the Peloponnesian fleet which came onwards to the chant of the Paian or pæan hymn of victory. Some way in front of this Athenian ship a merchant vessel was lying at its moorings. Sweeping swiftly round it, the Athenian trireme dashed into the broadside of its pursuer and forthwith disabled it. This exploit so dismayed the Spartan

admiral Timokrates who was on board, that he slew himself, and his body fell into the sea. It also damped the courage of the Peloponnesians who were coming up behind. The victory which they had just won seemed to render strict order unnecessary; and in a fatal moment the crews of some of the ships ceased from rowing, to enable the others to join them, while some from ignorance of the soundings found themselves among the shoals. Seizing instantly the favorable moment, the ten Athenian ships flew to the attack. The conflict was soon over. Disorder had already half done their work; and in a little while the Peloponnesian ships were seen in flight for Panormos near the Achaian Rhion from which they had advanced in the morning. Six of their vessels fell into the hands of the Athenians who also recovered their own triremes which had been taken by the Spartans earlier in the day.¹

The great plan of the Spartans which was to drive the Athenians from the Corinthian gulf had thus failed utterly: but before they dismissed the contingents of the several cities, the Peloponnesian leaders thought that a blow might be struck at Athens herself by a sudden attack on Peiraieus. No one had supposed that there was any need to guard the harbor of a city whose fleets had no rivals. Hence when the Megarians suggested the enterprise, Brasidas and Knemos at once gave orders to their men to hasten to the Megarian port of Nisaia, and there to man the forty triremes which were lying in dock. Thus far their commands were obeyed; but when they were fairly at sea, the desperate risk involved in carrying out their scheme led them or their men to substitute the easier task of a raid on Salamis. The excuse that they were kept by an unfavorable wind was a mere pretence. It was in fact safer to attack the three ships which kept guard at the promontory of Boudoron for the purpose of barring access to the harbor of Megara. The capture of these vessels and the landing of Peloponnesian plundering parties were made known at Athens by means of fire signals, and excited extreme alarm.² No sooner had day dawned than the Athenians hurried in full force to Peiraieus, and launching a number of triremes rowed off to Salamis. But the Spartans were already gone, taking with them a large amount of plunder and many prisoners, together with the three guard-ships from Boudoron. The Athe-

¹ Thuc. ii. 92.

² Thucydides, ii. 94, 1, says that no other incident in the war caused greater anxiety at Athens. He must mean, clearly, the war down to the peace of Nicias, just as the same period must be meant by the phrase *ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε*, iii. 98, 3. The loss

of Demosthenes in Aitolia was as nothing to the catastrophe at Syracuse. It was not until Thucydides reached a later stage in his history that he began to regard the Dekeleian war as a part of the Peloponnesian war. v. 26.

nians had been taught a severe lesson, and Peiraieus was never left unguarded again.¹

It had been the earnest wish of the Athenians to bring down upon Perdikkas or rather upon the Chalkidian towns the great but unwieldy power of Sitalkes, who had made himself master of the vast regions watered by the Hebros and its tributary streams, and whose dominions stretched from Abdera, near the mouth of the Nestos (the drain of the valleys lying between the chains of Rhodopê and Pangaios), to the mouth of the Istros or the Danube. Thus in extent at least his dominions were second to none in Europe after those of the Scythian hordes, whose union in the belief of Thucydides would have involved an omnipotence which Herodotus thought that the Thracian tribes, if really united, could not fail to achieve.² But this great empire had been founded with no definite political aim. Revenue in the form of tribute, and gifts answering closely to the blackmail of the Scottish Highland chiefs, were the great objects of ambition to the Odrysian princes. In short, the administration of the Thracian chief was marked by all the venality of the Roman empire; and without gifts, Thucydides tersely remarks, nothing could be done. A power thus extended over a vast tract of country could not soon or easily be brought to a head. Sitalkes had indeed a double motive for taking the field early. The Athenians had subsidised him well for his Chalkidian campaign, and he had his own private quarrel to settle with Perdikkas. This wily and treacherous chief had by a definite compact induced Sitalkes to give up the cause of his brother Philip, and he had refused to fulfil his promise. Philip was now dead; but the Odrysian king was resolved that his son Amyntas should be restored to his inheritance.³ At last the gathered mass was set in motion, to swell in size as it went onwards, like a rolling snowball. The approach of an army of 150,000 men might well strike terror among the peoples which lay in its path. The Makedonians fled to their fortresses; and although their cavalry, when able to act, beat back the mountaineers opposed to them, they dared not to run the risk of being surrounded by overwhelming numbers. The tidings of this expedition spread dismay not only among all Hellenic tribes to the north of Thermopylai, but among the states now in league against Athens. Their fears were groundless. The winter was now come; the supply of food, in spite of the plunder obtained from Bottiaia, Makedonia, and Chalkidike, was running short; and Perdikkas found that bribes and promises carried more weight than his cavalry. The

¹ Thuc. ii. 94.

² Thuc. ii. 98, 7. Herod. v. 3.

³ Thuc. ii. 95.

offer of his sister Stratonike in marriage with a large dowry secured the friendship of Seuthes, who had accompanied his uncle Sitalkes; and Seuthes found a strong argument for retreat in the absence of the Athenian ships which were to have co-operated with them. So much time had been wasted since the campaign was first planned, that the Athenians had given up the coming of Sitalkes as hopeless. They had sent him envoys with large gifts; but their failure to fulfil the rest of the compact made the pleadings of Seuthes for immediate retreat irresistible. Thirty days had gone by since Sitalkes had left his own dominions, when the order was given for the homeward march. Perdikkas felt that in Seuthes he had found an ally whom it was not safe to cheat, and he kept his promise in the matter of Stratonike.

The fourth year of the war brought with it for the Athenians not only another Spartan invasion, but a crisis so sudden and so serious that for a time their power of action was almost paralysed. All Lesbos revolted, with the exception of the one town of Methymna in the northeastern corner of the island. Together with Chios Lesbos alone now retained the privileges of free members of the Delian or Athenian confederacy: but light as were the burdens and constraints laid even on the subject allies, the Lesbian oligarchs who there ruled over the Demos hated utterly any state of things which interfered in the slightest degree with their dearly loved exclusiveness. We have already had ample evidence that while Athenian ascendancy was resented as an intolerable burden wherever the old Eupatrid houses remained supreme, Athens still had in the Demos an ally, if not a zealous friend. Even these demoi would, if left to themselves, have preferred to keep their interpolitical independence,—so deep had the roots pierced of that centrifugal feeling which in the oligarchical states had long since become a deadly and incurable vice. Hence even before the outbreak of the war the nobles of Mytilene, the great city of the eastern coast of Lesbos, had, like the men of Thasos, Samos, and Potidaia, besought aid from Sparta in the revolt which they meditated.¹ We are not told at what time the application was made: and it is possible that it may have come at a time when the attitude taken by Corinth compelled the Spartans to refuse the request of the Samian envoys.² Still the Mytilenian oligarchs persevered in their scheme; and Methymna was the only town which resisted a change not unlike that which Theseus is said to have effected for Attica. Antissa, Eresos, and Pyrrha, the two first lying on the north-western shore of Lesbos, the third sheltered within a bay which ran into the heart of the island a few miles

The revolt of
Lesbos.
428 B.C.

¹ Thuc. iii. 2, 1.

² See p. 260.

more to the southeast, were induced to become simply Demoi of Mytilene, and to hold here their common Prytaneion. The work of blocking up harbors, of building walls, of laying in stores and hiring mercenary archers from tribes lying beyond the gates of the Euxine, was carried on with zeal; and the men of Tenedos as well as the Methymnians warned the Athenians that, unless they acted promptly, the island would be lost. The tidings seemed to lay upon them a burden against which they could not bear up. The plague had terribly thinned their numbers and weakened the power and the will for action; and for a time they could not bring themselves to look upon news so terrible as true. But when the envoys sent to dissuade the Mytilenaians from reducing the other towns to the condition of demoi had returned home unsuccessful, they instantly dispatched to Lesbos forty ships which happened to be ready for an expedition to the Peloponnesian coasts. The orders given to the general Kleïppides and his colleagues were to surprise and seize Mytilene, if possible during the absence of the citizens while keeping the feast of Apollon Maloeis, or, failing in this, to summon the oligarchs to surrender their fleet and pull down their walls. Happily there were in the Peiræicus ten Lesbian triremes according to the terms of the alliance. These ships the Athenians seized, and guarded their crews as hostages; but the tidings of the mission of Kleïppides were carried to Lesbos in three days by a Mytilenaiian spy. The festival of Apollon was put off; and when the Athenians arrived, they were met by open opposition. But the ships which ventured out of the harbor were chased back again, and the Mytilenaiian leaders resolved to temporise. Kleïppides, with a fleet which he deemed too scanty to cope with the combined forces of the Lesbian towns, was easily persuaded to give time for the sending of a Lesbian embassy to Athens. These envoys had no further errand than to ask for the withdrawal of the Athenian squadron, and to give a general promise that the Mytilenaiian government meant no harm. Conscious that a trick so transparent must fail, they sent ambassadors at the same time to Sparta in a trireme which escaped by the southern entrance of the harbor, while Kleïppides kept guard only at Malea on the north of the town. But when the Lesbian envoys returned from Athens with no good report and the island had openly revolted, even a victory gained over the Athenians who had landed to blockade the city was followed by a retreat within the walls, and by the sending of a second embassy to Sparta. Awaiting the return of this second batch of envoys the Mytilenaiian oligarchs remained inactive; and the Athenians, who seldom failed to seize a favorable opportunity, at once sent to summon aid from their allies. The same remissness which had cheered the Athenians had also convinced the Chians and other

members of the confederacy that not much was to be expected from the Lesbian rebellion, and with their help, now readily afforded, Mytilene was blockaded from the south as well as the north.¹

If Thucydides had inserted in his history no speeches which could not have been uttered by the persons to whom they are ascribed, we might lay greater stress on the language of the Mytilenaian envoys when about midsummer of this year they appeared to plead their cause before the Hellenes assembled to celebrate the great Olympian festival. It is enough to say that for themselves these Lesbian envoys have no grievance whatever to urge. Far from having been either oppressed or even unfairly used, they admit that they had been treated with marked distinction;² and all that they could say for themselves was first that the idea of revolt had been forced on them by the slavery to which other members of the Delian confederation had been reduced, and secondly that they had been compelled to carry out their plan prematurely. Of the real relations of Athens with her free and her subject allies they said not a word. There was no intimation that the Athenian law-courts were open to receive and decide all complaints brought by one ally against another ally or by the citizens of any confederated city against Athenian officials or residents or settlers, and that these courts certainly could not be accused of perverting justice in favor of Athenian criminals. On the real independence of the allies in the management of their internal affairs they kept careful silence: but the checks which were put on quarrels and wars between two or more allied cities were resented as involving loss of freedom.³ In short, if the picture drawn by the historian be in any degree a true one, the revolt of Lesbos was the work of a faction with which the main body of the people had no active sympathy, and which they seized the first occasion for defeating.

It had been the special prayer of the Lesbian envoys that the Spartans should invade Attica for the second time this year, the inducement held out for this fresh toil being the likelihood that the Athenians would thus be compelled to withdraw their fleets both from Lesbos and from the shores of Peloponnesos. The Athenians, they urged, had not only been prostrated by the plague but had spent all their reserve funds. This last statement was true. Of the six thousand talents which were stored in the treasury at the beginning of the war, one thousand only remained,—that sum, namely, of which under pain of death no citizen was to propose to

¹ Thuc. iii. 6.

² Thuc. iii. 93.

³ The relations of Athens with

her allies have been examined already. See p. 246.

make use except for the defence of the city itself or its harbors against invading armies or fleets. The former assertion was refuted in a way which the Spartans little anticipated. They had accepted the Lesbians as their allies, and, having promised a second invasion of Attica, they made preparations for dragging their ships across the Corinthian isthmus to the Saronic gulf, sending round a summons at the same time for the immediate presence of their allies. These were in no hurry to obey the order. They were busy carrying their harvest; and the Athenians resolved to show, that in spite of all depressing causes they were able to meet their enemies on equal terms without taking away any portion of their fleet from Lesbos. Meanwhile the Mytilenaian oligarchs had been able to do but little. Their attack on Methymna had failed; but an attempt to retaliate was followed by a severe defeat of the Methymnaians. The Mytilenaians had in fact full command of the land, although the harbors of Mytilene were under strict blockade. On learning this fact, the Athenians sent out a force of a thousand hoplites under Paches, and the revolted city was at once completely invested.

So ended the fourth year of the war. Soon after the equinox of the following spring a Peloponnesian army again invaded Attica. Archidamos was perhaps still living, but his long reign was well-nigh ended; and the leader of this expedition was Kleomenes who acted as the deputy of his nephew the young king Pausanias, son of Pleistoanax. Their ravages were even more merciless than those of the earlier inroads. They were expecting daily to hear news from Lesbos, to which Alkidas had been dispatched with a fleet ordered during the preceding winter. But at length their food was all gone, no tidings had come, and they were reluctantly driven to retreat. In fact the Lesbian oligarchs had no successes to report. For some unknown reason Alkidas failed to make his appearance with his fleet; and, looking on his arrival as hopeless, the party in power armed the Demos as hoplites (they had thus far served only as light-armed troops) in order to sally out from the city against the besiegers. The step was fatal. The commons, instead of obeying the orders given to them, insisted on an immediate distribution of corn to alleviate the famine which already pressed hard upon them, or threatened in default of this to throw open the gates to the Athenians. Making a virtue of necessity, the oligarchs at once made a convention with Paches, who pledged himself neither to imprison, enslave, nor slay any Mytilenaian until the Athenian people had given their judgment in the matter. Struck with terror, the prime movers of the revolt took sanctuary: but without doing them any harm Paches, pending the decision of the Athenians, placed them

for safe keeping in the island of Tenedos. Seven days after this surrender the fleet of Alkidas entered the little harbor of Embaton on the southern shore of the territory of Erythrai beneath the Korykian mount, not twenty miles to the east of the Phanaian or southernmost promontory of Chios. Here a council was held, and Teutiaplos of Elis strenuously insisted on the duty of making an immediate attempt for the recovery of Mytilene. But Alkidas had had more than enough of the business, and he was determined to return home. For fifty miles, sailing to the south-east, he carried with him the prisoners whom he had seized in the merchant vessels which had approached his fleet without suspicion. No one had thought that a Spartan force would venture into waters over which Athens had thus far been supreme, and when the ships of Alkidas were seen, they were naturally supposed to be Athenian. So large a body of men had fallen into the trap that Alkidas now felt his movement of retreat seriously hampered. That men not engaged in hostilities on either side, and belonging possibly to cities which were only against their will in alliance with Athens, deserved a different treatment, never entered into his mind; and on the promontory of Myonnesos in the Teian territory he landed for the horrible purpose of lightening his cargo by a wholesale butchery. The greater number of the prisoners were thus slain; but this ruthless barbarity roused the indignation even of the oligarchic refugees at Anaia. They told Alkidas in few words that the repetition of acts so shameful would win him few friends and would change most of his friends into enemies. Shamed by the sarcasm which hailed the would-be deliverer of Hellas with the title of butcher, Alkidas set free those whom he had not slaughtered, and hastened a retreat which it was now needful to convert into flight. In fact, nothing but extreme haste saved him from Paches who pursued him as far as Patmos, and then, as the Spartan fleet was not in sight, turned back, congratulating himself that Alkidas had not taken refuge in some harbor where it would have been necessary to blockade him.

On his return to Lesbos Paches reduced the towns of Pyrrha and Eresos. The Mytilenians (in number about 1,000) who had been placed for safe keeping in Tenedos were sent to Athens, a large portion of the force under Paches returning home at the same time. At Athens indignation at the revolt ran high. By their own showing the Mytilenians, far from having any definite cause of complaint, had been treated with special indulgence and respect; and they had rewarded Athens by bringing a Peloponnesian fleet within waters which should have been closed to all armed vessels except those of the Athenian confederacy. No event had yet

Condemnation of the Mytilenian people by the Athenian assembly.

happened so seriously affecting her dignity and so greatly endangering her empire. Moved by the mastering passion of resentment, the Athenians were in no mood for drawing distinctions between the guilty and the innocent. Their one longing was to inflict a punishment which should be a warning to her subjects for all time to come; and this longing found utterance in the plan of murdering the whole adult male population of Mytilene. Of the orators who, in the assembly called together to decide on the question, spoke most vehemently in favor of this proposition the most violent, if we may believe Thucydides, was Kleon. The severity of the historian's judgment might be set down to a stern moral indignation at the inhumanity of Kleon's counsel, if we could forget that his judgment of character is not always determined by the morality or immorality of the men of whom he speaks. Not only does he relate the worst iniquities of Athenians and Spartans without saying what he thinks or feels about them; but he can hold up as one of the best of Athenian citizens a man rendered infamous by a series of dastardly assassinations.¹ Hence when we find that the unimpassioned impartiality of language which marks his history is disturbed only when he speaks in praise of a man like Antiphon or in blame of a man like Kleon, we cannot but ask whether there may not be a cause for so strange a difference. To this question the absolute honesty of the man happily furnishes the answer. He lauds the virtues of Antiphon, but he takes care to note the murders in which he has a share; he never mentions Kleon without a disparaging epithet, but he makes no attempt to conceal the fact that for Kleon he had a strong feeling of personal enmity and that his own character was bound up with that of the noisy and audacious leather-seller.

Although Kleon is here first mentioned by Thucydides, he had long since gained some notoriety, if not fame, by his opposition to Perikles. His career calls for notice chiefly as marking a new phase in the political growth of Athens. ^{Influence and character of Kleon.} Kleon is popularly known as the Demagogue; and for those who will not take the trouble to ascertain its meaning, the word involves some strange misconceptions. In the broad and coarse pictures of Aristophanes Kleon is the unprincipled schemer who gains influence by pandering to the vices of the people and cajoling them with the meanest and most fulsome flattery. No picture could be more untrue; and the false colors with which the comic poet can bedaub the low-born leather-seller may warn us how to take the slanders which he retails about the great Alkmaionid statesman whom Kleon made it his business to oppose.

¹ Thuc. viii. 68.

Kleon was a demagogue, not as leading the people by honeyed words, but as belonging to a class of statesmen whose activity was confined to the popular assemblies, and who were more likely to fail than to win distinction if they ventured to play the part of military leaders. In earlier ages this class had been unknown; it was only now becoming strongly marked. If a man so placed, without any advantages of birth or fortune, rose to such power as Kleon at length attained, by availing himself of the popular or dominant feeling, it may fairly be answered that he could scarcely rise in any other way. All citizens at Athens were now eligible to all offices: but in fact the meanly born and the poor seldom filled any offices except those for which election went by the lot. If a man belonging to the lowest class and meaner families in the state wished to obtain a hearing, he could do so only by enlisting popular feeling on his side and by presenting a firm front to the aristocratic and oligarchic orators who would seek to brow-beat and to silence him.

It is then undoubtedly true that the rudeness and grossness of the leather-merchant who came forward to resist or to accuse

Second de-
bate, and
withdrawal
of the sen-
tence
against the
Mytilenaian
people.

Perikles were forgiven by the aristocratic party to whom the policy of Perikles was distasteful. In other words, Kleon had in his favor a powerful sentiment in their dislike of the great Alkmaionid statesman who had dealt the deathblow to their ancient privileges.

In the case of the Mytilenaian he had on his side a feeling still more powerful. The maintenance of their maritime supremacy was for all Athenians a matter which admitted no questioning: and the very foundations of this supremacy had been assailed by men, who, revolting without cause, had dared to bring Spartan war-ships into Athenian waters. According to Thucydides, it was Kleon who determined the issue of the debate;¹ it is far more likely that a vast majority came to the debate vehemently eager to take the vengeance to which Kleon gave the name of justice. But the massacre which he and they desired was on so vast a scale that the feeling of burning anger was speedily followed by a feeling of amazement at the ocean of blood which was to be shed in order to appease it. Not a few of those who had voted for the slaughter felt, as they went home, or in the quiet of their houses, that they were making themselves responsible for a gigantic and savage iniquity. The manifest symptoms of this change of feeling revived the courage of the Mytilenaian envoys, and rendered it possible to bring about a reconsideration of the question. What-

¹ The phrase *ἐνεκικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτείναι* could hardly be said of a man merely because he had been a

speaker on the winning side. Thuc. iii. 36, 5. Kleon probably suggested the plan of massacre.

ever risk might be involved in summoning the assembly for the purpose of repealing a Psephisma passed only a few hours ago, the Prytaneis felt that the circumstances of the case justified the irregularity, and they took the step without hesitation.¹ It was early morning when Kleon found himself once more face to face with the men who, the day before, had tried in vain to resist the influence of his furious oratory. Without pausing to reflect on the risk which he might himself incur as the author of a measure which must rouse the indignation of the whole Hellenic world, he stood up again to administer a stern rebuke to the Demos and to urge with savage persistency the paramount duty of giving full play to the instinct of resentment. This course he held to be that of strict justice, and as he demanded no more than justice, so neither would he take less. The Lesbians had gained no experience from the punishment of Thasos or Samos; they had not been deterred by the certainty of losing special privileges and sacrificing the wealth and prosperity of the island. But Kleon, if the report of Thucydides may be trusted, uttered a direct falsehood when he asserted that the oligarchs and the Demos had been guilty of the same crime and therefore deserved the same punishment. The plea was palpably untrue. The Demos was armed only when the oligarchs felt that thus only could they escape imminent ruin; and no sooner had they grasped their weapons, than they used the power, thus gained, in the interests of Athens. To this vehement outburst Diodotos, who had strenuously resisted the proposal carried on the preceding day, replied in a speech which, if we may accept the report of Thucydides as substantially correct, is amongst the most remarkable ever uttered at Athens. It is the speech of a man comparatively humane, who yet feels that undue stress laid on the duty of mercy might defeat his purpose. It was unnecessary to enjoin as a duty that which was demanded imperatively on the score of mere policy and expediency. There was no need to gloss over the iniquities of the Lesbians, far less to attempt any formal apology for them, when the question turned not on the wickedness of the rebels but on the wisdom of slaughtering them in a mass. Nay, he would take Kleon on his own ground, and he would meet by a direct contradiction the plea that Athenian interests would be advanced by ruthless massacre. It was absurd to found expectations of future gain on the mere severity of punishment. Human action was determined not by pains and penalties which might possibly never be inflicted, but by desires or passions which bear down all constraints of prudence, law, or fear. The black codes

¹ A case somewhat similar occurred when Nikias proposed to consider as an open question the scheme of the Sicilian expedition which had already been determined on by the people.

which punished all offences with death had not been specially successful in lessening the number or the atrocity of offences. But if the results of merciless revenge were uncertain in one direction, they were clear enough in another. Far from being tempted, as they were now, to surrender betimes in the hope of moderate treatment, the knowledge that no heed would be taken of shades of guilt would goad revolted allies to desperate resistance. Nay, even this would not be the whole mischief wrought by this ill-judged vindictiveness. In all the states of her alliance Athens now had beyond all doubt a body of stanch friends: and even in Lesbos these friends had only been overborne by the selfish violence of the oligarchic faction. By following the advice of Kleon they would deal the death-blow to this friendship, and would encounter everywhere an ominous monotony of hatred and disgust.

When at length the question was put to the vote, the amendment of Diodotos that the prisoners then at Athens should be put upon their trial and that the lives of the Mytilenaians in Lesbos should be spared was carried by a very small majority. But although the decree of the preceding day was thus rescinded, there was little chance that the more merciful decision would take effect. The trireme carrying the death-warrant of six or seven thousand men had had the start of nearly twenty-four hours: but the errand on which they were dispatched was not so cheerful as to call for any special tension of muscle, and the second trireme was sent forth with far greater inducements for the most strenuous exertion. The Lesbian envoys stocked the ship with an ample supply of wine and barley meal, and they promised the crew rich rewards if they reached the island in time. Possibly the desire of saving Athens from a great crime and a great disgrace may have influenced them even more powerfully, and the men pushed onwards with a zeal which happily was not damped by adverse weather. Taking their meals as they sat on their benches, and working in relays of men relieved at very short intervals, they reached Lesbos, not indeed before the first trireme, but before Paches had begun the execution of the decree which he had already published. Here ended the repentance and the mercy of the Athenians. The thousand Mytilenaiian prisoners sent by Paches to Athens were put to death. The walls of Mytilene were pulled down and its fleet forfeited; and a definite annual tribute was imposed upon the city. The Mytilenaiian possessions on the mainland were seized at the same time, and henceforth formed part of the empire of Athens. Throughout all these operations Paches had shown himself to be a general of more than common power, if not gifted with the genius of Phormion; but either he did not care to keep his passions in check or he thought that his

official position would insure him impunity in indulging them. He was altogether mistaken. The courts of Athens were open, not in name only but really, to the citizens of allied states whether subject or free : and Paches, charged before an Athenian Dikastery with a monstrous crime, slew himself in the presence of his judges.

The subjugation of Lesbos preceded only by a few days or weeks the destruction of Plataiai. A year and a half had passed away from the first appearance of Archidamos before the devoted town, when the Plataians resolved to force their way through the lines of the besiegers. The destruction of Plataiai.

From Athens there was clearly no hope of help, and their store of food was rapidly failing them. But as the time for carrying out the plan drew nigh, not much more than half the number could muster courage to go on with the scheme. Two hundred and twenty still persevered, and the event showed the wisdom of their choice. After a long and careful preparation, they chose a night of furious storm for the great attempt. They had mounted and descended the wall, when seven more turned back and spread the tidings that all the rest had been slain. One was taken prisoner at the outer moat : the remainder found a welcome in Athens which had done nothing to help them against the blockading force. At daybreak the Plataians within the city sent a herald to ask for the bodies of the dead and then learnt that the boldness of their comrades had been crowned with success. For some months longer they held out against an enemy more terrible than man ; but as the summer wore on, the Spartan leader found that his assaults were met with steadily diminishing force. Famine was fast doing its work ; but there was a special reason for arresting it before its close. If the Plataians could be induced to make a voluntary surrender of their city, there would be no need, in the event of either truce or peace, to give up the place along with others which had been forcibly occupied. The proposal therefore made to them was that they should submit themselves to the judgment of the Lakedaimonians who would give them a pledge that the guilty only should be punished. The Plataians were in no condition to refuse these terms ; but they could at once foresee the issue when on the arrival of the five special commissioners dispatched from Sparta they were put upon their trial, or rather were called upon to answer the single question whether during the present war they had done any good to the Spartans and their allies. The very form of the question showed that no reference would be suffered to their previous history ; but only by such reference was it possible to exhibit in its true light the injustice of their present treatment. In fact, unless the Spartans were prepared to throw over their alliance with Thebes, the case of the Plataians was

hopeless. The Plataians might insist that their alliance with Athens was the direct result of Spartan advice, that from that time down to the treacherous inroad of the Thebans into their city they had never failed to do Sparta such good service as had been in their power, and that their sacrifices during the struggle with Persia had been followed by zealous aid given to the Spartans during the long Helot war. They might dwell on the iniquity of the Thebans in assailing their city in time not only of truce but of festival. They might invoke the deep religious instinct which still regarded the unbroken worship of ancestors as of primary importance; they might argue that the maintenance of this worship had by the common oath of all the non-Medizing Hellenes been committed as a sacred trust to the Plataians, and that, if these were destroyed, the Spartans would be depriving their own forefathers of the careful reverence which Thebans as the vehement allies of the Persian king could not even dare to offer. They might remind them, further, that they had submitted themselves to the Spartans and to the Spartans alone, and that if they had suspected the least collusion with the Thebans, they would rather have all died by famine than open the gates of their city. They might insist that the Spartans, if they were not prepared to do them justice and to set them free, should allow them to go back within the walls of their town, and there take their chance whether of death by famine or of succor from their allies. All this they might urge; but to each and all of these pleas the Plataians well knew that the Thebans had their answer ready. The very question to which Kleomenes replied by bidding them seek the alliance of Athens was in itself a crime. It was their duty to abide in the confederacy of their countrymen, and they had chosen from the first to assume an attitude of bitter and schismatical opposition. The surprise of a city with which the Thebans were not at war might be wrong: the case was wholly altered when they came at the wish of the first men in the town who desired only to bring back their fellow-citizens to their ancient allegiance. The Plataians had been invited by the Thebans to join the Boiotian confederacy of their own free will. No wrong had been done and the invitation was accepted; but the compact was no sooner made than it was broken, and in breach of a solemn promise all the men who had fallen into their hands were slain. The retort brings us back to the monster evil of this horrible war,—the exasperated and vindictive spirit which forgot prudence, reason, and sound policy in the blind longing for revenge. It matters not whether we take the version of the Thebans or that of the Plataians. These by their own mouth stand on this point self-condemned. By their own admission they had promised that the fate of their prisoners should depend on the

result of future negotiation, and the men were killed before a word more could be said on either side. If one crime was to serve as the justification of another, the Thebans had full warrant for demanding the death of the Plataians. But there was no need to urge a request with which the Spartans had already made up their minds to comply. The prisoners were again asked, one by one, the same question to which their speech had evaded a direct answer; and as each man replied in the negative, he was led away and killed. So were slain two hundred Plataians and twenty-five Athenians who had been shut up in the town; and so fell the city of Plataiai in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens, to rise again once more and to be once more destroyed. For a year the town was given over by the Thebans to some Megarian exiles and to such Plataians as had preferred Boiotian oligarchy to alliance with the Demos of Athens. But even thus the Thebans could not rest satisfied. The Plataian territory was declared to be public land, and was let out for ten years to Boiotian graziers. The play was played out, as the Thebans would have it. The phrase is strictly justified, for the existence or the fall of Plataiai could have no serious issue or meaning in reference to the war. Thebes would scarcely be a gainer by recovering the little town to the Boiotian confederacy: Athens would be in no way the weaker for losing her ancient and devoted ally. From first to last the Plataians were sacrificed to the vindictive meddlesomeness of the Thebans; and it must be admitted that in some measure they helped to sacrifice themselves. If the prisoners taken on the night of the surprise had been sent, as Perikles would have had them sent, to Athens, the possession of these hostages would have had a sobering effect upon the Thebans and would have extorted a very different verdict from the five commissioners of Sparta.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE REVOLUTION IN KOR KYRA TO THE CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA BY DEMOSTHENES AND KLEON.

THE defensive alliance of Kor kyra with Athens had been followed, it would seem, by something like peaceful and orderly government in that unhappy island; and things remained comparatively quiet until the Corinthians sent back the prisoners whom they had taken in the battles off the island.¹ Nominally they were set free under a promise to pay

State of parties in Kor kyra.
427 B.C.

¹ See p. 265.

800 talents as their ransom. Really their freedom was to be earned not by money but by severing the island from all connexion with Athens, in other words by transferring power from the demos to an oligarchy.

These men, in fulfilment of their compact, set to work to kindle a flame which was to consume not their enemies only but themselves. The time which followed was marked by a series of frightful crimes, by pitiless massacres, and an iron inhumanity, worthy of the worst days of the first French revolution. In Korkyra, as in France, the end was a thorough confusion of all political and social morality and the substitution of a new standard of right and wrong.¹ The animosity of the contending orders was embittered by resentment for terrible injuries, and all generous impulses were repressed by a blind and furious desire for revenge. The secret destruction of enemies became the great end to be aimed at, and they who were foremost in the race of iniquity won a reputation for pre-eminent wisdom. In this horrible rivalry the interests of faction supplied the one motive for every measure; and the ties of kindred and friendship went for nothing. In short, men on all sides acted solely from an all-absorbing selfishness,² and earth for the time became a hell.

The first step of the Korkyraians sent back from Corinth was a personal canvassing of the citizens generally for the purpose of breaking off the alliance with Athens. It was so far successful that on the arrival of envoys from Athens and Corinth a decree was passed confirming the Athenian alliance but re-establishing the ancient friendship with the Peloponnesians,—an arrangement which defeated itself. Their next act was the accusation of Peithias, a prominent member of the demos, on the general charge of betraying Korkyra to the Athenians. The trial (how carried on, we know not) ended in his acquittal: and Peithias in his turn, picking out five men of the wealthiest families, charged them with cutting stakes for vine props from the Temenos of Zeus and Alkinoös. The men were condemned to pay the fine of a stater, or four drachmas, for each stake cut. The vastness of the amount drove them to take sanctuary and to pray for permission to pay by instalments. But the demon of vindictiveness was busy at work; and Peithias prevailed on the people to let the law take its course. He was about to propose the renewal of an offensive alliance with Athens, when the oligarchic faction resolved to take

¹ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων
 ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαίῳσει.
 Thuc. iii. 82, 5.

² πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ
 πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν. Thuc. iii.
 82, 15.

the matter into their own hands. Breaking suddenly into the council chamber, they slew with their daggers Peithias and sixty of his fellow-senators, and then carried a decree that neither Spartans nor Athenians should be received except with a single ship. Envoys were at the same time sent to Athens to announce this resolution and to warn the Korkyraians who had sought a refuge there against making any attempts to disturb the order of things thus established. These envoys had already succeeded in gaining some of the exiles over to their side,¹ when they were seized by the Athenians and placed with their converts on the island of Aigina.² Meanwhile, at Korkyra the arrival of ambassadors from Sparta and Corinth encouraged the oligarchs to fresh acts of violence. The discomfited demos fled to the Akropolis and occupied the Hyllaic or southern harbor, while their enemies held the Agora and the harbor facing the coast of Epeiros. Both alike now made efforts to enlist the services of the slaves by the promise of freedom. The slaves for the most part joined the people: the oligarchs were strengthened by 800 mercenaries from the mainland. A battle which took place two days later ended in the defeat of the oligarchs, who, caring not at all whether they destroyed their own houses in that quarter, set fire to the Agora. Had the flames been carried by the wind, the whole town must have been burnt. At this moment, when the demos was most fiercely excited, the Athenian fleet of twelve triremes under Nikostratos reached Korkyra. The wish of the Athenian admiral was to effect an offensive alliance between Athens and Korkyra, and, having done this, to pour oil on the troubled waters. This task he thought he had accomplished when he had persuaded the Korkyraians to content themselves with bringing to trial ten of the most conspicuous and intemperate of the oligarchic party; and he was about to return to Naupaktos when the demos begged him to leave five of his ships and to take in their stead five triremes which they would themselves man. The consent of Nikostratos was followed, as we might expect, by an attempt to man these ships with crews taken from the aristocratic faction. But the going into vessels under the command of an Athenian general was much like going to Athens, and the going to Athens was death. The fear of being thus carried away drove them to take sanctuary in the temple of the Dioskoroi. Nikostratos tried in vain to disabuse them of their terrors; but the people were now in a state of feverish irritation, and construing their reluctance to serve on shipboard as evidence of some hidden plot, they deprived their enemies of their arms, and made fresh attempts to destroy them

¹ ὄσους ἐπεισαν. Thuc. iii. 72, 1.

² See p. 251.

which were again baffled by Nikostratos. Four hundred oligarchs took refuge at the Heraion; and the demos, now seriously alarmed, carried them over to the opposite islet, and sent to them thither their daily supplies of food. While things were in this state, a new turn was given to affairs by the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet of 53 triremes off Sybota. The tumult in Korkyra was terrible when in the early morning Alkidas, with whom Brasidas was joined as a counsellor, was seen bearing down upon the island. In wild confusion the Korkyraians set to work to man 60 triremes, which they sent out one by one, as they were filled, instead of allowing Nikostratos to follow his plan of keeping Alkidas in check until the Korkyraians could advance in a compact body. There was, in short, no authority and no law. Two Korkyraian ships at once deserted to the enemy, and the scattered groups of the remainder seemed to the Spartans so contemptible that twenty ships only were kept back to oppose them, while the remaining thirty-three prepared to encounter the twelve Athenian triremes. But Nikostratos was a general scarcely less formidable than Phormion. By a successful charge of one of his triremes he sunk one of the Peloponnesian ships, and then, while the Korkyraians were fighting rather among themselves than with their enemies, he so pressed upon the Spartans by sweeping rapidly round them, that the twenty ships reserved to deal with the islanders were drawn off to the aid of Alkidas. In face of this overpowering force Nikostratos was obliged to retreat; but he did so with perfect calmness and with a leisurely movement which might give the Korkyraians ample time to get back to their own harbor. By sailing straight to Korkyra Alkidas might now have carried everything before him; but to the disgust of Brasidas he contented himself with going to Sybota. Still fearing another attack the Korkyraian demos made overtures to the four hundred oligarchs whom they had brought back to Heraion, as well as to others, and prevailed on some of them to aid in manning thirty triremes which were hastily made ready.

The Peloponnesian fleet departed about midday, in all likelihood because they knew that large reinforcements might soon be expected for Nikostratos. Night was closing when Massacres at Korkyra. fire-signals warned Alkidas that Eurymedon with 60 Athenian triremes was sailing up from Leukas. Escaping under cover of darkness, the Peloponnesians dragged their ships across the Leukadian isthmus,¹ and so avoided an encounter. At Korkyra the approach of Eurymedon gave a vent to the pent-up fury of the demos, who now felt that they might requite their assail-

¹ See p. 61.

ants tenfold. They sent their ships round to the Hyllaic harbor, as being the quarter where the demos was strongest; but before the vessels could reach the haven, the work of bloodshed had begun. Those of the oligarchic party who had been induced to serve on shipboard were taken out and slain. The suppliants at the Heraion were invited to come forth and take their trial. Fifty obeyed, and were slaughtered within sight of their comrades. These chose rather to kill themselves than to be butchered by others: and the silence of death soon reigned in the Temenos of Hêrê. For seven days the massacre went on, and Eurymedon lifted not a finger to check or repress it. On his departure five hundred only of the oligarchic faction remained alive. These seized the Korkyraian forts on the mainland, and by frequent raids from these strongholds did so much mischief to the island, that the demos soon found itself pinched by famine. But their efforts to obtain aid from Sparta and Corinth were fruitless; and with a desperate resolution they landed on the island, burnt their ships to make retreat impossible, fortified themselves on the heights of Istônê to the north of the city, and made the surrounding country a desert.¹ They had maintained this post for nearly two years, when an Athenian fleet on its way from Pylos to Sicily under Eurymedon and Sophokles, son of Sostratides,² came to the aid of the demos, who were thus enabled to storm the fort and to bring to terms the garrison which had fallen back on a lofty and precipitous peak.³ By the covenant then made the oligarchic Korkyraians agreed to submit themselves to the judgment of the Athenians, and to give up their allies to the will and pleasure of the conquerors. Stripped of their weapons, they were taken to the islet of Ptychia, to be thence conveyed to Athens; but it was specially agreed that the attempt of any one man to escape would nullify the whole treaty and leave them at the mercy of their enemies. The demos or their chiefs were resolved that the treaty should be nullified. Emissaries were accordingly sent by these men to the prisoners, to cheat them into breaking the letter of the bond. They told them that the risk involved in an attempt to escape was at least to be preferred to the certainty of betrayal by the Athenians into the hands of merciless enemies, and they offered to provide boats to carry them to the mainland. The dismal ceremony went on. The boat was sent; the men got into it, and were taken; and the treaty was broken. The demos had gained their point, and to their lasting shame the Athenian generals had gained theirs also. These men were under orders to go on to Sicily, and to Eurymedon at least massacre was as

¹ Thuc. iii. 85.

² Ib. iii. 115.

³ Ib. iv. 45.

nothing in comparison with the annoyance of sending home a body of prisoners in the charge of a deputy who would carry off all the honors of the victory. The lie which was to cheat the prisoners to their ruin was thus deliberately concocted between the Athenian generals and the chiefs of the Korkyraian demos, who now shut up their victims in a large building, from which they were taken, twenty at a time, and made to run the gauntlet between the swords and spears of their personal enemies. Sixty had thus met their doom, when they who remained within the building found out what was going on and refused to leave it. The Korkyraians took off the roof of the building and began to shoot their prisoners down with tiles and arrows. The horrors which had already been witnessed at the Heraion were now seen here on a larger scale. All night long the work of murder and suicide went on, and in the morning the dead bodies were laid mat-wise on waggons and carted away from the city. The oligarchic faction was destroyed; and, like fire dying out for lack of fuel, the awful feuds which had drenched Korkyra in blood ceased, necessarily, to rend the island asunder. The narrative brings before us the picture of an unspeakably vindictive and savage people; nor is there any use in attempting to discriminate shades of guilt in criminals whose iniquities are all of so deep a dye. But one fact stands out, nevertheless, with singular clearness. The island was in orderly condition, when the oligarchic prisoners from Corinth came back with the deliberate purpose of stirring up trouble within it. It is enough to say that in both parties the sense of patriotic union was dead; that the demos was at the least an apt disciple in that school of iniquity in which the oligarchic factions in Hellas generally had distanced all competitors; and lastly that the crimes of these oligarchic factions were the crimes of men who called themselves pre-eminently gentlemen, nobly born, nobly bred, generous and refined, yet not less superstitious and altogether more hard-hearted, selfish, and cruel than the men of less splendid ancestry on whom they looked down with infinite contempt.

The summer of the fifth year of the war brought to the Athenians some success by the capture of Minoa, an islet used by the Megarians as a post to defend their neighboring harbor of Nisaia. The general in command of the successful force was Nikias the son of Nikaratos, a man who is said to have filled the office of Strategos even as a colleague of Perikles, but who is at this time first brought before our notice by Thucydides. From this moment he becomes one of the most prominent actors on the stage of Athenian politics, until his career closed under conditions thoroughly abhorrent to a nature singularly unenterprising and cautious. De-

Capture of
Minoa by
Nikias.
Summer of
427 B.C.

ficient in military genius, possessed of not much power as an orator, caring more for the policy of his party than for the wider interests of his country, this strictly conservative and oligarchic statesman gained and kept an ascendancy at Athens which might almost be put into comparison with that of Perikles. With both it rested in some part on the same foundation. In all that related to money Nikias, like Perikles, was incorruptible; and this fact alone, joined with careful decency of life, secured for him an influence with the people which from every other point of view was utterly undeserved. Endowed with ample wealth, he made use of his riches not for indulgence in luxury and pleasure but chiefly for the magnificent discharge of the Liturgies imposed on the wealthiest citizens. Generous in the gifts which were to increase his popularity, he was careful in husbanding and extending the resources which enabled him to make them. He was a speculator in the silver mines of Laureion, and he gained a large revenue by letting out slaves to work in these mines. In no way tainted with the philosophical tastes of Perikles, Nikias spent his leisure time in listening to the discourses of prophets whom he kept in his pay, while both his temper and the need of attending to his property made him either unambitious of public offices or even averse to filling them. Here again a carefulness which took the form of modesty increased the eagerness of the people to place him in positions which he wished rather to avoid, and to comply even with unreasonable demands which he made in the hope of avoiding them.

The summer in which Nikias captured Minoa was marked by the first interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily. The autumn was darkened by the reappearance of the plague which after a lull of some time burst out with extreme violence for a twelvemonth. But the earthquakes which took place in rapid succession in Attica and Eubœia and especially in the Boiotian Orchomenos during the following winter and spring were so far a benefit to the Athenians that they prevented the invading army of the Peloponnesians from advancing any further than the isthmus. An unsuccessful attempt on the part of the Athenians to bring the island of Melos into the Athenian confederacy was followed by an enterprise not much more successful, at first, on the side of the Spartans.

The Trachinians of the Malian gulf, annoyed by the mountaineers of Oita, had thought at first of asking help from the Athenians. But the fall of Plataiai or the recollection that the power of Athens was practically confined to the sea led them to apply to Sparta; and the Spartans

Second outbreak of the plague at Athens.

426 B.C.
Sixth year of the war.

Foundation of Herakleia by the Spartans.

saw in this petition an opportunity for inflicting permanent and serious mischief on Athens. Thus sprung into existence the town of Herakleia, from which friends and foes expected great things, and which hereafter was to attain some importance. But for the present a blight fell on the new settlement; and the Athenians found that nothing was to be feared from a colony which had started with high hopes, as under the special protection of Herakles.

Tidings of a more alarming kind reached them from a quarter to which they had looked without forebodings of evil. The Messenians of Naupaktos had impressed on Demosthenes the necessity of assailing in their fastnesses the savage clans of the Aitolian caterans, who, as living in scattered hamlets, could be attacked in succession and subdued long before they could combine their forces. So little did Demosthenes dread a conflict with these mountaineers, that he looked forward not only to an easy conquest, but to making use of them in further conquests. Second in ability as a naval commander only to Phormion, Demosthenes allowed himself to be carried away into schemes which Perikles assuredly would never have sanctioned. The caution which led the great statesman to oppose the expedition of Tolmides to Tanagra¹ would have resisted still more strenuously the daring but impracticable plan of restoring the supremacy of Athens in Boiotia by an attempt made not from Attica but from the passes of the Aitolian mountains. Yet such was the plan of Demosthenes. But his eyes must in some measure have been opened to the difficulties of his task, when on reaching Solion the Akarnanians flatly refused his request for their help. Still, undeterred by their desertion, he began his march towards the rugged sides of Oita. The villages of Potidania, Krokyleion, and Teichion were easily stormed; but the mountain tribes were now astir, and even the clans inhabiting the valleys watered by the tributary streams of the Spercheios hurried to the aid of their kinsfolk. Still the Messenians insisted that the enterprise was not merely practicable but easy: and without waiting for the Lokrian light-armed troops, of which he had the greatest need, he advanced to Aigition, a town not more than ten miles from the sea, and carried it by storm. But leaping down from the surrounding crags the Aitolians hurled showers of darts on the Athenians, falling back when these came forward, and harassing them as they again retreated. Everything depended now on the bowmen in the army of Demosthenes; but their captain was presently killed, his men scattered, and the retreat became a rout. Hurrying away from the Aitolian javelins, the Athenians fell into chasms worn

¹ See p. 251.

down by the winter torrents, or were entangled in difficult ground from which only an experienced guide could extricate them. Unhappily the Messenian Chromon, who had thus far served them, was among the slain; and the mountaineers hastened to fire the woods in which these fugitives were caught. A few only found their way to the Lokrian Oineôn, whence they had set out; and the triremes which had brought them from Leukas departed on their cheerless voyage to Athens. Demosthenes, not daring to face the people, remained in the neighborhood of Naupaktos.

But the Aitolians were now spurred on by the desire of further vengeance against the authors of the recent mischief; and when their envoys appeared at Sparta, they spoke to no unwilling hearers. It was now autumn; but a force was at once sent off for Delphoi, where Eurylochos, the Peloponnesian general, succeeded in detaching from their alliance with Athens the Lokrian tribes through whose lands he must pass on his way to Naupaktos. Keeping on in a westerly direction, he also took the Corinthian colony of Molykreion, now subject to Athens, and then turned round upon Naupaktos. But here he had a more formidable enemy to deal with. Undeterred by his last rebuff, Demosthenes went in person to Akarnania, and by persistent intreaty prevailed on the Akarnanians to come to the aid of the Messenian city. A thousand hoplites were embarked on board the fleet, and Naupaktos was saved. Eurylochos fell back to the west on the Aitolian town of Kalydon, the scene of the mythical boar hunt of Meleagros, and thence on Pleuron beneath the heights of Arakynthos. The winter season had begun when 3,000 Ambrakian hoplites seized Olpai, a fortress about three miles to the north of Argos; the Akarnanians sent also urgent messages to Demosthenes, who no longer seemed to them a person to be slighted, and to the leaders of the Athenian fleet of twenty ships then coasting off the Peloponnesos. Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet sailed into the Ambrakian gulf and took up a position off Olpai, while Demosthenes, who was now chosen general of the Akarnanians, incamped on ground separated from that which Eurylochos occupied by the bed of a winter torrent of more than usual width. Five days passed without any movement. On the sixth day both sides made ready for battle. From the superiority of their numbers the Spartans were able so to extend their line as well-nigh to surround their enemies: and Demosthenes resolved to adopt again the plan which had brought about the discomfiture of the Ambrakiots with Knemos at Stratos.¹ In the fight which followed, the Peloponnesians under Eurylochos on the

Attempt of the Aitolians and Spartans on Naupaktos.

¹ See p. 289.

left wing were turning the flank of the Messenians under Demosthenes, when the Akarnanians starting from their hiding-place attacked them in the rear. Smitten with panic terror they not only fled themselves but carried most of their allies along with them. The death of Eurylochos and of the best amongst his men added to their dismay. In the meanwhile the Ambrakiots and others on the right wing had chased the enemy opposed to them as far as Argos. Returning to the battle-field, they found the day irretrievably lost, and made their way to Olpai in a disorderly retreat which added to the number of the slain.

Darkness was closing in when the battle ended. During the night Menedaios, who, having been third in command, had now taken the place of Eurylochos, convinced himself that his first duty was to escape from a difficult if not a desperate entanglement. It was his wish, of course, to extricate all who had fought on his side. When on the following day he made overtures to Demosthenes for a truce which should give them time for retreat, he was met by a refusal to all appearance peremptory; but he was privately informed that if he and his Peloponnesians chose to withdraw quietly and secretly, the Akarnanian generals would take care that their retreat should be unmolested. These ignominious terms were not refused; and the design of Demosthenes for discrediting them among the allies whom they abandoned and among the Greeks generally was thoroughly successful.

About twelve miles to the north of Olpai rose two precipitous hills, known as Idomené. The higher of these two summits was occupied by the troops sent by Demosthenes to intercept the Ambrakiots, who, having already posted themselves on the lower hill, yet knew not what had taken place. Demosthenes himself marched during the night towards Idomené, leaving one-half of his force up the pass, while the other half worked its way round over the Amphilocheian hills. At dawn of day the Ambrakiot sentinels heard themselves hailed in the familiar Dorian dialect by men whom they naturally took to be their friends. The spokesmen were Messenians whom Demosthenes had purposely placed in the van, and who now began the work of slaughter on men practically unarmed and defenceless. The Ambrakiots were in every way at a disadvantage. They were roused suddenly from their slumbers by enemies who had taken care to cut off all chances of escape. The necessary result followed. Many of the Ambrakiots rushed into the gullies and watercourses and thus into the ambuscades there set for them. A few stragglers only returned to the Ambrakian city, while the Akarnanians, having plundered the dead and set up their trophies, betook them-

Retreat of
the Pelopon-
nesians after
the defeat at
Olpai.

Destruction
of the Am-
brakiots at
Idomené.

selves to Argos. Thither on the following day came a herald from the Ambrakiots who after the previous engagement had fled into the land of the Agraians. On the huge pile of arms taken from the men slain at Idomenê he gazed with such evident astonishment that a bystander asked him the reason of his wonder, and the number of the bodies which he demanded for burial. To his reply that they were at the most two hundred, his questioner answered by pointing out the obvious fact that the arms before him were those of at least a thousand men. 'Then,' said the herald, 'these are not the arms of the men who fought with us.' 'But they must be,' retorted the Akarnanian, 'if you fought at Idomenê yesterday.' 'We fought with none yesterday,' was the answer; 'the battle was on the day before when we were retreating from Olpai.' 'It may be so,' said the other; 'but these are the arms of the Ambrakiots whom we defeated yesterday on their way from the city.' The herald understood at once that the whole force of Ambrakia had been routed, if not cut to pieces, and with a loud and bitter cry of agony he departed without giving further heed to the errand on which he had come. So ended the most fearful carnage of the war which was brought to a close with the peace of Nikias.¹ The campaign had done little for Athens, but much for Demosthenes. Without calling on the state to aid him he had achieved a victory which insured to him the condonation of his previous mistakes; but the Athenians had gained nothing beyond a pledge on the part of the Ambrakiots that they would take no part in any operations directed against Athens.

The seventh year of the war began with the usual invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesian army under Agis, the son of Archidamos; but the time of the inroad was earlier. The corn was still green, and a singularly cold and stormy spring added to the discomfort of the invaders while it increased the difficulty of getting food. But scarcely a fortnight had passed since they crossed the Attic border, when Agis received tidings which caused him to hurry homewards with all speed. The ill-success of the Aitolian campaign had not damped the courage of Demosthenes, or deterred him from forming elaborate schemes for bringing the war to a happy issue. His plan for restoring the supremacy of Athens over Boiotia by an invasion from the northwest was suggested by the Messenians of Naupaktos; in his present design he followed the advice of the same counsellors. He was in this case justified in doing so; and the high reputation which he had won through his victories at Olpai and Idomenê insured him a favorable hearing

Occupation
of Pylos by
Demosthe-
nes in the
seventh year
of the war.
425 B.C.

¹ Thuc. iii. 113, 11.

when he asked the sanction of the people for employing in any operations along the coasts of Peloponnesos the fleet of forty ships which they were sending first to Korkyra¹ and then to Sicily. His request was granted ; and the fact that he was not one of the Strategoi for the year² attests the thorough confidence which his countrymen felt in his genius. But the generals with whom he sailed were less disposed to listen when on doubling the promontory of Methônê he suggested that Pylos might serve well for the purposes of his scheme. They insisted on sailing onwards, but a storm brought them back to Pylos, and Demosthenes again urged the advantages of occupying a spot not much more than fifty miles from Sparta, well supplied with wood and stone for fortification, and surrounded by a practically desert country. Their reply was that many such spots might be found on the Peloponnesian coasts, if he chose to waste public money upon them ; nor had he any better success either with the subordinate officers or with the men. But the storm lasted on for days, and the men, wearied with idleness, began of their own accord to fortify the place by way of passing the time. They soon took a serious interest in the work which they had begun almost in sport, and toiled hard to strengthen the comparatively small extent of ground which was not sufficiently fortified by nature, before a Peloponnesian army could be marched against them. Six days sufficed to complete the wall on the land side, and Demosthenes was left with five ships to hold the place, while the rest went on to Korkyra.

The spot thus chosen, associated with the traditional glories of Nestor, is described by Thucydides as a rocky promontory, known also under the name Koryphasion, separated from the island of Sphakteria by a passage wide enough to admit two triremes abreast. This island, fifteen furlongs in length or in superficial size (for his expression is not decisive on this point), stretched from northwest to southeast, a passage capable of admitting eight or nine war-ships abreast dividing it from the mainland. Within this breakwater lay the spacious harbor of Pylos, in which Demosthenes hoped to raise to a higher point than ever the reputation of the Athenian navy.

The tidings that the Athenians were masters of Pylos had brought Agis and his men away from Attica ; and a large force of infantry had assembled to attack the fortifications on the land side, before the sixty Peloponnesian ships could return from Korkyra. Their plan was simple, and of its success they felt no doubt, if only the work could be

¹ The Korkyraian demos was at this time still annoyed by the oligarchical exiles who occupied

Mount Istônê. See p. 309.

² Thuc. iv. 2, 3.

Attack of
Brasidas on
Pylos.

done before Demosthenes received any reinforcements. The Athenian ships from Zakynthos might arrive at any moment ; and in the interval it was indispensably necessary that the occupants of Pylos should be crushed by a simultaneous attack by land and sea. Triremes lashed together with their heads facing seawards were to block up, it is said, both entrances to the harbor, while a body of Spartan hoplites, landed on Sphacteria, would not only make it impossible for the Athenians to use that island as a military post, but would support the fleet in its attack on the fortification. The former part of this plan was not carried out ; but the hoplites, drafted by lot from all the Lochoi or centuries, were placed on the islet under the command of Eпитadas. Demosthenes on his side had done all that an able and brave leader could do. Before the Peloponnesian fleet entered the harbor, he had sent off two ships to summon with all speed the whole squadron from Zakynthos ; and drawing up his own five triremes on the shore under the walls of his fort, he hedged them in with a stout stockade. Their crews he armed with such shields (for the most part of wicker work) as could there be got or made ; and the few weapons which he placed in their hands were obtained from a Messenian privateer of thirty oars and a pinnace, from which he received also the not less welcome aid of forty hoplites. The day went precisely as he had anticipated. On the land side Peloponnesian besiegers were not much to be feared ; and we are only told that they achieved nothing. The attack made by the fleet of 43 ships under Thrasy-melidas is related with greater detail. In detachments of four or five vessels at a time the Spartans strove to effect a landing on some of the narrow openings by which alone they could approach the fort. The Athenians were already here to encounter them : but they had a powerful ally in the rocks and reefs which girt this dangerous promontory, and the captains of the ships exhibited a natural reluctance to risk the destruction of their vessels. Furious at the sight, Brasidas asked them whether they meant for the sake of saving some timber to allow the enemy to establish himself in their country, while on the allies he urged the duty of sacrificing, if need be, every ship belonging to them as a small return for the long series of good deeds which they had received from Sparta. Then, insisting that his own ship should be driven straight upon the beach, he took his stand on the gangway ready to spring on land. In this position he was exposed, before he could strike a blow or even attempt to leap on shore, to showers of darts and arrows. Struck down with many wounds, he fell back fainting into the forepart of the vessel with his left arm hanging over the side, and his shield slipped off into the water. Dashed up presently by the waves on the beach, it was seized by the Athe-

nians who with it crowned the trophy raised after the battle. The Spartans were completely baffled; and evening closed on the strange victory of Athenians on the Peloponnesian coast over Peloponnesians who sought in vain to effect a landing from their own ships on their own shores. Two days more were spent in futile efforts on the part of the Lakedaimonians to obtain a footing on the beach. On the third day they sent for wood for the construction of battering engines; but their schemes were disconcerted by the arrival of the Athenian fleet from Zakynthos. For that night the Athenian commanders were compelled to sail back to the islet of Protê, for Sphakteria was full of hoplites, and the Spartan army held the ground beyond the fortifications of Demosthenes, while their ships lay just within the entrance to the harbor. On the following morning the Athenian generals advanced in order of battle, with the intention of forcing their way within the passage, unless the enemy should come out to meet them in the open sea. With a strange infatuation the Lakedaimonians quietly awaited their attack within the harbor; and the Athenians sweeping in at both entrances dashed down upon their ships, disabling many and taking five, with the whole crew of one, and running into those vessels which had fled to the shore. Others were seriously injured before they could be manned and put to sea; and others again, deserted by their crews, were towed away empty.

The Athenians had won another and a decisive victory; and something must at once be done, if the hoplites in Sphakteria, many of them belonging to the first families of Sparta, were to be saved from starvation or from the imminent risk of being taken prisoners by an overwhelming force.

The ephors themselves at once hurried from Sparta to Pylos to effect a truce until envoys should have returned from Athens with the decision of the people whether for peace or for continued war. The terms on which this truce was arranged were sufficiently stringent. Every ship of the Lakedaimonian fleet, wherever it might be, was to be brought to Pylos and surrendered to the Athenians, who were to yield them up again at the end of the truce in the condition in which they had received them; and no attack whether by land or sea was to be attempted against the Athenian fortifications. On the other hand the Athenians, while they agreed that the Spartans should under strict inspection send in a daily allowance of food and wine for the men imprisoned in Sphakteria, reserved to themselves the right of keeping a constant guard round the island, under the one condition that they should make no attempt to land upon it. Not very many days had passed since the Athenians had witnessed the premature retreat of the invading army; and nothing was further

Embassy of the Spartans to Athens for the negotiation of a peace.

from their minds than the thought that the next scene in the drama would be the sight of Spartan ambassadors suing for peace with a tone of moderation, if not of humility, in little harmony with their general character. The blockade of the hoplites in Sphakteria had suddenly opened the eyes of the Spartans to the exceeding value of forbearance and kindness, and indeed to the general duty of the forgiveness of injuries. The Hellenic world, they urged, was sorely in need of rest, and the boon would be not the less welcome because they knew not now who had begun the quarrel, and had at best a vague notion as to what they were fighting for; and lastly they hinted that a haughty rejection of their proposal would carry with it a new and terrible danger. Thus far Sparta was actuated by no feelings of uncompromising enmity towards Athens; but the loss of her hoplites in Sphakteria and still more their massacre if taken prisoners by the Athenians would make the Spartans their bitter and relentless foes in a war which must end in extermination on one side or the other.

Adversity often teaches some very wholesome lessons, and the Spartans never spoke more to the purpose than when they said that the time for ending the war had come. They had indeed forgotten, or they did not care to dwell on the fact, that when Athens was down under the scourge of the great pestilence, they had dismissed with contempt the Athenian envoys who had come to sue for peace; but many of the more moderate citizens were content to overlook this inconsistency in their wider regard for the permanent interests not of Athens only but of Hellas. Unfortunately among these moderate citizens not one was to be found who could venture to force these interests on the attention of the people. Had Perikles been alive and in the full vigor of his mental powers, he would have insisted that the honor of Athens must be amply asserted; but he would have insisted not less earnestly that no unnecessary hindrances should be placed in the way of a settlement which Athenians might make not only with satisfaction but with self-respect. But Perikles was dead, and Kleon was living with a spirit unchanged from the day when he hounded on his countrymen to slaughter the friendly Demos as well as the rebellious oligarchy of Mytilene. The account which Thucydides gives of the interference of Kleon in the debate is short and marked by his personal animosity to the man. Introduced with all the particularity of a first notice,¹ Kleon is represented as saying that the Athenians could not honorably demand less than the surrender of the

Debate at Athens on the propositions of the Spartan envoys.

¹The introduction in Thucydides, iv. 21, 2, is clearly superfluous after the very similar terms in

which he is introduced, iii. 36, 5, before the second debate about the Mytilenians.

hoplites in Sphakteria with all their arms, and that after these men should have been brought as prisoners to Athens, the Spartans might make a further truce pending negotiations for a permanent peace, on the one condition of giving back to the Athenians Nisaea, Pegai, Troizen, and Achaia which had been extorted from them under constraint long before the beginning of the war.¹

To these demands the Spartan envoys made no direct reply ; but no rejection of the proposal was implied in their request for the appointment of commissioners to discuss the terms with them and submit the result, as it must necessarily be submitted, to the people. In the case of the Mytilenaians Kleon had availed himself of the popular feeling which was smarting under the sense of a causeless revolt on the part of a state which had been treated with exceptional kindness ; and he now availed himself of the popular sentiment which sprang from a natural elation on success as sudden as it was unlooked-for and decisive. On hearing the request of the Spartan ambassadors, he burst out into loud and indignant denunciations of their double-dealing. He had suspected from the first that they had come with no good intent : he was now sure that they wished only to cheat and mislead the people, before whom he bade them speak out anything which they had to say. The envoys were taken by surprise. Popular debates were things unknown at Sparta ; and the uncultured discipline under which their lives had been passed left them little fit to cope with the bluster of loud-tongued speakers or to plead their cause before a vast assembly. Nor had any citizen of the moderate party, from Nicias downwards, the courage to demand that the request of the envoys should be submitted to the decision of the people. It was the duty of such citizens to deny the right of Kleon to impute evil motives to the ambassadors. They might have insisted that although the people must in the last resort sanction or condemn the conclusions reached by the men whom they might appoint as commissioners, the preliminary stages would be far better left to the counsels of a few citizens selected especially for the task. Nicias, or those who agreed with him, might have urged further that of these citizens Kleon himself should be one ; nor in such case could Kleon have repeated his impudent assumption, when it must have called forth the obvious retort that his words must be made good by some show of proof.

With the return of the envoys to Pylos the truce ended, and the Spartans demanded the restoration of their fleet. But the Athenians alleged against them some attack on their fortification ; and as the slightest infraction of any one part of the agreement was to vitiate the whole, they

Resumption
of the war ;
blockade of
Sphakteria.

¹ See p. 254.

refused, on this excuse which the historian admits to be paltry, to surrender the Lakedaimonian ships. Protesting against the iniquity, the Spartans made ready to carry on the war. They did so at a great disadvantage: and the circumstances of the case generally make it more than possible that the double-dealing which Kleon imputed to the Spartan envoys was distinctly contemplated by Demosthenes and the Strategoi when the Lakedaimonian fleet was committed to their charge. Their one great object now was to cut off all possibility of escape from the hoplites in Sphakteria; and the most effectual way of preventing the Spartans from getting at them would be to deprive them of their ships.

But at first it seemed as though, in spite of these vast advantages, the Athenians would find that they had undertaken a task beyond their powers. Their slender garrison was itself besieged by an army which occupied the land on all sides: and one solitary spring on the summit of the little peninsula furnished a scanty supply of water for them and for the crews of the triremes. Compelled to land whether for sleeping or eating from ships which had no accommodation for either purpose, they scraped aside the pebbles on the beach to get such water as they might find underneath, and after a short time for rest returned on board to make room for others to land. On the other hand the hoplites in Sphakteria were well supplied from a spring in the centre of the island; and the Spartans on shore promised freedom to Helots and large rewards to freemen who might succeed in bringing ground corn, cheese, wine, or other provisions into the island.

In short, the prospects of Demosthenes and Eurymedon were singularly dark and gloomy; and they were at once felt to be so at Athens when the tidings came not that Sphakteria was taken but that the hoplites within it were in no lack of food while their own men were beginning to be in want. The feeling of elation caused by the coming of the Spartan envoys as humble suitors was followed by dark forebodings, and the popular feeling ran strongly not, as it should have done, in the channel of self-accusation, but, according to the Athenian fashion of shifting all responsibility upon advisers, against Kleon. The leather-seller was indeed sorely perplexed, and in the spirit of selfishness which characterises all sides in this fearful war¹ his opponents were in the same measure delighted. At the spur of the moment he charged the messengers from Pylos with falsehood: but he felt that he had made a false move when they asked that commissioners should be sent to test the truth of their report, and when he himself was chosen along with Theogenes

Causes tending to prolong the siege.

Mission of Kleon with reinforcements for Pylos.

¹ See pp. 304, 310.

to discharge this duty. If he went, he must either eat his own words, if their account should be correct, or be soon convicted of a lie, if he ventured to put a better face upon the matter. Then followed a scene which singularly illustrates that state of political feeling in the oligarchic party at Athens which was afterwards to lead to signal disaster. In bringing about the dismissal of the Spartan envoys Kleon was distinctly both foolish and wrong. But the question now was how to insure the safety of the garrison and fleet at Pylos; and the question was one which concerned all Athenians alike, and in which banter and levity must be dangerously near the borders of treachery. With all his faults and with all his recklessness in imputing falsehood to others, Kleon was none the less right in telling the Athenians, that if they believed the news just brought to them, their business was to sail without a moment's delay to help their countrymen and seize the hoplites in Sphakteria; that if the Strategoi then present were men they would at once do so; and that if he were in their place not an hour should be wasted before setting off. Nikias, instead of feeling that Kleon was doing no more than pointing out his clear duty as Strategos, answered at once that, if the task seemed to him so easy, he would do well to undertake it himself. Kleon was guilty of indiscretion, perhaps, in answering that he was ready to go; but he can be charged with nothing more, and his fault was more than atoned when on seeing that Nikias really meant to yield up his authority to him he candidly confessed his incompetence for military command. With incredible meanness, if not with deliberate treachery, Nikias called the Athenians to witness that he solemnly gave up his place to Kleon; and the eagerness of the demos to ratify the compact was naturally increased by the wish of Kleon to evade it. Noisy and arrogant as he may have been, Kleon yet was a man who, like Varro, refused to despair of the commonwealth; and he at once said that, if he must go, he should set out on his errand without any fear of the Lakedaimonians, under the full assurance that within twenty days he would return home either having slain, or bringing with him as prisoners, the hoplites now shut up in Sphakteria.

The bitter animosity of Thucydides to the man who was mainly instrumental in bringing about his own banishment could not tempt him to suppress facts; but it led him to indulge in feelings which apart from this ground of irritation he would have scouted as unworthy of an Athenian. Kleon had done no more than assert that Athens was well able to do what Nikias held to be impossible; and Thucydides stigmatises this assertion and his confident anticipation of success as tokens of

Attitude of
Nikias and
the oligar-
chic party.

¹ Livy, xxii. 61.

madness.¹ Kleon had further taken care that his colleague should be the man whose genius had not merely planned the enterprise at Pylos but had successfully achieved a far more difficult task among the Akarnanian and Amphilochian mountains. He could scarcely have shown sounder sense or greater modesty in his arrangements : and yet Thucydides can tell us without a feeling of self-condemnation that Kleon's speech was received by the Athenians with laughter and that sober-minded men were well pleased with an arrangement which could not fail to insure one of two good things, either the defeat and ruin of Kleon or a victory over the Lakedaimonians which might open the way for peace. Still more astounding is his statement that the ruin of Kleon was what these sober-minded men especially desired.² In the judgment of Englishmen these sober-minded men would be mere traitors : but it is hard, if not impossible to believe, that the words of Kleon were received with laughter by the whole body of the Athenians,³ and we are driven to the conclusion that in this instance personal jealousy has betrayed Thucydides into a distortion or at least into the exaggeration of fact. The laughter came probably only from the members of the oligarchic clubs and from those who were afraid of offending them.

Thus ended a scene infinitely disgraceful to Nicias and his partisans. But Kleon found himself at Pylos among men who were not less ready than the Athenians at home to fall in with his plan of immediate and decisive operations. They were thoroughly tired of being besieged themselves while they were professedly blockading others : and a fire, accidentally kindled by Athenians who were compelled to land in parties on the island and dine under a guard, had burnt down most of the wood in Sphakteria and greatly lessened the risks and the difficulty of landing. The Spartan hoplites could no longer shoot them down from behind impenetrable coverts, while they also lay exposed to the arrows of the Athenian bowmen, and the island could with comparative ease be traversed by a hostile force. Hence on the arrival of Kleon there seemed to be the more likelihood that the Spartans on the mainland would listen to the proposal which was at once made to them for the surrender of the hoplites. But the Spartans would not hear of it ; and with the full consent of Kleon Demosthenes arranged the plan of attack. His great aim was to do his work by means of the light-armed troops. An encounter of Athenian with Spartan hoplites could lead only to terrible slaughter in which not only would the Athenians probably be the greater sufferers but a large number of the enemy would be slain whom he especially wished to take alive.

¹ iv. 39. 3.

² iv. 28. 5.

³ τ ο ι ς δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἐνέπεσε κ. τ. λ. iv. 28, 5.

This end he hoped to achieve by surrounding them with numbers so manifestly overwhelming as to convince them that their only course was to surrender; nor could it be said that a slur was cast even on Spartan bravery if 390 men with their attendants yielded up their weapons to an army falling not much, if at all, short of 10,000. From the first the Spartans had no chance. The stones and arrows shot from the slings and bows of their enemies told on them from a distance at which their own heavy spears were useless; and if they made a charge, the force in front fell back while others advanced to annoy them in the rear. Before them stood motionless the compact mass of Athenian hoplites; but all attempts to reach them were baffled by showers of weapons from the light-armed troops on either side. All, it is true, who came within their reach were borne down by the strokes of the most redoubtable warriors in the world; and at the outset the light-armed troops of Demosthenes, even at a safe distance, gazed with feelings of wonder bordering almost on dismay upon men whose bravery, strength, and discipline had won for them a terrible reputation. But the discovery that at a little distance they were comparatively powerless so far restored their self-possession, that rushing simultaneously from every side they ran with loud cries and shoutings on the devoted band. Unable in the fearful din purposely raised by their assailants to hear the orders given, they at length began to fall back slowly to the guard-post at the north-western end of the island where the ground is highest; but the very fact of their retreat insured their doom. They had abandoned the only spring of water on the islet, and in a few hours more or less thirst alone would do all that Demosthenes could desire. But in the meanwhile they were comparatively safe. Their rear was covered by the sea, and the Athenians now as vainly strove to dislodge them from their position as the Spartans had thus far sought in vain to come to close quarters with the Athenian hoplites. Demosthenes and Kleon were, however, soon relieved of their perplexity. The leader of the Messenian allies, pledging himself to find a track which should bring them to the rear of the enemy, led his men round from a spot not within sight of the Spartans, and creeping along wherever the precipitous ground gave a footing, suddenly showed himself above them. Summarily checking all further attack, he sent a herald to demand unconditional surrender; and the dropping of their shields as their hands were raised aloft showed that the inevitable terms were accepted. Four hundred and twenty hoplites had been cooped up in Sphakteria when Kleon arrived with his reinforcements. Of these 292 lived to be taken prisoners, and of these again not less than 120 were genuine Spartiatai of the noblest lineage. The loss of the Athenians was trifling.

Seventy days had passed away since the victory of the Athenian ships in the harbor of Pylos had cut off the hoplites in Sphakteria from all communication with the army on land: but so carefully had Epitadas husbanded the provisions brought in during the three weeks of truce, or so successfully had the Peloponnesian boatmen and swimmers evaded the Athenian guard-ships, that the besieged were in no danger of famine when Demosthenes and Kleon determined to cut short the contest. The work was now done. Within twenty days from the time of his departure Kleon re-entered the harbor of Peiræus, bringing with him the costliest freight which had ever been landed on its shores. Thucydides dismisses the fact with the curt comment that the mad pledge of Kleon had thus been literally redeemed. On this verdict little needs to be said. Disgraceful though it may be, it is not nearly so disgraceful as the conduct of Nicias and his partisans in not merely suffering but compelling Kleon to undertake a work which they regarded as fit only for a madman. The judgment of the historian is, in short, the judgment of his party; and it proves not the insanity of Kleon but the political immorality of those who would have it that 10,000 Athenians, under a general singularly fertile in expedients, popular with his men, and supported by precisely the kind of force which he most needed, could not hope to capture 400 Spartans who were cut off from all possibility of escape by a hedge of the enemy's ships and the forfeiture of their own navy.

Return of
Kleon with
the Spartan
prisoners to
Athens.

CHAPTER V.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE CAPTURE OF SPHAKTERIA TO THE PEACE OF NIKIAS.

THE success of Demosthenes and Kleon had a marked effect on public feeling at Athens. The occupation of Pylos, bringing with it the hope of capturing the hoplites shut up in Sphakteria, had not only removed the depression which till then had been very generally felt, but had awakened in the party of which Kleon was the most prominent speaker a desire of recovering for Athens the supremacy which she had won and lost before the thirty years' truce. But there were nevertheless many to whom such schemes appeared impracticable; and it was only the personal influence of Kleon which turned the scale in favor of carrying on the war. Now, it would

Change in
the popular
feeling at
Athens.

seem, no voice was raised on behalf of peace; and Nikias had brought on himself so much disgrace by his behavior in the matter of Sphakteria that he could not venture on warnings which would now have been both seasonable and wholesome. The Athenians could make peace whenever they might choose to do so; but without offering for the present any terms to the Spartans they placed a permanent garrison at Pylos, and the exiled Messenians returning eagerly from Naupaktos began to lay waste the Lakonian territories.

The northern portion of the Peloponnesos was now to suffer from the activity of the Athenians. A fleet of eighty ships issued from Peiraiæus under cover of night, and before dawn the army had disembarked on the beach beneath the hill on which stood the unfortified village of Solygeia distant about six miles from Corinth and two from the isthmus. Fire-signals announcing the event called forth the whole available Corinthian force. The fight which followed was one at close quarters throughout; but the issue of the obstinate contest, after a temporary repulse of the Athenians, was determined by the Athenian cavalry. The Corinthians, destitute of horsemen, were at length made to give way; the Athenians sailed on the same day to Krommyon, and ravaged its lands. On the next day they occupied the peninsula between Epidauros and Troizen, and building a wall across the isthmus, made it a permanent post from which raids might be made on the coast lands of the neighborhood.¹

The history of this momentous year was not yet closed. An Athenian fleet had yet to make its way to Sicily, and on its voyage Eurymedon was to bring about by his detestable treachery the slaughter which marked the end of the bloody struggles at Korkyra.² An incident on the shores of the Egean brought the Athenians into momentary contest with the Persian power. Artaphernes, an envoy from Artaxerxes to the Spartans, was seized at Eion on the mouth of the Strymon by the commander of one of the tribute-gathering Athenian ships, and was brought to Athens with his dispatches. The gist of these lay in the complaint that with all his efforts the king could not make out what the Spartans wanted. Their ambassadors had come each with a different story, and if they wished to make their meaning clear, they must send with Artaphernes men who could speak intelligibly. The dispatch of Artaxerxes never reached Sparta. Artaphernes was sent back to Ephesos with some Athenian envoys to the great king. About

Campaign of Nikias on the coasts of the Saronic gulf.

Capture of the Persian envoy Artaphernes on his way to Sparta.

¹ Thuc. iv. 45.

² See p. 300.

the objects of their mission nothing is said ; but if we may fairly infer that they aimed at detaching Persia from all alliance with Sparta, we may be quite sure that they were guiltless of the treachery which led the Spartans to call down the force of an Asiatic despot to aid them in crushing an Hellenic city. To them the absurdity of bringing a Persian fleet or army to the Peloponnesos was manifest : and in the East their only interest was to keep the Persian king within the bounds which for nearly half a century he had been compelled to respect. But the object of the Athenians, whatever it may have been, was frustrated by the death of the king. The envoys heard the tidings at Ephesos, and returned straight to Athens.

The building of a new wall to their city by the Chians seemed to the Athenians to forebode a rebellion such as that which they had already had to crush in Samos and Lesbos, and a peremptory order was at once sent to them to pull it down. The decision of the Athenians was soon justified by the hostile movements of Lesbian exiles on the opposite mainland.

Order to the Chians to pull down the new wall of their city.

The Spartans had been already more than vexed by the settlement of a hostile force on the little peninsula of Pylos ; but within sight of the southwestern promontory of Lakonia lay an island, of which according to an old story the sage Chilon had said that it would be well for the Spartans if they could sink it to the bottom of the sea.¹ Whatever precautions the Spartans may have taken (and Thucydides tells us that they guarded Kythera with more than usual care), they were ineffectual against the energetic attacks which Nikias and his colleagues, with a fleet of sixty ships carrying 2,000 hoplites and some horsemen, made simultaneously upon the two towns in the island. In fact, the resistance was more nominal than real ; and the enterprise had been in part concerted with a friendly body among the people who wished to be rid of the oligarchic rule of Sparta. But for these allies the Athenians would without hesitation have dealt with Kythera as they had dealt with Aigina.² As it was, some few were sent to take their trial at Athens, under promise, however, that they should not be put to death ; and the Athenians set to work to show the Spartans how they meant to use their new conquest. Athenian ships made descents on Asine, Helos, and other places on the Lakonian gulf. The lands of Epidaurus Limera on the eastern coast were then ravaged, and lastly the Athenian fleet appeared before Thyrea where the ex-

Athenian occupation of Kythera. 424 B. C.

¹ Herod. vii. 235. See p. 188. This portion of the history of Herodotos must, it would seem, have been written before the descent of Nikias on the island.

² See p. 251.

pelled Aiginetans had found a home. The Aiginetans captured within it were all taken to Athens and were all there put to death. Thus was swept away the remnant of that people who had shared with the Athenians the glory of Salamis, and a second catastrophe as horrible as that of Plataiai attested the strength of the fatal disease which rendered impossible the growth of an Hellenic nation.

It was at this time, it would seem, that the Spartans committed a crime, the reality of which we can accept only on the assertion of an historian with whose veracity even personal hatred was not allowed to interfere. Among those who risked life and limb to convey food to the men shut up in Sphakteria the most prominent were the Helots to whom the Spartans had promised freedom as the reward of their good service. But, if Thucydides may be believed, the eyes of the Spartans were blinded to everything except the fact that Helots (probably those who had not been manumitted) were deserting to the Messenians at Pylos, and that the success of Nikias had opened for them another refuge at Kythera. Happily for the lasting interests of mankind the most strenuous preachers of the gospel of slavery have never hesitated to act towards the slaves of other men on the hypothesis that of all evils slavery is the worst; and even Aristotle himself, who would no more concede the right of rebellion to his own 'animated machines' than he would concede it to his horses or his asses, would without scruple, if he wished to ruin the citizen of another state, teach that man's 'breathing instruments' that they had fully as much right to be free as their master. The panic fear caused by the dread of such teaching has led to some crimes the enormity of which staggers our powers of belief; but these crimes have in their turn sealed the doom of that accursed system which received an execrable sanction from philosophers like Aristotle and Plato. Goaded on by such unreasoning terrors, the Spartans, it is said, issued a proclamation that all who felt that their exploits on behalf of Sparta gave them a title to freedom might at once come forward and claim it, under the assurance that if their claim should be found to rest on good evidence the boon should be conferred upon them. How many came forward we are not told: two thousand, it is said, were selected as worthy of liberty, and with garlands on their heads went the round of the temples in which they now stood on a level with the highest born Dorian. But the Spartans never meant that the gift should be really enjoyed. A few days later, of these 2,000 men not one remained to be seen. How they had dis-

¹ ἐμψυχον ὄργανον. *Polit.* i. 4, 2.

appeared, no one ever could say: but if they lived at all, their place literally knew them henceforth no more. If we hold that the crime was committed, there seems to be no other time to which we can possibly assign it: but there is a strange inconsistency in the readiness of the Spartans to employ the surviving Helots on foreign service after wreaking on them cruelties which might waken a desperate resistance in the meanest-minded of mankind. If there was danger in setting Helots free, there was greater danger in placing arms in the hands of their kinsfolk after a massacre more ruthless than any other of which we hear even in Greek history. Yet Helot hoplites not many months later are dispatched with Brasidas to Thrace: and no catastrophe follows.

The Spartans, in the judgment of Thucydides, were suffering under a paroxysm of selfish fear which had its natural fruit in cowardly and atrocious cruelty. Whether such a ^{Proposed expedition of Brasidas to Thrace.} state as Sparta was worth the saving, is a question with which we need not concern ourselves; but we can scarcely doubt that it must have fallen but for the singularly un-Spartan genius and energy of Brasidas. The larger mind of this eminent man saw that only a diversion of the Athenian forces to a distant scene would loosen the iron grasp in which they now held the Peloponnesos. Such a diversion was rendered practicable by invitations which came from the towns of the Chalkidic peninsula and from the habitually faithless Perdikkas who now wished to be aided in settling a quarrel with the Lynkestian chief Arrhibaics.¹ The Spartans were well pleased to intrust the task to Brasidas, whose coming the Chalkidians made a special condition in the compact: and they were still more pleased at the opportunity of getting rid of another large body of Helots by sending them on foreign service. Seven hundred of these bondmen were armed as hoplites;² and the fact that after the slaughter of the 2,000 they could fail to take dire vengeance as soon as they had crossed the Lakonian border and before Brasidas had levied the 1,000 Peloponnesian hoplites³ which accompanied him on his march through Thessaly into Thrace, is one which might tempt us to think that the story of that fiendish massacre was a wild distempered dream.

But before he could complete his levies, his interference was needed nearer home. Probably even when Megara revolted from the great city with which she had chosen to ally herself, there was a minority which felt that union with Athens was better than independence under an oligarchy. This minority had gained strength both from the bitter lessons of a protracted war and from the raids of oligar-

^{Attempts of the Athenians on Nisaea and Megara.}

¹ Thuc. iv. 79.

² Ib. iv. 80, 4.

³ Ib. iv. 78, 1.

chical exiles; and a plan for the surrender of the city was concerted with the Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes. The scheme was all but successful; but the appearance of Brasidas gave fresh confidence to the oligarchic faction, and suggested to the Athenian commanders the folly of risking a defeat which would be most severely felt, in order to encounter a force composed simply of detachments levied from many Peloponnesian cities which would lose at the worst only a small fraction of their troops. Their retreat was followed by the entrance of Brasidas into Megara; but this fiery Spartan had more important work to do elsewhere. On his departure a strict oligarchy was set up, which lasted, the historian remarks, far longer than most governments set up by a minority both numerically and personally insignificant.¹ Before the close of the year the Megarians gained possession of their long walls, and levelled them with the ground;² and thus was demolished a work by which the Athenians had hoped to maintain on the isthmus a hold as firm as that which they kept on their own harbor of Peiræus.³

Unconscious of the dangers which were threatening them from the north, the Athenians not only did nothing to prevent Brasidas from passing onwards to kindle the flame of revolt in Chalkidike, but were bent on making another attempt to recover the supremacy which had been lost by the defeat at Koroneia. With the help of the Theban Ptoiodoros, it was arranged that Demosthenes should sail from Naupaktos to Siphai, a town about 25 miles to the south-west of Thespiæ. By the betrayal of this place the Athenians would obtain a footing in the south. In the north they would have the like advantage by their admission within the walls of Chaironeia, while in the east they would gain a still stronger base of operations by fortifying the ground round the Delion, a temple of Phoibos Apollôn.⁴ The success of this plan depended obviously on the simultaneous execution of these several schemes. Unluckily the Athenian commanders were not punctual. In the Corinthian gulf Demosthenes sailed to Siphai, only to find that the plot had been betrayed and that both Siphai and Chaironeia were held by the Boiotians in full force.⁵ We might have supposed that the failure of Demosthenes and the consequent inaction of the Athenian partisans in the Boiotian towns would have led the Athenians to question the prudence of risking their chief military force in operations which would certainly be resisted with the undivided strength of the Boiotian

¹ Thuc. iv. 74.⁴ Herod. vi. 118.² Ib. iv. 109.⁵ Thuc. iv. 89.³ See p. 249.

confederacy. Not less, it seems, than 25,000 men set out from Athens to fortify the Temenos of Delion. In five days their work was practically done, and the light-armed force marched about a mile on the road to Athens, while Hippocrates remained at Delion with the hoplites. But these five days were fatal to his enterprise.

Gathering from all the cities, the troops of the Boiotian confederacy hurried towards Delion, to find that the main body of the enemy had passed across the Athenian border. At first, their resolution was to risk no engagement on Battle of Delion. Attic soil; but this decision was stoutly opposed by the Theban Boiotarch Pagondas. He professed that he could not understand the subtle distinction which forbade encounter with an enemy on his own ground. The Athenians were their enemies, wherever they might be. Their main army had but an instant ago profaned the Boiotian soil: their hoplites under Hippokrates were not merely profaning it still, but were defiling the temple of the lord of Delos. Far therefore from hesitating to attack them, they should remember the achievements of their fathers at Koroneia, and teach the Athenians that men who love freedom will not part from their inheritance without at the least striking a blow to retain it. The words of Pagondas removed all scruples; and although it was now late in the day, they resolved to fight at once. Between the two armies rose a small hill, which determined the issue of the struggle. On either side were drawn up the two opposing masses, the Boiotians being arranged after a sort which marked a change in military tactic not less important than that which had raised the Athenian navy to its undisputed pre-eminence. The Theban hoplites were drawn up 25 men deep:¹ the Athenian front had a depth of only 8 men. The arrangement points to a growing consciousness that with opposing forces consisting of men equal in discipline, bravery, and personal strength, weight must decide the contest. There is no evidence that the Athenians foreboded any disaster from this difference of tactic, and Hippokrates in the few words which he addressed to his men as he rode along the lines reminded them chiefly of the power which they had won by their victory at Oinophyta, and of the glory which would be theirs, if by another victory they could restore the supremacy of the imperial city. The battle which followed was fiercely contested. The Athenian left wing in spite of

¹ Thucydides, iv. 93, adds that the hoplites of the other cities were drawn up after the fancy of the Boiotarchs belonging to those cities. The statement illustrates

the want of cohesion which is the most marked characteristic of all the Hellenic states, and more especially of those whose constitution was oligarchic.

the bravest resistance was borne down by the tremendous wall of Theban hoplites; and even the defeated Thespians, Tanagraians, and Orchomenians were relieved by the appearance of a body of men whom Pagondas had sent secretly round the little hill, and who, suddenly showing themselves to the Athenians, threw them into a confusion which soon became irretrievable. So fierce was the pursuit that probably nothing but the approach of darkness prevented the complete destruction of the Athenian army. Nearly a thousand Athenian hoplites with their general Hippokrates lay dead upon the field.¹ On the next day only an Athenian garrison remained to defend the intrenchments round the temple. The rest of the survivors were sent home by sea.

The occupation of the sacred Temenos had awakened a singularly bitter feeling in the minds of the Thebans. Their victory gave them an opportunity for indulging it. The laws of war among all the Hellenic tribes required from the victor the surrender of the dead without any conditions to the kinsmen who might claim them; but as the Athenian herald was on his way to the enemy's camp, he was met by a Boiotian herald, who, hurrying back with him to Delion, charged the Athenian garrison with wanton profanation of a sacred site, and added that the bodies of the dead should not be restored to them so long as the temple or its close should be occupied by an invading force. Unfortunately the Athenians failed to urge the obvious answer, that, whatever their own guilt might be, the Boiotians were disingenuously shirking a duty for which Hellenic morality recognised no evasion and admitted no exceptions. Although such a rejoinder must have driven them to comply with the Athenian demand, the invaders took the short-sighted course of denying that they were invaders. The Boiotians, they argued, had gained their present territories by the conquest of the tribes more anciently in possession of them, and the possession of the temples was involved in the possession of the ground on which they were built, the extent of this ground being a matter of no consideration. The Boiotians retorted that, if they spoke the truth, there was an end of all debate. Athenians in Attica might do what they willed with their own, and being within their own borders they might bury their dead without asking permission of anyone. Even here, the Athenians might have answered that according to their own theory the limits of Attica extended no further than their own intrenchments, and thus the Boiotians were bound to give up the dead without further speaking; but the reply did not suggest itself to their herald, whose departure was followed by an immediate attack on the intrenchments.

¹ Thuc. iv. 101.

Two thousand Corinthian hoplites, together with the Peloponnesians and Megarians set free from Nisaia, took part in the assault which on the seventeenth day after the battle was successful. So ended a scheme which, so long as Brasidas was at large, ought never to have been undertaken. Assault and capture of Delion. But the fall of Delion was only the beginning of a series of troubles which were to lower the Athenians in the eyes of Hellenes generally as much as the events of Sphakteria had damaged the reputation of the Spartans.

While the Athenians were thus wasting their energies on plans from which at best no great good could be gained, they left a pathway open to the most able and the most vigilant of their enemies to strike a blow at the very heart of their maritime empire. Demosthenes was perhaps still sailing from Naupaktos to Siphai, when from the Spartan colony of Herakleia in Trachis Brasidas sent to his partisans at Pharsalos a message bidding them to furnish him at once with guides for his march through Thessaly. At no time was it easy for a foreign force to make its way through that country without a guide; in the present temper of the people it would be doubly dangerous. As it so turned out, the whole power of the oligarchic governments barely sufficed to carry him through. Setting out from the Phthiotic town of Melitia on the banks of the Enipeus a few miles below its source and under the shadow of the mighty range of Othrys, he had not reached Pharsalos (a town near the point where the Apidanos joins the Enipeus in the centre of the great Thessalian plain) when he was met by a large body of the people, who seemed resolved to bar his further progress. To their plea that no stranger could pass without the consent of the commonwealth the guides of Brasidas at once answered that they would not think of leading him any further against their will; and Brasidas himself with that singular power of adapting himself to the temper of his hearers which no Spartan had ever yet displayed, assured them that, if they wished it, he would at once turn back, but added that he should regard it as churlish treatment if he were sent back, since he had come not to hurt the Thessalians with whom the relations of Sparta were both peaceful and friendly, but merely to carry out plans which he had devised for the humiliation of the Athenians with whom they were at open war. These words, it is said, disarmed the opposition of the Thessalians; but the readiness with which they allowed him to pass onwards showed that their friendly feeling for Athens was a sentiment rather than a principle. Freed thus from a serious danger, Brasidas lost not a moment in hurrying forwards; but the wily Makedonian who had lured him by the promise of maintaining half his army looked upon him as a hired

instrument for doing any work which he might have in hand. Sorely against his will Brasidas was dragged off to the mountain-pass which shut in the territory of Arrhibaios the chief of the Makedonian clan of the Lynkestai. With a mission so sharply defined he was more likely to convert the Lynkestian prince than to be himself converted to the theories of Perdikkas; and when Arrhibaios expressed a wish to submit himself to arbitration and to become the ally of Sparta, Brasidas obstinately refused to carry the quarrel further, and in spite of prayers and protests withdrew his forces.

Not until he had passed the Thessalian border were the Athenians awakened to a sense of their danger; and even when they learnt that something must be done, they acted with a Remissness of the Athenians. tardiness and hesitation in singular contrast with the vehemence and promptitude of the Spartan champion. Nothing can show more clearly the fatal loss sustained by Athens in the death of Perikles than the weakness now displayed in maintaining that which they knew to be the very foundation of their empire. That Perikles would have countenanced either of the recent attempts to re-establish the supremacy of Athens in Boiotia, we may very confidently question; that he would have staked the whole power of the state in encountering and crushing Brasidas, we cannot doubt at all. The preservation of the subject allies on the coasts of Thrace was a matter to be carried through at all costs; but instead of striving with the energy of men struggling for their lives they contented themselves with simply increasing their garrisons¹ in the cities threatened by Brasidas.

The grapes were all but ready for the gathering, and the whole produce of the year was therefore at his mercy, when Brasidas Revolt of Akanthos. appeared before the gates of the Andrian colony of Akanthos. The oligarchic Chalkidians at whose invitation he had come had led him to look for an eager and even an enthusiastic welcome. He was unpleasantly surprised to find that the gates were guarded and that he could do no more than pray for permission to plead his cause before them in person. Once admitted, Brasidas was to employ again those arts of persuasion which might tempt the ignorant into thinking that Sparta was training up a body of citizens like the adroit orator who now exhibited himself as the apostle of absolute freedom and of perfect happiness for everybody. His business now was to convince the Akanthians that they could secure their own welfare only by revolting from Athens. Reminding them of the wholly disinterested motives which had led Sparta into the war, he assured them that the state which had sent him was honestly anxious to confine itself to the one definite task of putting down an iniquitous tyranny. He

¹ Thuc. iv. 82.

had come to set them free : he was amazed at not finding himself welcomed with open arms. Their coolness caused him even greater grief and alarm. Their refusal would tempt the other allies of Athens in these Thrace-ward regions to think that the freedom which Brasidas promised was Utopian, or that his power to insure it to them was not equal to his will ; and he could not allow such thoughts to be awakened in them. Their confidence he sought to gain for Sparta by assuring them that he had bound the ephors by the most solemn oaths that the cities which might join him should remain absolutely autonomous.¹ Two further arguments he had yet in store. The one was addressed to that centrifugal instinct which pre-eminently marked the Hellenic race in general : the other to their purses or their stomachs. He assured them that when he spoke of freedom and independence, his words were to be taken in their literal meaning, and not as denoting merely liberation from the yoke of Athens. They were to be left absolutely to themselves, as unconstrained as the oxen which parted company by the advice of the lion who hungered after their flesh. They would be free, after joining Sparta, to manage their own matters to their own liking ; they were perfectly free to decide now whether they would or would not join Sparta. Only they must remember that, as things then were, a large amount of money went yearly from Akanthos in the form of tribute for the support of a tyranny which his conscience would not allow him to tolerate ; and, further, they saw his army outside their walls. He would leave them to their deliberations : but if they should say him nay, their ripe grapes would be trampled under foot, their vineyards ravaged, and they must make up their minds to face poverty, perhaps famine, perhaps also a blockade. This forcible special pleading carried so much weight, that a majority of the citizens voting secretly decided on revolt. The wretched farce of free debate and free voting was ended, and Akanthos renounced the alliance of Athens. Brasidas had begun his work well, and Stageiros, another Andrian colony a few miles more to the north, soon followed the example of Akanthos.²

Not many weeks after achieving this success Brasidas appeared before the walls of Amphipolis.³ The post was as strong and as easily defensible as it was important. By a mournful Surrender of Amphipolis. infatuation it was allowed without a struggle to fall into the hands of Brasidas. On a stormy and snowy night the citizens learnt that the army of Brasidas was without their walls, and that their lands and all who happened to be without the city were wholly at his mercy. So great was the confusion that in the judgment of the historian Brasidas might with ease have carried

¹ Thuc. iv. 85, 6.

² Thuc. iv. 88.

³ For the founding of this colony see p. 259.

the place by assault : but he allowed his men to plunder the land instead, and so gave time to the citizens who were not on his side to recover their self-possession. These now found that they were still in a numerical majority, and they not only insisted that the gates should be kept shut, but that the Athenian general Eukles should send a request for immediate aid to his colleague Thucydides, the historian, who was then with his fleet off the island of Thasos about half a day's sail from Amphipolis. With a feeling, probably, of deep misgiving and self-accusation Thucydides hastened to the post which he ought never to have quitted after the arrival of Brasidas in Makedonia. Trusting that he might reach Amphipolis in time to save it from falling into his hands, he hoped that at the worst he should be able to rescue Eion. But Brasidas was beforehand with him. He knew that for a large proportion of the citizens alliance with Sparta had no attractions. He therefore offered terms by which he hoped to determine their action in his favor. All who chose to remain should have the full rights of citizenship. To those who preferred to depart he gave five days for conveying away their property. The proposals of Brasidas were accepted. Amphipolis was gone, and within twenty-four hours the Spartans would have been masters of Eion : but on the evening of the same day the seven ships of Thucydides entered the mouth of the Strymon, and this fresh humiliation was avoided.

Thus in these two cities of Akanthos and Amphipolis we have a greater and a less degree of opposition to the wishes of Brasidas : Lightness of the Athenian imperial yoke. but in both cases the majority of the people is disinclined to ally itself with him, and in neither case is really free debate or free voting allowed. The conclusion follows irresistibly that apart from the passion for inter-political independence the subject allies of Athens had no substantial grievance calling for redress. Men whose feelings have been offended are not likely to regard the offender with any warm or eager affection ; but so long as they feel that their connexion with him is on the whole to their own benefit, they are not likely to be carried away by enthusiastic admiration of a stranger who simply wishes to leave them in a state of complete isolation. It was precisely thus at Akanthos and Amphipolis. There was no positive love for Athens : but indifference towards the imperial city implied no longing to be severed from her confederacy, and the introduction of Brasidas was due not to the action of the main body of the citizens who in both these towns were well disposed to Athens, but to the intrigues of a small but overbearing faction, which, because it could not hope for the voluntary adoption of their plans, resolved to take the people by surprise and hurry them into revolt under pain of absolute ruin in case of refusal.

The tidings of the fall of Amphipolis came upon the Athenians almost as an omen of doom. But nothing was done beyond dispatching a few troops to reinforce the garrisons in the Thrace-ward cities; and disasters still more terrible were averted only by the jealousy felt at Sparta for a man whose achievements might bring with them quite as much of annoyance as of glory. Their chief wish now was to recover the prisoners taken in Sphakteria and so to bring the war to an end. For Brasidas the continuance of the war was the continuance of life itself; and while he set to work to build triremes on the banks of the Strymon, he asked them for more troops to aid him in carrying out his schemes. The Spartans cared little for his plans, and his request was refused.¹

Effects of the fall of Amphipolis on the Athenians and the Spartans.

For twenty years after the loss of Amphipolis Thucydides lived in exile. The story went² that Kleon brought against him a charge of incapacity or wilful mismanagement, and that the historian, failing to defend himself, was formally sentenced to banishment. From his own words³ we do not learn that he was sentenced at all; still less do we learn the nature or amount of the punishment or the name of his accuser.⁴ It is more than possible that the sense of personal injury may have intensified his feelings of dislike or disgust for the noisy leather-seller: but his silence on the share of Kleon in this matter seems to attest the self-condemnation of the general. In this instance Kleon, if he had anything to do with the matter, was perfectly right. Amphipolis and Akanthos were lost only through the carelessness of Thucydides and his colleague; and the absence of Thucydides from his post must, it is to be feared, be set down to a preference of his own interests over those of his country.

The exile of Thucydides.

The year was closing with a series of misfortunes and discouragements for the Athenians. Their garrisons still held the island of Kythera; their troops aided by the Messenians still harassed the Spartans from the side of Pylos; the Megarian islet of Minoa

¹ Thuc. iv. 108.

² See the life of Thucydides by Marcellinus, p. xix. in the edition of Arnold.

³ Thuc. v. 26.

⁴ Certainly his language cannot be taken to mean that a sentence of banishment for the precise period of 20 years was passed upon him: but the expressions of Pausanias, i. 23, 11, do not prove conclusively that it was not passed. Whether, as Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iii. 288, thinks likely, Thucydides was sentenced not to banishment but to death, we

have no means of ascertaining. But in this case Oinobios, before he proposed the vote for the recall of Thucydides, would have had to propose the repeal of the Psephisma ordering the capital sentence; and we can scarcely suppose that Pausanias would have failed to state this fact. If the same sentence was passed upon Eukles, we must suppose that both he and Thucydides allowed judgment to go by default, and that consciousness of ill desert kept both of them away from Athens. Eukles is not heard of again.

was still an Athenian outpost; and, above all, the hoplites from Sphakteria were still within the walls of Athens. But they were now daily feeling more and more that wars are wont to take turns not wished for by those who make them. Their attempt on Megara had been followed by very partial success: their campaign in Boiotia had ended in utter discomfiture; and their whole empire was threatened by the operations of Brasidas in Chalkidikê. Nor had they yet seen the end of Spartan successes and Athenian failures. The Athenian garrison was expelled from Torônê, a city lying on the extreme point of the Sithonian peninsula, and the Toronaians followed the example of the men of Akanthos by joining the Spartan confederacy.

Amid these and other operations in Chalkidikê the eighth year of the war came to an end. The ninth found both the Spartans and the Athenians more than ever disposed to rid themselves of the growing burdens of the strife. Little difficulty therefore was found in arranging the terms of a truce as a preliminary measure for a permanent settlement. Eager to conclude the matter at once, the Spartans drew up and signed a document which they forwarded for the approval of the Athenians with the assurance that they would readily make any equitable changes which the Athenians might consider necessary. This document, having secured to both sides equal access to the Delphian temple from which the Athenians had been excluded during the war,¹ laid down practically the rule that during the year of truce each side should retain its present possessions. The covenant was acknowledged to be a mere temporary measure, leaving room for more deliberate discussions for the permanent ending of the strife; and ample arrangements were made for the safe conduct of envoys to and fro between Athens and Sparta.

The hopes which the Athenians had formed of a time of repose among their subject allies on the coasts of Makedonia and Thrace were soon rudely disturbed. Two days after the ratification of the truce Brasidas received the adhesion of Skiônê, a city near the extremity of the Pallanian peninsula. It is not pretended that the subject allies of Athens were drawn to the imperial city by any other considerations than those of sound reason and sober judgment; and reason and judgment are the first to lose their power over a people dazzled by schemes which appeal to sentiments thus far kept under control,

¹The Boiotians and Phokians were no parties to this truce. The Spartans therefore pledge themselves only to employ persuasion to get this concession carried out. The

Amphiktyonic council has seemingly no voice in the matter. For their inaction in this case as in others, see p. 23.

Capture of
Torônê by
Brasidas.

Truce for a
year be-
tween Ath-
ens and
Sparta.
423 B.C.

Revolt of
Skiônê and
Mendê from
Athens.

and that not without difficulty and irksome self-restraint. The campaign of Brasidas had now acquired a romantic character, and the politic harangue in which he lauded the boldness of the Skionaians in defying the efforts of Athens made them look on themselves as fellow-crusaders with him in the sacred cause of liberty. In the place of public assembly a golden diadem was placed on the head of the Deliverer of Hellas; in private houses he was crowned with fillets and honored as an athlete who had reached the highest standard of Hellenic humanity. In the midst of these rejoicings the commissioners from Sparta and Athens arrived to announce the truce. A reckoning of the time showed that the revolt of Skiônê had taken place since the ratification of the covenant, and the Athenian Aristonymos refused to recognise this acquisition of Brasidas as coming within the terms of the treaty. Time pressed, and Brasidas boldly lied. His false message went to Sparta and there received credit. The true account stirred up at Athens a vehement wrath which refused to listen to the Spartan proposal to submit the matter to adjudication. The revolt of people in the position of the Skionaians was a deliberate defiance of Athens: and Kleon, encountering, it would seem, little opposition or none, carried a decree dooming the Skionaians to the sentence which had been all but carried out after the revolt of Mytilene.¹ It was not long before the town of Mendê followed the example of Skiônê,² and Brasidas, who had been naturally disgusted with a truce which cut short his career of conquest, received the city without hesitation into the Spartan confederacy.

Brasidas was now to pay the penalty of dallying with habitual traitors. He received from Perdikkas a summons (which we must suppose that he could not afford to disobey) to march once more against the Lynkestian chief, with whom on the previous expedition he had patched up a hasty peace. Arrhibaios was defeated; but Perdikkas, amazed at hearing that a body of Illyrian mercenaries by whom he was expecting to be joined had transferred their services to his enemies, hastily fled and left Brasidas to face the onslaught of the savages. With singular readiness the Spartan leader prepared his men for the conflict, and by a vigorous effort threw the Illyrians into confusion. The Brasideians now wreaked their wrath on

Difficulties
of Brasidas
in Make-
donia.

¹ Thuc. iv. 122.

² Too much stress can scarcely be laid on the fact that here also, in spite of the enthusiasm which had greeted Brasidas in Skiônê, the main body of the people was altogether averse to the revolt. Thucydides, iv. 123, says plainly that the rebellion was carried out only

because the conspirators, when they had once proposed the scheme, did not like to abandon it and to own themselves beaten; and when an opportunity offered for abandoning the Peloponnesians, the demos availed themselves of it without hesitation. Thuc. iv. 130, 4.

Perdikkas by appropriating the baggage waggons which his followers in their haste had left behind them, and by the useless slaughter of the beasts of burden which with greater profit they might have appropriated also. This absurd revenge thoroughly alienated Perdikkas, who resolved to seek once more the alliance of the Athenians whom he had more than once betrayed.

The events which followed the departure of Brasidas on the errand of the Makedonian chief fully justified the reluctance with which he marched against Arrhibaios. While he was still entangled in the passes of Lynkos, an Athenian fleet sailed from Potidaia against the Mendaiaans, who with a Skionaian force had taken up their position under the Spartan Polydamidas on a strong hill without the city. At first the Athenians seemed to be baffled; but the weak side in the system of Brasidas was now to be brought into clear light. He had come as the apostle of freedom; it was now to be seen that the natural consequence of his preaching was dissension and sedition. The arrival of Nikias and his colleague had thrown the Mendaiaans into such a state of agitation that the 300 Skionaiaans who had come to help them hastened hurriedly homeward. On the next day Nikias ravaged the lands to the borders of Skiônê, while Nikostratos kept watch without the gates of the city. Impatient to put an end to these movements, Polydamidas drew out his own troops in order of battle and summoned the Mendaiaans to sally out against the enemy. But the spell of Spartan authority was broken; and in an evil hour Polydamidas ordered the arrest of a citizen who cried out that he had no intention of serving against the Athenians, and that the war was merely a luxury for the rich. This insult drove the demos to seize their arms, and to surprise their antagonists who had conspired to bring the Peloponnesians upon them. The Spartan garrison thus attacked fled to their former post in the Akropolis, while the Athenians burst into Mendê with an eager thirst for revenge which could be satisfied with little less than the blood of all the townsmen. Bidding the Mendaiaans to retain their old constitution, the Athenians left to their judgment those citizens whom they suspected to be the authors of the revolt.

The incessant shiftings of Perdikkas had in some degree taught his enemies and his friends how he might best be dealt with; and when during the blockade of Skiônê he proposed to Nikias to renew the old alliance, the answer was that he must give some substantial evidence that he really meant what he said. Happily for the Athenians he was able to do this, and to gratify his resentment against Brasidas at the same time. Ischagoras was known to be

Recovery of Mendê by the Athenians.
Arrival of Ischagoras and other Spartan commissioners.

on his march from Sparta with the reinforcements for which Brasidas had so eagerly and thus far vainly intreated: and a message from Perdikkas to the Thessalian chiefs in his alliance rendered this scheme abortive. The army was compelled to return home: but Ischagoras went on with Ameinias and Aristeus as commissioners appointed to act in conjunction with Brasidas. An ineffectual attempt of Brasidas on Potidaia¹ closed the operations of this unwearied leader for the winter.

With the beginning of the tenth year from the surprise of Plataiai the twelve months' truce drew towards its close. But while in the continuance of the war by Brasidas in Thrace both the Spartans and the Athenians had a valid reason for resuming the old strife if they had wished to do so, the mere fact that no positive step was taken on either side before the close of the Pythian games—in other words, for more than four months beyond the time agreed on for the truce—shows not merely the anxious desire for peace on both sides but the indifference of the Spartans for the theories and schemes of Brasidas. But the feast had no sooner come to an end than we find Kleon in command of an army and fleet which Perikles would have dispatched or led thither before Brasidas had crossed the Thessalian border. That this appointment was not made without strong opposition, there can be not the least doubt. The facts which we have specially to note are these, that after an interval of nearly three years a man, who had never put himself forward as fitted for military command, and who had been successful in a task of no special difficulty because he had the good sense to subordinate himself to a leader of real genius, is now sent on a far more dangerous service without the aid of such a colleague as Demosthenes. Why this distinguished general was not sent with him, we are not told. It is possible that he may now have been employed on his old station at Naupaktos. In such a matter guesses are worth but little; but if Demosthenes was thus absent, the state of things at Athens becomes clear enough. If Perikles had been living, he would have insisted that the recovery of Amphipolis and the neighboring towns was just one of those objects for the attainment of which the full strength of Athens should be put forth without a moment's hesitation or delay. But during the whole sojourn of Brasidas in Thrace Nikias and his adherents had been throwing cold water on a policy which would have been prudent as well as vigorous, and urging that the career of the Spartan champion would be best cut short not by sending out armies to fight him but by making peace with Sparta. In all

¹ Thuc. iv. 135.

Expedition
of Kleon to
Makedonia.
422 B. C.

likelihood Kleon insisted that the futility of such a course had already been made plain; nor are we doing injustice to Nikias and his partisans, if we say that the old trick was employed again, and that they deliberately thrust Kleon into an office in which they hoped and thought that he would not fail to ruin himself. This shameful and treacherous policy, we are told, had been openly avowed before Kleon's departure for Pylos; we have no ground whatever for questioning that they were prompted by the same disgraceful motives now. The fact that Kleon had not been employed in the interval is conclusive evidence that he had not sought employment, and it is to the last degree unlikely that he would now thrust himself into an office to which he had no other title than a sincere and hearty desire to maintain the honor and the true interests of his country.

The summer solstice had long passed when Kleon sailed from Peiraieus. Touching first at Skiônê, he took away some of the heavy-armed men belonging to the blockading force, and sailing on to Torônê learnt the welcome news that Brasidas was not within the city and that the garrison was scarcely adequate to the maintenance of the place. The place fell into the hands of the Athenians; the tiger-like rules of ancient warfare made every home in Torônê desolate; and while fathers, husbands, and brothers went into captivity, mothers and wives with all the children were sold as slaves. These henceforth disappear wholly; so little is the history even of a city the history of its inhabitants. The Peloponnesian prisoners were exchanged on the ratification of the subsequent peace. The Toronaians were ransomed by the Olynthians, to return to homes where the voices of those whom they had loved, if Hellenes are to be supposed capable of loving, were to be heard no more.

The next attempt of Kleon, on Stageiros, failed: but the Thasian colony of Galepsos was taken by storm. Kleon, however,

felt that he could not venture to advance upon Amphipolis with his present forces, and he sent to the Makedonian Perdikkas for aid according to the terms of his alliance, while he requested the Odomantian chief Polles to bring him a body of Thrakian mercenaries. While Kleon to the disgust of his men waited at Eion, Brasidas for the purpose of guarding Amphipolis took up his post on the hill of Kerdylion on the western bank of the river facing the city, and commanding a view of all the land around it. He had heard, probably, that the Athenians had little confidence in their general, that they despised his timidity, and resented his inaction: and his task clearly was to watch for an opportunity of surprising him when discontent and want of discipline had thrown his army into

Capture of
Torônê by
Kleon.

The battle of
Amphipolis.
Death of
Brasidas and
Kleon.

sufficient disorder. Blunder after blunder followed. Whatever they were, we see them at their worst, for he had a merciless critic in the historian whom he helped to banish from his country. Kleon, it is manifest, was wholly at a loss how to act. His men were becoming impatient, and he was driven at last to the course which had led him to success at Pylos. This course was seemingly nothing more than marching up a hill for the purpose of marching down again; and even this manœuvre, the historian adds with supreme contempt, Kleon regarded as a trick worth knowing.¹ The wall of Amphipolis, forming the chord of the arc within which the city lay, ran across the ridge which rises to the eastward until it joins the Pangaian range. This ridge Kleon, for the sake of doing something, felt himself compelled to ascend. No sooner was the Athenian army in movement than Brasidas, seeing from the heights of Kerdylion how things were going, hastened down the hill and entered the city across the bridge over the Strymon, which by carrying a rampart and stockade from the main wall to a point on the river some one or two hundred yards further eastward he had included within the fortifications of the city. Of this change of position Kleon can scarcely have been unaware: it is more likely that from the scanty numbers of the men who entered with Brasidas he did not attach much weight to it. On reaching the top of the ridge from which he had an unbroken view of the city at his feet and of the river as it flowed out of the Lake Kerkinitis and sweeping round the city ran into the sea at Eion, he was impressed by the silence and quiet of the scene. Through the vast extent of country over which his eye ranged no bodies of men were to be seen in motion; not a man was visible on the walls; not a sign betokened preparation for battle. Even the entrance of Brasidas seemed to make no change in the aspect of things, for that leader had seen enough to convince himself that he could hope for victory only if he could dupe Kleon by a simulation of extreme weakness. Still, if a blow was to be struck at all, it must be struck at once, for the reinforcement of Kleon's army would seriously add to his difficulties. Summoning, therefore, all his men together, Brasidas, having explained to them the simple order of the coming engagement, offered sacrifice before sallying forth against the enemy. This ceremony was seen by the scouts of Kleon who also told him that under the city gates they could see the feet of horses and men ready to issue out for battle. Having satisfied himself, by personal inspection, that their report was true, Kleon resolved not on maintaining his ground, which he might have done with little less than the certainty of success, but on a

¹ Thuc. v. 7, 3.

retreat to Eion. He must await, he said, the reinforcements which he expected from Thrace, and thus his army, wheeling to the left, began their southward march with their right or unshielded side exposed to the enemy. 'These men will never withstand our onset,' said Brasidas. 'Look at their quivering spears and nodding heads. Men who are going to fight never march in such a fashion as this. Open the gates at once that I may rush out on them forthwith.' The sudden onslaught at once broke the Athenian ranks, and Klearidas issuing from the Thracian gates further to the north completed the disorder. In the pursuit of the Athenian left wing Brasidas fell, mortally wounded; but his people bore him away without suffering the Athenians to know what had happened. On the right wing the resistance of the Athenians was more firm; but Kleon, we are told, had come without any intention of fighting, and he made up his mind at once to run away. Flight, however, is more easily thought of than executed, and Kleon hurrying away from the men whom he had undertaken to lead was intercepted and slain by a Myrkinian peltast. Their leader was dead: but the Spartans under Klearidas were none the more able to crush the Athenian right wing, which gave way only under the showers of arrows poured in upon them by the Myrkinian peltastai and the assaults of the Chalkidian horsemen. Brasidas lived just long enough to know that the Athenians were defeated; and the romantic career of this thoroughly un-Spartan champion of Sparta was closed with a public funeral in the Agora of Amphipolis, where he received yearly henceforth the honors of a deified hero. The buildings raised by Hagnon were thrown down, and Brasidas was venerated as the founder, or Oikistes, of the city.

The historian remarks that the battle of Amphipolis removed the two great hindrances to a pacific settlement between Athens and Sparta; but he makes no effort to show that Comparative merits of Brasidas and Kleon. peace at the cost of sacrifices which Kleon was not willing to offer was at this time to be desired for Athens. Of Brasidas his judgment is more indulgent: it is even enthusiastic. His moderation, his affability to the citizens of revolted towns, his reputation for universal excellence,¹ his sagacity and decisive promptitude, are all carefully noted. The blunders and shortcomings of Kleon, his bluster, his arrogance, his incompetence as a military leader, are not less exactly registered; but whether the energetic prosecution of the war in Thrace was or was not necessary, he takes care never to ask. From first to last, in fact, in his account of the career of Kleon, we have not a trace of that judiciously balanced criticism which marks his sketch of

¹ Thuc. iv. 81, 3.

Themistokles ; and we are left to discover for ourselves whether and how far in the several stages of his course Kleon was right or wrong. Happily the unswerving honesty which never allows him to suppress facts has shown us that he was throughout more than justified in the policy by which he held that Brasidas must be encountered and put down in Thrace. That he was left to carry out this policy himself, was his misfortune, not his fault ; that he was feebly supported at Athens and sent without competent colleagues to Thrace, redounds not to his own shame but to that of his adversaries.

The death of Brasidas and Kleon left the way clear for those statesmen at Athens and Sparta who had regarded the policy of both with suspicion and dislike. Nikias and his ^{Negotiations} followers were now free to urge that Sparta might ^{for peace.} fairly be trusted to fulfil her engagements : and at Sparta the peace party had a strongly interested advocate in the king Pleistoanax, whose retreat from Attica shortly before the ratification of the Thirty Years' Truce had been ascribed to personal corruption,¹ and had been punished by a sentence of exile.

There was nothing therefore to stand in the way of immediate negotiations. Both sides were depressed, and each side had its own special causes of anxiety. Still it was only after some little difficulty that the contending parties agreed ^{Terms of the treaty. 422 B.C.} each to give up what they had acquired during the war. This arrangement may have been proposed by Nikias, by whose name this peace is generally known ; it is, at the least, thoroughly in accordance with the policy which had prompted his opposition to Kleon. By this stipulation the Athenians supposed that they would regain Plataiai ; but they found themselves mistaken. The Thebans availed themselves of the shuffle that the Plataians had voluntarily yielded themselves. But the Athenians remembered that if this plea gave the Boiotians the right to hold Plataiai, they had precisely the same title to retain the Megarian port of Nisaia, and they insisted on keeping it accordingly. The treaty for fifty years between Athens and Sparta with her allies thus pledged the latter to restore Amphipolis, while Athens was bound to leave autonomous all towns in Chalkidikê which had put themselves under the protection of Brasidas, the obligation of paying to Athens the tribute enjoined on them by the assessment of Aristides still continuing in force. The last concession to the Athenians was Panakton, a fort at the foot of Kithairon, which the Boiotians had seized in the preceding year.² On their part the Athenians, who were to receive back all prisoners in the hands

¹ See p. 253.

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² Thuc. v. 3, 5.

whether of the Spartans or their allies, were bound to restore all captives belonging to Sparta or any city in her confederacy, as well as to surrender Koryphasion (Pylos), Kythera, Methone, and Atalante.

CHAPTER VI.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE MASSACRE AT MELOS.

EVER since the victory of Demosthenes and Kleon the great desire of the Spartans had been to recover the hoplites taken prisoners in Sphakteria. Whether these prisoners should be surrendered at once or not, would depend on the order in which the stipulations of the treaty might be carried out. The lot which was to decide this question was drawn by the Spartans, who had now to fulfil their part of the compact in order to bind the Athenians to the performance of their engagements. Their love for Athens was not great; but to their wish for the recovery of the hoplites was added another anxiety nearer home. The thirty years' truce which the Argives had refused to renew except on the cession of Kynouria was drawing to its close; and an alliance of Argos with Athens might restore her to her ancient supremacy in the Peloponnesos. The friendship of Athens had therefore become a matter of importance for the Spartans who at once set free all Athenian prisoners in their possession, and sent orders to Klearidas to surrender Amphipolis forthwith. In the hope that it might still be possible to obtain some lighter terms, that officer returned with the envoys to Sparta and reported the determination of the Chalkidians not to give up the city. He was sent back with the peremptory mandate to carry out his orders or to withdraw the whole Peloponnesian garrison. The troops were accordingly withdrawn, for Klearidas still insisted that the Chalkidians were steadily set against submission. Nay more, the envoys of the confederate cities renewed their protest against the injustice of the peace, and this protest left slender hope that the other stipulations of the treaty would be fulfilled. It was clearly, therefore, the policy of Sparta to separate Athens from Argos; and as this could only be done by binding her to a private alliance with herself, a covenant was proposed and forthwith signed, pledging Athens and Sparta to defend each the other's territories against all invaders. So great was the worth

Separate
treaty of
alliance be-
tween Ath-
ens and
Sparta.

421 B.C.

of this alliance in the eyes of Nikias and his followers that by a tacit agreement Sparta received as her reward the prize which she most eagerly coveted. The Sphakterian hoplites were all given up; and in this barren exchange Athens received the first-fruits of the philo-Lakonian policy of her oligarchic citizens. Kleon was no longer living to maintain a policy not lacking the spirit and foresight of Perikles; and the lamp-maker Hyperbolos can scarcely be said to have taken his place. Athens was now practically ruled by those who prided themselves on being nobly born and nobly bred; and these statesmen who, like Hekataios, could trace their generations back to the ancestral god set to work to strip her of one advantage after another, offering her in their stead apples of the Dead Sea. The continued detention of the Pylian prisoners and a demand that a combined Athenian and Spartan force should undertake the reduction of Amphipolis would at once have compelled the Spartans to display themselves in their true colors, or, as is far more likely, have secured to Athens all that she wanted. As it was, the terms of the peace were not kept on either side, and the period which followed until the open resumption of the war was at best no more than a time of truce.¹

The clause in the treaty of peace which gave the Spartans and Athenians power to modify any of its terms at will had grievously offended the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.² The Corinthians gladly availed themselves of this irritation to carry out their own plans. Instead of returning straight home, their envoys went to Argos, and there said that on the Argives lay the duty of saving Peloponnesos from a combination which might enslave them as effectually as the Athenians had enslaved the islanders of the Egean. The Argives agreed readily to issue a proclamation inviting the alliance of any autonomous Peloponnesian cities, and appointed commissioners with full powers to treat with the chief men of each city in private. The Peloponnesian cities generally were deeply stirred. The democratic Mantinea, which in the course of the war had subdued some of the neighboring Arkadian towns, was the first to throw itself into the new alliance. The accession of Corinth and Elis was followed by that of the Chal-

Scheme for setting up a new Peloponnesian confederacy under the presidency of Argos.

¹ This fact impelled Thucydides to regard the whole period from the surprise of Plataiai by the Thebans to the surrender of Athens and the destruction of the Long Walls as taken up with one persistent struggle, lasting for 27 years,—the only matter in which the prophecies in

vogue among the people happened to hit the fact. He states his own acquaintance with these predictions from the beginning of the war, and adds that the reckoning was exceeded only by a few days. v. 26.

² Thuc. v. 29, 2.

kidians among whom Brasidas had toiled and died. The Boiotians and Megarians held aloof.

Meanwhile the feelings of the Athenians towards the Spartans were undergoing a change. The latter had signally failed to fulfil their promises; but they had learnt that words went a long way with the philo-Lakonian party at Athens, and so, putting them off with undefined promises of undertaking with them a joint expedition to coerce the Corinthians and Boiotians, they had the assurance to demand either that the Athenians should give up Pylos or that they should withdraw all the Messenians and Helots who might be in the place, leaving only Athenians as the garrison. They were well aware that they had strenuous allies in Athens; and these allies worked so well on their behalf that the Helots and other deserters in Pylos were taken from Peloponnesos and lodged in Kephallenia. The patience of the Athenians was to be still more severely tried. In the following winter deputies from Athens, Boiotia, and Corinth met in vain debate at Sparta. With a fickleness equal to that of any democratical commonwealth the policy of Sparta was changed. Of the new ephors two, Kleoboulos and Xenares, were vehemently opposed to Athens, and with the Corinthian and Boiotian envoys they concocted the scheme that the latter should first make an alliance with Argos and then should bring Argos into alliance with Sparta. One condition only they attached to the working of this roundabout plan. The Boiotians must surrender Panakton, that by giving it up to the Athenians the Spartans might bring about the evacuation of Pylos. Even this the Boiotians were ready to agree to: and their willingness was still further increased when on their homeward journey they were accosted by two of the most distinguished of the citizens of Argos, who expressed an extreme anxiety that Boiotia and Argos might be united in the same confederacy. With the report thus brought from Sparta the Boiotarchs were highly gratified, and they never for a moment supposed that the Four Boiotian Senates¹ would refuse to ratify a decree sanctioning an alliance with the Corinthians, Megarians, and the Chalkidians of Thrace, and thus opening the way for an alliance of all these states with Argos. But the idea of alliance with Argos was so new to the people that the Boiotarchs never ventured to reveal the plot, and to tell them that the step which they proposed was eagerly desired at Sparta. The Boiotians knew only that Corinth had abandoned her old alliance, and they at once declared that they durst not offend Sparta by entering into covenant with her enemies. Thus foiled

¹ Nothing is known of the constitution of these bodies.

at the threshold of their task, the Boiotarchs could go no further ; and for a time the spinning of these complicated webs seemed altogether at an end.¹

But the Spartans could not rest without regaining Pylos ; and as the Boiotians refused to yield up Panakton with which the exchange was to be made, unless the Spartans would make with them a separate alliance like that into which they had entered with the Athenians, the latter ended the eleventh year of the great struggle with a piece of deliberate treachery to the Athenians, to whom they were pledged to make no engagements without their knowledge and consent. The Boiotians, however, were resolved that no Athenian force should occupy the border fortress, and they spent the winter in levelling its walls with the ground.

Separate alliance between Sparta and the Boiotians.
420 B.C.

The demolition of Panakton naturally annoyed the Spartans, who feared the difficulty of getting a living lion in exchange for a dead dog ; but in the hope that the excuse which had served them in the matter of Amphipolis might stand them in good stead here, Andromedes was sent with two colleagues to Athens to demand the surrender of Pylos on the ground that the surrender of the site of Panakton fulfilled the stipulation. But the Athenians were not in the mood for further fooling. They were wearied out with talking which had now gone on for twelve months to little purpose or to none, and the Spartan envoys were dismissed after a reception which showed the depth of their indignation.

Dismissal of the Spartan ambassadors from Athens.

This feeling was sedulously fostered by Alkibiades, the grandson of that Alkibiades who had been one of the most strenuous opponents of the Peisistratidai, and who had thrown up a standing friendship with Sparta on purely political grounds. This friendship Alkibiades had sought to renew. Special attention paid to the comfort of the hoplites taken at Sphakteria would win for him, he hoped, the office of proxenos for Sparta ; and he was honestly convinced, if honest conviction can be associated at all with his name, that for such an office no man had a better title. The blood of Zeus and Aiakos was flowing in his veins ; and the gods had endowed him with marvellous bodily beauty. To the possession of vast wealth he added a readiness of wit, a fertility of invention, a power of complaisance, which invested his manner, when he wished to please, with an almost irresistible charm. Magnificent in his tastes, splendid in the lavishness of his Liturgies,² revelling in the elegance of the most refined Athenian luxury, Alkibiades shrunk from no hardship in war, and

Intrigues of Alkibiades.

¹ Thuc. v. 38.

² See p. 80.

faced danger with a bravery never called into question. At the siege of Potidaia under Phormion he had been severely wounded ; but his life was unfortunately saved by the philosopher Sokrates then serving among the Athenian hoplites. In the battle of Delion he had repaid the obligation by saving the life of Sokrates. With the qualifications which, as he hoped, might commend him to Spartan favor, he combined a spirit of oligarchical exclusiveness which might have satisfied the most rigid disciples of the school of Lykourgos. But in their eyes his youth was an offence (he was now a little over thirty years of age, the age at which an Athenian became eligible for the *Boulê* or Senate) ; and Spartans, although they were oligarchs, had respect for oligarchical law. Alkibiades had respect for none. Without a conscience, without a heart, caring for nothing but his own grandeur, as ready to make oligarchs his tools as to cheat and dupe a demos, defying the magistrates, insulting the law, Alkibiades presents an image of violent selfishness and ingrained treachery standing very near the pinnacle of human wickedness. Hating a demos in his heart with the supercilious arrogance which looks on human blood as a vile fluid when it runs in the veins of men who boast no pedigree, he was still as ready to destroy an oligarchy as he was to uproot a free constitution, and he was therefore justly dreaded by men of all political parties as a man treading in the paths of the old Hellenic despots. The welfare of Athens was the one end and object of Themistokles with whom he has been compared : Alkibiades cared no more for Athens than he cared for Argos or for Sparta. He could pretend to love each or all, so long as it suited his purpose to do so. To commit the people to his plans, he could act or utter a lie with only a feeling of self-complacence at his own cleverness. His life had been saved by the man whose life and teaching have remained from that time to the present a subject of absorbing interest : but he sought the company of Sokrates for no higher purpose than to learn the trick of leading his opponents by *Eironeia* (Irony) or pretended ignorance to contradict themselves, as well as to acquire with a certain adroitness of language and readiness of illustration an insight into the characters and motives of men, the better to make use of them as tools in the execution of his own plans.¹ The society of this wonderful man tended therefore only to make him more dangerous ; and if we are to believe the stories told of him, his career from first to last was one unbroken course of gilded sensuality and of barbarous ruffianism scantily hid by a veil of superficial refinement. Under any circumstances such a man must be infamous : but Alkibiades had opportunities of committing

¹ Xen. *Mem.* i. 2.

crime on a vast scale, and he availed himself of them to the uttermost.

To such a man a slight was a deadly offence ; and Alkibiades had received a marked slight from the Spartans. Alkibiades therefore ceased to be a philo-Lakonian ; and he now discovered that an alliance with Argos would secure to Athens her old preponderance. There is much to be said in favor of a vast number of alternative political schemes ; and it may fairly be urged that in deserting the party of Nikias he was consulting the true interests of Athens. The arrival of the ambassadors to surrender to the Athenians not the fortress of Panakton but its site enabled him to make with decency the change which had become necessary. While he inveighed in the assembly against Spartan duplicity, shuffling, and dilatoriness, he sent a message to Argos urging the need of sending envoys at once to propose an alliance with Athens. The embassy was accordingly sent. But the tidings of this movement had reached Sparta, and no time was lost in sending a counter embassy consisting of men personally popular at Athens. Even in this desperate strait they charged their envoys, with an obstinacy almost praiseworthy, to insist that the ground on which Panakton had stood was a fitting equivalent for Pylos, and that no harm whatever was meant by the private agreement of Sparta with the Boiotians. To all this the Athenians might have turned deaf ears : the case was altered when the envoys said in the Senate that they had come with full powers for the immediate settlement of all differences. Alkibiades at once saw that such a statement, made before the assembly, might jeopardise his proposed alliance with Argos. It must not, therefore, be made : and he found the means of prevention in one of the envoys named Endios. Through Endios he gained access to his colleagues and persuaded them that their profession of full powers before the assembly might expose them to demands and importunities which they might find it difficult to resist, adding that if they would claim no further mission than that of envoys charged only to report the wishes of the Athenians he would pledge himself to secure for them the surrender of Pylos and to plead their cause in person before the people. The Spartans fell into the snare. On their introduction to the assembly on the following day Alkibiades, we are told by Plutarch,¹ rose and asked them with his most courtly manner with what powers they came. The

¹ *Alkib.* 14. Thucydides, v. 45, 4, does not mention this fact ; but it is obvious that no one else would ask the question. In all likelihood Alkibiades gave no one time to

speak ; otherwise the speakers would probably have informed the people that they saw before them the plenipotentiaries of Sparta.

Treachery of
Alkibiades to
the Spartan
envoys.

answer was given according to his prompting, and roused the instant and deep indignation of hearers who could hardly believe their senses. Far from saying a word in their favor, Alkibiades joined vehemently in the outcry against Spartan shuffling and lying and was proposing that the Argive envoys should at once be admitted to an audience when a shock of earthquake caused the adjournment of the assembly to the following day. So ended a scene in which the descendant of Zeus and Aiakos, the refined and cultured gentleman, played a part infinitely more disgraceful for its unblushing impudence and unscrupulous lying than any in which the coarsest leather-seller or lamp-maker among the demos had ever been an actor. The comic poets had jested about the shiploads of lies brought from Perdikkas to Athens; the falsehoods of Alkibiades would have formed the cargo of a fleet.

When the assembly met again, Nikias insisted with greater success that if alliance with Sparta was to the interest of Athens, it was their business, whatever they might think of the conduct of the envoys, to send commissioners to Sparta to ascertain their real intentions. The answer of the Spartans was that although they could not give up their compact with the Boiotians, they were ready to renew the oaths of their covenant with the Athenians. This, Nikias knew, was a superfluous and useless ceremony, and so great was the irritation against him that Alkibiades found no difficulty in effecting with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, a defensive alliance which distinctly recognised the imperial character of each of those states.

The Olympian festival of this year was marked by the presence of the Athenians and their allies who had been shut out for eleven years. The exhaustion of Athens, it had been supposed, was so great that not much competition might be looked for from her citizens. Alkibiades was resolved that this notion should be signally falsified. He had little hesitation in straining his own resources for this purpose to the utmost, for he knew that his money would be well laid out politically: he had none in availing himself of the aid of the Chians, Lesbians, and Ephesians. The result was a splendor of display on the part of the Athenians which dazzled even eyes long accustomed to the magnificence of Panhellenic feasts; and the enterprise of Alkibiades in sending seven four-horsed chariots to the lists, when few had ever sent more than one, was rewarded by a first and a second prize, while another chariot was placed in the fourth rank.¹

Under the guidance of Alkibiades Athens was now rapidly committing herself to schemes which completely reversed the

¹ Thuc. vi. 16.

policy of Perikles. The ill-fated expedition which ended in the catastrophe at Delion aimed only at the recovery of a power which had for a time belonged to her; but new conquests alone could satisfy Alkibiades, and the paramount duty of the Athenians to re-establish their empire in Chalkidike was put aside for the establishment of a new supremacy in the Peloponnesos. The Argives had at this time some religious quarrel with the Epidaurians connected with the service of the Pythian Apollon; and the occupation of Epidauros would, he believed, be greatly to the advantage of Athens. The Argives, however, although urged on by Alkibiades, hesitated to strike a blow while the Spartans were in the field. They had heard that Agis was advancing towards the border town of Leuktra; they were soon reassured by the tidings that unfavorable sacrifices had compelled him to return home, and that no further movement would be made before the end of the holy Karneian month. Four days were still to run before this time of truce binding on all members of the Dorian race would begin, and the Argives determined not only to invade Epidauros at once but to secure themselves ample time by the readjustment of their calendar. It was the twenty-sixth day of the month when the Argives set off, and it remained the twenty-sixth day of the month so long as their work of invasion went on. The Spartans after the feast advanced as far as Karyai, and were again turned back by unfavorable sacrifices at the border. The summer ended with a second invasion of the Epidaurian territory by the Argives, aided by Alkibiades and 1,000 Athenian hoplites. Irritated with this warfare which really broke, while it nominally respected, the peace, the Spartans during the winter contrived to smuggle 300 men into Epidauros; and the Argives urged the grievance at Athens in terms which could not fail to gratify the pride of the imperial city. It had been agreed between them that neither side should allow hostile forces to pass through their territory: but the Spartans had conveyed these men by sea, and the sea was specially the dominion of Athens. They demanded therefore that by way of atoning for their remissness the Athenians should bring back to Pylos the Messenians and the Helots whom they had placed in the Kephallenian Kranioi. The request was complied with, a note being added to the inscription on the pillar of peace at Athens ascribing this step to the violation of the covenant by the Spartans.

But the Spartans were now fully awake to the dangers of their position. In the following summer the full force of the Lakadaimonians with their Helots set out for the invasion of Argos. The Argives took up their position on a hill near the Arkadian

Methydriion about 15 miles to the west of Mantinea. Here they were directly in the path of Agis on his march to join the allies at Phlious. The Spartans were posted on an opposite hill; and the Argives made ready for battle on the morrow. But Agis had no intention of fighting here, and in the night the Spartans left their ground and hastened on to Phlious. The Argives, finding the enemy gone, hurried back to Argos, a distance of about 40 miles, and thence on the road to Nemea. No long time had passed before they saw behind them on the plain of Argos the Spartan force, which had worked its way over the mountain tracks to the west. By another road not less rugged the Corinthians, Pallenians, and Phliasians were pouring down into the low ground, while along the pass of Tretos in their front were advancing the Boiotians, Megarians, and Sikyonians. Hastening back towards Argos, the Argives found themselves hemmed in by the Spartans in their rear, and two other armies in front and flank. Under such circumstances their destruction was certain: but with an astonishing blindness the Argives saw in their position only an opportunity for taking ample revenge upon the Spartans. Two men alone, Alkiphron and Thrasyllus, seemed not to share their madness; and almost at the moment of onset these two sought an interview with Agis, and on their own responsibility asserted that, if he would withdraw his army, the Argives would submit all matters in dispute to arbitration. Taking counsel for a moment with one of his officers only, Agis granted them a truce of four months, and gave the order for retreat. In utter amazement the Spartans witnessed the breaking up of the finest Hellenic army which had ever been gathered together,¹ and set out on their homeward journey in deep indignation against the leader who had snatched the prey from the very claws of the lion. To crown the series of wonders, the Argives, far from feeling gratitude to the men who had saved the city from ruin, burst out in frantic wrath against them for suffering their enemies to escape.

The Spartans on their side were with difficulty withheld from razing the house of Agis to its foundations and from sentencing him to a fine of 100,000 drachmas. Agis simply asked that he might be allowed an opportunity of redeeming his past error before the infliction of the punishment; and the message which now came from the people of Tegea to say that only instant help could prevent the loss of the city to the Spartan confederacy brought the occasion which he desired. With a rapidity never, in the judgment of Thucydides, yet matched, Agis set out at the head of the whole Spartan force. From Orestheion he sent back for the defence of Sparta itself a sixth part of his forces, consisting

¹ Thuc. v. 60, 3.

of the oldest and the youngest men. With the rest he reached Tegea where he was joined by the Arkadian allies ; and advancing into the Mantineian territory, he began to ravage it. Posted on a precipitous eminence the Argives waited his attack in order of battle, and the Spartan leader, eager to wipe out his disgrace, was anxious only to order the onset. So manifest was his rashness that a Spartan veteran could not help citing the old proverb on the healing of evil by evil.¹ Struck by the truth of the man's words, or possibly making the discovery for himself at the same moment, Agis drew off his men when they were almost within javelin's cast of the enemy. Puzzled by the sudden disappearance of the Spartans, the Argives soon began to grow weary of inaction in their strong and almost impregnable position, and to accuse their generals of a trick like that which they had resented at the hands of Alkiphron and Thrasyllus. To the Argive leaders these threats came with a force not to be resisted, and they at once brought their men down from the hill and drew them out in order of battle on the open plain. On the following day the Spartans returning northwards from Tegea suddenly came in sight of the whole Argive army in full fighting array and almost within the range of archers. Spartan discipline alone preserved them from the panic which under such circumstances would have seized Hellenic troops generally ; but while the leaders of the Mantineians and their allies were going through the speeches by which the courage of the men was wound up to battle pitch, the Spartans also had formed in fighting order and were ready for the attack. Their right wing was decisively and almost instantaneously victorious. The steady march of the iron wall seems to have resumed its old terrors, for the Spartans conquered almost without a conflict, and vast crowds of fugitives were trampled down in the vain effort to escape from the pursuers who were on them. For the Athenians the worst danger was averted partly by the efforts of their cavalry, but still more by the order which Agis was obliged to issue that the pursuit of the enemy must be abandoned for the defence of his left wing from the onslaught of the Mantineians. The mere approach of Agis chilled the courage of the enemy ; and in their hurried flight the Mantineians were far greater sufferers than the Argive regiment of One Thousand. But on the whole the slaughter was not great, for it was not the Spartan custom to spend much time on the chase of a flying foe. So ended the great battle in which little was done by the skill of the general, but everything by the bravery and discipline of his men.² It did away with the impression which the surrender of

¹ This proverb is found in Sopho- 363.
kles, *κακὸν κακῷ διδοῦς ἄκος*. *Αἴας*, ² Thuc. v. 72, 2.

the hoplites at Sphakteria and the subsequent sluggishness of the Spartans had almost everywhere created; and it was at once acknowledged that although they may have been unfortunate, Spartan courage was as great and Spartan discipline as effective as ever.

We have seen that in the cities which Brasidas detached from the Athenian empire, and in those which the Athenians recon-
 quered after revolt, the demos generally was averse to
 the revolution, and in many instances counteracted it
 as soon as it was possible to do so. But the course
 now taken by the Spartans speaks volumes on the utter futility of
 the promises made by Brasidas to the subject allies of Athens. Far from encouraging the theory of absolute independence which according to that fiery leader lay at the root of her foreign policy, Sparta made it clear that freedom, as interpreted by her, meant only the liberty of modifying constitutions so as to suit her fancy, or of adopting the form of government which she might dictate. The Argive conspirators were a formidable body; and the Thousand Regiment were ready to throw off all disguise. In the fight at Mantinea the demos had been shamefully beaten, while they had been really victorious. In casting their lot in with the Spartans, they were thus consulting at once their interests and their dignity: and with their sanction Lichas arrived from Sparta with an ultimatum, offering the Argives either war or the treaty which he brought with him ready written. The acceptance of this covenant was followed by the withdrawal of the Spartan force, and probably by the departure of Alkibiades. The tide had now turned against the influence of Athens; and the Argive oligarchs soon brought about the ratification of a treaty of alliance which declared the autonomy of all allies whether of the Argives or of the Spartans. Mantinea could now no longer hope to enforce her claim to supremacy over her allies; and accepting her position, she acknowledged herself once more a member of the confederacy of Sparta.¹

The fabric of oligarchy thus raised at Argos stood on an uncertain foundation. The Argive demos waited until the time came when the people at Sparta busied themselves in watching the Gymnopaïdai, or dances of naked men and boys, and then rising up against the oligarchs slew some and drove others out of the city. The wanton insolence of the Thousand Regiment had become insufferable, and after such provocation the bearing of the demos seems to have been singularly moderate. They were fortunate in the time chosen for their rising. The Spartans had refused to stir on the first invitation of the oli-

¹ Thuc. v. 81.

Restoration
of democracy
at Argos.

417 B.C.

garchs ; and when at length they were persuaded to put off the games, it was too late. The Argives again became allies of Athens, and gave themselves to the task of connecting their city by long walls with the sea not less earnestly than the Athenians had undertaken like tasks in the days of Themistokles and Perikles. If this design could have been completed, Argos might have defied the attacks of any land force, as the Athenians could pour in from the sea any supplies needed for the people ; but the oligarchical party was not wholly rooted out, and the Spartans received promises of aid from the faction within the city if they would once more put down the demos and destroy the unfinished long walls. These promises they were unable to fulfil : but when in the following winter Agis with his army departed baffled from Argos itself, he levelled the long walls to the ground.

The feebleness of Athenian policy is shown by the course which in the winter of this year the Athenians found themselves constrained to adopt towards the Makedonian Perdikkas. Nikias and his adherents, who now saw that Amphipolis, if it was ever to be recovered at all, must be recovered by force, urged an expedition for this purpose which was nevertheless to be made dependent on the co-operation of a chief whose only gifts to Athens had been confined to shiploads of lies. Perdikkas, of course, failed to keep his engagements, and the enterprise was abandoned.

Failure of an Athenian expedition for the recovery of Amphipolis.

But the policy of Athens was as misdirected as it was feeble. In a struggle such as that in which she was now engaged it was of the utmost importance that no enterprise should be undertaken in which success would not be fully worth the time, labor, and cost bestowed upon it ; nor could any condemnation be too strong for the policy which would waste the strength of the city in schemes in which success could bring no profit, and would involve a lasting shame. Such a scheme was the expedition undertaken in the sixth year after the so-called peace of Nikias against the island of Melos, which, like the neighboring island of Thera, had been colonised from Sparta. Thirty Athenian triremes with six from Chios and two from Lesbos, carrying about 2,700 hoplites, besides light-armed troops, sailed to the attack of a city, which, as a source of wealth or power to Athens, was utterly insignificant. The story of the expedition is soon told. The request of the islanders to be allowed to remain, as they had been, neutral in the contest was peremptorily refused : and the demand of the Athenians that they should become allies of Athens was refused also. On receiving this decision the invaders applied themselves diligently to the task of the siege. The city of Melos was completely walled in, while the fleet blockaded it by sea. Plots

The massacre of Melos. 416 B.C.

for betraying the place to the Athenians were soon discovered ; and the Melians determined to anticipate them by unconditional surrender. The islanders underwent the fate which the Mytilenaians had all but suffered and which the Skionaians had actually undergone. The grown men, including even those who had betrayed or wished to betray the place to the Athenians, were all slain, the women and children sold as slaves ; and five hundred Athenians were brought into the island, not as Klerouchoi retaining their political rights at home but as colonists. On the brutal savagery of the ancient laws of war it is useless to say a word ; but it must be noted that the case of Melos was utterly unlike that of either Mytilene or Skione. The Melians had done to the Athenians no specific wrong ; nor have we, it would seem, any valid reason for supposing that they would have refused to contribute an equitable portion of their revenue to meet the expenditure of an empire from which they themselves derived now or had derived direct and important benefits. But this would not satisfy the Athenians. The Melians must become their subject allies, and, as such, must take part in the struggle against their mother city. This they naturally refused : and the strength which might have recovered Amphipolis was put forth to convince them of their folly. Nor can we doubt that an attempt to awaken them to this conviction had been made in words before the final appeal was made to force ; and this attempt assumes in the narrative of Thucydides the form of a conference which forms one of the most singular, if not perplexing, portions of his history. It is true that both by Perikles and by Kleon the supremacy of Athens over her allies is represented as in some respects resembling a tyranny ; but we have seen that this phrase denotes nothing more than that amount of centralisation which was indispensably necessary if the confederacy was to be maintained at all. It was perfectly competent to the Athenians to plead that the Melians had no right to enjoy the tranquil waters of a sea cleared of Persian cruisers and tribute-gatherers at a cost in which they took no share ; but this would have been a reason for compelling them to join the confederacy in the days of Aristides, not for straining the strength of Athens in reducing them now when a long war with Sparta had, at least for Spartan colonists, given a very different complexion to the case. Still it is to such arguments as these that Athenians would be tempted to resort for the materials of their indictment against the Melians. The open avowal that might make right was one which would not be made by Greeks generally. Least of all would it be made by Athenians, whose sophists were, whether justly or unjustly, credited with a singular skill in making the worst appear the better reason. The temper which glories in the exertion of naked brute force and

delights to insult and defy the moral instincts of mankind is the growth of not every condition of society ; and we should least of all look for it amongst a people who were always disposed to call ugly things by pretty names.¹ But in the conference which precedes the Melian massacre we have a rude and wanton trampling on all seemliness of word or action, a haughty assertion of an independence which raises them above all law, an impudent boasting that iniquity to the weak can do the strong no harm, of which we have had as yet no example and no sign in Athenian history.²

In its whole spirit and form this conference stands out in glaring inconsistency not only with the previous history of Athens but with the language whether of her own statesmen, of her Historical authority of the Melian conference. subject allies, or of her open adversaries. It is still more completely at variance with the principles and methods ascribed with justice perhaps to some sophists, most unjustly to the sophists as a class. It gives the impression that the Athenians wished to be regarded as bidding a studied farewell to all honorable or even human motives and instincts, and as pledging themselves henceforth to a new mode of dealing with those who might be weaker than themselves. But if their earlier history does not prepare us for such an outburst, so neither is their philosophy here borne out by the history which follows it ; and we are thus driven to ask whether any explanation of so perplexing a phenomenon be forthcoming. When we remember that the massacre at Melos was a political crime greater certainly and more atrocious than any of which the Athenians had yet been guilty, that it brought them no gain while it insured to Athens a bitter harvest of hatred and brought down upon her a terrible revenge, and that this wanton, inexcusable, and infatuated crime preceded only by a few months that ill-fated Sicilian expedition which was to seal her doom, we can have little doubt that the historian has for once dropped his function of recording facts rigidly as they occurred, and that he has left us in this so-called Melian conference an ethical picture like that which Herodotos has drawn of the Persian despot in his overweening arrogance and pride.³ From this time forwards the strength of Athens was to be turned aside to impracticable tasks in which even unqualified success could scarcely bring a gain proportionate to the outlay, and the affairs of the city were to be conducted in the gambling spirit which stakes a continually increasing sum in the hope of recovering past losses. The expedition to

¹ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀεὶ τα πρῶτατα τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τιθεμένων. *Plut. Alk.* 16.

² On this ground Dionysios, *de Thuc. Jud.* 39, regards this conver-

sation as fabricated by Thucydides in order to bring discredit upon his countrymen.

³ See p. 195.

Melos marks the turning-point beyond which the policy of Perikles is lost to sight, and full play is given to the policy of Alkibiades.

If in the massacre and enslavement of a people we see the Athenians in their most repulsive and loathsome aspect, the ostracism of the lamp-maker Hyperbolos exhibits the ignoble use to which an instrument, fashioned for better purposes, may be at length applied. From Thucydides¹ we learn only the fact that Hyperbolos was ostracised. By Plutarch² we are told that the challenge came from Nikias and his adherents to Alkibiades and his followers, but that before the time for voting came these two parties had changed their plans and formed a combination to bring about the banishment of the lamp-maker who is said to have taken the place of Kleon. The combination was, of course, successful; and Hyperbolos lived as an exile at Samos where some years later he fell a victim to the daggers of oligarchic conspirators. The historian adds that he was a pestilent man, exiled not on account of any fears of his political genius or influence but simply because his madness and violence reflected disgrace upon the city. Thucydides was well aware that ostracism was never devised to be a punishment for such men, and in all likelihood he meant his statement to be taken as an expression of this conviction. The matter was regarded in the same light by the people, and ostracism was never again resorted to against an Athenian citizen.

The general condition of Hellas at the time of the Melian expedition presents an astonishing picture of the complications which may arise from the conflicting interests of independent city communities. Formally the treaty of peace between Athens and Sparta was still in force: nor had these two cities renounced their private treaty of alliance made after the peace. The Spartans still had their own private agreement with the Boiotians, and the Boiotians their ten days' truce with the Athenians. At the request of the Argives the Messenians and Helots had been brought back from Kephallenia to Pylos;³ and while the Athenians were blockading Melos, the Pylian garrison made destructive inroads into the Lakonian territory. The Corinthians also had their own grounds of quarrel with the Athenians: but they had no formal covenants to restrain them from open strife. They had refused to accept the peace of Nikias, and they were free to act openly. The Spartans were not yet prepared to destroy the pillar which bore witness to their compact with Athens; but they determined to requite the ravages of the Messenians from Pylos by issuing licenses, or in modern phrase letters of marque, to those who might be willing to retaliate as privateers on the coasts of Attica or on the mercantile fleets of Athens.

¹ viii. 73.

² *Alk.* 13. *Nik.* 11.

³ See p. 348.

CHAPTER VII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.—THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION.

IN the year which witnessed the disgraceful revolution at Korkyra, the rhetor Gorgias headed an embassy from the Sicilian Leontinoi to ask the aid of Athens against the Syracuseans, who were at open war not only with them but with Naxos and Katana. In this strife Syracuse had the aid of all her Dorian neighbors except the men of Kamarina who threw their force into the opposite scale.

First interference of the Athenians in the affairs of Sicily.
427 B.C.

On her side also appeared the troops of the Épizephyrian Lokrians, while the men of Rhegion took the side of Leontinoi.¹ Whatever power the eloquence of Gorgias may have exercised over the Athenian assembly, no more constraining argument probably was adduced than the warning that if the Sicilian Dorians should be suffered to subdue their Ionian kinsfolk, the Spartans would assuredly receive from Sicily the succors on which the Corinthians especially had eagerly counted. The fact may be doubted; and had Perikles still been in his place in the assembly, he would in all likelihood have told his countrymen that they could find more effectual means of aiding the Ionians of Sicily than by diverting the strength of Athens to operations in that distant island. But neither was Perikles living, nor was his policy in reference to foreign conquests taken up by Kleon, although when vigorous efforts were needed for the recovery of revolted cities the line taken by the leather-seller was more spirited and creditable than that of the high-born Nikias and his followers. The Leontine envoys had thus little difficulty in obtaining the promise of help; but although three Athenian fleets appeared successively during the next two years in Sicilian waters, no decisive results were obtained on either side.

The great success of Demosthenes at Sphakteria produced in the public opinion of Sicily a change not less marked than that which it brought about at Athens. If the Athenians were led by it not only to insist on harder terms from the Spartans but even to engage in schemes for regaining their short-lived supremacy in Boiotia, the Sicilian Greeks began to feel that their incessant quarrels and wars might leave the whole island at the mercy of a people who had shown a power of resistance and a fertility of resource far beyond any with which at the beginning of the war their enemies would have

Congress of Sicilian Greeks at Gela.
424 B.C.

¹ Thuc. iii. 86.

credited them. The necessity of making common cause against Athens was felt first by the citizens of Kamarina and Gela, and was first expressed probably by the men of the weaker city. The truce between these two cities was followed by a congress at Gela in which before the general body of Sikeliot envoys¹ the Syracusan Hermokrates stood forward for the first time as the uncompromising antagonist of Athens.

The decision sought for by Hermokrates was attained; and it was agreed that a general peace should be made between the several cities which should retain each its present position, Morgantine only being given to Kamarina on the payment of a fixed sum of money. The Athenian commanders were at once informed of the treaty to which, it was added, they might, if they pleased, become a party.² For the time being they had scarcely an option; and the Athenian fleet was accordingly withdrawn. But since the departure of Eurymedon from Pylos and Korkyra the mad promise of Kleon, as some chose to call it, had been fulfilled; and the admirals on reaching Athens found themselves to their amazement objects of general and vehement indignation. The people would have it that bribery only could explain the facts: and on this theory Pythodoros and Sophokles were banished, while Eurymedon, the infamous hero of the Korkyraian massacre, was fined.

The pacification brought about by the efforts of Hermokrates was short-lived. It was not, indeed, likely to last longer than the general fear of Athenian ambition; and the disasters of the Boiotian campaign, crowned by the catastrophe in Leontinoi.^{423 B.C.} of Delion, speedily dispelled this fear. But in spite of all the fair words of the Syracusan envoy some at least of the weaker towns could not rid themselves of the suspicion that in the city which Hermokrates represented they had a neighbor more dangerous than Athens. The men of Leontinoi resolved accordingly to increase the number of their citizens, a measure which would be necessarily followed by a re-arrangement of the land. To this the oligarchical party could not bring themselves to submit; and they had power enough to expel the demos, and to dismantle the city. They now became possessed of all the lands, which they continued to occupy although they had taken up their abode at Syracuse. The new strife thus brought about furnished a fresh excuse for Athenian intervention, but the mission of Phaiax ended only in promises of further and more effectual aid to the Leontines.

¹ It is scarcely necessary to say that the Sicilian Hellenes spoke of themselves as Sikeliotai, thus marking the distinction between them-

selves and the native Sikeloi.

² The Epizephyrian Lokrians alone refused to agree to this covenant. Thuc. v. 5, 3.

The complication of affairs in Peloponnesos after the peace of Nikias left to the Athenians no time for any thoughts of interference in Sicily. But when in the beginning of the year in which the Melians were massacred an embassy reached Athens from Egesta, one of the two cities of the Elymoi, in Sicily, the envoys were far more graciously received than the poor exiles of Leontinoi. These had appealed simply to their feelings of compassion: the Egestaians enforced their claim on the more constraining grounds of expediency and good policy. They asked for help against the men of Selinous in a quarrel which had arisen from some merely local dispute; and probably they would not have cared to deny the insignificance of its cause. But they pointed simply to the policy of Syracuse, and to the likelihood that, when she had made herself the imperial city of Sicily, she would come forward openly to the help of the great Dorian state of Continental Hellas. She had already wiped Leontinoi out of the number of Sicilian towns; and unless her course was cut short, Egesta would suffer the same fate. But although the envoys were quite willing to admit that they could not stand by themselves, they were not less strenuous in asserting that their power, if combined with that of Athens, was not to be despised. Reminding the Athenians that they were already their allies by virtue of a treaty made ten years ago with Laches, they pledged themselves not merely to bring their own men into the field, but to take on themselves the whole costs of the war.

The picture, as it was drawn and colored by the envoys in repeated audiences before the public assembly, was sufficiently seductive; nor can we doubt that among the citizens there were many who were ready to dress it out in still more enticing colors. So far were the people charmed by the new influence that, instead of pausing to think whether under any circumstances further interference in Sicily would be either wise or profitable, they resolved to send ambassadors to test the resources of the Egestaians and their prospects of success in their war with Selinous.¹ The Egestaians turned out to be mere impostors: but unhappily the cheat was not discovered until the Athenian fleet had reached Rhegion.² The envoys returned from Sicily in the spring of the following year with glowing accounts of the wealth which they had seen there, not only in the temples and public buildings, but in the houses of the citizens; the crews of the triremes which conveyed the ambassadors were loud in expressions of wonder and admiration at the magnificent hospitality with which they had

Quarrel between Selinous and Egesta.
416 B.C.

Resolution of the Athenians to maintain the cause of the Egestaians.
415 B.C.

¹ Thuc. vi. 6.

² Ib. vi. 46.

been entertained during their whole stay at Egesta. But the treasures of the temples were of silver, not gold; and the ornaments which made their feasts so splendid represented the collective wealth not only of Egesta but of other cities from which they were borrowed, the whole being transferred secretly from house to house for each successive entertainment. The Athenian people, however, felt assured that the Egestaians had told the simple truth, when the envoys laid before them sixty talents of uncoined silver as a month's pay in advance for a fleet of sixty vessels. The popular enthusiasm had been wrought up to the requisite pitch, and a decree was passed appointing Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos commanders of an expedition charged with maintaining the cause of Egesta against the men of Selinous, with the restoration of Leontinoi, and with the general furtherance of Athenian interests in Sicily. Five days later the assembly was to meet again to discuss more fully the details of the expedition.

Nikias, we cannot doubt, had done what he could, or felt that he could do, to knock the whole scheme on the head. We are expressly told that his appointment to the command of Nikias. was made against his will; and the statement implies that he had made no secret of his opinion. The life of Nikias, born though he was to high station and abundant wealth, was not particularly fortunate: but of all his misfortunes none was greater than his strange inability to discern the road which almost at any given time would have led him out of his difficulties. The expedition to Sicily was not much more to his mind than the enterprise of Demosthenes at Pylos. In the former case he pronounced success to be difficult: in the latter he asserted it to be impossible. Had he chosen, when replying to the sarcasms of Kleon, to adopt the line which he took in opposition to Alkibiades in reference to the Sicilian invasion, he might with the aid of Demosthenes have secured a victory far more brilliant than that which Demosthenes and Kleon achieved on the island of Sphakteria. But Nikias opposed himself to resolute action under all circumstances: and his words failed to carry due weight when, as in the present instance, they were fully borne out by facts. He was indeed fully justified in asserting on the day of the second assembly that Athens owed no duties to barbarian inhabitants of a distant island,¹ while she owed the strongest duties to her own citizens and to the members of her great confederacy; that the Spartans were only nominally at peace with her, and that her first disaster would be to them a welcome opportunity for giving vent to a wrath long pent up;² that their example would be followed by other states which had

¹ Thuc. vi. 9, 1.

² Ib. vi. 9, 2.

either openly repudiated the peace or had contented themselves with a ten days' truce periodically renewed ; and that if Athens was bent on righting wrongs, her business was to redress her own. The Thrace-ward Chalkidians were still in revolt ; and until these were again brought under obedience, it was madness to dispatch fleets and armies to aid the Egestaians.¹ In short, there was absolutely no reason for going, and every reason for refusing to go. The plea of the Egestaians that Syracuse was seeking to make herself mistress of all Sicily was one to which it was absurd to listen. The success of Syracuse in any such scheme would be to the interest of Athens, not to her injury. In their present state of isolation, the several Dorian cities of that island might be tempted to take part with the Dorian states to which they traced their origin : but if Syracuse became an imperial power, she would be less likely to risk her empire in a contest with a city whose strength was equal to her own.² A far more serious danger threatened Athens from the Spartan itch for subverting democratical constitutions and setting up oligarchies in their place,³ and from the selfish ambition of men who far outran their fortunes in the extravagant luxury of their private lives, in the ostentatious magnificence of their liturgies, and in the splendor of the chariots and horses with which they competed for the prizes in the great Hellenic festivals. If such men urged on the expedition, they had the twofold motive of wishing to increase their own importance and making good the ruinous costs of their lavish and iniquitous display ; and on this account they were utterly unfitted to be intrusted with any command in such an enterprise. Lastly he intreated the Prytanis, or President, to put the whole question once more to the vote under the full assurance that the irregularity of the step would at the least be condoned.

The speech of Nikias roused the vehement indignation of Alkibiades. Making a virtue of necessity, he gloried in the acts which had called forth the strongest censures of Nikias. It was true that he had competed for the Olympian prize with seven chariots of four horses each, and that he had sought to make his liturgies as splendid as he could. But his victories at Olympia had impressed the whole Hellenic world with a sense of the power and wealth of Athens, in which they had well-nigh ceased to believe, while the richness of his public services had tended greatly to attract and reassure her subjects and her allies. He had even the effrontery to boast of his Peloponnesian

¹ Thuc. vi. 10.

² Ib. vi. 11, 3.

³ Ib. vi. 11, 5. Nikias belonged, it is true, to the oligarchical party

at Athens ; but no one will charge him with any complicity in the violent counsels which disgraced this party a few years later.

Counter-arguments of Alkibiades.

intrigues and of the strait to which he had reduced Sparta when she was obliged to stake everything on a single throw at Mantinea; and he crowned his avowal with the impudent falsehood that, although Sparta won the stake, she had not yet recovered the haughty confidence of the times preceding the disasters of Sphakteria. It was true also, he added, that he was young, and that Nikias had the experience of maturer years: but this was only a reason for turning to the good of the state the youth of the one and the wisdom of the other. As to the strength of the Sicilian cities, Nikias was scaring them with imaginary terrors. They were but solitary units without power of cohesion, on whom the barbarous tribes of the Sikels would be glad to wreak the enmity of ages. But, as Athenians, they were bound to remember their own wants and their own honor. The very life of Athens depended on energetic action. Sicily would supply a field for such action. The refusal to occupy this field would be followed by stagnation, and stagnation would end in death.¹ It was the old argument of Asiatic conquerors which Herodotos puts into the mouth of Xerxes;² and it was worthy alike of the Persian despot and the selfish Athenian oligarch.

The speech of Alkibiades was followed by addresses from other orators and by renewed intreaties from the Egestaian envoys; and the effect of all was so powerful that Nikias, feeling himself already practically defeated, resorted to a device by which he hoped to disgust them with the enterprise. Assuming that the expedition would be voted, he insisted that it must be made on a scale which might fairly justify confidence in its success. They must carry with them hoplites, bowmen, and slingers, and must go amply provided with a convoy of grain-bearing vessels, and with everything that could insure the well-being of the army under all possible accidents of war. These were for him no matters for doubt or controversy; and if any viewed them as such, he would resign to them a command which had been thrust upon him against his will.

This manœuvre on the part of Nikias was followed by a result precisely opposite to that which he had hoped for. Far from inducing the people to give up the enterprise as one wholly beyond their strength, he united all parties by proposing a course which seemed to make failure impossible. The enthusiasm of those who were most eager for the expedition was increased tenfold, while the more sober-minded were led to think that what Athens under-

Attempt of Nikias to disgust the people by insisting on the vast effort needed to carry out the enterprise.

Compliance of the Athenian people with all the demands of Nikias.

¹ Thuc. vi. 18.

² See p. 161.

took with a superfluity of resources, she would assuredly be able to accomplish. When then one of the citizens started up and insisted that instead of further preface Nikias should say precisely what he wanted, the unfortunate general was caught in his own trap. Like one passing sentence of death on the high-spirited, although mistaken, men whom he feared that he should be leading to ruin, Nikias said that he must have at least a hundred triremes, and, if possible, more than five thousand hoplites, with light troops in proportion. Not only was his request instantly complied with, but with his colleagues he received full powers over all arrangements for the expedition. The die was cast. The efforts of Nikias to chill the ardor of the people had secured to Alkibiades a victory far greater than any which he had hoped for, and staked almost the existence of the state on the issue of the enterprise. But in justice to Nikias it must be remembered that his dissuasions were not founded on the mere anticipation of disaster. He went with no high hopes; he was weighed down perhaps with some heavy misgivings: but unquestionably he had not made up his mind that the scheme would inevitably end in failure. Nikias went to Sicily, because on a general view of the case he felt that he might hope to return home in triumph; but he condemned the whole scheme emphatically on the ground that in such an enterprise victory would be not much less a calamity than defeat. The latter might cripple Athens for years; but success would extend her empire to an unmanageable size, would involve her in an inextricable network of difficulties, and would lead to further schemes of aggression which would be avenged in her speedy downfall.¹

The prospect for the present was singularly bright and alluring. The regard paid to the personal integrity of Nikias roused the vehement enthusiasm of the Athenians, and brought forward an eager crowd of volunteers where the generals The mutilation of the Hermai. had feared that they might have to constrain men to an irksome service. With the same ardor the trierarchs vied with each other in the lavishness with which they provided everything necessary for the comfort of their crews and of the troops whom they were to convey to the scene of action. The vehement impulse thus imparted was at its height, when the citizens awoke one morning to find that the figures of Hermes, busts standing on quadrangular pedestals, had with scarcely an exception been mutilated and defaced. These Hermai, or statues of the Master Thief,² stood in the Agora, before the temples, the public buildings, and private houses; and the people comforted themselves with the thought that the reverence which they paid to him enlisted

¹ Thuc. vi. 11 *et seq.*

² *Myth. Ar. Nat.* i. 119; ii. 226.

the god on their side, and pledged him to protect them against the robbers of whom he was the most adroit and subtle. The event produced a profound sensation. The religious fears of the Athenians had been roused; and no people perhaps were ever on this point more sensitive.¹ It was clear that there lurked in the city a body of men for whom religion, law, and duty had no constraint, men who did not scruple to wage war against the gods and to involve the guiltless in the punishment due for their own iniquities. But the presence of such men in the city involved a political not less than a religious danger. The one in fact could not be separated from the other. The sacrilege committed on the Hermai was the act of men belonging to an organised body; and hence the Athenians had in their midst a secret society who hated the existing constitution of their country. Men who had any respect for law and decency could never have become partakers in such evil deeds, and thus the suspicion of political conspiracy was necessarily roused by the discovery that a gross insult had been offered to one of the divine protectors of the city.

Respecting the mutilation of the Hermai at Athens two things only are certain. There is not the least doubt that a conspiracy existed, whatever may have been its objects, and that with this conspiracy Alkibiades had nothing to do. We may advance one step further, and maintain confidently that the end at which most of the conspirators aimed was the ruin of Alkibiades. It is also possible that with this motive was combined a desire to bring about the abandonment of the Sicilian expedition altogether. It is perhaps even not unlikely that among the conspirators may have been some who were actuated by the latter motive alone; and these, knowing how earnestly Nikias had spoken against the scheme, may have felt that an appeal to his religious fears would be the means of re-opening the question and rousing a more determined opposition on the part of men who were thus far afraid to break silence. But that the whole career of Alkibiades whether as a statesman or a private citizen had raised up against him a band of bitter enemies, there is no doubt at all. He was hated more especially by wealthy men of the oligarchical party, whom he insulted by his arrogance and eclipsed by the ostentation and extravagant costliness of his liturgies. An oligarchical society may display towards the inferior classes a supercilious haughtiness scarcely surpassed even by that of Alkibiades, but oligarchs generally have no mind that this haughtiness should be exhibited towards themselves by one who is only their peer. As soon as the sacrilege was discovered, rewards were offered for

¹ This characteristic, known as *their δεισιδωμονία*, is specially noted in the speech of St. Paul on the hill of Areiopagos.

the apprehension of the conspirators; but the slaves, who came forward as informants, appeared not to give an account of the mutilation of the Hermai, but to say that they had seen Alkibiades with other young and rich men mimicking in private houses the ceremonies of the Eleusinian mysteries. The preparations for the departure of the fleet were all but finished, and, if we may believe Andokides, the trireme of Lamachos was already moored in the outer harbor, when in the public assembly Alkibiades was charged with this intolerable profanation. His demeanor in this crisis was straightforward and commendable. He insisted on being brought to trial before he sailed, and protested against the injustice of allowing him to depart in charge of an army, while at home an accusation impended over him which his enemies by slanders spread about during his absence might indefinitely aggravate. In demanding an immediate trial he was acting wisely. His opponents saw that a large proportion of the troops were on his side, and they feared that his condemnation might send home in wrath or disgust the Argive and Mantinean allies who by his influence had been induced to take part in the expedition. It was indispensable that the fleet should not be detained; and the speakers who now followed the instructions of his personal enemies urged that the trial should be postponed until a definite time should have passed after his recall, whenever the latter step should be resolved on.

It was now midsummer, and the fleet was ready for sea; and never did a more magnificent force issue from Athens than when the hoplites left the city to embark on board the ships which were to bear them away to Sicily. On the shores of the great Athenian harbor the day was made memorable not so much by the brilliancy of military array as by the high hopes, troubled by some transient misgivings, which filled the hearts of all who had accompanied their friends from the city and were now to bid them farewell. Almost the whole population of Athens had come down to Peiræus. Foreigners were there, gazing in wonder at the sumptuousness of the armament, while fathers, brothers, wives, and children felt their bright hopes fading away as they were brought face to face with the stern realities of parting. Thus far they had buoyed themselves up with the thought that the power of Athens was fully equal to the achievement of any scheme on which she had set her mind; but now the length of the voyage, their scanty knowledge of the great island which they were going to conquer, and the certainty that in any case many were departing who would never see their homes again, threw a dark veil over the future, and many burst into bitter weeping. The trumpets gave the signal for silence, and while some prayed to a God and Father neither local nor changeful, the

voices of the heralds rose in invocation of the gods of the city. From golden and silver goblets the libations were poured to appease the deities of the heavens and the earth, of the land and the sea. The Pæan shout echoed over the waters, and the long line of triremes swept in file from the harbor.

During the many weeks spent by the Athenians in getting their armament together, tidings of the coming invasion were from time to time brought to Syracuse: but they were received for the most part with a stubborn incredulity against which Hermokrates in vain raised his voice. Ten years before at the synod of Gela he had striven earnestly to form a confederacy of all the Sicilian Greeks, whether Dorians or Ionians, avowedly as a check on the boundless aggressiveness of Athens. Now he came forward in the public assembly at Syracuse to tell his countrymen that the danger which he had feared was no longer distant. The Athenians, having taken up the absurd quarrel of the Egestaians and the ruined Leontinoi, were already on the way upon their errand of conquest. But all history taught the same lesson. Schemes for distant conquest were rarely successful, and the brightest page in Athenian annals was the humiliation of Xerxes and the destruction of Mardonios with forces vastly larger than any which Athens could bring against Sicily. Nothing more, then, was needed than timely caution. The Syracusans must be ready for the struggle themselves. Nay, were it not for their habitual inactivity or sluggishness, he would urge upon them the adoption of more vigorous and decisive measures. If they were of his mind, provisions for two months would be placed on every Syracusan trireme, and the Athenians should learn that they must fight on the shores of Italy, before they could make their way to those of Sicily.

The position of Hermokrates as an oligarchical leader could scarcely fail to impart a political complexion to his censures on the character of the Syracusan people. At least it might be turned to a political account by speakers belonging to a different school. The arguments urged by Nicias against the whole scheme from first to last and under any conditions were so strong and at the same time so obvious that we need feel no surprise if they suggested themselves to the Syracusan Athenagoras. This speaker treated the coming of the Athenians as a bare possibility, very much to be desired, indeed, because their coming could only lead to their complete destruction; but until he had for the fact of their approach evidence which he believed not to be forthcoming, he must regard these reports as the malicious fabrications of men who for their own oligarchical purposes were bent on keeping the city in a state of continual ferment. The persons,

Public debate at Syracuse.

Reply of Athenagoras to Hermokrates.

therefore, to be punished were not the Athenians whom they would never see, but the orators who for their own selfish ends sought to scare them with imaginary terrors, and to shut their eyes to more real perils at home. The harangue of Athenagoras would have been followed, we cannot doubt, by an angry controversy, had not the Strategoi or generals interposed their authority. Rising up at once, one of them insisted that these personal arguments and retorts must come to an end, and that as they were responsible for the safety of the city, so they would take the measures most likely to insure it.¹

While with the Syracusans the coming of the enemy was a matter of doubt and controversy, the tidings, no longer questionable, were received that the Athenian armament had already reached Rhegion. At Korkyra, in order to avoid difficulties in procuring supplies of food and water, the fleet had been divided into three portions, one being intrusted to each of the three commanders. These divisions followed at fixed intervals the three ships which had been sent to ascertain the intentions of the Italian and Sicilian cities.² The bright hopes with which they started were damped almost at the outset. Nowhere would the people of the towns which they passed allow them more than mooring ground and liberty of watering; and even this boon was refused to them by the Tarantines and the Lokrians. The Syracusans had now been awakened to a full sense of their danger, and were strengthening their outposts with strong garrisons, when the ships, sent forward by the Athenian commanders before the fleet, returned with the news that the pretended wealth of Eggesta was a mere cheat, and that the whole contents of its treasury amounted to no more than the modest sum of thirty talents.³ To Nikias this was no disappointment; but the rude shock to his bright dreams greatly depressed and disconcerted Alkibiades. The commissioners who, whether bribed or not, had by their first report excited and fed these brilliant hopes had now to undergo no gentle censure; but the generals had to face the graver duty of determining the course to be taken under the circumstances. The mind of Nikias was soon made up. He had been sent to bring to an end the quarrel between Eggesta and Selinous, and further to see whether the restoration of Leontinoi were possible, and whether anything more might be done to promote the interests of Athens generally. He proposed to act according to the letter of these instructions, and having displayed the power of Athens before the cities on the coasts of Sicily, to return home unless any fresh events should open the way for further operations.

¹ Thuc. vi. 35-41.² *Ib.* vi. 42.³ *Ib.* vi. 46.

Counsel so tame and prudent as this could have no attractions for Alkibiades, who contended that envoys should at once be sent to all the Sikeliot cities in the hope of detaching them from Syracuse, and to the Sikel tribes in the hope of securing their alliance for Athens, and that if these things could be done they should then besiege Selinous and Syracuse, unless the former would agree to a reconciliation with Egesta and the latter to the restoration of Leontinoi. With a sharpness and precision equal to that of Nicias Lamachos urged the view of the mere general as distinguished from the statesman. Not a moment in his opinion was to be lost, while the impression made on the mind of the Sicilians by the sudden arrival of the Athenian fleet was still fresh. Either complete victory or an important success would follow an immediate attack on Syracuse.

Of these three plans that of Nicias was the best from the statesman's point of view. From that of the general the counsel of Lamachos was both bold and able: that of Alkibiades was utterly unworthy whether of the soldier or the statesman. Looking to the political interests of Athens, we can scarcely imagine a more prudent and business-like course than that of Nicias; and the result would have been a return home, if not after brilliant success, yet without disgrace, and without that exasperation of feeling both in central and Sporadic Hellas which would have followed the triumphant execution of the plan of Lamachos. But that of Alkibiades was a trimming and vacillating compromise which boded no good issue to the campaign, and showed him to be as deficient in military genius as he was prominent for the audacity and arrogance of his demeanor. Unhappily it was the plan which the adhesion of Lamachos made it necessary to adopt. This brave and gifted military leader was a poor man to whom neither birth nor culture gave an adventitious importance; and when he found himself in a minority, he naturally felt, as a soldier, that it was better to run the chance of victory with Alkibiades than at once to abandon it with Nicias.

The first step of Alkibiades after carrying his point against Nicias was to cross over in his trireme to Messênê in the hope of securing its alliance: but here too he was foiled. The

Occupation of Katanê, and alliance with the Katanaians.

Messenians would allow him nothing more than a market beyond the walls of their city. Taking with them only sixty ships, the Athenian generals then sailed to Naxos, where they found the people well disposed: but the hospitality of the Naxians was followed by a rough reception at Katanê where the Syracusan party was uppermost, and the Athenians were compelled to take up their night station on the banks of the Terias. On the next day the whole fleet, the re-

maining triremes having joined them from Rhegion, advanced in file to Syracuse. Ten ships sailed into the great harbor, and a proclamation was made inviting the Leontines within the city to join their friends the Athenians who were come to restore them to their homes. Nothing further was accomplished, however, beyond a survey of the fortifications; but on their return to Katanè, although the army was still kept shut out of the city, the generals were allowed an audience before the public assembly. Alkibiades was still speaking, when some Athenians, having succeeded in effecting an entrance into the town through a gate which had been imperfectly walled up, made their way to the Agora. The sight of the enemy thus seemingly in possession of the place frightened the small minority which constituted the Syracusan party; and on their flight the men of Katanè, having passed a decree of alliance with the Athenians, invited the generals to bring thither the portion of the forces which had been left at Rhegion. The news that Kamarina also might be expected to join them seemed to disclose for the moment a brighter prospect; but the whole Athenian fleet, passing by Syracuse, doubled the Pachynian promontory, only to find that the Kamarinaians were resolved to abide by the treaty which bound them to admit no more than a single war-ship at a time into their harbor. On their return voyage to Katanè, they committed some ravages on Syracusan territory, and routed a small body of Syracusan horse.

At Katanè they found the Salaminian trireme. This ship had brought a summons to Alkibiades and some others who were named with him, to return at once to Athens and take their ^{Recall of} trial on the charge of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries. ^{Alkibiades.} The excitement attending the departure of the fleet had quieted only for a moment the popular feeling which had been sorely wounded by the mutilation of the Hermai and the disclosures, whether true or false, which followed it. Promises of immunity and of rewards in money produced the usual crop of informers, and the circumstantial stories of these worthless men fed the credulity and the terror of the multitude.¹ But while their alarm grew daily more intense, evidence of the quality which they felt to be indispensable was for some time not forthcoming. The circumstantial story of Diokleides was rewarded with a wreath of honor and a public entertainment in the Prytaneion; the circumstantial story of Andokides whom along with more than forty others he had denounced contradicted his graphic tale, and Diokleides was put to death. At last the Athenians breathed freely. An Athenian citizen had come forward to accuse himself while he laid bare the iniquities of the Hermokopidai. Of the men thrown into prison

¹ Thuc. vi. 53, 2.

on the information of Diokleides those who were not accused by Andokides were discharged with the informer: the rest were put upon their trial, and the language of Thucydides implies that they were convicted on evidence as slender or absurd as that which sent Lord Strafford and his fellow-sufferers to the scaffold. But although the punishment of these victims had, as it was supposed, appeased the wrath of Hermes, nothing had been brought out to connect Alkibiades with the plot. Still his enemies were resolved that if he could not be convicted of mutilating statues he should be found guilty of profaning the mysteries. In the accusation laid against him by Thessalos, the son of Kimon, he was charged not with any share in the matter of the Hermai or even in political plots of any kind, but simply with mimicking the Eleusinian ceremonies in his own house. Unfortunately the march of a small Spartan force to the isthmus for the purpose of concerting some measures with the Boiotians caused in the public mind a fresh paroxysm of suspicion and terror. In this movement they saw plain evidence of a deep-laid plot on the part of Alkibiades for the subversion of the democracy; and in their agony the whole force of the city slept with their arms in the Temenos of Theseus near the gates which opened on the roads to Eleusis and Corinth. The feeling against Alkibiades had now been raised to a height which satisfied his enemies that they might safely insist on his recall; but although the commander of the Salaminian trireme received for Alkibiades only an order that he should return home in his own ship, there can be no doubt that the trireme which carried this summons brought him also information of the efforts which his enemies had made to poison the mind of the people against him. His resolution was at once taken, and with it the doom of the Athenian demos was sealed. He accompanied the Salaminian trireme as far as Thourioi; but when the ships were to sail onwards from that place, he was nowhere to be seen. All attempts to search for him were fruitless. The ships returned to Athens without him; and with the rest who had shared his flight he was sentenced to death.

The departure of Alkibiades left to Nikias and Lamachos the joint command of the whole expedition. Instead of sailing south-wards, the whole fleet steered through the Messenian strait, and then along the northern shores of the island. The generals wished to visit both Egesta and Selinous,¹ for the purpose of obtaining money from the former, and bringing about a peace between the two cities. They had hoped to be received at Himera, the only Hellenic town

¹ We have no reason for supposing that they went on to this latter city.

on this coast ; but their exclusion here was in some degree compensated by the capture of the Sikanian fortress of Hykkara, which they gave over to the Egestaians, while the captives taken in the place brought to them the sum of 120 talents, in addition to the thirty obtained from Egesta. So ended the summer, the bright hopes with which they left Peiraiæus still remaining dreams for the future which were rapidly vanishing away. To the Syracusans on the other hand the indecision of the Athenians and their ill-success in gaining allies in Sicily changed the first feeling of awe into one of positive contempt, and Syracusan horsemen riding up to the Athenian lines asked them if they were come as colonists to Sicily or for the purpose of restoring the city of Leontinoi. This insult suggested to Nikias a plan for effecting a landing near Syracuse without the danger of a battle. The Athenians had no cavalry, and an attempt to force their way on to the shore in the face of the horsemen of Syracuse might end in a failure as signal as that of Brasidas at Pylos. A Katanaian on whom Nikias could thoroughly depend was therefore sent to Syracuse. Availing himself of his own previous reputation and that of the Syracusan partisans in Katanê whose names he mentioned, this man told them how easily the Athenian army might be destroyed. If a day were definitely fixed for the attempt, the Katanaians would shut up in their town those Athenians who were in the habit of sleeping within the walls, and would also set fire to the Athenian fleet, while the Syracusans, attacking the Athenian lines, would carry everything before them. The Syracusans caught eagerly at the bait, and their whole force of cavalry and infantry was dispatched at the time agreed upon to Katanê, only to find a deserted camp and to suspect that their presence was needed most of all at home. Meanwhile the Athenian fleet had sailed round the island of Ortygia into the great harbor, and had landed the troops at leisure on its western shore near the inlet known as the bay of Daskon. The bridge across the Anapos near the temple of the Olympian Zeus was immediately broken ; the trees felled in the neighborhood supplied a strong palisade for the ships, while a fort of wood and stone was hastily run up on the shore of Daskon. To all these operations no opposition was offered by the Syracusans within the city : but the army on its return from Katanê showed its unabated confidence by at once offering the Athenians battle. For that day it was declined ; but on the following morning Nikias placed the Argives and Mantineians on the right wing, and the other allies on the left, while the Athenians occupied the ground in the midst. The short address which Nikias made to his men before the engagement contains, if it be accepted as historical, a humiliating confession of the evil effects produced by his own

hesitating strategy ; and the Syracusans are now represented as men needing a severe lesson from enemies whom they despise, while the Athenians are spurred on by the sense not of their own intrinsic superiority but of the difficulties of their position which courage alone would enable them to surmount.¹ The previous indecision of Nicias had led the Syracusans to think that they might choose their own time for the attack. In this they were mistaken. Nicias had no sooner ended his speech than he ordered a sudden and rapid charge, and the Athenian hoplites were on the enemy almost before the latter could seize their arms. But in spite of this surprise the struggle was obstinate, and the result might have been indecisive but for a heavy storm of rain and thunder which discouraged the Syracusans, while the Athenians, not having as yet anything to dismay them, ascribed the incident to the season of the year. Thus dismayed, their infantry fled ; but the Syracusan horse so effectually protected their retreat that the Athenians were soon compelled to give up the task of pursuing them. Two hundred and fifty had been slain on the side of the Syracusans : the Athenians and their allies had lost fifty. The results of the battle were confined, it would seem, to the erection of a trophy. A large treasure lay in the Olympieion ; but the Athenians made no attempt to take it, and the Syracusans threw a strong garrison into the Temenos. A decisive defeat might have led Nicias at once to give up the enterprise, to the unspeakable benefit of Athens ; his insignificant success furnished him with an excuse for spending the winter in comparative idleness and for sending to Athens for troops and munitions of war. Even now, although some three months had passed since their arrival in Sicily, the general prospect was almost as favorable as it had been at the first. Between the great harbor and the bay of Thapsos lay the inner city on Ortygia joined by a bridge to the mainland, and the outer city on Achradina to the north, each with its own encircling walls. Between the two the little harbor afforded an unwall'd landing-place : and there was no reason why the Athenians should not at once have drawn their besieging lines far within the circuit of the wall which, during the winter now beginning, the Syracusans threw up from the shore of the Great Port, taking in the precincts of Apollon Temenites, to the eastern extremity of the ground afterwards occupied by the suburb of Tyche.² But now, as before, the golden hours were wasted. The

¹ Thuc. vi. 68.

² This suburb was so known from the temple of Tychê, or Fortune, which it contained ; but there is little doubt or none that the name Sykê, mentioned by Thucydides, vi.

98, as that of a position seized by the Athenians after occupying Labdalon, is not another form of Tyche. There is no reason for supposing that the Syracusans said Sycha for Tycha ; and, had they done so, the

fleet sailed away to Katanê, and thence to Messênê in the hope that that town would be betrayed to them. Here they had the first practical experience of the hatred of Alkibiades. His countrymen had sentenced him to death: he had sworn that they should feel that he was alive. His first act was to warn the Syracusan party in Messênê of the intended betrayal of the town; and the partisans of the Athenians were put to death. For thirteen days the fleet lingered in vain hope before the place, and then withdrew to winter quarters at Naxos.¹

The conduct of Hermokrates in Syracuse was as prompt and statesmanlike as that of Nikias was feeble and silly. Taking the true measure of the situation, that sagacious leader told his countrymen that the result was fully as encouraging as he had dared to hope that it might be. Even in battle they had undergone nothing more than an insignificant reverse at the hands of the most experienced troops in Hellas; and better discipline for the future would soon make up for past want of skill. But he told them candidly that they were suffering from the evil of having too many masters. The large number of fifteen Strategoi would do more harm than good: three would amply suffice, if they were invested with adequate powers. His advice was taken, and he himself was appointed to be one of the three with Herakleides and Sikanos as his colleagues. Envoys were sent to Corinth and Sparta to urge the adoption of vigorous measures against Athens. The wall which might have formed the line of Athenian circumvallation was advanced rapidly to the needful height, and if the slopes of Epipolai to the northwest had been garrisoned as well as the deserted town of Megara and the Olympieion, the great catastrophe of the Athenian army might have been prevented by the impossibility of attempting the siege. Further, all places on which a hostile force might find it easy to land were strongly palisaded by stakes thrust into the sea bottom; and lastly the empty camp of the Athenians at Katanê was burnt and the neighboring country ravaged.

Still more to counteract the feeble efforts of Nikias, the Syracusans sent envoys to Kamarina the alliance of which place with Laches,² ten years before, had induced the Athenians to make fresh overtures. The envoys of both parties

fact must have been noticed by historians. Syche is said by Stephanos Byzantinos to have been a place near Syracuse, so called from the fig-trees which grew there. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* vii. 559, agrees with Dr. Arnold, *Thucydides*, vi. 98, in placing Sykê on the middle

of the southern slope of Epipolai, exactly to the southward of Targetta, a name which along with the neighboring Targia seems to exhibit traces of the ancient name Trogilos.

¹ Thuc. vi. 74.

² Thuc. vi. 75.

were introduced together before the assembled citizens. On the part of the Syracusans Hermokrates sought to draw them into a closer friendship or a more hearty co-operation by dwelling on the restless and aggressive temper and habits of the Athenians, and warned them that, if the Syracusans should gain the day, they would know how to recompense the inaction of those who left them to their own resources in the hour of supreme danger. The reply of the Athenian ambassador Euphemos is noteworthy chiefly as inviting the alliance of the Kamarinaians on the very grounds which Nicias in the first debates at Athens had urged as reasons for abandoning the enterprise altogether, and as ascribing the expedition to motives which must have wholly failed to awaken the enthusiasm of the Athenian people. They were not come to effect any permanent settlement in Sicily, or to make the island a part of their empire. They indulged in no such wild dreams. The distance was far too great, the impossibility of maintaining such distant conquests far too obvious,¹ to justify any fears on this score, on the part whether of the Syracusans or of their allies. Their objects were twofold. The one they would be glad to attain; the other must at all hazards be achieved. They earnestly hoped to win the friendship of Kamarina and other Sicilian cities; but they could not afford to leave the Dorians of Sicily in a position which would enable them to interfere actively on behalf of the Dorians of Peloponnesos.

As we read the speech of Euphemos, we can scarcely help feeling how easily that portion of it which relates to the growth of the Athenian empire might be translated into language thoroughly harmonising with our own notions of national unity and freedom. The Athenian empire was a standing protest against the suicidal policy of isolation on which Sparta for her own selfish purposes found it convenient to act; and the Athenians, whether consciously or unconsciously, felt that the Hellenic theory of autonomy tended first to keep up a dead level of insignificance and then to leave the feeble units thus produced at the mercy of one great military state. Euphemos would have been speaking the truth, had he said that Athens had been striving to weld the Ionic tribes into a nation; but the Greek language had no word to express the idea, nor could he have dared so far to wound the strongest instincts of the Hellenic, and more especially of the Dorian, mind. But the very truthfulness of this assertion would have laid him open to the retort that on his own showing he was advocating a policy of isolation for the Sicilian cities which he deprecated as mischievous or fatal nearer home. Euphemos could not confess that the expedition was from first to

¹ Thuc. vi. 86, 3.

Neutrality
of the Ka-
marinaians.

last opposed to the principles which had guided the most illustrious Athenian statesmen, and he could not therefore remove the suspicions with which the Kamarinaians, in spite of their friendly leanings and their habitual distrust of the Syracusans, still regarded the undertaking. Both the envoys were therefore dismissed with courtesy, and Kamarina remained professedly neutral,¹ when the prompt action recommended by Lamachos might long ago have secured her hearty alliance for Athens. In fact, during this winter, the plan of action, so far as it deserves the name, was that of Nikias; and throughout it showed his incompetence as a general not less than his previous career had shown his incompetence as a statesman. Whether success in this expedition would have been better for Athens and better for the world in general, is a question into which we need not here enter; but there can be no doubt that had Demosthenes and Lamachos been sent out at the first, Syracuse would have fallen in the first summer. Nay the conquest of all Sicily would in all likelihood have been achieved, while Nikias was frittering away time in seeking to patch up alliances with Sikel tribes who fell away as soon as their chief Archonides was dead,² and in humiliating petitions for aid addressed to the Phenicians of Carthage, from whom he received only a rebuff, or to Tyrrhenian cities, which professed a willingness to help him, perhaps because they saw in descents on the Sicilian coasts a means for enriching themselves. He was also, it is true, collecting horses, together with bricks, iron, and other siege instruments; but it is quite possible that these might not have been needed by a more energetic general, and we almost blush for the determined sluggishness which insists on remaining idle in the luxurious temperature of a Sicilian winter when Brasidas could work hard through the frosts and icy winds of the Thrace-ward Chalkidike.

Meanwhile the evil genius of Athens was busily at work elsewhere. From the Thourian territory Alkibiades found his way in a trading vessel to the Eleian port of Kyllene; but probably before he left Italy he had made overtures to the Spartans in which he claimed for himself the power as well as the will of destroying the Athenian empire. He knew, however, that the remembrance of Mantinea would not tell much in his favor at Sparta, and not until he had received a solemn pledge for his safety did he dare to venture thither. But it would seem that he was already there when the Corinthians came with the Syracusan envoys to plead the cause of the Sicilian Dorians and to urge them to an open resumption of the war with Athens. The ephors were contenting themselves with the placid expression of a hope that the Syracusans would not submit to

¹ Thuc. vi. 88.

² Thuc. vi. 88, 4; vii. 1, 4.

Traitorous
schemes of
Alkibiades.

Nikias, when Alkibiades broke in upon the debate with a vehement eagerness for which he felt that some apology was needed. The apology which he offered brands him with an infamy even blacker than that which the deep malignity of his suggestions would deserve. It was made up of a string of lies. No Athenian citizen had ever so systematically defied the law and insulted its officers as himself; and he had now the effrontery to take credit to himself for an exceptional moderation and sobriety,¹ for the prudence of his public counsels, and for his real love of oligarchy in which he asserted that all well-educated Athenians sympathised, his intention being to set it up in the place of democracy on the first convenient opportunity. Having thus lied about himself, he went on to spin a web of falsehoods about his countrymen. The fatal enterprise in which they were now engaged had been his own special creation; and even in the speech by which he had striven to rouse their lust of conquest and had most succeeded in exciting it he held out to them no higher hope than that victory in Sicily might lead in the end to a supremacy over all Hellas.² But now speaking at Sparta, he said not a word about his own share in the business, while he ascribed to the Athenians a boundless scheme of aggression and conquest which had probably taken shape in his own brain since he made his escape from the Salaminian trireme at Thourioi. These schemes would almost certainly be carried out, if the Syracusans should be conquered. A Spartan force should be sent out at once to aid them; the presence of a Spartan general to organise their resistance was even more needful; but it was most of all necessary that the Athenians should be crippled at home. The one measure which the Athenians regarded with unmingled dread their enemies, happily for them, had not yet tried. The maintenance of a permanent garrison³ within the borders of Attica would weight them with a burden which they would be hardly able to bear; and the Spartans would find in the lower ground between Parnes and Pentelikos a post than which none could be more convenient. The occupation of Dekeleia would give them the command of the silver mines of Laureion, while it would do to the Athenians mischief more serious than the loss of a few cart-loads of precious metal. The calls of incessant military service would not only paralyse the administration of the Athenian law-courts but would deprive the poorer citizens of a revenue which had become to them almost a necessity of life. Still more, it would break the spell of Athenian authority over their allies who would see that their masters were at length unable to hold their

¹ Thuc. vi. 89, 5.

² Thuc. vi. 18, 4.

³ Compare the suggestion put

into the mouth of the Corinthians,
Thuc. i. 122, 1.

own at home, and would seize the opportunity for sending their tribute-ships away empty.

When we remember that Athens lay exposed to this deadly wound only because the flower and strength of the people had been drafted away on a distant expedition which Alkibiades himself had planned and urged on with frantic passion, we shall feel that, whatever may have been his wrongs, treachery more dastardly and inhuman can scarcely be found in the annals of mankind. But what were his wrongs? His life at Athens had been one of unparalleled license; yet even thus he had been able to repel an accusation for which the evidence of facts was not forthcoming. His recall had nothing to do with the mutilation of the Hermai; he had not even to answer any charge of political conspiracy. But of profaning the religious mysteries he knew himself to be guilty, and, fearing that the personal enmity which his insolence had roused might make the matter go hard with him, he resolved to defy his countrymen by flight. So great, however, was the charm of his manner and such his powers of persuasion that had he chosen, when first charged with complicity in the plot of the Hermokopidai, to make a clean breast of it, and, while he asserted his absolute ignorance of that plot, to express his regret for acts of profanity and irreverence which were never designed to be more than a private jest and which ought not therefore to be regarded as an offence against the Athenian people or the public gods, the minor transgression would in all likelihood have been condoned, and, promising greater care for the time to come, Alkibiades would have departed for Sicily free from all accusations and from all suspicion. For the present his work was done. The slow current of Spartan blood was quickened by the stimulus of his fiery rhetoric. It was decreed that a Spartan army should seize on Dekeleia, and that Gylippos should be sent to take the command at Syracuse. This general at once requested the Corinthians to send two ships to convey him from the Messenian port of Asine, and to make ready the rest of their fleet with the utmost speed. While the enemies of Athens were thus stirred to more vigorous action in the Peloponnesos, the trireme dispatched by Nikias for more troops and more money reached Athens. Both were granted without a word to express the disappointment which they must have felt, and the strength of the state was more dangerously committed to an expedition which it would have been infinitely better if they had from the outset starved.

From the level land adjoining Achradina the ground to the west of Syracuse rises by an ascent almost imperceptible except where it is broken by four slopes or ledges of rock, narrowing

gradually to the northwest until it reaches an apex at the point now known as the Belvedere, which marks the site of the Euryelos of Thucydides. The northern and southern sides of this triangle break off into precipitous cliffs seldom exceeding twenty or twenty-five feet in height, leaving access only through the gaps which occur in them to the table-land of Epipolai. To this rising ground with the higher table-land behind it the new wall built by the Syracusans, inclosing the ground to the east of the statue of Apollon Temenites, had given a sudden and great importance. From the table-land of Epipolai the inner and the outer city was seen stretched out on the level ground at the foot of the long and gentle slope which began from Euryelos. The possession of this slope by the Syracusans must in all likelihood have led the Athenians to abandon a task which would thus have become impracticable; its occupation by the Athenians would give them the command of all the ground as far as the Syracusan wall, the capture of which would at once enable them to cut off Achradina from Ortygia and to blockade the outer and the inner city separately both by land and sea. This discovery may have been made simultaneously by the Syracusans and the Athenians, but to their ultimate ruin the latter were the first to take advantage of it. In a review of their whole force on the low ground bordered by the river Anapos the Syracusans had told off 600 picked hoplites under an Andrian exile named Diomilos for the special purpose of occupying and holding the range of Epipolai; but for whatever reason the order was not at once carried out. In the meanwhile the whole Athenian army had landed unnoticed at a spot facing the hill or rock known as the Lion,¹ while the fleet was drawn up on the peninsula of Thapsos which was strongly palisaded on the land side. No sooner had the troops disembarked than they advanced at a run on the road leading to Euryelos, and they were already in possession of the summit before Diomilos and his hoplites caught sight of them and began to move from the plain of the Anapos.² These had nearly three miles of uphill ground to get over before they could even reach the enemy, and they arrived out of breath and in a disorder which left them no chance of success. Diomilos was killed with one-half of his band: the rest retreated to the city. The Athenians on the next day advanced to the Syracusan wall, and offered battle which the Syracusans declined. Their next step was to build a fort on Labdalon. This

¹ Thucydides merely says that Leon was distant about three-fourths of a mile from Epipolai; but he does not say that it was on the sea-shore or how far it was from the sea. It was probably some-

where to the north of the peninsula of Thapsos.

² From the words of Thucydides, vi. 98, 2, it seems that the Syracusans had a review of their forces on two successive days.

was followed by the erection of another work with a rapidity which astonished and alarmed their enemies. Hard by the spot known as the Syche the Athenian generals ordered the construction of a strongly fortified inclosure, either circular¹ or quadrangular, which might serve as a stronghold for the army and as a centre and starting-point for the blockading walls which were to run thence eastward to Trogilos and westward to the Great Harbor. So marvellous was the speed with which this fortification was raised that the Syracusans advanced for the purpose of summarily arresting the work. But the horsemen sent from Athens had now been provided with Sicilian horses, and about four hundred more had been got together from Egesta, Naxos, and the friendly Sikel tribes. As the Syracusans drew near to the enemy, the generals, contrasting their lack of discipline and the inferiority of their weapons and armor with those of the Athenians, determined on retreat. Their cavalry for some time hindered the Athenians in their work, but were presently attacked and beaten. Nikias might profess to see in this victory the earnest of still greater results to be achieved by a force the lack of which he had pleaded as his excuse for his long inaction: but we do not hear of the Athenian cavalry again, until they are mentioned as undergoing a defeat in the engagement which preceded the final conflict in the Great Harbor.²

This reverse convinced Hermokrates that the strength of the city must not be hazarded in open fight with the enemy. Starting from a point in their new wall probably not far from Temenites, the Syracusans carried, as rapidly as they could, a strong palisading, behind which they erected a wall reaching to the cliffs of Epipolai, thus cutting the extended line of the Athenian wall and also depriving the enemy of the power of turning these defences and attacking them in flank. To this work Nikias offered no interruption. The Athenians had enough to do in building their blockading wall on both sides from the circle, so far as their course was clear, and in destroying the aqueduct which supplied the city with water from the springs of Epipolai. The generals probably preferred to take the chance of surprising the defenders of the intersecting wall to wasting time and force in desultory efforts to hinder its progress; nor had they long to wait for an opportunity. The stockade with its wooden towers and the wall behind it were no sooner finished than the Syracusans retreated within their new line of

Destruction
of the first
Syracusan
counter-
work.

¹ Thucydides, vi. 98, calls it simply the Circle *κύκλος*; and as he speaks of it as finished, there can be no doubt that the word does not

mean the whole circuit of the intended Athenian circumvallation, which was never finished.

² Thuc. vii. 51, 2.

defence, leaving the troops of one tribe to guard them : and of these some even during the heat of the day took refuge in the city, while others went to sleep in their tents and none kept a careful watch. Of such improvidence the Athenian generals quickly took advantage. By their orders 300 picked hoplites with a certain proportion of light-armed troops assailed the intersecting wall, while one-half of the Athenian army advanced to the wall of the city, the other half to the stockaded gate which probably opened from the Temenos of Phoibos. The palisade of the intersecting wall was soon taken by the 300 hoplites, and the defenders, abandoning their post, sought refuge within the new city wall. So quickly were they followed by the enemy that many of these forced their way in along with the fugitives but were beaten back with some loss by the Syracusans within. Still the enterprise was thoroughly successful. The intersecting wall was destroyed, and the materials of the palisade were used by the Athenians in their work of circumvallation.

The Athenian generals were now resolved that the Syracusans should not have the opportunity of throwing out fresh counter-

Destruction
of the second
Syracusan
counter-
work.
Death of
Lamachos.

works running like the last to the cliffs of Epipolai and thus defying the enemy to turn them. The cliffs were themselves fortified, and the Athenians thus started with an immense advantage in their further task of carrying their southward wall to the great harbor. But while this work was going on, the Syracusans were busy in preparing a fresh stockade, defended by a deep trench, from the new wall of the city across the low and marshy ground which stretched to the banks of the Anapos ; and by the time that the walls on the cliffs were finished, the Athenians found themselves opposed by a fresh obstacle in their progress to the sea. Lamachos determined to make himself master of this counterwork at once. The fleet was ordered to sail round from Thapsos into the great harbor ; and an attack on the trench and stockade at day-break was rewarded by the capture of almost the whole of it. The Athenians had to make their way across the marshy ground by making a sort of causeway with planks and boards : and thus the rest of the counterwork was not taken until later on in the day. The real purpose of Lamachos was now accomplished. The Syracusans had not only been driven from their counterwork, but had been defeated in open battle. Their right wing had fled to the city ; the left wing was in retreat for the river ; and it would have been to the advantage of the Athenians if these had been allowed to cross and so been cut off from re-entering Syracuse. But at this point the three hundred picked hoplites who had done their task so well at the first counterwork brought about a disaster

which carried the whole Athenian army many steps nearer to its ruin. Hurrying towards the bridge in order to cut off the fugitives, they were attacked by a body of Syracusan horse and thrown back on the Athenian right wing in such disorder as to disturb the ranks of the tribe with which they came into contact. Lamachos saw the danger, and hurried to their aid from the left wing with the Argive allies and a small force of archers. In his haste he advanced with a few companions and crossing a trench was for a moment separated from his followers. In an instant he was struck down and killed. Five or six died with him, and their bodies were carried off by the enemy. But the main body of the Athenian army had now come up, and the Syracusans were again compelled to retreat. Meanwhile those of them who had fled from the stockade to the city, encouraged by the repulse of the three hundred and the disorder of the Athenian right wing, issued again from the walls; and while they remained in sufficient numbers to retain the enemy on the former battle-ground, a detachment was sent to take the great central fortification from which the Athenian siege walls had started. They had hoped to find it empty, and they succeeded in taking and destroying the redoubt of one thousand feet in length raised for the protection of the builders; but when they advanced beyond it, they found themselves suddenly facing a wall of flame. Nikias was lying sick within the fort, and as soon as he knew that the enemy was approaching, he ordered his attendants to set on fire all the woodwork within their reach. The assailants at once retreated; the day had, indeed, again turned against them. The Athenian army, startled by the sudden outburst of flame round the fortress, was hurrying up from the lower ground; and at the same moment the magnificent Athenian fleet was seen sweeping round into the great harbor which it was destined never to leave.

Once more Nikias had everything in his favor, and prompt action would have been as certainly followed by success now as when his army first landed near the Olympieion. Some weeks were yet to pass before Gylippos could attempt to enter Syracuse; and the one thing of vital moment was that the city should be completely invested before that attempt should be made. A single wall carried from the great harbor to the central fort and thence to the sea at the northern extremity of Achradina would have amply sufficed for this purpose. But instead of urging on this work with the utmost speed, Nikias wasted time in building the southward wall double from the first, while much of the ground which should have been guarded by the eastward wall was left open. The Syracusans were therefore able still to bring in supplies by the road which passed

under the rock of Eurýelos ; but even thus their prospects were sufficiently gloomy. They were, in fact, beginning to feel the miseries of a state of siege, and their irritation was vented first upon their generals whom they suspected either of gross neglect of duty or of wilful treachery. Hermokrates and his colleagues were deprived of their command, and Herakleides, Eukles, and Tellias put in their place. Even this measure of success was fully enough to lull Nikias into a feeling of fatal security : and the temptation to abandon himself to an inactivity which a painful internal disease made doubly agreeable was at this time for other reasons yet stronger. From the first a party in Syracuse had been at work to make him master of the city ; and later in the siege, when the Athenians had begun to feel that their chances of success were becoming very small, these partisans induced him to linger on when retreat had become a matter of urgent need.¹ By these men he was now told that the utter dejection of the Syracusans foreboded their almost immediate surrender ; and the near prospect of this unconditional submission probably made him turn a deaf ear to the proposals which were actually made to him for a settlement of the quarrel.²

Three or four months at least had passed away since the synod at Sparta in which Alkibiades propounded his infamous treachery, before Gylippos found himself able to advance beyond Leukas. At length with two Lakonian and two Corinthian vessels he crossed over to Taras, and thence went on to Thourioi in the vain hope that the Thourians would be glad to aid him for the sake of his father Kleandridas, who had long sojourned among them. Far from giving him any help, they sent to Nikias a message telling him that a Spartan general was making his way to Sicily more in the guise of a pirate or a privateer than as the leader of a force which should command respect. The contempt implied in the phrase soothed the vanity of Nikias, who showed his sense of his own superiority by failing to send, until it was too late, so much as a single ship to watch the movements of his enemy and to prevent his landing in Sicily.³ Gylippos had already passed through the straits of Messênê on his way to Himera, before the four triremes dispatched by Nikias on learning that Gylippos was already in Lokroi reached Rhegion. But even when Gylippos had set out on his march from Himera with a force of nearly 3,000 men, Nikias still remained as unconcerned within his lines as though the approach of a general bringing with him the influence of the Spartan name were a thing wholly beneath his notice. He had now only to block the roads by which

Voyage of
Gylippos to
Italy.

¹ Tnuc. vii. 49 and 86.

² Ib. vi. 103.

³ Ib. vi. 104.

he had himself seized Epipolai, and Gylippos must have fallen back to devise some other means for succoring Syracuse.

The time demanded indeed all the energy and the caution of which an Athenian army was capable. An assembly had already been summoned in Syracuse to discuss definitely the terms for capitulation, when the Corinthian Gongylos in a single ship made his way into the city and told them that the aid of which they had despaired was almost at their doors. All thoughts of submission were at once cast to the winds, and they made ready forthwith to march out with all their forces to bring Gylippos into the town. Nikias was doing all that he could to make his way smooth before him. The materials for the new wall to the east of the central fort were lying for the most part ready for the builders: but the workmen were busy on the few furlongs which still remained unfinished at the end of the southern wall where for the present there was no danger whatever, and Gylippos entered Syracuse almost as a conqueror. The Athenians were at once made to feel that the parts of the actors had been changed. The Spartan general offered them a truce for five days, if they would spend this time in leaving not merely Syracuse but Sicily. The terms were treated with contemptuous silence; but the very fact of their being offered was not less significant than the refusal of Nikias to accept battle when Gylippos led the Syracusans into the open space before his lines. The next day was marked by the loss of the fortress of Labdalon, which seemed to have gone from the mind of Nikias because it was out of his sight, and by the seizure of an Athenian trireme in the harbor.¹ Event followed event with astonishing speed. A night attack made by Gylippos on a weak part of the southern blockading wall was frustrated by the vigilance of the besiegers, who were now fast taking the place of the besieged; and the Athenian watches were in this portion of their work henceforth disposed with something like effectual care. But these precautions were of little avail or none; and Nikias resolved, while there was yet time, to fortify the promontory of Plemmyrion which with Ortygia, from which it is one mile distant, formed the entrance to the port. Here he stationed his large transport and merchant vessels with the swiftest of his triremes, while the stores for the army generally were deposited in three forts erected on the cape; and undoubtedly, as commanding the entrance to the bay, the post had great advantages. Convoys could enter the harbor without risk, and the Athenian fleet could intercept any vessels seeking entrance on the enemy's side: but as a set-off to these benefits, Plemmyrion had no water, and the

Entry of
Gylippos
into Syra-
cuse.

¹ Thuc. vii. 3.

Syracusan horsemen, having full command of the country, harassed or destroyed the foraging parties which were compelled to seek supplies from long distances. More fatal than all was the admission, implied by this change of position, that the Athenians were rather defending themselves than attacking. Henceforth their seeming victories were to do them no good: their slightest failures or blunders were to do them infinite harm, and the former were indeed few and far between. No attempt had been made to stop Gylippos before he reached the Epizephyrian Lokroi; but twenty triremes were now sent to intercept the approaching Corinthian fleet under Erasinides. In a few days the enemy's ships reached Syracuse without having even come into contact with the Athenian squadron.

A faint gleam of hope seemed to light up the prospect for the besiegers, when Gylippos, having led out his army to battle many times without being attacked, determined himself to become the assailant. The ground which he had chosen for the action near the new counterwork was too much cramped and broken up with walls to allow free action to his horsemen and archers; and he was punished by a defeat in which the Corinthian Gongylos was slain. Of this defeat he took the whole blame on himself. He would take care on the next day that they should fight under no such physical disadvantages, and the thought was not to be borne that Dorians from Peloponnesos should be unable to drive out the jumbled crowd of an Ionian army. In this second battle, the Syracusan horsemen did their work with fatal success. The Athenian left wing was immediately broken, and the whole army driven back to their lines,—not an attempt being made by their cavalry to avert or to lessen the disaster. Nikias had fought only to hinder the progress of the counterwork which had all but reached his wall. In the night which followed the fight, the point of intersection was passed, and all hope of blockading Syracuse except by storming the counter-wall faded finally away. But Nikias still had it in his power to guard the entrances to the slopes of Epipolai, and thus to keep the ground open for the work which the new force to be presently summoned from Athens must inevitably have to do. It would have been better even to abandon the whole line of siege works and concentrate the army on the high ground which overlooked the city, thus maintaining full communication with the interior of the island, and trusting to the effect of main force for dislodging the enemy, so soon as the new army from Athens should arrive. But there was no need to do even thus much. If an adequate detachment had occupied this ground now, Demosthenes would have encountered no opposition until he reached the third Syracusan counterwork. But Nikias again let the opportunity slip: and the

Third counterwork of the Syracusans.

crews of the Corinthian fleet which had just reached Syracuse took part in the construction of the further works without which Gylippos saw that the city could not be safe, if an army of sufficient strength should occupy the heights under Euryelos. So passed away the precious days, while the idleness of Nikias added to the colossal burden under which even the genius of Demosthenes broke down.

Meanwhile, Gylippos had left Syracuse for the purpose of stirring her allies to greater efforts in her behalf, and of inducing other cities to abandon their neutrality and to join in crushing the invaders, while a messenger was bearing to Athens a letter in which Nikias professed to give a plain unvarnished report of all that had thus far befallen the fleet and army. It is, to say the least, a marvellous specimen of the ingenuity with which a religious man may deceive himself about the motives and consequences of his own actions. To their misfortune the Athenians believed him when he extended the scale of the armament intended for the expedition to Sicily : to their utter ruin they believed him now, and took his letter as a picture not of things as Nikias saw them but of things as they were in themselves. Nikias told them in substance that at first they had been uniformly victorious and that they had finished their besieging walls,¹ when Gylippos came with an army from Peloponnesos and from some towns in Sicily ; but he never told them that common care would have made his entrance impossible. He told them that his first victory over Gylippos had been followed by a defeat caused by the Syracusan horsemen and archers ; but he added not a word to explain the lack or absence of cavalry and bowmen on his own side. He told them of the Syracusan counter-walls which had crossed his own, forgetting that he was thus contradicting his previous assertion that his own wall had been finished, and that the success of the Syracusans with this counterwork was his own fault. He told them that not merely the splendid appearance but the usefulness of their ships was wretchedly impaired, forgetting that only through his own resistance to the counsels of Lamachos they had failed to do and to finish their work long ago. He told them that the change in their fortunes had been followed by discontent and some insubordination among the troops and by desertions both among their allies and among their slaves ; but he did not tell them whether to this or to what cause they were to ascribe the disappearance or inaction or carelessness of his cavalry. He told them that either the present army must be withdrawn, or another army of equal strength sent to reinforce it, adding the

¹ τὰ τείχη οἰκοδομησάμενων. Thuc. vii. 11, 1. Taken strictly, this assertion was not true.

expression of his own wish to be relieved from his command, for which he was now incapacitated by disease of the kidneys. He had always been incapacitated for it; but although for his unconsciousness of this fact he must not perhaps be too severely judged, yet it would be hard to count up the many benefits which, as he said, the Athenians had derived from his generalship. In their infatuation they thought that they would derive more still. The resignation of Nikias was not received; but two of his officers Menandros and Euthydemos were appointed his colleagues, until the new generals Demosthenes, Alkisthenes, and Eurymedon should reach the scene of action. About the time of the winter solstice Eurymedon was dispatched with ten ships and 120 talents of silver, to tell them that the other generals would come with the spring bringing more effectual succor.¹ Twenty ships were at the same time dispatched to the Peloponnesian coasts to see that no Spartan or Corinthian fleets should depart thence for Sicily.

But troubles greater than any which they had experienced in the earlier years of the war were impending over the Athenians nearer home. The disaster of Sphakteria had convinced the Spartans that they and their allies were under divine displeasure for the way in which they had brought about the war, and they acknowledged that in the crisis which preceded the outbreak of the struggle the Athenians were in the right and themselves wholly in the wrong.² Hence they were especially anxious that the blame of renewing the strife should attach distinctly to the Athenians; and such a manifest breach of the peace seemed to be furnished by the mission of an Athenian fleet which about the time when Gylippos departed for Sicily was sent to aid the Argives. The desultory warfare carried on by the Helots and Messenians from Pylos did not in terms break the compact inscribed on the brazen pillars which still stood in Athens and in Sparta; but when Athenian ships landed their crews to ravage the territories of the Limerian Epidaurus, Prasiai, and other cities,³ they held that no room was left for further hesitation,⁴ and they set diligently to work to get together materials for the permanent garrisoning of Dekeleia. In the early spring a Spartan army not only renewed openly a war only nominally interrupted, but without any opposition on the part of the Athenians⁵ built the fortress which gave its name to the ten years' struggle which followed its erection. Once more after an interval of twelve years the fertile farms of Attica were

¹ Thuc. vii. 16.

² Ib. vii. 18, 2. See also p. 267.

³ Thuc. vi. 105.

⁴ They chose to forget that their

own part of the compact relating to Amphipolis and some other points had never been fulfilled.

⁵ Thuc. vii. 19, 1.

ravaged and dismantled, while from the very walls of their city or from the Eleusinian plain the Athenians could now see in the distance the hostile camp which was to be a thorn in their side until the gates of Athens itself should be thrown open to admit a Spartan conqueror.

Twenty-five Corinthian ships kept watch over the fleet of twenty Athenian triremes stationed at Naupaktos, while a convoy of merchant vessels set off for Sicily with the Peloponnesian reinforcements for the Syracusans. More than 2,000 heavy-armed soldiers thus left the Peloponnesian shores. The armament taken by Demosthenes was far more imposing, and if it could have been used for any other purpose than that of repairing a series of fatal blunders would doubtless have been far more efficacious.

Peloponnesian and Athenian reinforcements for Sicily.

While Athens was thus making ready more victims for the slaughter, Gylippos was urging the Syracusans boldly to attack the Athenians on the element which they regarded as their own. With his usual promptness he arranged that five-and-thirty ships should issue from the great harbor at the moment when five-and-forty from the dock in the lesser harbor should double the islet of Ortygia, the one to attack the Athenian fleet in the harbor, the other to assail the naval station at Plemmyrion, and thus to cover the attack on the forts which was to be made simultaneously by the land-forces. It was a fight to determine which side should command the entrance to the harbor; and with common care the Athenians might have retained it to the great discomfiture of their enemies. Five-and-twenty Athenian triremes advanced hastily from their station at the extremity of the blockading wall to meet the five-and-thirty ships of the enemy; but at first the day went against them, not only here, but also in the battle off Plemmyrion, until the Syracusan fleet becoming disordered from their own success furnished the Athenians with an opportunity for the employment of a tactic in which they were unrivalled. With a loss of three triremes they sunk eleven ships of the enemy, the crews of three being made prisoners, the rest slain. But a victory which might otherwise have at least insured the ultimate safety of the besiegers was rendered worthless by the loss of Plemmyrion. With an imprudence against which it was the business of Nikias to guard, the garrison of the three forts on the cape went down to witness the sea-fight from the shore where they could do no good, leaving a few only of their number to keep watch at their post. On these Gylippos fell with overpowering force. After a short and sharp conflict the first fort was in his hands, and the fugitives found some difficulty in escaping to the merchant and transport vessels,

Naval victory of the Athenians, and capture of Plemmyrion by Gylippos.

for the Syracusan fleet was thus far victorious. With the other two forts he had even less difficulty: but when these had been taken, the fortune of the day had changed on the sea. It mattered little. The Athenian garrison escaped; but Gylippos was master not only of the entrance to the harbor, but of the Athenian forts and of the vast quantities of corn and money, some belonging to the military chest, some to private merchants, which had been placed there for safety. With these the Athenians lost three triremes which had been drawn up for repairs, and the sails and tackle of not less than forty ships. But worse than this, they saw two of their forts permanently occupied by their enemies, while the Syracusan fleet kept guard off Plemmyrion. Henceforth convoys could be introduced into the harbor only after a fight, and they were made to feel on how slender a thread the very existence of the whole armament was hanging.

Blow after blow now fell upon the besieging force. The idea of their maritime supremacy had led the Athenians to think that supplies of money for the army might be safely intrusted to merchant vessels even without a convoy. Eleven ships were thus sent with a vast amount of treasure: almost all of them fell into the hands of the Syracusan cruisers off the coast of Italy. A large quantity of timber for ship-building lay ready for the Athenians in the territory of Kaulon: it was all set on fire by the Syracusans. An Athenian squadron of twenty triremes watched off Megara for the return of the ships which had done them so much harm; it succeeded in intercepting only one of them. Nor were they more fortunate within the great harbor. Much time, money, and toil was spent in the useless effort to pull up or to saw off the stakes which the Syracusans had planted in the water in front of their old docks; but while they were thus working to no purpose, the Syracusans were maturing their larger scheme for the destruction of the Athenian fleet before any reinforcements should reach them. It was to the misfortune of Athens that this scheme was not wholly successful, for the ruin of the navy of Nikias would have furnished to Demosthenes a sufficient justification for taking off the army and forthwith returning home.

Meanwhile Demosthenes was approaching with his new force from Athens. At Kephallenia and Zakynthos he took in the hoplites furnished by those islands, and thence went to the Akarnanian towns of Alyzia and Anaktorion, there for the last time to gather slingers and javelin men near the scene of the brilliant campaigns which had marked his earlier career. It was here, where every spot reminded him of happier times, that Eurymedon met him, bringing not

Indecisive
Athenian
operations
in the Great
Harbor.

Voyage of
Demosthe-
nes to Kor-
kyra and
Italy.

merely the disheartening report of what he had himself seen but the tidings which he had received on his voyage of the disastrous loss of Plemmyrion. Hither also came Konon, the commander at Naupaktos, to make a confession which to Phormion would have seemed intolerably humiliating but which was extorted by a stern necessity. The eighteen ships which formed his squadron were unable to cope with the Corinthian fleet of twenty-five ships which were manifestly making ready to attack him. Ten ships were detached to reinforce him: and Eurymedon went on to Korkyra, where for the last time he appeared as an Athenian general on the island where he had won a fame less enviable than that of his colleague.¹ The Korkyraians furnished fifteen triremes and some hoplites for the fleet which now crossed the Ionian gulf to the Iapygian promontory. At Thourioi they found the philo-Athenian party dominant, and a resolution was taken to aid the Athenians with 700 hoplites and 300 light-armed troops.²

At Syracuse the attack on the Athenian fleet had been delayed by a disaster which befell some reinforcements of Syracusan allies. These were marching across the territory of Sikel tribes, whose chiefs had been warned by Nicias to do what they could to cut short their journey. Had he taken this step, when he heard that Gylippos was marching from Himera, the issue of the siege might have been different. As it was, eight hundred of these Syracusan allies were slain by Sikels who lay in ambush for them, together with all the envoys but one: but this one, the representative of Corinth, led the remaining 1,500 to Syracuse, and the delay thus caused served only to involve the second Athenian army in the ruin which might otherwise have been confined to the first. Of the Sikeliot cities Akragas alone insisted on remaining neutral: the rest felt the need of abandoning the sinking ship, and came forward to take active part with the Syracusans. In short, the Syracusans were not merely gaining strength by additions to their numbers: they were fast acquiring that power of making the best of circumstances which had marked the Athenians in their most vigorous days. The bulk and awkwardness of the Syracusan ships would tell only in their favor, so long as the Athenians were debarred from using their peculiar tactics; and they had no hesitation in so arming the prows of their triremes and reducing their projection as to render them fatal to the lighter ships which under other conditions had won for Athens her command of the sea. The entrance to the great harbor was only one mile in width, and after the loss of Plemmyrion the Athenian fleet had been cooped up in that part of the harbor whence their blockading wall ran northward to Epipolai. The

¹ See pp. 308-310.

² Thuc. vii. 33 and 35.

Syracusans counted therefore on a certain victory, if an attack were made simultaneously both by sea and by land. Unhappily for the Athenians, their hopes were disappointed. The advance of the Syracusan army against the blockading wall led the Athenians to think that their work for the day would be confined to the land ; and the sudden appearance of 80 Syracusan ships advancing up the harbor at first amazed them. Hastily manning 75 triremes, the Athenians hurried to meet them ; but the day was spent in desultory and indecisive movements. On the following day the Syracusans did nothing, and Nikias spent the time in placing his transports before the stockade of his naval station in such wise that any trireme hard pressed by the enemy might retreat through the openings left between them and return to the battle in good order. The conflict which began early on the next day was following much the same course with the last engagement, when the Corinthian Ariston suggested that the Syracusan crews should take their mid-day meal on the shore, and then immediately renew the struggle. Arrangements were accordingly made for this purpose ; and the Athenians, seeing their enemies retreat about noon, thought that their work for the day was done. They were soon undeceived. Most of them were still fasting, when the Syracusan fleet was seen again advancing in order of battle. Even thus, in spite of the disorder in which the Athenian ships were manned, neither side had any decisive advantage until the Athenians, wearied out with hunger, determined to bring the matter to an issue, and advanced rapidly against the enemy. The result instantly verified the calculations of the Syracusans. The loss of three Syracusan ships was more than compensated by the sinking of seven Athenian triremes and the disabling of many more ; and the Syracusans were counting on the complete destruction of the fleet and army of Nikias, when seventy-three Athenian triremes swept into the great harbor. The feeling first excited in the minds of the Syracusans was one of consternation. For a moment the relative position of the antagonists was reversed. The Athenians at once issued from their lines and ravaged the lowlands of the Anapos without any resistance except from the garrison in the Olympieion ; but Demosthenes saw at a glance that this must go for nothing, unless some decisive advantage could be gained which would fairly justify a continuance of the siege. At present the very name of blockade was an absurd misnomer, unless the Athenians were to be regarded as the blockaded party. The forces of Nikias were in part demoralised, in part worn out by marsh fever caught in the lowlands of the Anapos ; nor was it of the least use to prolong operations near the sea unless the position of the Syracusans could be turned on the northern side of Epipolai. But it was soon evident that

attacks by day had little chance of success ; and with the consent of his colleagues Demosthenes resolved on a night assault.

With the whole disposable force of the camp Demosthenes with Menandros and Euthydemos set out on a moonlit night for their march to Euryelos. He felt that everything depended on the work of that night, and his men, in spite of all the sufferings and disasters which had thus far attended the expedition, were full of hope and even of confidence. They were now acting under a general whose sagacity in council and energy in the field had won him the highest reputation. They were carrying with them everything which might be reasonably expected to insure a successful surprise. It wanted about two hours of midnight when Demosthenes, leaving Nikias to command in the camp, marched along that portion of the slope of Epipolai which still remained in the possession of the Athenians : and not only did he succeed in making his way under Euryelos, but the cross wall itself was taken before any alarm was given. Some of the garrison were slain ; but the greater number, feeling that the post was no longer tenable since the enemy was on the northern side, fled in haste and roused the picked body of Six Hundred who had suffered so severely under Diomilos when the Athenians first surprised Epipolai. They were now not less hardly handled by Demosthenes, when they hurried from the forts in front of the cross wall to the recovery of the wall itself ; and the Athenian generals, thus far victorious, led on a large proportion of their forces towards the Syracusan counter wall, while others began the task of demolishing the cross wall. The Syracusans were now fully alarmed ; but even Gylippos with all the forces at his command was at first driven back by the determined energy of the Athenian assault. In fact the work of Demosthenes was already done, if he could only maintain his present position. But he was anxious to push the Syracusans at once as far back as possible ; and success had excited in his army a confidence which with Greek troops generally led to a dangerous neglect of discipline. The Athenians in front were already in some disorder when they were thrown into confusion by the sudden charge of a body of heavy Boiotian hoplites, who had been recently brought to Sicily. From this moment the battle became a wild jumble, in which all authority was lost. The light of the moon, which was shining brightly, revealed the general features of the scene, but left it difficult or impossible to distinguish at a distance one body of men from another ; and the Athenians, as they were driven back, became separated from the columns which were pressing forward in full confidence that they were still victorious. As the disorder increased, they were no longer able to see in what direction their

Night attack
by the Athe-
nians on the
Syracusan
cross wall.

movements should be made, and in the uproar the words of command could not be distinguished. In this fearful din they began to regard as enemies every body of men which was seen advancing towards them; and as these bodies were now frequently their own fugitives, the horrors of conflict with their own people were added to the fierce onsets of the Syracusans, while the watchword repeatedly asked for and given became known to the enemy. The discovery was fatal. Small parties of Syracusans, if brought into collision with a larger Athenian force, could now escape as being able to give the password, while Athenians in the like case were at once slaughtered. The presence of Dorians in the Athenian army completed the catastrophe. The war-cry of the Argives, Korkyraians, and other Dorian allies could not be distinguished from the Syracusan pæan; and the Athenians, dismayed already, were hopelessly bewildered by the horrible suspicion that the enemy was in their rear, was among them, was everywhere.¹ Attacking all who raised the Dorian war-shout, they not unfrequently fell on their friends, nor were they easily convinced of their mistake. The defeat had in fact become rout. The one thing for which the Athenians now strove was to reach their lines on the plain of the Anapos; but the slopes which led to them were bounded by precipices over which vast numbers were pushed by their pursuers, and either grievously maimed or killed. Even when they had reached the lower level, all danger was not yet surmounted. The new comers belonging to the reinforcements of Demosthenes knew nothing of the ground, and many of them strayed away into the country where they were found on the coming day by the Syracusan horsemen and cut to pieces. The loss to the Athenians was fearful; but the number of the shields which fell into the hands of the enemy was greater even than that of the slain. Many who had safely reached the camp had been compelled to throw down their arms before venturing on the terrible leap over the crags of Epipolai.

The folly or the iniquity of Nikias was now to inflict on Athens a deadlier mischief than any which Alkibiades had striven to do to her. Syracuse was wild with excitement; Gylippos was gone to gather fresh recruits in other parts of Sicily; and while the victory on Epipolai was stirring the Syracusans to a mighty attack on the Athenian camp near the harbor, their enemies, overwhelmed by the long series of their calamities, were being wasted by the marsh fever which becomes most malignant in the autumn, and were possessed by the one absorbing desire to be quit of a task which brought them nothing but deadly and

Thuc. vii. 45, 7.

Refusal of Nikias to retreat or to allow the fleet to leave the Great Harbor.

ignominious defeat. In circumstances such as these Demosthenes was a man not likely to hesitate. All that he could do as an assailant had been done : and he was bound to preserve lives on which the very salvation of their country depended. For the present the new fleet which he had brought with them made them once more masters of the sea ; and it was his business to remove the army while the path was open. The reply of Nikias betrays an imbecility, an infatuation, or a depravity which has seldom been equalled, perhaps never surpassed ; and we have to remember that it is given to us by an historian who reviews his career with singular indulgence and who cherished his memory with affectionate but melancholy veneration. The party in Syracuse which had been all along in communication with him may still have urged him not to abandon the siege. By these men he may have been informed that the Syracusans had already spent 2,000 talents on the war, that they owed a heavy debt besides, and that it would be beyond their power to maintain the contest much longer ;¹ but it was impossible for him not to see that while the strength of the Athenians was daily becoming less, that of his enemies was enormously increasing. The truth is that, if the report of his speech may be trusted, his resolution was taken on other considerations. The Athenians, he asserted, were a people under the dominion of loud-voiced and bullying demagogues, and of the men who were now crying out under the hardships of the siege the greater number would join eagerly in charging their generals with treachery or corruption, if ever they should again take their seats in the Athenian assembly. Nothing therefore should induce him to consent to a retreat until he received positive orders from Athens commanding his return. In plain English, Nikias was afraid to go home, and he was a coward where Demosthenes, in spite of his failure, was honest, straightforward, and brave. His absurd delusion found no favor with Demosthenes, who insisted again that the siege ought at once to be given up, but that, if on this point they must wait for a dispatch from Athens, they would be grossly disregarding their duty to their country if they failed to remove their fleet at once either to Katanê or to Naxos. To linger in the great harbor was to court ruin. Above all, there was time now to carry out this change. Soon it might be too late. Even to this wise and generous counsel Nikias opposed a front so firm that his colleague began to think that he had some private grounds for his

¹ Thucydides, vii. 49, 1, speaks of the knowledge which Nikias had of Syracusan affairs as being exact and accurate. It may have been so, so far as the mere financial facts on the Syracusan side are concerned ; but

Nikias knew well and ought to have remembered that men are not likely to slacken in their efforts when they have reason to think that the enemy's ship is sinking.

resolution which time in the end would justify. He had none; and when Gylippos returned to Syracuse with reinforcements Nikias at once saw that any attempt to speak of the resources of Syracuse as failing would be utterly vain, and only requested that the order for retreat should be privately circulated through the army, not formally decreed in a council of war.

Days and weeks of most precious time had Nikias thus wasted, while Gylippos was gathering his reinforcements in other parts of Sicily. But although all hope of taking Syracuse was gone, the mischief done to Athens was not yet irreparable. The consent of Nikias, even now reluctantly extorted, had come to Demosthenes as a reprieve for which he had almost ceased to hope; and the preparations for departure were far advanced when an eclipse of the moon filled Nikias with an agony of religious terror. To the grovelling devotee one course only was open. The prophets must be consulted, and their decision scrupulously obeyed. Unhappily his own prophet Stilbides had recently died, and the soothsayers whose opinion was taken declared that the Athenians must remain where they were until thrice nine days should have passed away.¹ Nikias accordingly insisted that during this period the question of retreat should not even be mooted; but he had sealed the doom of the army and the doom of his country, and long before the seven-and-twenty days were ended this once magnificent armament had been utterly destroyed.

Through Syracuse the tidings flew like fire that the Athenians had resolved to sail away, and that their resolution had been changed by the eclipse. The former decision was a virtual confession both of defeat and hopelessness; the second gave the Syracusans ample time to prepare the net for seizing the prey. They knew the character of Nikias too well to fear that he would move of his own accord before the allotted time had run out. When at length they were ready, the first attack was made by land upon the enemy's lines. A force of Athenian hoplites and horsemen advanced to meet them, but was soon driven back with the loss of seventy horses and some hoplites. On the following day the attack on the lines was renewed, while 76 triremes issued from the city and sailed straight to the Athenian naval station. The Athenians hastened to meet them with 86 ships, and learnt that even with superior numbers Athenian science and skill were of no avail under the

¹ Diodoros says that the prophets required no more than the usual delay of three days. Plutarch affirms that in insisting on a delay of 27 days Nikias went beyond the demands of the soothsayers. If this

story be true, the infatuation of Nikias assumes a blacker character; but we may, perhaps, accept the statement of Thucydides, and acquit him of this monstrous and criminal extravagance.

circumstances in which Nicias had placed them. Forgetting for a while that he was not in the open sea, Eurymedon with a division of eighteen ships made an effort to outflank the enemy. The movement isolated him from the rest of the fleet and brought him dangerously near to the shore. The Athenian centre was already broken, and the Syracusans at once bore down upon Eurymedon. His eighteen ships, driven back upon the land, were taken and all their crews slain; and the life of Eurymedon closed in a massacre more dreadful than that to which he had condemned the oligarchs of Korkyra. The rest of the Athenian fleet narrowly escaped the same fate; but Gylippos, seeing the ships nearing the shore beyond the protection of the naval station, hurried down to the causeway which, running out from the city wall, shut off the sea from the low ground known as the Lysimeleian marsh. His force advanced in some disorder, and the Tyrrhenian allies who kept guard in this quarter of the Athenian lines hastened to engage them. The Syracusans, soon thrown into confusion, were pushed back into the marshy ground behind the causeway, and the arrival of a large Athenian force compelled them to retreat with some little loss. The rules of Greek warfare constrained the Athenians to treat this check as a victory: but they probably felt that the setting up of their trophy was but as the last flash of the sinking sun which gives a more dismal and ghastly hue to the pitch-black storm-clouds around him. It was true that the massive prows of the Syracusans had done them enormous mischief in the battle which was brought to an end by the entrance of Demosthenes into the great harbor; but they had hoped that the arrival of his seaworthy triremes with their healthy crews would do more than restore the balance, and this hope too had failed them. They were utterly cast down. Superiority of force had done nothing for them, and the generals could hold out no bait which might excite a political reaction in their favor.

For the Syracusans their great naval victory had changed the whole character of the struggle. A little while ago they had been fighting in the mere hope of compelling the enemy to abandon the siege. From this hope they had passed to a desire of so crippling the Athenians as to remove all cause for fearing a renewal of the war in any other part of Sicily. But now their thoughts turned with a feeling of bewildered exultation to the contrast between their present position and the splendor of the Athenian armament when it first approached their shores. In their view the Athenians had come to enslave Sicily; and the issue of the contest had opened to the Syracusans the prospect of sweeping away her empire. With the intoxication of men who from mountain summits seem to look down on a world

Effects of
victory on
the Syra-
cusans.

beneath them, they abandoned themselves to the conviction that henceforth they must fill a foremost place in the history of Hellas. But as yesterday they were about to discuss in their public assembly the terms of capitulation to Nikias. Now they held a position even prouder than that which either Sparta or Athens had ever attained; and few things in history are more impressive than the change which passes over the language of Thucydides, as he describes this mighty revolution in the thoughts and aims of the Syracusans. These were now leaders, along with Spartans, Corinthians, Arkadians, and Boiotians, against the relics of the most splendid and efficient armament which had ever left the harbors of Athens or had ever been brought together throughout her wide-spread empire. The epical conception which had led the historian to ascribe to the Athenians before the massacre at Melos language which belies their general reputation now leads him to enumerate with a solemnity full of pathos the tribes which were to face each other in the last awful struggle. Here, as at Marathon, the Plataians were present in the hope perhaps of avenging themselves on the Boiotian allies of Syracuse, but prompted still more by a devotion to Athens which had never for an instant wavered. Here were the ships of her free allies from Chios and Methymna. Here were Rhodians who, perhaps against their will, were to fight against their colonists of Gela, and Korkyraians who were anxious to settle scores with the men of their mother city. Here with the Dorian allies of Athens were Messenians from Pylos and Naupaktos, and Akarnanians who were now to follow to their death the standard of their favorite general. On the Syracusan side were enrolled the Kamarinaians for whose friendship Euphemos and Hermokrates had bidden largely, and the men of Selinous who were to play their part in the closing scenes of the stupendous drama which had grown out of their petty quarrel with the barbarians of Eggesta.

In the enthusiasm created by their victory the Syracusans resolved that the whole Athenian armament should be destroyed like vermin in a snare: and they proceeded with calm deliberation to set the trap. Triremes, trading ships, and vessels of all kinds were anchored lengthwise across the whole mouth of the harbor from Rlemmyrion to Ortygia, and strongly lashed together with ropes and chains. This was all that Nikias had gained by fostering silly scruples for which the men to whom Athens owed her greatness would have felt an infinite contempt. The indignation with which Demosthenes had protested against any delay after the failure of his great night attack must have burned still more fiercely when he saw the supreme result of the besotted folly of his colleague.

Closing of
the mouth
of the
Great Har-
bor by the
Syracusans.

Their very food was running short, for before the eclipse a message had been sent to Katanê to announce the immediate return of the fleet and to countermand all fresh supplies. But regret and censure were now alike vain. No longer insisting on the supreme authority with which the Athenians had invested their generals, Nikias summoned a council of war, in which all present admitted the stern necessity of abandoning the whole length of their lines on Epipolai, and finally of staking everything on a gigantic effort to break the barrier which now lay between them and safety. If this effort should fail, the ships were to be burnt and the army was to retreat by land.

A hundred and ten triremes still remained, some scarcely seaworthy, others still strong and in good trim; and we must not press hardly on Athenian generals who shrunk at the first from a sacrifice so costly. A few only of the seven-and-twenty days had passed when Nikias told them that all had been done which could be done to insure success in the struggle which must bring them to their doom, if it failed to furnish some hope of escape. He reminded the countrymen of Phormion, who had shattered fleets as large again as his own, that they still had many more ships than the Syracusans; and he besought them to show that, in spite of bodily weakness and unparalleled misfortunes, Athenian skill could get the better of brute force rendered still more brutal by success. He sought to stir the enthusiasm of the allies by reminding them of the benefits which they had reaped from association with the imperial city; to the Athenians he said plainly that they saw before them all the fleet and all the army of Athens. Her docks were empty, her treasury was exhausted, and, if they should now fail, her powers of resistance were gone. A speech more disgraceful to himself and less likely to encourage his men has seldom been uttered by any leader; for Nikias himself was the whole and sole cause of all the shameful facts which he was now compelled to urge as reasons for a last and desperate effort. It was his fault that Syracuse had not been taken a year ago; it was his fault that everything went wrong after the death of Lamachos; it was his fault that Gylippos had entered the beleaguered city; it was his fault that they had not retreated when retreat was first urged by Demosthenes; and it was his fault, lastly, that they had not left the harbor before the barrier of ships had made departure almost impossible. Yet this was the man who could beseech his soldiers to remember that on the issue of this fight depended the great name of Athens and the freedom which had made her illustrious.¹ How far the speech of Gylippos or even that of Nikias answered to

Preparation
for the final
conflict in
the Great
Harbor.

¹ Thuc. vii. 64.

the words actually spoken, we cannot say. It is natural that the Spartan leader should dwell on the utter despondency of the enemy, and on the duty of taking a revenge which should make the ears of all who heard it tingle. But Gylippos is further represented as insisting on the more dreadful fate which the Athenians had designed for them, a fate involving death or slavery for the men, and the most shameful treatment for their wives and children.¹ If he so spoke, he knew that he was uttering lies. The conditions of ancient warfare were horrible indeed, and the Athenians were not especially tender in their treatment of the conquered; but the history of their dealings with their own revolted allies would show that the fears of Gylippos were groundless. To adopt the language put into the mouth of the Athenians at Melos, such cruelties would have been highly inexpedient.

The time for the last great experiment had come, and the men were all on board, when Nikias in his agony determined to make one more effort to rouse his men not to greater courage, for this had never failed, but to greater confidence. He cared nothing whether he repeated himself or dwelt on topics which might be thought weak or stale.² They were in fact neither the one nor the other, and they had furnished the substance of the great funeral oration of Perikles; but it may be doubted whether he was acting judiciously in drawing to this extreme tension, at a time when steadiness of eye and hand was most of all needed, the nerves of a people so highly sensitive as the Athenians. At length the signal was given, and the fleet made straight for the narrow passage which the Syracusans had left for ingress and egress in the barrier of ships across the harbor. In the desperate force of their onset the Athenians mastered the vessels which were here keeping guard; but they had not succeeded in breaking the chains when the Syracusan fleet starting from all points of the harbor attacked them in the rear; and the harbor soon presented the sight of groups of ships locked in a deadly struggle, three or four sometimes being fastened upon one. To Athenians trained in the school of Phormion and Demosthenes the conflict was utterly bewildering. Their decks were crowded with archers and javelin men who had no room for the free use of their weapons, and who frequently did more harm than good. The terrible din rendered all orders unintelligible, and the sounds which presently reached them from the shore had the effect rather of paralysing than of encouraging them. Within their lines the Athenian army, advancing to the water's edge, surveyed with alternations of passionate hope and fear the fortunes of a fight on

Thuc. vii. 68, 2.

² ἀρχαιολογεῖν. Thuc. vii. 69, 2.

which the lives of all depended. So long as the two sides seemed nearly equal, the suspense of the spectators kept them silent; but the defeat or destruction of a ship called forth the loud and bitter wail which expresses the grief of southern peoples. At last brute force prevailed, and the weight of the Syracusan charge became in the excitement of the moment irresistible. Borne on with a fury of rage and revenge, they pushed the Athenians further and further back until their whole fleet was driven ashore. Amidst the piercing shrieks and bitter weeping of the troops who hurried down to give such help as they could, the crews of the shattered ships were landed, while some hastened to the defence of their walls and others bethought themselves only of providing for their own safety.

The sun sank down on a scene of absolute despair in the Athenian incampment, and of fierce and boundless exultation within the Syracusan walls. The first care of the Greek after a sea-fight was to recover, if he could, the wrecks of his ships, and in any case to demand permission under truce for the burial of the dead. The supreme misery of the hour left them no heart for any task except that of preparing for instant flight. Demosthenes was anxious that one more effort should be made to break the barrier at the mouth of the harbor. The advantage of numbers still lay with the Athenians: but, although Nikias assented to the plan of Demosthenes, the men would not stir, and they were right. Every hour left them more powerless for lack of food; every hour added to the strength and the spirit of the enemy, while the conditions of the struggle would remain unchanged except for the worse. They therefore determined to retreat by land at once; and had they acted on this resolution, the whole of this still mighty armament would have been saved. But Nikias was to be their evil genius to the end. The false report of some Syracusan horsemen who professed to be sent by the Athenian party within the city now led to a resolution which sealed the doom of the army as that of the fleet had been sealed by the occurrence of the eclipse. Feeling sure that the Athenians would attempt immediate flight, Hermokrates spent the afternoon in trying to persuade the generals to send out at once a force which might break up and guard the roads on the probable lines of march. Their answer was that for the present their power was not equal to their will. A great sacrifice was on that day to be offered to Herakles, and the whole city was so given up to a frenzy of wild delight that the carrying out of the scheme proposed by Hermokrates was simply impossible. Foiled here, Hermokrates dispatched the horsemen to the Athenian lines with the tidings that the roads were already blocked and guarded, and that a careful and deliberate retreat on the following

Stratagem of Hermokrates to delay the retreat of the Athenian army.

day would be better than a hasty departure during the night. The tidings, we are told, were implicitly believed, and we are left to infer that Demosthenes was as thoroughly tricked as Nikias. Either the inference is untrue, or the judgment of that excellent officer was at last over-clouded and weakened by the long series of his misfortunes. The message was almost transparently false, and under a less grievous weight of misery he must have seen that, even if its truth were granted, every hour's delay would only make matters worse instead of better. Having remained over the first night, they now thought it best to tarry yet another day and make preparations for a more orderly retreat. But early in the morning the Syracusan troops had set out into the country, and long before the day was done the roads, the fords, and the hill passes were broken up, or carefully occupied and guarded.

With the morning of the second day after the battle the retreat which was to end in ruin began with unspeakable agony. Forty

The departure of the Athenians from their fortified camp. thousand men were to make their weary and desolate journey, they scarcely knew whither, with a vague notion of reaching the country of some friendly Sikel tribes. The cup of bitterness was in truth filled to the brim and running over. Not until now had the history

of Hellenic states exhibited such an appalling contrast of overwhelming misery with the lavish splendor and high-wrought hope which had marked their departure from Peiraieus. They had looked their last on the rock and shrine of the virgin goddess with the expectation that they were going to make Athens the centre and head of a Panhellenic empire; they were now marching ignominiously after irretrievable defeat, perhaps to slavery or to death. But although they could take their food (its weight now would be no oppressive burden), they could not take their sick. Hundreds were pining away with the wasting marsh fever; hundreds were smitten down with wounds received in the recent battles. All these must now be left, and left, not, as in the less savage warfare of our own times, with the confidence that they would be treated with something like mercy and humanity, but to the certainty of slavery, tortures, or death. As the terrible realities of departure broke upon them, the whole camp became a scene of unutterable woe. In the agony of the moment the fever-stricken sufferers clung to their companions as these set out on their miserable march, and mangled wretches crawled feebly on, intreating to be taken with them, until strength failed and they sank down by the way. The sight of the still unburied dead might well in a superstitious age rouse dark forebodings in minds more superstitious, if such there could be, than even that of Nikias. To these vague terrors and to the awful wrench of parting was added the dire

humiliation of the catastrophe ; and the men lost all heart as they contrasted the splendor of the morning with the utter darkness of the night which was coming on.

In this desperate crisis Nikias did his best to cheer and encourage the men whom his own egregious and obstinate carelessness had brought into their present unparalleled difficulties. Exhortations of Nikias on the march. If the substance of his exhortations be rightly given (and in this instance we can have little doubt that it is), his words were singularly characteristic of the man. They were chiefly a comment on the homely saying that the lane must be long which has no turning. If when they set out on this ill-starred enterprise they had incurred the wrath of any of the gods, they had surely been amply punished, and they might therefore now reasonably hope for gentler treatment at the hands of the offended deity. In any case the evils which they might still have to suffer must in some degree be lightened by the consciousness that they were shared alike by all. Suffering now from a painful malady, accustomed during his life to the graceful ease and luxury of a high-born and wealthy Athenian, and, more than this, scrupulously exact in his religious worship and blameless in his private conduct, he had now to bear up under the same toils and privations with themselves. This is not the language of a man who dreads the physical dangers of war : but it is the language of one who even in the direst extremity cannot be brought to see that the misery which he is striving to alleviate is the result of his own folly in wasting a series of golden opportunities.

In the order of march the division of Nikias led the way, followed by that of Demosthenes. At the bridge of the Anapos they found the way blocked by a Syracusan force ; but this was defeated, and the army passed on, harassed throughout the day by the cavalry and light troops of the enemy, until they incamped in the evening on a rising ground about four miles from their fortified post on the shores of the great harbor. Early on the following day the march was resumed ; but after advancing about two miles, they incamped on a plain in the hope of obtaining some supply of food from the neighboring houses or villages, and of laying in a store of water to carry them through the drier region which lay before them. During their ill-timed sojourn here the Syracusans built a wall across the road which passed under the Akraian cliff with a torrent-bed on either side. This barrier on the next day the Athenians found themselves unable even to reach, and they returned sadly to their incampment of the night before. On the fourth day they made a desperate but vain attempt to force the pass. Not only was the enemy too strongly posted, but a violent storm of

History of the retreat to the surrender of Demosthenes.

thunder and rain convinced the Athenians that they were still the special objects of divine displeasure.¹ So greatly had their spirit and temper been changed since the time when precisely the same incident had dismayed their enemies while it failed to terrify themselves.² At the end of the fifth day the Athenians, having had to gain every inch of the way by sheer hard fighting, found themselves only half a mile further from Syracuse; and this fact that in five days they had accomplished a distance which without hindrance they could have traversed easily in two hours, convinced the generals that the line of march must be changed. They resolved to make for the Helorine road leading to the southern coast of Sicily. In the dead of night, under cover of many fires which they kindled to put the enemy off his guard, they set forth on their southward march. It was safely accomplished, in spite of a panic which separated the division of Nikias from that of Demosthenes. The two leaders had taken counsel together for the last time: but having reached the road to Heloros early in the morning, they pressed on to the fords of Kakyparis. A Syracusan force which was already raising a wall and stockade across the channel was beaten off, and the Athenians having crossed the stream pursued their march to the Erineos.³ Demosthenes was never to reach it. Marching in the rear, he had to think more of keeping his men in order of battle than of getting over ground.⁴ Thus constrained to mass his troops, he was exposed to the danger of being surrounded. Hemmed in between walls in an olive garden intersected by a single road, his men could here be shot down by an enemy who needed not to expose himself to any danger. As the day drew towards its close, Gylippos made proclamation that the inhabitants of Sicilian cities who chose to desert the Athenians might do so without prejudice to their freedom. Not many were found to accept the invitation; but later on in the evening the Syracusans invited the surrender of Demosthenes and his troops under the covenant that none should be put to death either by open violence or by intolerable bonds or by starvation.⁵ The summons was obeyed, and four shields held upwards were filled with the money still possessed by the troops of Demosthenes, who were now led away to Syracuse.

Nikias, five miles further to the south, knowing nothing of the catastrophe which had befallen his colleague, had crossed the Erineos and incamped his men on some sharply rising ground. He had well-nigh reached the end of his march, and the incessant

¹ Thuc. vii. 79, 3.

² See p. 376.

³ Thuc. vii. 80, 5.

⁴ *Ib.* vii. 81, 3.

⁵ Thuc. vii. 82, 2. The compact distinctly includes Demosthenes not less than his men.

toil of a whole week had left this great army within two or three hours' distance of Syracuse. Early on the following day Syracusan messengers informed him of the surrender of Demosthenes with his whole division, and summoned him to follow the example of his colleague. Incredulous at first, Nikias was convinced, when the horsemen whom he received permission to send under truce returned to confirm the wretched tidings. He lost no time in proposing to Gylippos that in exchange for the men under his command Athens should pay to the Syracusans the whole cost of the war, hostages being given at the rate of one man for each talent until the whole sum should be paid off. Terms more advantageous to Syracuse could not well have been obtained, and, as things turned out, the public treasury would have been much richer, had they been received. But the Syracusans were now filled with the absorbing delight of the savage in trampling a fallen enemy under foot. The proposals of Nikias were rejected, and all day long the Athenians were worn down with the incessant attacks of their pursuers. In the dead of night they took up their arms, hoping that they might be able to cross the next stream before their flight was discovered; but the war-shout which instantly rose from the Syracusan camp showed the vanity of this hope, and with a feeling of blank dismay they remained where they were. On the following morning the miserable scenes of the preceding days were renewed for the last time. Not far in front ran the stream of the Assinaros; and fainting with exhaustion the Athenians dragged themselves on in the hope partly of quenching a thirst which from lack of water had now become unbearable, and partly of obtaining on the other side of the river some respite from tortures fast exceeding the powers of human endurance. But the end was come. The sight of the sparkling and transparent stream banished all thoughts of order and discipline, all prudence and caution. In an instant all was hopeless confusion and tumult; and the stream, fouled first by the trampling of thousands, was soon after reddened with their blood. To put an end to slaughter which had now become mere butchery, Nikias surrendered himself to Gylippos personally, in the hope that the Spartan might remember the enormous benefits which in times past Sparta had received from him. He submitted himself, he said, to the pleasure not of the Syracusans but of the Spartans, and requested only that the massacre of his men should cease. The order was accordingly issued to take the rest alive; but the number of prisoners finally got together was not large. By far the larger number were stolen and hidden away by private men, and the state was at once defrauded of wealth which an acceptance of the offers

Defeat and
surrender
of Nikias.

of Nikias would have insured to it.¹ Of the prisoners thus surreptitiously conveyed away not a few made their escape, some almost immediately, others after having spent some time in slavery.

But this slight alleviation fails to affect the completeness of the catastrophe. Forty thousand men had left the Athenian lines on the great harbor : a week later seven thousand marched as prisoners into Syracuse.² If we assume that twice this number were stolen away into private slavery, nearly half of this great multitude had in seven days perished after the most intense and exquisite suffering alike of body and mind. What became of the sick and wounded who were left in the camp, we are not told : but we can scarcely doubt that all were murdered, and murder was mercy in comparison with the treatment of the 7,000 prisoners who were penned like cattle in the stone quarries of Epipolai. Without shelter from the sun by day and from the increasing chills of the autumn nights, never suffered to quit for a moment the dungeon into which they were thrust, these miserable captives had to live as best they might amidst noisome stenches which by breathing deadly fevers relieved many from their miseries, with no liquid whatever beyond the daily allowance of half a pint of water and with half the portion of flour usually given to slaves. Thus passed away seventy days of unspeakable wretchedness to the living and of shameful indignities to the dead which were literally piled in heaps to rot away.³ At the end of that time their sufferings were somewhat lessened. All who were not Athenians or citizens of Sikeliot or Italiot cities were taken out and sold. Their own lot could not be made worse, while that of the men who still remained shut up in the quarries became less intolerable. For nearly six months longer were these men kept within their loathsome prison, with deliberate and most unselfish wickedness.⁴ The sale of these men brought to the state probably not a tithe of the sum for which Nikias offered to pledge the credit of Athens, while the way in which they were treated exhibits the Syracusans as a race of savage and bloodthirsty liars. They had promised to Demosthenes that no man belonging to his division should suffer a violent death or die from bonds or for lack of necessary food ; and they insured the death of hundreds or of thousands as certainly

¹ Thuc. vii. 85, 3.

² Ib. vii. 87, 3.

³ Ib. vii. 87, 1.

⁴ If any iniquities may be cited in proof of Bishop Butler's assertion that men are too little instead of too much guided by self-love, it must surely be the cruelties of men who more or less impoverish themselves

in order to gratify a dominant passion. Self-love, according to Bishop Butler, *Sermons*, xi. xii., would not only have led the Syracusans to get hard money in place of prisoners whose maintenance must cost something, but would have taught them that men are not happier for being inhuman.

as Suraj-ud-Doulah murdered the victims of the Black Hole of Calcutta.

The Athenian generals were happily spared the sight of these prolonged and excruciating tortures. Unless the terms of the convention were to be kept, Demosthenes could, of course, expect no mercy. In flagrant violation of a distinct compact the doom of the victor at Sphacteria was sealed, and he died, as he had lived, without a stain on his military reputation, the victim of the superstition and the respectability of his colleague. But the Syracusans were determined on the instant death not of Demosthenes only, whose life they were pledged to spare, but of Nikias. The Corinthians too, it is said, were sorely troubled by the fear that his great wealth might revolve him his freedom and that his freedom would be used to involve them again in a struggle like that which had now reached its close. Their fear was absurdly thrown away. Had they voted to him a golden crown with a public maintenance for life in their Prytaneion as the destroyer of Athens and the benefactor and saviour of Syracuse and Sicily, their decree would have been not too severe a satire on his political and military career.

So ended an expedition which changed the current of Athenian history and therefore, in more or less degree, of the history of the world. In the Athenian people the mere entertainment of such a project as the conquest of Sicily was a grave political error. They had hazarded on this distant venture an amount of strength which was imperiously needed for the protection of Attica and the recovery of Amphipolis; and instead of a starvation which, as things turned out, would have been wise, they fed the expedition with a bounty so lavish that failure became utter ruin. In short, from first to last, everything was done to court disaster and to play into the hands of their enemies; but unless we are to maintain the doctrine that things have always happened as it is best that they should happen, it would have been distinctly better for Syracuse and better for the world, if the success of Athens had been only somewhat less complete than her catastrophe. The power of trampling on Sicily as Gylippos and his allies trampled on the defeated armament would have done no good either to Athens, or to the world; but if the isolating policy which seeks to maintain an infinite number of autonomous units be in itself an evil, then it is unfortunate that the victory of Gylippos insured the predominance of this policy. Athens had done what she could to weld into a coherent body a number of such centrifugal units. Her work may have been imperfect, but so far as it went, it was real, and, as we

Death of
Nikias and
Demosthe-
nes.

Effect of the
expedition
on the sub-
sequent his-
tory of
Greece.

have seen, it involved no substantial injustice.¹ To a vast extent she could offer to her allies or her subjects common interests and common ends. Sparta could offer none; but the system of Sparta fell in with instincts in the Hellenic mind which may have been weakened but were never eradicated, and against this instinct the wisdom and prudence of Athenian statesmen strove in vain. The military history of the expedition has a painful and terrible interest of its own: but the Athenians who were led to death or slavery in Sicily were not mere professional soldiers, and the horrors of the catastrophe are heightened by the intense political emotions with which they undertook to fight the battles of their country. Never had they behaved more gallantly, never had they undergone privations so cheerfully, never had they nerved themselves so zealously to renewed efforts under frightful disasters as in this fatal expedition. Had they left Peiraicus under the command of Lamachos and Demosthenes, they would have returned home in triumph a year before the time when they were brought to utter ruin by the folly and obstinacy of one man.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN) WAR FROM THE CATASTROPHE AT SYRACUSE TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE OLIGARCHY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS.

WHILE the walls of Dekeleia, daily gaining height and strength, showed that the enemy was permanently established on Attic soil, the Athenians still fed themselves on bright hopes of Sicilian conquest. There was, in truth, need of encouragement. Previous invasions had left the land at rest after a raid of five or six weeks at the utmost; now the whole country lay at the mercy of the enemy. Each day they felt the sting of the monster evil of slavery. Twenty thousand men, whom Greek philosophy delighted to regard as animated machines, deserted to the enemy and left Athens almost destitute of skilled workmen. Each day the Athenian cavalry was employed in repelling the assaults or keeping back the forces of the enemy: and each day its strength and usefulness were impaired by the laming or the wounding of horses on ground utterly unfitted for their operations. Thus far, even during the yearly invasions of the enemy, the pressure had been comparatively slight. If the Eleusinian plain was wasted, still abundant supplies could be brought

Effects of
the Spartan
occupation
of Dekeleia.

¹ See p. 247.

into the city by way of Oropos. But this way was now blocked by the Spartan garrison : and the fiery energy of Agis, in marked contrast with the slower movements of Archidamos, made the idea of forcing it hopeless. Everything must now be conveyed round Sounion in merchant ships which lay exposed to the attacks of Peloponnesian privateers. Athens had, indeed, ceased to be a city. It was now nothing more than a garrison in which the defenders were worn out with harassing and incessant duty. The very magnitude of their tasks involved a charge of something like madness or infatuation. Athens was herself practically in a state of siege : and all her fleet with the flower of her forces was besieging a distant city of equal size and power. Their expenses were daily rising at a ruinous rate, while their revenues were melting away, or proved themselves wholly inadequate to bear the strain put upon them.

Nor was this the end of the evils involved in the lack of means brought about by this deadly war. A body of 1,300 Thracian mercenaries reached Athens after Demosthenes had sailed for Sicily ; and as it was impossible to send them after him, so sheer poverty prevented the Athenians from keeping them in Attica for a service in which they would probably have been especially useful. They were accordingly dismissed under the command of Diitrephes, who was charged to do the enemy a mischief, if he could, as he went along. With these men he made his way to Mykalessos, distant about two miles from their night post at the Hermaion. The town was small ; the walls were weak and for the most part in ruins ; and the gates were wide open. An attack from enemies was the last thing which the inhabitants looked for, when the troop of bloodthirsty savages burst in upon them and a massacre began to which even the frightful annals of Hellenic warfare could furnish no parallel. Not less than eight or nine hours could pass before tidings of the catastrophe could bring help from Thebes : and when the Thebans reached Mykalessos, the Thracians had departed with their booty. But success had made them incautious ; and their enemies were upon them before they had traversed the short distance which separates the town from the sea. Two hundred and fifty were killed : the rest got on board and sailed homewards. The Boiotians lost about twenty horsemen and hoplites with the Boiotarch Skirphondas ; but the Athenians sustained a greater injury in the deep and universal indignation excited against them by this frightful massacre.¹

Scarcely more than three weeks later the Athenians must have received the dispatch which informed them of the failure of the night attack on Epipolai and taught them that success was no longer to be hoped for. The Athenians would have done no more than their duty, if as soon as these tidings came they had sent to the

¹ Thuc. vii. 30.

generals an order for the immediate return of the army and fleet. For a full month longer such an order would have averted the last terrible catastrophe; nor can they be acquitted of a most culpable remissness except on the ground that, although their confidence in Nikias was egregiously misplaced, they had ample reason for trusting the judgment as well as the bravery of Demosthenes. During the month which followed the night attack no dispatch probably was sent after the one which announced its failure; and if any was sent along with the order countermanding further supplies from Katanê, it preceded only by a few days the events which sealed their doom. Of those last awful hours no official record ever reached Athens; and it needed probably the exultation which was soon manifested by their enemies to convince the Athenians of the infinitude of the ruin. In the first burst of despairing grief they turned angrily on the speakers who had urged on the expedition, and on the soothsayers and diviners who had augured success for the enterprise: but such revenge was a poor consolation for the utter failure of a scheme which they had themselves decreed. Their thoughts were soon drawn away to more practical matters. The strength and flower of their army had been cut off; their fleet was either burnt or in the enemy's hands; their docks were almost empty of ships, and their calamity had rendered their adversaries irresistible. But although the heavens seemed laden with their doom, one feeling only pervaded the people. The idea of submission crossed no man's mind. The struggle must be carried on vigorously and economically: and the second consideration was as important as the first. They resolved at once to provide wood for ship-building, and to watch closely all movements among their subject allies, and especially in Euboia. The dockyards were again busy with workmen, and with the rapidity which had astonished the Syracusans¹ the promontory of Sounion was strongly fortified to protect the passage of merchant vessels, while a further force was rendered available by abandoning the fort on the Peloponnesian coast facing the island of Kythera.

The calamities which had thus strung the nerves of the Athenians to a pitch of desperate resolution roused in their enemies a vehement enthusiasm which regarded the struggle as all but ended. One more blow only was needed; and if this blow should be struck quickly and firmly, Athens would experience the fate which she had designed for all the Hellenic tribes. Such at least seemed the prospect to the oligarchical factions which were more or less powerful in the cities belonging to the Athenian

State of feeling in Peloponnesos and among the oligarchical factions in the cities subject to Athens.

¹ See p. 383.

confederation.¹ Orders were issued for the building of a hundred ships, of which the Spartans and Boiotians should each furnish twenty-five, fifteen being furnished by the Corinthians and the same number by the Phokians and Lokrians together. But the winter had not passed away before some of the allies of Athens made efforts to transfer their allegiance to Sparta. The first deputation came from Euboia : and Agis at once summoned Alkamenes and Melanthos from Sparta to undertake the government of the island. Before they could accomplish their journey a second deputation came from Lesbos ; and the influence of the Boiotians, who insisted on the paramount need of securing that island, induced Agis to leave Euboia for the present to itself, while Alkamenes was sent as Harmostes or governor to Lesbos.

At Sparta the drama soon became more complicated. The oligarchic factions in Chios and Erythrai² were anxious to avail themselves of the prostration of Athens in order to realise their dreams of autonomy. With their envoys, whom they sent not to Agis but straight to Sparta, appeared ambassadors from Tissaphernes. The Persian satrap of the province which lay to the south of the gulf of Adramyttion had received notice from the great king that the tributes due from the Hellenic cities within his jurisdiction must be paid into the treasury. The mere fact that the weakness of Athens should at once call forth such a claim might have taught them that in seeking to be free of the Athenian yoke they were but wishing, like the frogs, to change king Log for king Stork. Both sides were indeed much like thieves who needed each the aid of the other. The oligarchic conspirators, for such they literally and strictly were, felt that they dared not run the risk of revolt unless they could have the support of an adequate force of allies, and they knew that Sparta would not stir unless it could be made clear that it was to her interest to do so. Tissaphernes, again, on his side knew that without Spartan aid he could not break up the Athenian empire, and that until this result could be achieved, he must remain

Overtures
of Tissa-
phernes and
Pharnaba-
zos to the
Spartans.

¹ Thucydides, viii. 2, 2, says sweepingly that the subjects of the Athenians were most of all eager to revolt, thus implying unanimity of thought and action. We shall see that this statement is as untrue now as it was when Brasidas went on his errand to Chalkidikê. See p. 335 *et seq.*

² Thucydides, viii. 5, 4, says boldly that the application came from 'the Chians and Erythraians.' By his own showing the statement is false. The large majority of the

Chians knew nothing of the intrigues which had revolt from Athens for their object : and it was this ignorance which compelled the conspirators, for such they were, to proceed with the utmost caution. viii. 9, 3. They knew that if the people should become acquainted with what was going on, their schemes would be hopelessly frustrated. It is of the utmost importance to keep this fact steadily in view.

a debtor to the king for a sum the magnitude of which was every day increasing. But Tissaphernes did not stand alone in his wish to make alliance with Sparta. The same demand which pressed so heavily upon him had been forwarded from Sousa to the satrap of the Hellespont whose representatives intreated that the Hellespont might be made the scene of the first operations. That the Hellespont should each be anxious to win the royal favor by being foremost in pulling down the Athenian empire was perfectly natural; that the Spartans who in the day of need had abjured the Athenians not to betray their kinsfolk to the barbarian should now deliberately reopen the way for Persian aggression was an unnatural and dastardly treason against the liberties not only of Hellas but of Europe. But looking merely to the mode in which treachery might be made to yield its fruits most readily, we cannot doubt that the Spartans were right in inclining rather to the side of Tissaphernes than to that of Pharnabazos. The contest was decided by Alkibiades, who with all his strength urged the claims of the Chians¹ as being the highest bidders. For the moment he had everything in his favor. The mission of Gylippos had saved Sicily, and this mission had been suggested and passionately urged by himself. He was in a special sense the hero of Dekeleia and Syracuse: and his verdict turned the scale in the councils of Sparta.²

So passed away the winter which ended the nineteenth year of the war. The spring had come; and the Chian conspirators³ still waited impatiently for the promised succor. At last three Spartan envoys were sent to Corinth with a request that the nine-and-thirty ships then lying in the port of Lechaion should be hauled over the isthmus and all be dispatched to Chios together with the twenty ships which Agis had promised to send to Lesbos.⁴ The prospect was not altogether encouraging. The Chian oligarchs were in a fever of anxiety lest their secret devices should become known to the Athenians, while the envoys of Pharnabazos went off in disgust, vowing that they would have nothing to do with Chios, and carrying back with them the money which they had brought. Agis, however, threw himself heartily into the scheme of Alkibiades. To distract the attention of the Athenians and to divide the scanty fleet which still remained to them, they determined that only one-and-twenty ships should be brought across the isthmus. These were launched

¹ Thuc. viii. 6.

² Ib. viii. 8, 3.

³ I am compelled to use this term, because no other will express the facts of the case. Thucydides, viii.

7, 1, says simply 'the Chians;' but his own subsequent statements convict this expression of falsehood.

⁴ Thuc. viii. 5, 2, and 7.

without an attempt at concealment, as in the utter prostration of Athens secrecy seemed both superfluous and absurd. This confidence was not wholly justified. The refusal of the Corinthians to sail before the celebration of the Isthmian games gave the Athenians time to verify in some measure the suspicions which they had already formed, and which during the celebration of the festival were converted almost into certainty.¹ Aristokrates was accordingly sent to Chios, and on being assured by the government that they had no intention of revolting, he demanded a contingent of ships by the terms of the alliance, and as a pledge of their fidelity. The demand was complied with, we are told, only because the conspirators dared not to call the people into their council. Seven Chian triremes sailed for Athens; and curses not loud but deep were probably imprecated on the Spartans whose remissness had brought this ignominy upon them.²

When therefore the Peloponnesian fleet under Alkamenēs set out from Kenchreai, an Athenian squadron of equal strength advanced to meet them in the hope of provoking a conflict in the open sea. The Peloponnesians declined the risk; and the Athenians also retreated, feeling that they could place no confidence in the Chian ships which accompanied them.³ On the following day the Athenians again came on in order of battle as soon as the enemy began their voyage, and drove them back on the desolate harbor of Peiraion near the Epidaurian border. One Peloponnesian ship was sunk at sea; the rest were moored on the beach. But the Athenians attacked them both by sea and land, and with some loss to themselves disabled most of the enemy's ships and killed the admiral Alkamenēs. It had been agreed that as soon as the fleet began its voyage from Kenchreai, Chalkideus should be dispatched with his squadron of five, taking Alkibiades with him. This squadron had actually set sail, when a second messenger brought the tidings of the defeat and death of Alkamenēs; and the Spartans saw in this disaster an evil omen for their fortunes in a struggle which was now rather an Ionian than a Peloponnesian war. They at once recalled Chalkideus and resolved on issuing orders for the return of some ships which had set out before him. In this resolution Alkibiades saw the deathblow to the whole scheme. Chios could be added to the Spartan confederacy only by the success of the oligarchic plot: and Alkibiades with his partisans had to contend not only with the certain opposition of the demos but with the wariness of the conspirators who were ready to revolt from Athens

¹ Thuc. viii. 10, 1.

² Ib. viii. 9, 3.

³ It seems strange that the Athe-

nians did not at once take the precautions which they adopted a little later. Thuc. viii. 15.

but not at all ready to run the risk of ruining themselves. He insisted that the original plan should still be carried out, and he pledged himself that, if once he reached the Ionian coast, he would bring about the revolt not only of Chios but of the other cities in alliance with Athens. The influence of his friend Endios, united with his own, gained the day : but the hasty departure of Alkibiades and of Chalkideus with his five triremes left the Spartans not less rich in the number of ships at their command. The twenty-seven Athenian triremes which kept guard off Leukas had succeeded in destroying only one of the fleet of sixteen ships which Gylippos was bringing back from Syracuse. The rest made their way safely to Corinth.

It was necessary now to hoodwink the conspirators at Chios not less than the Chian demos : and Alkibiades accordingly compelled every vessel which he met or overtook to accompany his triremes, until they reached the peninsula of Korykos or Erythrai. Thus no tidings of the defeat of Alkamenes reached the oligarchs, who advised the Spartans to enter the Chian harbor without giving any notice of their approach. The plan of proceeding had been carefully arranged. The council was assembling when to the dismay and bewilderment of the Chian people the Spartan triremes approached the landing-place ; and Alkibiades, appearing at once before the senate, assured them that the little ~~squad~~ ^{fleet} on which had brought himself and Chalkideus to their harbor was but the van of a larger fleet already on its way, while of the incidents at Peiraion he said nothing. The decisive step was taken. Chios revolted from Athens, and her example was followed first by Erythrai and then by Klazomenai. Thus had Alkibiades once again changed the history of his country ; and the voyage of Chalkideus with his five ships bore its fruit in the final catastrophe of Aigospotamoi.

Having once committed themselves to the venture, the Chian oligarchs espoused the cause of their new friends with impetuous ardor ; but there is no reason for thinking that the demos shared their zeal. The oligarchic faction at Chios was not blind to the benefits which they had reaped from their connexion with Athens ; and while they wished to weaken the imperial city, they had no desire to impoverish themselves. But for the present their act had produced all the results which could have been looked for. It had given a new and startling impulse to the centrifugal instincts of the Athenian allies ; and it had filled Athens with a dismay bordering on sheer despair. With her present resources she was

Revolt of Chios, Erythrai, and Klazomenai from Athens.

Employment of the Athenian reserve fund to meet this crisis.

¹ Thuc. viii. 10-13.

wholly unable to make way against the difficulties which were overwhelming her : but there remained still the reserved fund of one thousand talents which under solemn sanctions Perikles had stored up in the Akropolis.¹ These sanctions were now removed, and a decree was passed that the sum should be used for the needs of the state. A new fleet, probably of inferior ships, was at once manned and sent to take the place of the blockading squadron off Peiraion. Of this squadron eight ships commanded by Strombichides were dispatched to Chios, while the seven Chian ships were taken to Athens where the free men among the crews were imprisoned and the slaves belonging to them set free. In addition to these, thirty more triremes were to be equipped and manned.²

Meanwhile Strombichides had reached Samos. Sailing thence to Teos, he insisted on the neutrality of the Teians if he could not have their active help. But the approach of a land-force from Erythrai and Klazomenai warned him to stand out to sea, where presently the three-and-twenty triremes of Chalkideus hove in sight from Chios. Against such a number his own small fleet was useless, and retreat now became flight. While Chalkideus was chasing him to Samos, the Teians were induced to admit the Erythraian and Klazomenian forces whom they had refused to receive so long as the Athenians maintained their ground. The strangers, having vainly waited a while for the return of Chalkideus, set to work to demolish the wall which the Athenians had built on the landward side of the city, and Stages the deputy of Tissaphernes hurried up with a body of troops to take part in the pleasant task. But Alkibiades was impatient to strike a harder blow on the falling power of Athens. His arrival at Miletos was followed by the immediate revolt of the city and the ratification of a treaty between the Persian king and the Lakedaimonians. This compact not only bound either party to carry on the war so long as the other should desire its continuance, but declared the great king to be the rightful owner of all lands which he or his predecessors had at any time possessed.³ The promises which Brasidas had made to the revolted towns of Chalkidike had been kept with no great strictness : but now the Spartans, who had sworn to maintain the autonomy of every Hellenic city, had declared a barbarian despot the master not only of the lands lying to the east of the Egean, but of Boiotia, Thessaly, Attica, and Megara.⁴

Revolt of Miletos. First treaty between Sparta and Persia.

¹ See p. 279.

² Thuc. viii. 15.

³ Ib. viii. 18.

⁴ The territory of Megara or a part of it had been held for a few

days by Mardonios, after the second occupation of Athens: and any such occupation served in the eyes of the great king as a title to possession.

But, while the prospect seemed daily to grow darker and more hopeless, an event occurred which for a time averted the final catastrophe and seemed even to make it likely that Athens might yet be victorious over her enemies. A revolution took place in Samos not against her but in her favor. So little had Athens interfered with the domestic affairs of the island since the suppression of the first revolt,¹ that the Geomoroi, or oligarchical landowners, had contrived to regain their preponderance and to deprive the demos of all right of intermarriage with the dominant class. Of the time when or the mode in which this change occurred we know nothing; but it is certain that when the rising of the demos took place, Samos was strictly under local government. The demos had probably been for some time watching an opportunity for deposing their rulers, and the presence of the Athenian ships determined them to act at once. The oligarchy was in all likelihood taken completely by surprise; but they made an obstinate resistance. Two hundred were slain in the struggle; four hundred were driven into exile; and their property, both real and personal, was divided amongst the demos, who with a studied irony treated the Geomoroi as an inferior class by forbidding the people, on whom they had thus far looked down with infinite contempt, from contracting any marriages with them. These were sweeping if not hard measures; and the Samians must be severely condemned, if the acts cannot be justified. But there cannot be a doubt,—indeed it is admitted even by historians who are least disposed to favor Athens,—that these oligarchs intended to follow the example of their brethren at Chios: and unless it can be maintained that the people were bound to be passive while a foreign enemy was being brought in, and a yoke put upon them far harder than the mere sentimental grievance which formed their one ground of complaint against the Athenians, then it must be granted that they took the only course open to them. That the Athenians should feel both pleasure and gratitude towards the Samian people, is only what we should look for. The Samians had given signal proof of their fidelity, and Athens rewarded them by raising them at once to the rank of autonomous allies.

The effect of this revolution soon became felt. If the Athenians were to continue the struggle at all, their base of operations must be secure: and such a post they now had in Samos. Nor was it long before they were able to check the eager zeal of the Chian oligarchs who dreaded most of all to stand alone in revolt, and who now made a strong effort to detach Lesbos from Athens. Thirteen Chian ships sailed to Lesbos,

Rising of
the Samian
Demos
against the
Geomoroi.

Revolt and
recovery of
Lesbos.

¹ See p. 260.

while a land-force of Peloponnesians and their allies marched towards Klazomenai and Kyme, on their road to the Hellespont, if the revolt of Lesbos should leave the way open. Methymna and Mytilene at once threw off their allegiance to Athens; but three days after the arrival of the Spartan high-admiral Astyochos at Chios, five-and-twenty Athenian triremes under Leon and Diomedon sailed to the island. Seeing them pass, Astyochos with his four Peloponnesian ships and one Chian vessel followed them late in the day, and sailed to Pyrrha and thence to Eresos, where he learnt that the Athenians had taken the Mytilenaïans completely by surprise and carried their city by storm. The men of Eresos showed their courage, if not their wisdom, by revolting after they heard this news; and Astyochos sailed on to Antissa and Methymna in the hope of retrieving losses and gaining fresh ground. But his efforts were vain. The Athenians were soon masters of the whole island. The Peloponnesian land-force was broken up, and the idea of immediate operations at the Hellespont in conjunction with Pharnabazos was abandoned.

On the suppression of the Mytilenaïan revolt in the days of Kleon the whole male population of the city was condemned to death. If the Lesbians now escaped, as it would seem, without any pains and penalties except those which are involved in actual warfare, their good fortune may be ascribed rather to the weakness of the conquerors than to their magnanimity. The Athenians could not afford to do now as they had done at Skione or at Melos: but there was nothing to prevent them from retaliating on their enemies at least those evils which the fortification of Dekeleia had so bitterly aggravated for themselves; and their vengeance was directed first against the conspirators of Chios. In an attack which they now made on the Milesian Panormos the Spartan commander Chalkideus was slain: and then the storm burst upon the Chians simultaneously from Lesbos, from the Oinoussian islets off the northern promontory of their own island, and from Sidoussa and Pteleon on the opposite territory of Erythrai. A series of defeats at Kardamylê and Bolissos, at Phanai and Leukonion reduced the Chians to a state of siege within their walls, and compelled them to look passively upon the ravaging of those fruitful and happy lands on which no invader had trod since the days of Xerxes. This was all that the plotters had gained by intrigues warily carried on and by schemes carefully matured. The singular and unbroken prosperity of the island from the time when Athens became the head of the Delian confederacy furnished indisputable proof that the islanders not only had no real grounds of complaint against the administration of the imperial city, but were indebted

Defeat and death of Chalkideus. Athenian ravages in Chios.

to it for happiness and wealth which in like measure they would never know again. It is unnecessary to palliate those enormous crimes of the Athenian people which stand out in their naked hideousness from the more decent tenor of their general history : nor need we even ask for any arrest of judgment on the ground that the crimes of Spartans, Boiotians, Korkyraians, and Syracusans were immeasurably more loathsome and disgusting. There was enough in the conduct of the Chian government to excite the deepest indignation of Englishmen at the present day. Had it not been for Athens they must have remained subject to the degrading yoke and the arbitrary exactions of the Persian king. Under her protecting arm they had passed more than half a century in perfect safety, and, as her free allies, they had been called upon only to furnish their yearly quota of ships for the maintenance of an order from which they derived benefits fully equal to any which Athens herself received. It is not, indeed, too much to say that this order was the greatest political blessing which the world had yet seen ; and to this order in spite of the sentimental grievances shaped by diseased dreams of autonomy the people in most of the allied or subject cities were honestly attached. In Chios their attachment was so strong that the oligarchs had to work in fear and trembling lest their plots should come prematurely to the knowledge of the demos.

While Astyochos was seeking, by taking hostages or in other modes, to keep down the philo-Athenian party in Chios,¹ a fleet of 48 ships under the command of Phrynichos, Onomakles, and Skironides was conveying from Athens to Miletos a force of 1,000 Athenian and 1,500 Argeian hoplites (500 of these having received their panoplies at Athens), together with 1,000 furnished by the allies. This force had incamped on Milesian ground, before the Milesians, aided by the Peloponnesians under Chalkideus and by Tissaphernes himself with a body of Persian cavalry, came out to meet them. The Dorian Argives advanced with the carelessness of contempt against the Ionians of Miletos who were opposed to them ; but their disorder was punished by a defeat which cost them 300 men, while the Ionians of Athens were not less decisively victorious over the Dorians of Sparta. The astonishment caused by this strange result might have been especially useful to the Athenians in their intended investment of Miletos, had not tidings come that a fleet of 55 ships from Peloponnesos and Sicily under the command of Hermokrates might at any moment be looked for. The whole armament reached the islet of Leros, about 30 miles to the southwest of Miletos, under the

Victory of the Athenians and Argives over Astyochos and Tissaphernes at Miletos.

¹Thuc. viii. 24, 6.

command of Theramenes, who was charged to hand it over to Astyochos. Thence, hearing that the Athenians were at Miletos, he sailed eastwards to the gulf of Iasos; and here at Teichioussa Alkibiades who had fought in the last battle told him in a few words that unless Miletos could be relieved their whole work in sapping the empire of Athens must be frustrated. A resolution was taken to go at once to its aid; but their mere approach had attained the object in view. The Athenian commanders were at first anxious to meet the Peloponnesians in open fight: but they were opposed by Phrynichos with a determined energy which, if displayed by Demosthenes, might have conquered even the obstinacy of Nicias and made the revolt of Chios and Miletos impossible. Defeat, he insisted, was the one thing which Athens in her present need could not afford to incur. This need was so great that even with full preparation they were not justified in risking a battle, unless they were absolutely compelled to fight; but here there was no such necessity, and he assuredly would not allow the safety of Athens to be imperilled from any fancied notions of honor or self-respect. This advice of Phrynichos calls forth the warm praise of Thucydides.¹ But neither here nor in the later scenes of his career is it easy to determine the character of his motives. We are now approaching the time in which the constitutional life developed in Athens from the days of Solon, or rather perhaps those of Kleisthenes, was to be disastrously interrupted; and the acts of Phrynichos were not such as to vindicate for him the trust reposed whether in Perikles or in Aristeides.

The summer passed away without the excitement of angry feeling between the Peloponnesians and their allies. In the autumn the payment of the fleet at the rate of a drachma daily for each man, together with a notice that for the future Tissaphernes could not, except on direct orders from the king, pay more than the half drachma, showed the working of a secret influence which afterwards led to more important results. By Theramenes, who was only in temporary command, the notice was received with indifference; but the loudly expressed indignation of Hermokrates convinced Tissaphernes of the wisdom of compromising the matter, and he agreed to furnish a rate of pay which should enable all to receive the half drachma, while the crew of one ship in rotation would be paid at the old rate. The events of the winter, on the whole, told more for the Athenians than for their enemies. A fresh force of five-and-thirty ships under Charminos, Strombichides, and Euktemon, joined the fleet already at Samos, thus raising the whole number of efficient ships on that station to 104, in scarcely more than a year from the

Dispute between Tissaphernes and Hermokrates.

¹ Thuc. viii. 27, 5.

time when the catastrophe of Syracuse left them practically without a navy. On the Spartan side Astyochos was mortified by a failure first at Pteleon and then at Klazomenai where the citizens refused to banish to Daphnous the philo-Athenian party. From Klazomenai he went to Phokaia and Kymè, where a deputation of Lesbian oligarchs besought his help for a second revolt. Astyochos, eager to comply with their request, went himself to Chios, and strove to prevail on the Spartan commander Pedaritos by the argument that even their failure would do far more mischief to the Athenians than to themselves. Pedaritos answered briefly that he would neither go himself nor allow the Chian ships to be taken on this errand; and Astyochos, vowing that he would not return to aid the Chians if they should need his help ever so much, departed for Miletos.

In the powerful Spartan fleet here assembled Astyochos, it would seem, read the condemnation of the disgraceful treaty made by Chalkideus with Tissaphernes; and accordingly he insisted on a revision of the terms. The result was a compact which formally bound the Spartans not to injure whether by invasions or in any other way any country or city which might at any time have belonged to the reigning Persian monarch or to any of his predecessors. From such territories or towns they were forbidden to exact any tax or tribute whatsoever. In return for these concessions the barbarian despot graciously condescended to give the Spartans such help as he might be persuaded to afford, and to guarantee them to the best of his power from invasion on the part of any of his subjects.¹

Meanwhile the Chians had been feeling in its full effects the angry declaration of Astyochos that in their hour of need they should seek his aid in vain. Having finished their preparations in Samos, the Athenians sailed to Chios and established themselves in a fortified camp at Delphinion somewhat to the north of the city. From this sheltered harbor they could harass the island by sea, and ravage the country at their will. Nor is it surprising that the losses thus occasioned roused again the indignation of the demos against a struggle to which they had never given a voluntary sanction, or that the Chian oligarchs should begin to feel the sting of slavery even more poignantly than the Athenians had been made to feel it after the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia. So large was the number of slaves in the island that great severity became needful to keep them down; and this harshness led many to escape to the mountains and there maintain themselves by systematic plundering. To these men the Athenian occupation of Delphinion

Second treaty
between
Sparta and
Persia.

Fortification
of Delphi-
nion; and
ravaging of
Chios by the
Athenians.

¹Thuc. viii. 37.

furnished a temptation for desertion not to be resisted ; and their desertion was followed by calamities which almost reduced the Chian oligarchy to despair. Once more they applied to Astyochos ; and the manifest feeling of the allies convinced him that the refusal of their request would be impolitic as well as wrong. He had made up his mind to go at once to that island, when he received the news that a fleet of seven-and-twenty Spartan ships, having on board eleven men who after Spartan fashion were to give him advice or keep him in check, had reached Kaunos, on the southern coast of Asia Minor.¹

The admiral in command of this fleet was Antisthenes ; at the head of the commissioners was Lichas ; and they were charged to do all that might be in their power to further the wishes not of Tissaphernes but of Pharnabazos. The arrival of these ships at Kaunos was a circumstance which in the judgment of Astyochos fully justified him in abandoning for the present the thought of helping the Chians.² Sailing to Kos, he found the city of that island helpless, the walls having been thrown down by an earthquake ; but this was a sufficient reason for ravaging the city and for the selling of those among the prisoners who had been slaves. On reaching Knidos they would have preferred to land and rest ; but the Knidians insisted that he should sail at once against the twenty triremes with which Charminos was looking out for the Peloponnesian reinforcement. On his way to the islet of Syme a storm with heavy rain and fog dispersed his fleet ; and at daybreak his left wing was sighted by Charminos, who, supposing that this was the squadron under the command of Antisthenes, attacked it at once. He was fast gaining the day, three of the enemy's ships being sunk and others being disabled, when he found himself thoroughly hemmed in by the rest of the ships belonging to the force of Astyochos. In their flight the Athenians lost six vessels : the rest made their way first to the island of Teutloussa, and thence to Halikarnassos, while the two divisions of the Peloponnesian fleet effected a junction and sailed together to Knidos.

The possession of so mighty an armament justified the assumption of a little more dignity in their dealings with the Persian satrap, who was now invited to a conference with the Spartan commissioners. Speaking for his colleagues, Lichas passed in review the provisions of the former covenants, and told Tissaphernes flatly that he had not the least intention of abiding by pactions so shameful and humiliating not merely to Sparta but to the Hellenic states generally. Taken

Defeat of Charminos by the Spartan admiral Astyochos.

Rupture between Lichas and Tissaphernes.

¹ Thuc. viii. 41, 1.

² Ib. viii. 41, 1.

aback by language utterly unlooked for from men who, so long as they crushed Athens, seemed to care for nothing, Tissaphernes turned away and went off in a rage.¹

The retreat of the Athenians to Samos left Rhodes exposed to the full force of Spartan influence. The three cities of this island, Lindos, Ialysos, and Kamiros, (the fourth city, Rhodes, Revolt of Rhodes from Athens. not having yet been formed,) were all inhabited by a Dorian population; and it might be supposed that they would thus bitterly resent their subordination to an Ionian power and be eager to shake off the yoke. But it was not so; and the fact speaks volumes for the general spirit of the imperial administration of Athens. Here, as elsewhere, revolt was the work not of the people but of the oligarchs. When the Peloponnesian fleet of ninety-four ships entered the harbor of Kamiros, the demos, dismayed as well as astonished, fled hurriedly to the mountains; and the conspirators, now able to manage things in their own way, summoned the representatives of the other cities, unfortified like Kamiros, to a conference, in which Rhodes was declared to be a member of the Spartan confederacy. On receiving these tidings, the Athenian fleet set sail from Samos; but the mischief could not be undone, and they were compelled to content themselves with making occasional descents on Rhodian territory, while the Peloponnesian fleet remained for nearly three months drawn up on shore in the harbors of the island.

This strange and injudicious inactivity was in some measure the result of the irritation which had prompted the remarks of Lichas to Tissaphernes. The Spartans had chosen Rhodes as Intended murder of Alkibiades by the Spartans. their winter station to be more out of his way; and in the hope that they might be able to carry on the war without Persian money they levied a tribute of thirty-two talents on the Rhodians, who thus found that autonomy was a blessing which must at least be paid for. But it was owing far more to the intrigues of Alkibiades. For him there was emphatically no choice between pre-eminence and ruin: and pre-eminence could be secured and retained only by brilliant, if not unbroken, success. His suggestions had manifestly brought about the fortification of Dekeleia and the destruction of their armaments in Sicily. But in the waters of the Egean things began to assume a different aspect. Either he had already done the Spartans all the good which he was capable of doing; and this of itself would be a sufficient reason for discarding him; or he was trading on his genius elsewhere, and this would be a reason for putting him out of the way altogether. They forgot that the conditions of the conflict were not now what they had been in Syracuse: and perhaps

¹Thuc. viii. 43.

Hermokrates alone saw that in spite of all their troubles both financial and military the Athenians had the advantage of standing on the defensive with the popular feeling of the allied cities strongly on their side, while the Peloponnesians had committed themselves to aggressions as vast as those of which the Athenians were guilty in Sicily. But they were irritated by such unlooked-for events as the rising of the people in Samos and the disagreeable air of superiority assumed towards them by the Persian satrap; and at the instance of his personal enemy Agis an order was sent out to Astyochos to kill the Athenian exile; but that keen-sighted schemer was still more than a match for the stupid cunning and treachery of Spartans. Contrasting possibly the secret assassination of a refined oligarchic community with the open courts and the straightforward decrees of the vulgar Athenian demos, Alkibiades, warned of his intended murder, shook the dust off his feet and made his way to Tissaphernes.

But like other able and unscrupulous men, Alkibiades seldom failed to overreach himself. He had been a most convenient instrument in the eyes of the Spartans; and Tissaphernes now stood in need of just such an agent in his dealings with the Greeks. So far as his advice tended to increase their difficulties, he was ready to avail himself of it and to act upon it promptly: so far as it concerned himself, he would believe and adopt as much as he pleased. It was from this new counsellor that the suggestion came for reducing the pay of the Peloponnesians from a drachma to half a drachma daily; but the satrap felt greater confidence in the result of another suggestion made by Alkibiades for bribing the generals and trierarchs belonging to the Peloponnesian force. Too much stress can scarcely be laid upon the fact that the plan succeeded with all except the Syracusan Hermokrates. Personal corruption has often been alleged as the special vice of democracies; and in Athens it is supposed to have found a singularly congenial soil. But in Athens its growth is but dwarfish in comparison with the gigantic proportions which it reached in the pure Doric oligarchy of Sparta and the haughty and refined nobility of her allies.

The acceptance of these bribes by the Peloponnesian officers at once enabled Alkibiades to come forth as the accredited agent of Tissaphernes, and to adopt towards them and others a tone which he knew that they dared not openly resent. Greek cities came to ask for aid in money: they were dismissed with the answer that they had paid tribute to Athens while they were her subjects, and that they must expect to find freedom a luxury even more costly. For Tissaphernes Alkibiades, it is said, had further advice. It was to his interest, he urged, and to that of his master that the movement of the war

Growing influence of Alkibiades with Tissaphernes.

Suggestions of Alkibiades for prolonging the war.

should be slow. The cause of Persia could not be furthered by the victory either of Sparta or of Athens; nay the victory of the latter would be by far the lesser evil. Her object was to bring the islanders of the Egean into absolute subjection to herself, and to secure to the great king the same absolute power over the continental Hellenic cities. To these cities the Spartans promised freedom; and although for the present they signed treaties which seemed to attest their indifference to the matter, yet success would compel them to throw off the mask, or would make the Hellenic cities strong enough to compel the Spartans to go on with the work which they had begun. To this string of glibly-uttered lies Tissaphernes listened probably with a calm incredulity to which he took care that his countenance should give no expression. He was perfectly aware that he was himself in debt to the king because for more than half a century Persian tribute-gatherers had been shut out from the continental not less than the insular cities by this state which was now represented as bent on multiplying Persian slaves. But while he saw through these flimsy falsehoods, he was none the less ready to follow the advice which protected his purse or increased his power. Acting on his counsel, the satrap allowed his payments to become irregular, while he insisted on the near approach of the Phœnician fleet as a reason for not venturing a battle with the Athenians in the present efficiency of a navy which but twelve months before had no existence. It was thus that weeks and even months passed away while the Peloponnesian ships lay hauled ashore in the Rhodian harbors; and the Spartans began to suspect that Tissaphernes had made up his mind to look on while the two contending parties wore each other out.¹

But Alkibiades had no intention of remaining long the mere agent or instrument of a Persian satrap. Scarcely a year ago it had seemed that Athens must soon lie at the mercy of her enemies: now by an unparalleled effort she was able to keep at bay the navies of Peloponnesos and Sicily aided by the gold of Persia. Nor can there be a reasonable doubt that she would have outridden the storm had it not been for the vile machinations of one of the worst of traitors acting on a knot of Athenian citizens almost as treacherous and as unprincipled as himself. But not one of these men had thought seriously of making a systematic effort to overthrow the existing political constitution of Athens, until Alkibiades stirred the smouldering embers into flame. This miserable victim of his own cleverness spent his life in spinning webs of intrigues which seem to have brought him no rest and little satisfaction. The result of the Sicilian expedition had made his influence for the moment

¹ Thuc. viii. 46.

paramount at Sparta; but as soon as things went wrong in the Egean, he was made to feel that traitors can be tolerated only so long as they are successful. He had been driven to take refuge with Tissaphernes; and he saw clearly that he must soon get ready a place of retreat elsewhere. If anything in the life of Alkibiades could be amazing, we might be astonished at the impudence of the message which he now sent to those of the oligarchic party who were serving in the armament at Samos. Calling himself to the remembrance of the best men of Athens (to oligarchs in all ages their fellows are always the cream of the cream), he could dare to say that he owed his banishment to the demos, and that so long as this vagabond society continued to exist at Athens, he would never set foot in the streets of his native city. Nor did he shrink from adding that, if he could return to an oligarchical Athens, he would secure for her the active friendship of Tissaphernes.¹ Nothing more was needed to rouse the enthusiasm of the oligarchic party in the Athenian army at Samos. Some envoys went from the camp of Samos to Alkibiades, who now had even better things to tell them. He had promised them, before, the friendship of Tissaphernes: he now assured them that he would bring them into alliance with the great king himself, if they would put down the democratical constitution which made it impossible for the king to put any trust in Athenian citizens. The envoys were completely duped. Instead of asking for some solid warrant for all these fine assertions, and especially for evidence that the Persian despot felt this deep interest in the domestic concerns of Athens, they hastened back to Samos, eager to deliver themselves of the tidings that the friendship and treasures of the Persian king were within their grasp, on the small conditions that the banishment of Alkibiades should be annulled, and that the democracy of Athens should be put down. To the great mass of the army and fleet the conditions were intolerable. But there were both at Athens and in the camp at Samos many who in strictness of speech were thorough traitors, and who in order to gain their object would without remorse or scruple upset everything. For such men it mattered comparatively little whether Alkibiades could or could not fulfil his promises. Even if he should fail to do so, the assumption of his ability would in the meantime vastly strengthen their hands and enable them to intimidate the people.

One man only, it would seem, saw through the transparent lies of Alkibiades; and this was the general Phrynichos.² With the vast majority of the Athenians at Samos the subsidies Opposition of of the great king were the one object to be aimed at; Phrynichos. and they never cared to inquire whether they might not be led

¹ Thuc. viii. 47.

² Ib. viii. 48, 2.

blindfold to their ruin. But Phrynichos detected the fallacies underlying the statements of Alkibiades, and dwelt on the absurdity of supposing that Dareios would at all care whether Athens was or was not governed by a democracy. With an earnestness which seemed to indicate a hearty attachment to the existing constitution of Athens Phrynichos sought further to dispel the miserable delusion that the establishment of oligarchy would tend to maintain and strengthen her maritime empire. The idea that the imperial city would retain its revenues under an oligarchical government Phrynichos treated as an absurd and fatal mistake. The revolution would bring back not one single revolted city to its allegiance, or render any one of the allies more trustworthy. Speaking from his own personal experience, he assured them that under the regimen of gentlemen¹ the allied cities would be only more troublesome and unruly, for these refined and highborn rulers were just the men who were most of all bent on securing what they were pleased to call their freedom, while they also hounded on the people to acts of violence and bloodshed which they hoped to turn to their own profit. Nay more, he knew that, whatever might be the desire of the allies for autonomy, it was the Athenian demos alone which had held or would hold them together at all. No more triumphant or emphatic eulogy of the imperial government and the political constitution of Athens could have been pronounced than the simple statement of facts by which Phrynichos sought to warn the assembled oligarchs against a step likely to involve them and the whole state in ruin. The very object of government is the maintenance of order and of the absolute sovereignty of Law; and according to Phrynichos it was the demos and the demos alone which maintained both order and law not only at Athens but throughout her whole confederation. It might be supposed that Phrynichos belonged to the school of Perikles or Ephialtes. The fact that he did not adds only to the strength of his words and makes his warning more memorable. His warning was thrown away. The conspirators were resolved to make the venture, and it was determined that Peisandros should be sent with other envoys to Athens to bring about the ruin of the demos and the restoration of Alkibiades.

Having reached Athens Peisandros disburdened himself of his message in the assembly of the citizens, telling them in few words that without foreign help ruin was inevitable, and that they might have this help from Persia, if they would consent to receive Alkibiades and to change their constitution. The proposal was met by vehement opposition. Disregarding the clamor, Peisandros went up to each speaker and quietly asked him how he proposed to

Reception of Peisandros and the envoys from Samos at Athens.

¹ Thuc. viii. 48, 5.

carry on the war with an enemy whose fleet now far outnumbered that of Athens, if the whole weight of Persia should further be placed in the scale against them. The speakers were silenced, and Peisandros added that the establishment of oligarchy would win for them the confidence of the Persian king; that Alkibiades was the only man who could do the work for them; that constitutional forms were a matter of small moment compared with the safety of the state; and that if they did not like oligarchy when they had fairly tried it, why,—then it would be very easy to restore the democracy.¹

Impudence of assertion will go a long way with men who are worn down by a seemingly endless series of crushing disasters coming upon a struggle which had now lasted for nearly a generation. No one asked what grounds there were for believing that the influence of Alkibiades with Tissaphernes was what he represented it to be, or whether the Persian king would hold himself bound by the bargain of this satrap, even if that bargain should be made. In this unreflecting temper they resolved to send Peisandros with ten commissioners authorised to settle matters as they might think fit with Alkibiades and Tissaphernes, and to put Leon and Diomedon in place of Skironides and Phrynichos.²

Appointment of Athenian commissioners for settling affairs with Alkibiades and Tissaphernes.

But before he could return to Samos Peisandros knew that he had still much to do at Athens. The Demos was not yet put down; the army at Samos was strongly opposed to any constitutional change; and there was no guarantee that the old energy of the Athenian people might not at any moment be roused against the oligarchic conspirators. It was necessary therefore to set in order the oligarchic machinery without which the foundations of the democracy could not possibly be thrown down. The polity of Athens rested on freedom of speech; and if this could be summarily repressed, the constitutional forms and the modes of legal procedure to which they were so much attached would be found most useful in riveting their chains. Well knowing how the mouths of the citizens must be gagged, Peisandros went round to all the political Clubs, and concerted with them a plan of action to be carried out by the leaders who should remain behind him. At the head of these was the Rhetor Antiphon. Gifted with great natural powers sharpened by a singular acuteness, he had taken to a calling which made it hard, if not impossible, for him to attain to a position like that of Perikles in the public assembly. The professed rhetorician was one who, it was supposed, had given his whole mind to devising

Organisation of the oligarchic conspiracy at Athens.

¹ Thuc. viii. 53.

² Ib. viii. 54.

tricks of debate and advocacy and with whom ordinary citizens stood at an unfair disadvantage. But if the occupation of Antiphon interfered with his popularity, it added largely to his gains. Disliking the demos partly perhaps because popular feeling had debarred him a public career, but more probably from a general leaning to oligarchy, he threw himself into the conspiracy for upsetting the Athenian constitution with an energy equal to his ability, and for this end worked with consummate skill the machinery of assassination. But in private life, we are told, he was a man of genial character, sober, kindly in his relations with his family, and affectionate in his intercourse with his friends. He had, in short, the estimable qualities of Nikias; and for the oligarchic Thucydides this was enough. Antiphon becomes in his eyes a man 'second to none of his age in virtue.' This employer of murdering bravoës was ably seconded not only by Theramenes, the son of Hagnon founder of Amphipolis, but by Phrynichos, who in his hatred and fear of Alkibiades hesitated not to inflict upon Athens a system which according to his own previous warning must be fatal to her empire and could not be beneficial to himself.¹

A gleam of brightness seemed to fall on the arms of Athens after the departure of Leon and Diomedon for the Egean. Their first descent was on Rhodes, where they found the Peloponnesian fleet still drawn up on shore. After a victory over the Rhodians who came out to encounter them, they made Chalkê their naval station in preference to Kos, as furnishing a better look-out for the enemy's fleet in case it should put to sea. Meanwhile the Athenian fortress of Delphinion was fast approaching its completion, and urgent messages were sent to Rhodes for immediate help. But before it could arrive, Pedaritos with the whole force of the Chians, aided by some allies, fell upon the stockade around the Athenian ships and succeeded in taking part of it, together with some vessels which were drawn up on shore. The arrival of the Athenians changed the fortunes of the day. Pedaritos was slain: and the loss to the Chians was heavy both in men and arms.

It was at this moment when the Chians were still more strictly blockaded than they had been, and when they already felt keenly the pressure of famine, that Peisandros and the commissioners from Athens reached Magnesia with their proposals for the alliance of Persia with the now oligarchical city. Alkibiades saw at once that he was caught in a trap, the plain fact being that Tissaphernes had no intention of making any definite covenant with the Athenians. One course only remained open to him. By some means

Victories of the Athenians at Rhodes and Chios. Death of Pedaritos.

Abortive negotiation of the Athenian commissioners with Tissaphernes.

¹ Thuc. viii. 68, 3.

he must make it appear that the failure of the negotiation was the work not of the satrap but of the Athenians themselves; and he sought to effect this by raising the terms for Tissaphernes at each conference. The first demand was for the surrender of all Ionia to the king: the second involved the cession of all the islands lying off the eastern shores of the Egean, and was carried even further. With both these demands the commissioners expressed their willingness to comply; and Alkibiades was almost at his wits' end to devise conditions more humiliating, when it struck him that they might be less complaisant if in a third conference the king should insist on maintaining in the Egean as large a fleet as might suit his purposes. The point beyond which Athenian oligarchs would refuse further to abase themselves and to dishonor their country was not easily reached; but Alkibiades had reached it at last by proposing terms which contemptuously swept away the real or so-called convention of Kallias. The commissioners, now thoroughly angry, departed with the feeling that they had been both insulted and cheated by Alkibiades. Unfortunately, the Athenian army at Samos drew their own inference from this rebuff of the oligarchic envoys: and this inference was that in his heart Alkibiades leant to the democracy, and that he might be induced to bring Tissaphernes into active alliance with it. His ability to do this was questioned by neither side.

The spring of the next year, the twenty-first of this weary war, was ushered in by no good omens for the endurance of Athenian empire. While Astyochos remained inactive at Rhodes, the Chians after the death of Pedaritos had chosen as their commander a Spartan named Leon who had come out as a hoplite serving on board the fleet of which Antisthenes was the admiral.¹ With him they received a reinforcement of twelve ships which were keeping guard off Miletos. They were thus enabled to oppose six-and-thirty ships to the two-and-thirty triremes of the Athenians; and in the fight which followed they were now for the first time not defeated. In short, the tide had begun to turn in their favor, while their enemies were almost daily harassed by fresh distractions. The return of Peisandros and his fellow envoys after their ignominious dismissal by Alkibiades had convinced the traitors in the Athenian camp that no aid was to be looked for from Tissaphernes, and that the relation of Alkibiades himself with the Athenian oligarchs was one of open war. They affected to feel special satisfaction in being rid of a man so little likely to work in harmony with them; and they resolved only the more determinately to do by themselves what they had hoped to achieve by his aid. Their first step was

Progress of
the oligar-
chic con-
spiracy in
Samos.
411 B.C.

¹ Thuc. viii. 61, 62.

to make overtures to such of the present Samian government as might seem favorably inclined to oligarchy.¹ Shortsighted as well as treacherous, they still fancied that oligarchy would advance the interests of Athens; and as by this they meant enrichment and license for themselves,² they were ready to carry on the war from their own private resources. Their activity, in short, was the result of an absorbing and pitiless selfishness, in strange contrast with that nobler energy which in the stirring words of Herodotos³ the Athenians had displayed when, just a hundred years before, they had risen up against the Peisistratidai.

There was, in truth, no end to their folly and madness. They would have it that oligarchy must strengthen an empire which Phrynichos had solemnly warned them it would most assuredly dissolve; and in this frenzy they dispatched Peisandros with five of the commissioners to Athens to complete the work of revolution there, and to establish oligarchies in any towns which they might visit on their way. With the remaining five Diotrophes was sent as general to operate in the Thrace-ward regions. His first exploit was to suppress the government of the people in Thasos and to place the oligarchs in power. Two months later the oligarchs showed their gratitude for the boon by fortifying the town and openly joining the enemies of Athens.

With the aid of some hoplites which he gathered as he went along Peisandros did his errand well. In the several cities which he passed the few were enabled to thrust aside the many; and when he reached Athens, he found that there was little more for him to do. He had probably sent to his partisans full tidings of the breach with Alkibiades, and the conspirators were perhaps not sorry to be quit of his interference and to carry on their work purely as a political revolution without reference to any foreign aid. They boldly attacked the citadel, and for the time freedom of speech was at an end. The first blow had fallen upon Androkles, a man who had been prominent among the accusers of Alkibiades before his departure to Sicily; and by a strange irony, while that restless schemer was throwing his influence into the opposite scale, this unhappy victim was offered up for the special purpose of winning his favor and with it the money of Tissaphernes.⁴ The

¹ Thuc. viii. 63, 3. We have seen that Thucydides takes little care to distinguish the oligarchical factions from the people. The Chian conspirators are generally spoken of as 'the Chians;' hence we have no sufficient warrant for saying that the Samians who now joined the Athe-

nian plotters had brought about the rising against the faction in power. It is more likely that they joined the movement when its success seemed more probable than its failure.

² Thuc. viii. 63, 4.

³ v. 78.

⁴ Thuc. viii. 65, 2.

Political assassinations at Athens by the oligarchic conspirators.

work of assassination once begun was not allowed to flag until it had achieved its purpose. Not many murders, however, were needed to silence the people. In the assembly the conspirators asserted loudly that no pay ought under any circumstances to be issued to any citizens except while they were actually serving in war, and that not more than five thousand must be allowed to retain the franchise, the principle being that they only should have a vote who could contribute substantially to the needs of the state. Even this was a cheat. The conspirators had no intention of sharing power, if they should secure it, with others; and they took their measures accordingly. Not a subject was proposed for discussion except after their dictation; the men who rose to speak on these subjects belonged to their faction, and the very words of their speeches were pre-arranged. At the same time beyond the walls of the assembly young men, hired as bravoës and murderers, struck down citizens whose presence might be inconvenient, and picked off especially all the popular speakers. The man who ventured to oppose a measure or utter a protest against revolution disappeared soon and for ever; and with the silencing of all opposition followed perfect impunity for the assassins. The order of society was for the time broken up. No man could put trust even in those whom he had looked upon as his friends. While Antiphon with his partisans took advantage of these vague and indefinite terrors, he availed himself, with even greater ingenuity, of the existing constitutional forms for the more effectual subjugation of the people. The Council of the Five Hundred still held their meetings; and if there were some who had spirit enough to absent themselves from the Senate-house, there were others who would feel that even their absence might tell as much against them as a speech in opposition to oligarchic innovations. Their presence was indeed all that Antiphon wanted, for if they were present, they must vote; and by their vote they must be bound. The revolution, in short, was practically accomplished; and the highest and best characteristic of the Athenian people—their respect for law and order—was thus ingeniously used as an instrument for establishing and keeping up a reign of terror.¹ While this terror was at its height, Peisandros with his colleagues arrived. They set themselves at once to complete the work which a series of dastardly murders had brought so nearly to a successful issue. Their first proposal was to appoint ten commissioners, Peisandros seemingly being one of them, with absolute powers, charged to be ready by a given day with a plan for the better government of the city. On the day named, the assembly was summoned, not, as usual, to the Pnyx within the walls, where the interference of the

¹ Thuc. viii. 66.

Metoikoi or alien residents and even of the slaves might be inconvenient or dangerous, but to the Temenos of Poseidon at Kolonos about a mile beyond the city gates. Without preface or comment the commissioners at the suggestion of Peisandros proposed that every citizen should be left perfectly free to bring forward any measures whatsoever, and that any attempt to punish him by means of the Graphê Paronomôn or writ for illegal procedure should be visited by heavy pains and penalties. One great bulwark of Athenian polity was thus thrown down without a protest, for the citizens now knew well that the assassins were ready with their daggers; and the next proposition swept away all existing offices and all pay except for military service, while it gave the commissioners power to choose five men who should in their turn choose one hundred, these hundred again nominating each three. It was further agreed that these Four Hundred, invested with absolute powers, should take their place in the council chamber and carry on the government after their will and pleasure, taking counsel, whenever they might wish to do so, with the Five Thousand citizens not of Athens but of Nephelokokygia. Such were the blessings which Athens received from conspirators who prided themselves on being gentlemen, brave, refined, and honorable, and who regarded plain-spoken demagogues (if the word must be used) as the very scum and offscouring of the earth. For the noisy arguments of these vulgar debaters they had substituted the point of the dagger; and a large measure of success had rewarded a graceful change singularly befitting men of careful culture and ancient lineage.

All that remained now to be done was the installation of the tyrants into the chamber of the senate which represented the Kleisthenean tribes. The work was soon done. All Athens was now one vast garrison. It was easy for the conspirators to instruct their bravoës to remain near at hand after the dispersal of the citizens (few probably in number and utterly cowed in spirit) from the place of meeting at Kolonos. Attended by a godly band of four hundred and twenty assassins' carrying each his hidden dagger, the Four Hundred marched from Kolonos to the senate house, and commanded the senators to depart, tendering them at the same time their pay for the fraction of their official year which was still to run out. The money was taken; the democracy of Kleisthenes died with self-inflicted ignominy; and in its place was set up the religious association of the old Eupatrid polity.²

¹ The new association consisted of 300: but the conspirators had already organised a band of 120 young men gathered seemingly

from various Greek cities, for carrying out the sentences of their Vehmîc tribunal. Thuc. viii. 69, 4.

² See p. 9 *et seq.*

The selfish and heartless traitors, who had thus undone the work of a century, were to receive some hard and wholesome lessons. The trusty oligarchs, who found assassination a vastly more convenient instrument than long and troublesome trials in courts of law, were now supreme. There could therefore be no difficulty in adjusting the quarrel with Sparta, and no hindrance to the enjoyment of a peace sadly needed to recruit the exhausted powers of Athens. The message was accordingly sent in full confidence to Agis at Dekeleia, and by him treated with contempt.¹ Sending for a large reinforcement to Sparta, the Spartan king allowed sufficient time for their march to the Athenian border and then advanced from Dekeleia in the hope that the present confusion within the city might even enable him to carry the walls by storm. He found himself completely mistaken. There was no slackening in the watch, and some of the enemy who approached too close paid a heavy penalty for their rashness, while a body of Athenian hoplites, bowmen, and light-armed troops, sallying out, caused great loss. Agis therefore after a while sent his Peloponnesian reinforcement home, and returned to his border fortress, whither a fresh embassy from the Four Hundred soon followed him. These were more graciously treated, and received permission to send envoys to make their wishes known at Sparta.

But the tyrants felt that their work was but half done, rather than done at all, so long as they failed to secure the co-operation of the army of Samos. Envoys were accordingly sent to assure them that the oligarchical conspirators had acted from a disinterested generosity which looked only to the interests of the city and the empire; that they had done away with a cumbrous and impracticable franchise, securing at the same time a great saving in the public expenditure; but that the governing body, being still five thousand, fully represented the whole mass of the people. Before they could reach Samos, the traitors in that island had set in motion the machinery which Antiphon had worked so successfully at home. Some few of the Samians, who scarcely a year ago had taken part in the democratic revolution, were induced to join the plot.² The brave work was begun by the murder of Hyperbolos, who had been ostracised by the combined partisans of Alkibiades and Nikias certainly six, and perhaps even ten, years earlier. Sundry other like things they did, the historian tells us; and they were fast maturing their scheme for putting down the opposition of the adverse majority. In all likelihood, their plans might have been carried out, had it

¹ Thuc. viii. 71.² Thuc. viii. 73, 2.

not been for the precautions taken by Leon and Diomedon, the commanders sent out on the suggestion of Peisandros to supersede the oligarchic Phrynichos.¹ Honestly attached to the law and constitution of Athens, these men never quitted Samos without leaving behind them some ships to keep guard against oligarchical intriguers; and they were ably and zealously seconded by the trierarch Thrasylos and by Thrasyboulos then serving as a hoplite in the army. Roused by the earnest requests made to them, these men canvassed the army personally, praying them not only to guard the laws of Athens, but not to let go their hold on Samos which had now become the mainstay of her empire. The sincerity of the men whom they addressed was attested by the heartiness of their answers; and thus when the oligarchs ventured to trust the issue to the dagger or the sword, they were met by a resistance which cost them the lives of thirty of their number. The victors were more generous than the vanquished deserved, more generous than sound policy required that they should be. Three only of those who were most guilty were banished; the rest were allowed to remain unmolested under the rule of the demos which they had sought to subvert. In the enthusiasm of the moment they dispatched the Paralian trireme with Chaireas, the son of Archestratos, to Athens with a report of what had taken place. They sailed ignorantly into the lion's den. As soon as they landed, some few of the men were imprisoned by the Four Hundred; the rest were placed in another ship and ordered to cruise about Eubœia. Chaireas contrived to make his escape, and hastening to Samos, informed the army that Athens was in the hands of tyrants who were scourging the citizens and insulting their wives and children, and whose intention was to imprison and to put to death those of the army who were not prepared to submit to their dictation.²

The escape of Chaireas was followed by results which showed that the tyrants had committed a blunder in not putting him to death. An oath enforced by the most solemn sanctions was taken by every soldier in the army that he would maintain harmony under the ancient constitution of Athens, that he would vigorously carry on the war, and that he would have no dealings with the Four Hundred, who were denounced as public enemies.

But the citizens assembled at Samos did even more. In a formal assembly it was ruled that as the demos at Athens had been forcibly put down, the lawful administration of government devolved upon themselves, and that they in fact constituted the true Athens. Exercising thus their undoubted rights of citizenship,

¹ Thuc. viii. 54.

² Ib. viii. 74, 3.

Determination of the Athenians in Samos to maintain the constitution.

they deposed such of their generals and trierarchs as were suspected of being concerned with the oligarchical conspiracy, Thrasyboulos and Thrasylos being among the officers chosen in their place. The assembly was one worthy of that great name of Athens which Nikias knew better how to invoke than to defend.¹ Unlike the contemptible or starving senators who consented to abandon their trust for a pittance held out to them by traitors, the speakers in the Samian council declared with memorable terseness that Athens had revolted from them, and that this fact could not humiliate and should not discourage those who had had nothing to do with her apostasy. There was no need to change their position in order to carry on the war. Nay because her army and fleet had found a sure refuge in Samos and friends to be trusted to the uttermost in the Samians, therefore and only therefore was the mouth of the Peiraieus kept open for the conveyance of supplies to a town which must otherwise soon be starved out. The traitors of Athens were thus really in their power, for they might at any moment sail from Samos and block up the harbor themselves. If again their thought was for money, the city since the Sicilian disasters had been able to do but little for them. In few words, the conspirators at Athens had sinned by setting at naught the laws of their fathers; it was the business of the citizens at Samos to keep those laws and to compel these traitors to keep them.

Resolution of the citizens at Samos to treat Athens as a revolted city.

Such was the attitude of the Athenians in Samos when the ten envoys of the Four Hundred reached Delos and heard the report that the citizens serving in Samos would have nothing to do with the oligarchic usurpers. They naturally hesitated to go further, fearing probably most of all that the influence of Alkibiades might be set in the scale against them. At first it seemed unlikely that their fears would be realised. The main body of the citizens at Samos was greatly opposed to his restoration; and it needed all the eloquence and energy of Thrasyboulos to induce them to consent to his recall.² But Thrasyboulos was as firmly convinced, as the oligarchic envoys had been, that Alkibiades could do what he pleased with Tissaphernes, and that the salvation of Athens depended on her obtaining foreign aid, or at the least in detaching Persia from the alliance with Sparta. Under this conviction he went to Magnesia and brought back Alkibiades to Samos. The narrative of his introduction to the assembly is painful not so much for the glibness of the lies strung together by this consummate traitor as for the pitiable credulity of his hearers. To

Election of Alkibiades as general by the citizens at Samos.

¹ Thuc. vii. 64, 2. See p. 401.

² Thuc. viii. 81.

the oligarchs he had said that on no consideration would he again set foot on Attic soil until the demos which had driven him into exile should be put down :¹ speaking to the people, he laid the blame of his calamities not upon them but upon his own unhappy destiny. He had told the oligarchs that the suppression of the democratic constitution was the one indispensable condition for winning the thorough confidence of the Persian king : to the people he not only uttered no hint that any such condition was required, but he described in moving terms the absorbing anxiety of Tissaphernes to secure the close friendship of democratic Athens. All who heard him were too much carried away by the heated fancies of the moment to question his facts or to see that he had a triple motive in thus parading his supposed influence with the Persian satrap. If his statements could only be credited, they would strike terror into the oligarchs at Athens and paralyse the action of the Clubs in the city ; they would encourage the army in Samos and impress them with a due sense of his importance ; lastly they would have the effect of sowing mistrust between Tissaphernes and his Peloponnesian allies, and of disappointing the bright hopes of the Spartans. So greedily were his words received by his hearers that before the assembly dispersed he was appointed general, and a strong wish was expressed to sail at once to the Peiræus and punish the men who had subverted the constitution. From this course Alkibiades strongly dissuaded them. He had a part to play with Tissaphernes, and in order to get away he promised to return so soon as he should have concerted with him the necessary measures for carrying on the war.²

But before the return of Alkibiades to Magnesia, the oligarchic envoys, who had felt their bravery oozing away at Delos, ventured Reception of the oligarchic envoys at Samos. on presenting themselves to the assembly of the citizens at Samos. They were received with a storm of indignation which threatened their lives ; but when at length they were allowed to speak, they delivered themselves of the comforting message with which they had been charged,³ adding some comments which recent incidents seemed to call for. The manifest hatred of the army for government by a club of tyrants drew forth the assurance that all the Five Thousand would take their place in turn in the Council of the Four Hundred : but with special earnestness they inveighed against the monstrous lies with which, as they insisted, Chaireas had cheated the citizens in Samos. There was no intention whatever of doing the least harm to their wives, their children, or their kinsfolk ; nor could the charges of past ill-treatment be sustained. The assassination of men who

¹ See p. 427.² Thuc. viii. 81, 82.³ See p. 435.

were honestly attached to the constitution of Athens was a subject on which it was best to be silent; and about this therefore they said nothing. Their lame and stumbling apology rather inflamed than soothed the angry feelings of their hearers, of whom a large majority insisted on immediate return to Peiraieus to punish the traitors and to undo their work. Against this plan Alkibiades threw the whole weight of his influence; and the people accordingly gave it up. Pacifying the assembly as well as he could, Alkibiades bade the envoys of the Four Hundred go back and tell their masters that they must yield up their power to the Five Hundred whom they had thrust out of the Senate-house; that to the rule of the Five Thousand, if these were a reality and not a sham, no objection would be made; and that for any retrenchments which should leave more means for carrying on the war vigorously the Athenians at Samos could feel only gratitude to their kinsmen at home.

The tidings brought from Samos by the envoys soon brought to the surface those elements of disunion which Thucydides admits to be the bane of oligarchical governments based on the ruins of a democracy. It was clear that the people at home were only waiting for an opportunity to shake off the yoke of their tyrants: it was still more clear that in the people at Samos the Four Hundred had to deal with a force of resolute and uncompromising enemies. Among the most prominent in the active work of the conspiracy had been Theramenes and Aristokrates; but their share of power and of the fruits of power was by no means on the same scale, and they could not but remember that they belonged to a society in which each man avowedly was strictly for himself. It was only natural therefore that the eyes of these men and of others like them should now be opened to the vast importance of making the Five Thousand a reality,—in other words, of restoring practically the old democracy, for as these Five Thousand had been thus far an indefinite quantity, so an indefinite quantity they would remain.

Opposition of Theramenes in the council of the Four Hundred.

The tactics of Theramenes warned those of their colleagues who were hopelessly committed to the usurpation of the Four Hundred, that the resistance with which they were threatened must be put down at once, and, if need be, put down by force. One attempt to send ambassadors to Sparta had miscarried through their own folly in committing them to men who had delivered them as prisoners to the Argives. It was therefore only the more necessary to send off others charged peremptorily to conclude a peace on whatever terms and at whatever cost.¹ On this errand, loathsome to the ruder feelings of the

Fortification of Ectonia by the Four Hundred.

¹ Thuc. viii. 90, 2.

demos, yet grateful, it would seem, to the refined and cultured tastes of Eupatrids, Phrynichos and Antiphon departed with ten others, while their accomplices at home set to work to prepare a place for the enemy, by raising a fortress on the mole Eetionia, which ran out on the north side of the artificially narrowed mouth of the Peiræus.

There remained, in truth, for the Spartans nothing more to do but to take possession on their own terms. It is more than possible that the very abjectness of the envoys may have made the ephors fearful of being caught in some trap; but whatever may have been the cause, the traitors were dismissed with nothing more than a promise that a fleet should pass the Athenian harbor on its way to Euboia. The Four Hundred were naturally anxious that their fortress should be finished before this fleet should appear; but the secret of its coming could not be kept from Theramenes, who distinctly protested against the erection of the fort as part of a scheme arranged in concert with the Spartans. The return of the ambassadors stirred the people still more deeply; and the oligarchs were now to learn that others besides themselves could use their favorite weapons. In the open market-place and in the middle of the day Phrynichos was struck down by a man belonging to the force of hoplites employed in the garrison duty of Attica. Rendered bolder by the impunity which attended this crime, Theramenes insisted that the Spartan fleet which had now come to Aigina and thence fallen back on Epidauros could not possibly be going straight to Euboia. His language roused an ungovernable excitement. The hoplites employed in building the fort of Eetionia had all along hated their work and had toiled under the conviction that they were by it enslaving themselves. But they were working under the orders of the general Alexikles: and furious oligarch though he was, Alexikles had for them the authority of a law which they were bound to obey. Their patience, however, had now reached its limits: and possibly they were told by Aristokrates¹ that they had obeyed him far too long. Alexikles was seized and shut up in a house by the hoplites, who were aided by the police at Mounychia under their captain Hermôn. Receiving the tidings of this outrage as they sat in their council-chamber, the Four Hundred roundly charged Theramenes with having brought it about. Theramenes replied that, if they wished, he would go at once and rescue the prisoner. To the Peiræus accordingly he went with one of the strategoi whom he could trust. Thither also went Aristarchos, a furious partisan of the oligarchy, with a body of young horsemen. Athens and Peiræus were now both in

¹ Thuc. viii. 91, 4.

tumult. A battle was prevented only by the interference of some of the more aged citizens, who warned the people against the desperate madness of civil strife, while the enemy was almost at their gates. Meanwhile Theramenes, having reached Eetionia, addressed the people in pretended anger. Aristarchos reviled them in more real rage. But the fear of attack grew less with every moment's delay; and the hoplites boldly asked Theramenes to tell them plainly whether it would not be well to demolish the fortress. There was no need to affect scruples here which he had cast away even in the Senate-house; and the general by his side was ready to sanction the demolition to which Theramenes would interpose no hindrance. With impetuous eagerness the hoplites set to work to throw down the walls which they had been compelled to raise, and all were invited to join in the task who wished that the Five Thousand should be put in place of the Four Hundred.

In fear and trembling the Four Hundred assembled on the following day in their council-chamber, while the hoplites from Peiraieus, dismissing Alexikles unhurt after the destruction of the fort, took their station in the Anakeion at the base of the Akropolis on its northern side. Here they were joined by some emissaries of the Four Hundred, who mingling freely with the hoplites besought them to keep order and promised that the list of the Five Thousand should be published, still falsely implying that this list had really been drawn up. They renewed, further, the pledge that the appointment of the Four Hundred should be in the hands of the larger body. With singular moderation the people accepted the compromise. A day was fixed for an assembly of the people in the theatre of Dionysos at the southern end of the wall of the Akropolis; and on that day the citizens were gathered and the debate had all but begun when it was announced that the Spartan fleet was off the coast of Salamis. At once and by all present the fact was coupled with the warnings of Theramenes, and rushing down to Peiraieus, some hurried into the triremes already launched, while other ships were hauled down to the water. But it was no part of the plan of the Spartan commander Agesandridas to risk a battle off Peiraieus; and seeing that a surprise was not to be thought of he went on his way, and on the next day reached Oropos. At once the Athenians saw that this squadron was intended to cover the revolt of Euboia; and now that Attica itself was beleaguered, Euboia was to them everything. At all risks then they must hasten to its defence: and with heavy hearts they must have felt that the risk was indeed appalling. Reaching Eretria a few hours after Agesandridas had disembarked at Oropos, Thymochares hoped that he might have time to refresh his wearied and hungry crews. But the Agora of the Eretrians

Defeat of
Thymochares
and revolt of
Euboia.

was purposely empty : and while the men in their search for food straggled even to the ends of the town, a signal raised at Eretria warned Agesandridas that the time for attack was come. His own men were fresh and well-fed, and his ships had crossed the narrow strait while the Athenians were still scattered through the city. Six-and-thirty ships hastened as best they could to encounter the Spartan fleet ; two-and-twenty fell into the hands of the enemy, their crews being all slain or taken prisoners. The Athenian fleet was, in fact, destroyed : and the revolt of all Euboia except Oreos, which was still held by Athenian Klerouchoi,¹ crowned the schemes of the murderers who looked down calmly from their council-chamber on their awful handiwork.

According to their own philosophy oligarchs might afford to do so. But for the people, whose life-blood they had poured out like water, the revolt of Euboia seemed to bring with it the day of doom. Even had there been a plethora of ships, men were lacking to man them ; and Athens herself was torn by factions which at any moment might be locked in bloody conflict. The town was indeed defenceless ; and for a second time in the space of a few weeks a Spartan fleet and army might have crushed the once imperial city almost without a struggle. But the great catastrophe was to be delayed yet a little longer, and the respite came through that singular slowness and dulness which, in the emphatic words of the historian, made the Spartans the most convenient of all enemies for the quick-witted and prompt Athenians, who found in the Syracusans foes not much less energetic than themselves and suffered at their hands accordingly.²

Twenty ships only were the Athenians able to bring together,³ but happily they were not called upon to encounter any enemy.

Agesandridas allowed the opportunity to slip ; and the Athenians were enabled to fix their minds on the restoration of order and law. In an assembly held in the Pnyx, the Four Hundred were solemnly deposed and the elastic company of Five Thousand substituted in their place. No attempt was made to publish any list of the men included in this number. All who supplied their own arms or who furnished arms for others could claim to be reckoned among them. The miserable conspiracy was at last put down ; and Athens once more lived under the polity of Kleisthenes and Perikles.

Thus was accomplished, seemingly amidst the death-throes of the state, a change which re-asserted the supremacy of law : and

¹ These Klerouchoi had held Histiaiotis from the time of the reconquest of the island by Perikles.

Thuc. i. 114.

² Thuc. viii. 96, 5.

³ Ib. viii. 97, 1.

Consternation at Athens on the defeat of Thymochares.

The suppression of the tyranny of the Four Hundred.

it was accomplished with a sobriety and calmness which calls forth the enthusiastic eulogy of Thucydides.¹ Nor, if we survey the whole circumstances of the time, can we say that his praise was undeserved. If the citizens at Samos deserve any censure, they are to blame for taking no further guarantees from the oligarchs whom they had mastered than the mere banishment of two or three of their number. If again the hoplites of the Peiraieus are to be blamed, it would be for letting Alexikles go instead of putting Aristarchos along with him into safe durance and taking good care that their fellow-conspirators should not escape to renew their mischief at Athens or to carry on their intrigues and treachery elsewhere. It was only through the most incredible sluggishness of the Spartans that Athens was not now held by a Peloponnesian garrison; and if, after treachery which, if committed by the peers and gentlemen of England, would rouse in the whole mass of the people an implacable wrath, the Athenians showed themselves ready to live peaceably with their tormentors, this is assuredly one of the most astonishing facts recorded in any history.

For the Four Hundred, indeed, it was a fortunate thing that their usurpation was repressed in some part by the co-operation of men belonging to their own side. If Theramenes and his helpers had not been concerned in restoring the democracy, the people would have been free to search out and punish the murderers of Androkles and of all later victims of the oligarchic bravoes. As it was, the one act laid to their charge was the sending of the last embassy to Sparta to offer a peace clogged by no conditions; and for this charge Theramenes to his own future cost came forward as the accuser. But of the men thus accused, one had passed beyond the reach of earthly law. Phrynichos, the man who with the clearness of Balaam saw his duty and deliberately defied it, had paid the penalty of his crimes with his life. Three only, Antiphon, Onomakles, and Archep- tolemos, remained at Athens. The two last may have thought that their sins might be condoned: the hardihood of Antiphon who must have known that he at least had sinned unpardonably is scarcely consistent with his sagacity and practical wisdom. The decree was passed for their apprehension and for their trial, which was to be conducted according to all the forms of the polity of Perikles; but before the writ could be executed Onomakles, who had been a colleague of Phrynichos at Samos,² seems to have made his escape. The other two were brought before the tribunal of the people, were condemned and executed. Their houses were razed,

¹ Thuc. viii. 97, 2.² Ib. viii. 25.

their property confiscated, their children deprived of citizenship; and any citizen who might adopt any of their descendants was to lose at once his own franchise. The injustice done to the guiltless may rouse a righteous indignation; but the harshness of Athenian law was not worse than the tender mercies of an English attainder. At the least the criminals themselves were fairly tried: nor can the *Dikasteries* which condemned them on overwhelming evidence be compared with the slavish juries which sanctioned a series of judicial murders at the bidding of *Jeffreys* or *Scroggs*.

While Athens was thus convulsed by the usurpations and violence of a knot of traitors, the history of *Tissaphernes* and his Spartan allies exhibited the working of suspicion on the one side and of discontent fast passing into indignation on the other. For eighty days the Peloponnesian fleet had been in absolute inaction in *Rhodes*; and the men became daily more and more convinced that the promise of a Phœnician fleet to reinforce them was a mere lie and cheat. So formidable indeed seemed the attitude of the Peloponnesians and their allies, and so loud the complaints of the *Syracusans* especially against the slender and infrequent pay doled out to them, that *Astyochos* was compelled to move his fleet from *Miletos* and again challenge the enemy to battle. But as they approached the promontory of *Mykalè* with 112 ships, the Athenians with their 82 triremes stationed off *Glaukè* thought themselves not justified in risking a general engagement. On the next day the return of *Strombichides* raised the Athenian fleet to 110 ships; and thus, nearly matched in numbers, they advanced in order of battle against the Spartans, who now in their turn declined the contest.¹

If even this poor and negative check brought some comfort and encouragement to the Athenians, it caused in the Peloponnesian camp still greater indignation against the neglect or treachery of *Tissaphernes*, and led the Spartans to think of the more generous promises made to them by the Hellespontine satrap *Pharnabazos*. To him accordingly a squadron of 40 ships was sent under *Klearchos* who had received his commission at *Sparta* for this very service.² He set out with the hope not only of abundant pay for his men, but of detaching *Byzantion* from its connexion with Athens. At first this result seemed little likely. The necessity of avoiding the Athenian fleet compelled him to keep out at sea, and a severe storm drove most of the ships to *Delos* whence they made their way back to *Miletos*. *Klearchos*, not to be thus baffled, went to the Hellespont by land, and the Megarian general *Helixos*, sailing with ten ships to *Byzantion*, brought about the revolt of that city.

¹ *Thuc.* viii. 79.

² *Ib.* viii. 39.

Indecisive movements of the Athenian and Peloponnesian fleets.

Revolt of Byzantion from Athens.

The departure of Klearchos and Helixos for the Hellespont in no way improved the state of things in the Peloponnesian camp at Miletos. Not only had Tissaphernes become still more slack in his payments since they had refused the challenge of the Athenian fleet; but the Athenians themselves had become far more formidable from the patriotic enthusiasm awakened by the suppression of the oligarchic conspiracy. The discontent of the army was no longer expressed by mere murmurs. The Spartans at home were also wearied out with the lethargy which seemed to have come over their army in the East; and Mindaros was sent to take the place of Astyochos. In Astyochos Tissaphernes felt that he was losing a friend whose departure might be most inconvenient to him, and whose recall showed that not much reliance could be placed on his influence at Sparta. The satrap, therefore, sent with him a special envoy both to lay a complaint against the Milesians for destroying his fort in their city, and more particularly to counteract the indignant remonstrances of the Milesians and the Syracusan Hermokrates by explaining his position and his motives.

But Tissaphernes felt that something more was needed than the dispatch of an envoy to Sparta. He knew that the Phœnician fleet either had reached or would soon reach Aspendos, and he therefore invited Lichas to accompany him thither and come back with the force which was to turn the scale decisively against Athens. Mindaros, not yet versed in the artifices of the game in which the satrap thought himself an adept, saw with satisfaction the departure of Lichas, while Tamôs remained as the deputy of Tissaphernes to furnish regular payments to the Peloponnesians and their allies. The voyage to Aspendos, it needs scarcely to be said, was only a fresh trick to gain time and to exhaust both the Athenians and their enemies. Mindaros and Lichas were thoroughly fooled. As a paymaster, Tamôs was even worse than Tissaphernes, while Tissaphernes himself, having brought the Phœnician fleet to the Pamphylian coast, kept it there for a while and then sent it home again. But if Tissaphernes cheated Mindaros still further by receiving Philippos who had been sent by Mindaros with two triremes to join Lichas, he was in turn overreached himself. It was no part of his plan to exasperate the resentment already felt against him in the Spartan camp, if such a result could be avoided; but Alkibiades was resolved that it should not be avoided. This unwearied schemer was well aware that Tissaphernes had no intention of bringing the Phœnician fleet into action; and therefore he eagerly availed himself of the opportunity by promising the Athenians at Samos that he would either bring up the Phœnician fleet to their

Tumults in the Spartan camp at Miletos.

Dismissal of the Phœnician fleet from Aspendos.

help or prevent it from coming to the help of their enemies. Sailing to Aspendos with thirteen triremes, he took care to parade ostentatiously his close intimacy with the satrap; and as the Phœnician fleet was not allowed to take part in the war, the Athenians believed that this supposed change of plan was due to the influence of Alkibiades.

The patience of Mindaros reached its limit, when a message from Philippos told him that the Phœnicians were actually on their way home. Not tied by the bribes which had corrupted Astyochos, he resolved at once to close with the more tempting offers of Pharnabazos, who promised to detach from Athens all the Hellenic cities in his satrapy. Sixteen Peloponnesian ships from the fleet of Mindaros had already reached the Hellespont and overrun a great part of the Chersonesos, and thither Mindaros himself now prepared to make his way with 73 triremes. He succeeded in escaping the notice of the Athenian guard-ships off Samos: but a severe storm carried him to Ikaros and kept him there for nearly a week before he could sail to Chios. Meanwhile a body of oligarchic exiles from Methymna had succeeded in making Eresos revolt again from Athens. Hastening thither, the Athenian commander Thrasylos found Thrasyboulos already there with five ships from Samos, which together with two triremes returning from the Hellespont and five belonging to Methymna raised his fleet to 67 vessels.

In full confidence that the movements of Mindaros would be carefully and speedily reported to him, Thrasylos made his preparations for carrying out the siege of Eresos with the utmost vigor. But his calculations were disappointed. Aware that the Athenians were on the look-out in the channel between Lesbos and the mainland, Mindaros resolved to keep out of their sight; and having reached the islets of Argennoussai unnoticed, he was at Rhoiteion at the entrance of the Hellespont before midnight of the next day. Beacon fires kindled by friends and foes warned the Athenian squadron of eighteen ships at Sestos that the enemy's fleet had passed the mouth of the strait off Sigeion. To be thus caught in a trap by a force perhaps three or four times as large as their own would be certain ruin; but this ruin they could not by whatever speed or skill have escaped had it not been that the orders of Mindaros kept at their post the sixteen ships which were on guard at Abydos. The Athenian triremes were thus enabled to make their way unmolested to Elaïous. Here they still were when morning made them visible to the ships of Mindaros.

By the combined Peloponnesian fleet of eighty-one ships the day was spent in an ineffectual attempt to reduce Elaïous, from

which place they sailed to Abydos. Soon afterwards the Athenian fleet of Thrasylos, strengthened by the ships which had succeeded in escaping from Sestos, took up its station at Elaious, numbering now 76 triremes. Five days were spent in preparations for the battle, the story of which may be dismissed in a few words. The decay of Athenian power and science is strikingly proved by the mere choice of the scene of conflict. In single line the Athenian fleet advanced from Elaious along the coast of Chersonesos, and drew up between Idakos and Arrhianoï, unknown places lying between Elaious and Sestos, when the Spartan fleet advanced to meet them along the coastline lying between Abydos and Dardanos. The Peloponnesians drove back the centre of the Athenian fleet upon the shore; but here, as with the troops of Demosthenes in the night attack on Epipolai, success produced disorder, of which the Athenian general Thrasybulos speedily took advantage. His colleague, Thrasylos, who had doubled the promontory of Kynossema, or the Hound's Grave, and for the time had passed out of sight, returned after defeating the Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates, and gave the finishing stroke to the victory. The whole Peloponnesian fleet was thus driven back, leaving in the hands of the enemy eight Chian ships, five from Corinth, two belonging to the Ambrakiots and Boiotians, and one to each of the several states of Leukas, Sparta, Syracuse, and Pèllène,—twenty-one in all. But the Athenians had lost fifteen vessels, and thus were gainers only by six.

Compared with the great exploits of Phormion and Demosthenes, the victory was poor indeed; but to the Athenians it came at a time when their spirit was almost crushed by a seemingly infinite series of disasters, and it exercised on them a moral influence scarcely less than that which the victory of Mantinea had exercised over the Spartans. The trireme sent home with the tidings was received with unbounded delight. The depression which had so long hung about them as with the darkness of death was suddenly dispelled; and they felt that the hope of a successful issue to the war was no longer a presumptuous and unreasonable delusion.

The battle
of Kynos-
sema.

Moral effects
of the victo-
ry on the
Athenians.

CHAPTER IX.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR, FROM THE BATTLE OF KYNOSSEMA TO THE BATTLE OFF THE ISLANDS OF ARGENNOUSSAI.

THE battle of Kynossema was not the last victory won by Athenian fleets in the war which was now gradually drawing to its close.

But the whole history of the struggle after the Sicilian expedition shows that Athens had reached a point after which the most brilliant successes cease to produce any permanent results. She was, in fact, involved now in a contest in which victory was impossible. It was not merely that her fleets and armies had been destroyed, and her revenues become precarious. Against such difficulties as these she might have struggled successfully. But she could not do this unless she was seconded by the hearty goodwill of the great body of her allies; and if these were not honestly convinced that alliance with Athens was to their own interest, there could clearly be, sooner or later, but one issue to the struggle. In all the allied states there was a party which hated as well as feared her, a party which, knowing that her courts would give redress for the crimes which they dearly loved to commit, was ready to cast off her yoke at any cost. This alone would have sufficed to shake her empire to its very foundations; but all hope of preserving it was gone when Athenians themselves became traitors to their own constitution, and employed the dagger to put down opposition in a city for which freedom of speech was the very breath of life. Through the resolute resistance of the Athenians at Samos, aided by the determined friendship of the Samian people, this infamous conspiracy had been put down; but the wounds left behind it were never healed, and among the most fatal of these was the lessening of that respect for forms and processes of law which in earlier days had most notably distinguished Athens from every other Hellenic city,—in other words, from every other city in the world. Athens, therefore, fell; but she had exhibited to the world a polity which might be the means of overcoming the miserable feuds of scattered clans, and of cementing into a single nation the inhabitants of cities spread over many lands. She had sown seed which was to bear fruit in commonwealths yet unborn; and the work of the great founders of her empire was therefore not wrought in vain.

The departure of Mindaros for the Hellespont convinced Tissaphernes at last that he had overdone his part. His province

was exposed to dangers which might threaten serious consequences. His garrisons in Antandros, Miletos, and Knidos had been expelled;¹ and he resolved to go in person to the Hellespont, both to complain of these wrongs and to make an effort for recovering the influence which was fast slipping away from him.

Departure of
Tissaphernes
for the Hel-
lespont.

For the present the crafty schemes of Tissaphernes told in favor of Alkibiades. The homeward return of the Phœnician fleet enabled him to go back to Samos and say not only that this part of his promise was fulfilled but that the satrap was better inclined to the Athenian cause than he had ever been. Sailing from Kos he reached the Hellespont just in time to decide a battle which had begun in the early morning by the defeat of Dorieus in the bay of Dardanos, and which had been continued during the day by the fleet of Mindaros. Thirty ships fell into the hands of the Athenians who, having recovered their own captured triremes, sailed away to their station at Sestos.² Here however they kept only 40 ships: the rest were sent to gather money, where they might and as they could. The necessities of war had displaced the orderly collection of a fixed tribute for a system of arbitrary and indefinite exactions; and the indifference and even the friendly feeling of the allies gave way to active dislike or a fiercer indignation.

Defeat of
Dorieus and
Mindaros in
the bay of
Dardanos.

Twenty years earlier a victory even such as this might have changed the face of the war. All that Thrasylos could now do was to go to Athens to ask for more help both in ships and men.³ A force of thirty triremes was immediately sent out under Theramenes who sailed to help the Makedonian chief Archelaos in his siege of Pydna and probably to live upon his pay. The city was reduced at last: but before its fall Theramenes had been compelled to sail away to the Athenian naval station which, in fear of the large fleet now being collected by Mindaros, had been transferred from Sestos to Kardia on the northern side of the Chersonesos. To this place Alkibiades had found his way, no longer as a friend of Tissaphernes or of his master, but as a fugitive from the power of the satrap who, professing now to have received orders from the king to carry on war vigorously against the Athenians, had thrown him into prison.

Escape of
Alkibiades
from im-
prisonment
at Sardis.
B.C. 410.

The tidings that Mindaros was engaged in the siege of Kyzikos made the Athenian generals resolve upon attacking him at once with their whole fleet of 83 triremes. Having contrived by sailing past Abydos at night to evade the

Battle of
Kyzikos.

¹ Thuc. viii. 109. ² Xen. *H.* i. 1, 7. Diod. xiii. 46. ³ Xen. *H.* i. 1, 8.

notice of the Peloponnesian guard-ships, they rested at the island of Prokonnesos, a few miles to the northwest of the peninsula of Kyzikos. On the next day Alkibiades told the men that they must undertake simultaneously the tasks of a sea-fight, a land-battle, and a siege. The first measure was to disembark the hoplites on the mainland with orders to advance upon the town. According to Diodoros¹ the issue of the day was decided by a trick of Alkibiades, who by a pretended flight concerted with his colleagues lured the squadron of Mindaros to some distance from the rest of the fleet and then turned fiercely round on the hoisting of a signal. Finding themselves between two forces, the seamen of Mindaros had no option but to fly to a place called Kleroi where the army of Pharnabazos was placed for co-operation by land. Mindaros was slain, bravely fighting on shore. All the Peloponnesian ships fell into the hands of the Athenians with the exception of the Syracusan triremes which the crews themselves set on fire; and still more important in the exhaustion of all resources was the enormous plunder in slaves and other booty taken in the camps of the Spartans and the Persians. On the day after the fight the victors found Kyzikos evacuated by the enemy. But no real benefit could accrue from the victory unless the Athenians could command the gates of the Black Sea as well as those of the Egean. Byzantion and Chalkedon on the opposite side of the strait were both in revolt, and the latter city was so effectually protected by the troops of Pharnabazos that an attack upon it at once failed. But its unfortified port of Chrysopolis was seized and converted into a fortified post from which the Athenians levied tolls on all ships entering the Propontis.² They were thus again masters of the most important road for the introduction of supplies to Athens.

A few hours after the battle of Kyzikos, Hippokrates, the admiral's secretary, addressed to the ephors the following letter: Alleged embassy of Endios to Athens. 'Our glory is gone: Mindaros is dead: the men are hungry: we know not what to do.'³ The dispatch was intercepted and carried to Athens, where the people received the tidings with a tumult of joy which found expression in magnificent religious processions and displays. What may have been the precise effect produced upon the Spartans, we cannot say with certainty. The history of Thucydides here fails us, and we are made at once to feel the irreparable want of a guide so incorruptibly truthful, so unwearied in his search for evidence, and so exact in his discrimination of it. The propositions of the envoy whom they now sent to Athens were confined, we are told,

¹ xiii. 50.² Xen. *H.* i. 1, 22.³ *Ib.* i. 1, 23.

to a mere exchange of prisoners and the withdrawal of hostile garrisons on either side,—in other words, to the plan that the Athenians should abandon Pylos and the Spartans quit Dekeleia. But even if the Athenians had been willing to listen to these terms and, by the condition that each side was to keep its present possessions, to yield up her claim to the allegiance of the most valuable members of her maritime confederacy, they knew by bitter experience that Sparta, even if willing, was unable to coerce her allies. They knew further that at the present time the Spartans were under covenant with the Persian king not to make peace without his consent; and they had no reason for thinking that the necessities of Sparta would be to him a constraining motive for coming to terms with her enemy and his own. Athens was no longer receiving the riches of other lands: her reserved fund was long since exhausted: and her fleets were able to carry on the war only by a system which had become little better than organised plundering. She was manifestly approaching the end of a struggle which must end in the ruin of one side or the other, and every sign seemed to tell that that ruin would be her own.

Whatever may have been the discouragement of the Spartans, Pharnabazos felt none. Comforting the troops of Mindaros with the promise of unbounded supplies of ship-timber from the forests of Ida, he gave them each a garment together with provisions for two months, and distributed the seamen as guards throughout the coast cities of his province, while orders were given for building at Antandros a number of ships equal to that of the triremes lost at Kyzikos.

Energy of
Pharna-
bazos.

At Dekeleia the effects of the victory of Kyzikos were more visible than at Sparta. From his lofty stronghold Agis could see the corn-ships from the Euxine sailing into the Peiræus and felt that, until this stream could be cut off, his occupation of Athenian soil was to little purpose.

Repulse of
Agis before
the walls of
Athens.

An inroad to the very walls of Athens had been tried and had failed;¹ and Agis thought it best to dispatch Klearchos with fifteen ships from Megara and other allied cities to the Hellespont. Of these vessels three were taken and destroyed by the Athenian guard-ships: the rest made their way first to Abydos,² then to Byzantium.

The events of the following year made no essential change in the position of the combatants in this weary war. On the coast of Attica Thorikos was fortified for the protection of the corn-ships sailing to Peiræus from the Hellespont;³ and Thrasylos

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 1, 33.

² Xen. *H.* i. 1, 36, says that they went to Sestos: but as Sestos was

the Athenian naval station, this would be going into the lion's den.

³ Xen. *H.* i. 2, 1.

at the beginning of summer set out with his fleet of fifty triremes for Samos. At Ephesos the Athenians sustained a serious reverse, in which five-and-twenty Syracusan ships took the most prominent part. But this defeat, again, was compensated, when not long afterwards Thrasylos, from his station at Methymna, espied this Syracusan squadron sailing out from Ephesos, to which he drove back all the triremes with the exception of four which were taken with their crews. These were dispatched as prisoners to Athens where, in remembrance probably of the treatment which Athenians had undergone in the Latomia of Syracuse, they were shut up in the stone quarries of Peiraieus. The sufferings of these captives may not have been so severe: they were certainly not so protracted. Before the autumn was well ended, they had succeeded in excavating a way out of their prison-house, and in making their escape, some to Dekeleia, some to Megara.¹

But in spite of all fluctuations the tide was running strongly against Athens. Fifteen years ago Sparta had been utterly humbled by the shutting in of a number of hoplites on the island of Sphakteria. During those years the Messenian garrison at Pylos had been to the Spartans an annoyance only less serious than that which Dekeleia was causing to Athens. But the strong efforts which the Athenians were making to restore their shattered empire in the East led the Spartans to think that a determined attack on this post might be successful; and the tidings soon reached Athens that their Messenian allies were being blockaded by a fleet of fifteen ships and besieged by a large land force the divisions of which kept up a series of assaults upon the fortress. In spite of the drain both of men, ships, and money in the direction of the Hellespont, the Athenians managed to send out thirty ships under Anytos, the future accuser of Sokrates. He was sent to no purpose. Stormy weather, he said, had prevented him from doubling cape Maleai, and the ships came back to Athens. Indignant at his failure, the people brought him to trial; but Anytos was acquitted. Thus deserted by their ancient friends, the Messenians at Pylos held out stoutly for a time: but their numbers were sorely thinned in conflicts with the enemy and so wasted by actual famine that they were at last compelled to make terms for the surrender of the place. It is a satisfaction to learn that these stout-hearted Helots could so maintain their ground as to secure their safe departure from a land which, if the Spartans could have had their will, they would never have left alive. The loss of this outpost was followed or accompanied by that of Nisaia.² These

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 2, 14.

² See p. 345.

losses told on Athens with far heavier effect than the betrayal of the colonists in the Trachinian Herakleia at this time told upon the Spartans.¹

The events of the following year seemed to point more clearly to a good issue for Athens from the troubles which had well-nigh crushed her. The whole Athenian fleet took up its position off Byzantion and Chalkedon, while the land force besieged the latter city, shutting it in all round with a wooden wall which, so far as it was practicable, blocked the river also. The satrap was anxious to break the Athenian lines, while Hippokrates, who was then harmost within the city, made a vehement sally from the gates. The attempt wholly failed. The troops of Pharnabazos were beaten off, Hippokrates himself was slain, and his men pushed back within the walls. The reduction of the place now became a mere question of time; and on the advice of Pharnabazos the Chalkedonians agreed to surrender under covenant that they should become, as they had been, tribute-paying allies of Athens, making up all arrears for the time during which they had been in revolt against her.² But the satrap seemed now to be convinced that Athens was not so easily to be put down as he had hoped that she would be, and that he had made a mistake in assuming towards her so determinately hostile an attitude. He therefore made with the Athenians a convention on his own behalf by which he agreed to send up their envoys to Sousa to arrange a treaty with the king, while the Athenians pledged themselves to do no mischief during their absence in the territories of the satrap. The Athenian envoys met the satrap at Kyzikos, where they were joined by an embassy from Sparta under Pasippidas and by the Syracusan Hermokrates whom a grateful city had rewarded with the boon of exile.

At Byzantion the Athenians might very possibly have been defeated, had it not been that popular feeling still ran in their favor; but in the town were many who were exasperated by the severities of Pharnabazos and by the calmness with which he sacrificed the interests of the citizens to those of his troops. These men opened the gates and admitted Alkibiades and his men to the quarter called the Thrakion, and the garrison was compelled to surrender.³ Athens was thus once more mistress of the great high road which brought to her harbors the wealth of the corn-growing districts bordering on the Black Sea.

Had the Athenian envoys been allowed to make their journey to Sousa, the issue of the war would, it is more than likely, have

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 2, 18.

² Xen. *H.* i. 3, 9.

³ Xen. *H.* i. 3, 22.

Reduction
of Chalke-
don by the
Athenians.
408 B.C.

Surrender of
Byzantion.

been in favor of Athens. Unhappily the ambassadors after spending the winter in the Phrygian Gordion were met on their way to Sousa by Spartan envoys who boasted of having obtained from the king all that they wanted. Their words were borne out by a letter, bearing the royal seal, which declared that Cyrus, the younger son of Dareios and his cruel wife Parysatis, was sent down as lord of all the armies gathered at Kastolos.

Before Cyrus reached the coast, the Spartan admiral Kratesippidas had been succeeded by Lysandros, a man to whom the shaping of governments in the interests of oligarchy was a task thoroughly congenial. A liar more unscrupulous, if such a thing might be possible, than Alkibiades himself, he was determined that the services which he performed for his country should make his own continuance in power indispensable. In the Persian prince now sent down to the coast he found not merely an ally but a friend. On their meeting at Sardeis the hope expressed by Lysandros that the war might now be carried on with real vigor was sustained by the assurance that if the 500 talents which Cyrus had brought with him should not suffice, he would drain his own private resources, and in the last resort he would according to the Persian metaphor turn his silver-gilt throne into coin. Promises thus large emboldened the Spartan to urge that the pay of the men might be raised to a drachma daily. A bait like this, he said, would soon empty the Athenian triremes : but on this point the young prince was firm. Lysandros was silenced ; but when towards the end of the banquet at which he was entertained by the prince, Cyrus asked what he might do to gratify him, he answered promptly that the best favor to himself would be the addition of an obolos daily to the pay of the men. Cyrus granted the request, and the troops received a month's pay in advance together with all unpaid arrears. This generosity excited in the army an enthusiasm which Lysandros directed to the refitting and strengthening of a fleet now seriously out of condition, while for himself the friendship of the Persian prince was secured by conduct which showed that in the matter of money the Spartan admiral walked in the ways of Perikles and Nikias. But while he was thus repairing his ninety ships at Ephesos, he took care to send for the chiefs of the oligarchical factions in the several cities allied with Athens and form them into clubs pledged to act by his orders, under the assurance that so soon as Athens should be put down they should be placed in power.¹ He thus became the centre of a widely ramified conspiracy, which he alone was capable of directing.

¹ Diod. xiii. 70.

Meanwhile Alkibiades had been working for his return to Athens. He was still hesitating as to his future course, when he received the tidings that the Athenians had elected him Strategos with Thrasyboulos and Konon among his colleagues. With twenty triremes, not with the fleet which conveyed to Athens the vast multitude of vessels captured at Kyzikos, he arrived at Peiraieus, still doubting whether he might trust himself among his countrymen. Instead of the triumphant landing which later writers invested with imaginary colors, the exile whose memory must have recalled the long series of his treasons stood for a time on the deck of his trireme, not venturing to land until he saw that his cousin Euryptolemos with other friends was waiting to greet him and to guard him on his way to the city. He had chosen, some said,¹ an ill-omened day for his return. It was the festival of Plynteria, when the statue of Athênê was veiled from sight and reverently washed by the Praxiergadaï. His mind was perhaps too much occupied with weightier things to think of this coincidence. His friends could scarcely conceal from him the fact that some with candid courage denounced him as the cause of all the disasters which Athens had undergone since his departure and of all the dangers which still threatened her safety.² But they would dwell with more satisfaction on the sophistry and falsehood which had half-convinced the majority of his innocence. Some of these arguments might in truth call up a blush on the cheek even of Alkibiades. The self-possession of the hardest traitor could scarcely put forth for him the excuse that during his years of exile he had been the unwilling slave of men at whose hands his life was daily in danger, and that through the whole of his weary time his one grief arose from his inability to do for Athens the good which he would gladly have achieved for her. That this language did not represent the spirit of the Athenian people generally, we may be quite sure. But however black the crimes of Alkibiades may have been, the fact could not be denied that, whether rightly or wrongly, he had been suffered by the Athenian army, or rather by the Athenian people, at Samos, to take part not only in the war as one of their generals but in the suppression of the Four Hundred, and that for a year or two his efforts had been for the welfare and not for the mischief of Athens. It was true that his past career afforded no guarantee for his future conduct; but unless he was still to be treated as an enemy, that career must not be thrown in his teeth. Such, we cannot doubt, was the temper of a large body of moderate and sober-minded men; but for the present the majority was carried away by a weak

Return of
Alkibiades
to Athens.

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 4, 12.

² Xen. *H.* i. 4, 17.

sympathy with the sufferings which he took care to parade in his speeches before the senate and the assembly. In moving words he protested his innocence of all impiety, and with brazen impudence declared himself an injured man. So well did he play his part and so well was he supported by his friends that before the assembly dispersed he found himself once more general with full powers. But if he had landed, as some would have it, on an unlucky day, the recurrence of the mysteries of the Great Mother furnished an opportunity of which a man like Alkibiades would avail himself with eager delight. For seven years, that is to say, since the time when on his own vehement advice Agis had been sent to fortify and hold Dekeleia, the procession along the sacred road to Eleusis had been necessarily given up, and the communicants with their sacred vessels had been conveyed thither, as best they might, by sea. It should now be said that under the man who had been charged with violating these mysteries this procession should follow its ancient path as quietly and safely as in a time of profound peace. The pomp issued from the gates of Athens, guarded by all the citizens of military age; but no attack was even threatened by the garrison of Dekeleia. Alkibiades had made his peace with the mighty goddesses, and he could now depart with cheerfulness to meet the enemies of Athens elsewhere. With a fleet of 100 triremes, carrying 1,500 hoplites and 150 horse, over whom Aristokrates and Adeimantos were appointed generals, he sailed to Andros. Having defeated the Andrians and their Spartan allies in the field, he shut them up in the city, and departed leaving Konon with twenty ships to blockade it.¹

He reached Samos, to experience a series of disappointments brought about partly by his tortuous policy in the past and in part by the almost incredible folly which led him to intrust a whole fleet to a pilot who may have been an excellent boon companion but who utterly lacked all the qualities of a commander. Sailing from this island, he joined Thrasyboulos who was fortifying Phokaia, having left the pilot Antiochos in command of the fleet with a strict charge to avoid all engagements with the enemy until he should return. The notions of Antiochos on the subject of duty were on a par with those of his master; and Alkibiades had not long been out of sight before his deputy sailed out with only two triremes and passed insultingly before the prows of the Spartan fleet at Ephesos. Lysandros came out and chased him with a few ships, and the conflict began which Antiochos so eagerly desired. The result was the loss of fifteen Athenian triremes² and the death of Antiochos

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 5, 18.

² Xen. *H.* i. 5, 14.

himself. The news of this disaster brought Alkibiades at once back to Samos, whence with the whole Athenian fleet he sailed to challenge Lysandros to battle off Ephesos : but it no longer suited the Spartan to fight, and Alkibiades returned baffled to Samos.

Thus had a serious reverse been sustained through his own fault. Nor was this the only count in the new indictment for which he was now furnishing the materials. By comparison with her wealth in the days of Perikles Athens was now poor indeed ; and the crews of her fleets had long been compelled to maintain themselves in great part by plunder seized on the lands of the enemy, or by exactions from hostile or revolted cities. But it was reserved for Alkibiades to make a foray on the friendly town of Kymê, and, so far as his power extended, to make the name of Athens odious to all the members of her confederacy. Alkibiades and his people were driving to the shore a large body of slaves when the Kymaians fell upon him suddenly with all their forces and compelled them to yield up their prisoners and fly to their ships. Enraged at this defeat, Alkibiades sent to Mytilene for hoplites, and supported by these gave the Kymaians a challenge to fight which they wisely refused to accept. Instead of fighting the Athenian general, they preferred to carry their complaints to the Athenian assembly. The story of his misdeeds at Kymê came upon the tidings of the disaster of Notion ; and the significance of these incidents was indefinitely enhanced by the accusation of Athenian citizens at Samos who charged him with a deliberate scheme for betraying the fleets and armies of Athens to Pharnabazos or the Spartans, and for sheltering himself in his forts on the Chersonesos until by the help of his allies he could realise the true object of his life by making himself despot of Athens.

The biter is not unfrequently bit : and against such a charge as this Alkibiades with all the keenness of his wit and all his readiness of resource was absolutely powerless. In one sense he was less happy than Nikias : in another, it would have been happier for Athens, if the moral character of Nikias had been as bad as that of Alkibiades. That unfortunate general retained the misplaced confidence of his countrymen to the day of his death, because he was supposed to be a good man. The revived ascendancy of Alkibiades came suddenly to an end, because his character was infamous. The disaster at Notion had been caused by his neglect ; the sufferings of the Kymaians were the result of his own crimes. There was nothing to do but to send others to take his place ; and a melancholy interest attaches to the names of most of the commanders thus appointed. In the pages of Xenophon¹ Konon heads the list with Diomedon, Leon, Perikles

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 5, 16.

(the son of the great Perikles and Aspasia),¹ Erasinides, Aristokrates, Arcestratos, Protomachos, Thrasylos, and Aristogenes. The tidings of his deposition convinced Alkibiades that he had quitted Athens for the last time. With a single trireme he left Samos, and made his way to his fortified posts on the Chersonesos.

On reaching Samos Konon was struck by the great depression of the men whom he was sent to command. Their ships were becoming daily less and less efficient, and for pay they had little to depend on except plunder. He therefore cut down the number of his triremes from one hundred to seventy, and dismissing the rest of the crews picked out for these ships the strongest and most skilful oarsmen,² who found ample exercise in roving expeditions for the purpose of raising money or extorting supplies. The naval command of Lysandros expired about this time. It was not the Spartan custom to retain their generals in office for more than a year, or to send the same man out twice in the same capacity. But Lysandros was resolved that his successor should repose on no bed of roses. By organising his clubs in the various cities he had attached the oligarchic factions to himself personally, and he had further succeeded in exciting among his troops a strong dislike for service under any other commander. He took care that this dislike should be heightened by the pressure of want. He placed in the hands of the Persian prince every drachma not yet paid out to the troops;³ and when that successor arrived, he told him with studied insolence that he yielded up his place while lord of the sea. When Kallikratidas assured him that he would give full credit to his words if, setting out from Ephesos and having passed the Athenian station at Samos, he would hand the ships over to him at Miletos, Lysandros replied that he saw no need of taking further trouble when he was no longer in command. For such petty annoyances Kallikratidas may have cared little. The case was altered, when he found throughout the fleet a general spirit of contemptuous resistance to his authority with openly expressed complaints against the Spartan rule of yearly change.

In this labyrinth of difficulties Lysandros left a young man in comparison with whom he was as Mammon in the presence of the Archangel Michael. Untrained in the school of lies in which his predecessor was so renowned a proficient, Kallikratidas had not even learnt the sophistry with which Brasidas cheated the Thrace-ward allies of Athens: nor had he convinced himself that the ruin of Athens would be cheaply purchased at the cost of prostration before the throne of

Arrival of
Kallikrati-
das to super-
sede Lysan-
dros.
406 B.C.

Character of
Kallikrati-
das.

¹ See p. 284.

² Xen. *H.* i. 5, 20, and 6, 16. Diod. xiii. 77.

³ Xen. *H.* i. 6, 10.

the Persian despot. More than this, he had actually learnt that the Hellenic states had something better to do than to tear each other in pieces for the benefit of barbarians against whom scarcely eighty years ago they had pledged themselves to maintain a perpetual warfare. A singular interest attaches to the brief career of a man who with more than the bravery of Lysandros and immeasurably more than the honesty of Brasidas was determined that, so far as his power might carry him, the deadly quarrel between Sparta and Athens should be ended by a permanent friendship, and who with even greater nobleness of soul resolved that his example at least should remain as a perpetual protest against the ferocious and inhuman usages of Hellenic warfare.

Thus deploring the miserable strife which had now dragged itself on through four-and twenty years, Kallikratidas found himself face to face with men who practically refused to obey him. He met the difficulty with the courage of a righteous man. Summoning the officers together, he told them that he was there by no will of his own; that, having come, he must do the bidding of the state which had sent him; but that, if they thought otherwise, they had only to tell him so, and he would at once go back to Sparta and report the state of matters at Ephesos. An appeal so manly and straightforward could be met only by the answer that his work must be done and his authority must be obeyed. Thus freed from one trouble, Kallikratidas betook himself to the Persian prince and demanded the pay needed for the seamen. Cyrus kept him two days waiting; and Kallikratidas in the agony of humiliation deplored the wretched fate of the Hellenes who for the sake of silver and gold were compelled to crouch before Persian tyrants, and declared that if he should be spared to return home he would do all that he could to bring to an end the quarrel between his own city and Athens.¹

Insubordination in the Spartan fleet and army.

Sending some triremes to Sparta to bring the money which he had failed to get from Cyrus, he sailed to Miletos, and there, having summoned an assembly of the ruling oligarchy, he addressed them in a speech which was a melancholy commentary on their abandonment of the Athenian alliance. Living in the midst of barbarians, they ought, he told them, to be animated by a double zeal against enemies who had already done them vast mischief, and who, by a necessary inference, might do them much more. Nothing less than this he expected from them; and this zeal would lead them to contribute sums equal to that which he had already requested the ephors to send him. They should be repaid as soon as this money reached him;

Speech of Kallikratidas to the Milesians.

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 6, 7. Diod. xiii. 76.

but he could not bring himself to haunt the doors of a Persian prince, to obtain funds which the Greeks ought to be able to provide for themselves, unless, failing this, they were ready to admit that the whole war was a mistake and therefore to end it by any reasonable compromise.

The manliness of Kallikratidas put his hearers to shame; and at once they produced from their private purses a supply of money which enabled him, with further help obtained at Methymna by Kallikratidas, Chios, to win over or reduce Phokæia and Kymê and to advance against the Lesbian Methymna. Here his overtures for alliance were bluntly rejected. The demos was firm in its attachment to Athens; and Kallikratidas, ordering an assault, carried the place by storm. The captives were all brought into the market-place, and the allies insisted that every one should be sold, the Methymnaians themselves not less than the Athenian garrison whom they had so firmly supported. The demand was met by a noble protest against the frightful code by which all warfare was conducted then and by which it continued to be conducted for a long series of centuries afterwards. The infamous practice which justified the slaying or enslaving of prisoners at the will of the conqueror was really war not against states but against private homes, against women and children; and although Kallikratidas may not fully have seen this, his soul revolted against the murderous policy which must in the end leave Hellas at the mercy of any powerful invader. With solemn earnestness he declared that so long as he held command and so far as his power might carry him no Hellen should ever be reduced to slavery. The citizens of Methymna and Athens were all set free:¹ and by this act Kallikratidas won a place in that company of merciful men whose righteousness shall not be forgotten.

Thus generous in his warfare, Kallikratidas was not less vigorous as a general. His first act was to chase to Mytilene the fleet of Konon whom he had warned that the sea was now the bride not of Athens but of Sparta. With all his speed Konon was

¹ Xenophon, *H.* i. 6, 15, does not mention that any conditions were attached to their freedom. Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 117, says that the Athenian garrison was sold along with the slaves found in the place. Mr. Grote denies this. The soundness of the text is doubtful; but if Kallikratidas had said already that he would do his best, as soon as he was free, to reconcile Athens and Sparta, it is unlikely that he would forego this opportunity of showing that he was in earnest. The pre-

ceding sentence of Xenophon, *H.* i. 6, 14, lays a stress on the demand that the Methymnaians should be sold along with the rest. About these there might be some doubt, as it might be held that they had been led astray by the Athenians: and it is more likely that Kallikratidas settled the difficulty by saying that neither should be sold, than that he should half stultify his previous words by yielding the point in the case of the Athenians.

unable to enter the harbor before the enemy was upon him, and a conflict at the entrance cost him not less than thirty out of his seventy triremes. Happily their crews escaped ashore, and the remaining ships were drawn up and guarded by a stockade. But Kallikratidas remained master both of the northern and southern gates of the harbor between the islet on which Mytilene had been originally built and the coast of Lesbos itself. Konon had not been prepared to stand a siege; without relief he must soon surrender; and relief could not be looked for, while his situation remained unknown at Athens. Picking out the best rowers from all his triremes, he placed them on board two of his quickest vessels, and for four days waited vainly for an opportunity which might justify him in giving orders for attempting the forlorn enterprise. On the fifth day at the time of the noontide meal the dispersion of the Spartan crews and the slackness of the guard seemed to promise success; and the two triremes started, making with the utmost haste the one for the southern and the other for the northern entrance of the harbor. With all their efforts one only escaped. Hurrying to their ships the Spartans cut their anchor-ropes, if they could not at once haul them up, and gave chase to the fugitives. Before the day was done, one trireme with its crew had been brought back to Mytilene; the other first announced the strait of Konon to Diomedon at Samos and then hastened on to Athens, where the tidings roused only a more vehement spirit of resistance. By a vote to which no opposition, it would seem, was made, the assembly decreed that all persons within the military age, whether free or slaves, should be drafted into one hundred and ten triremes: and in thirty days this prodigious force was on its way. Strengthened at Samos by ten ships, and in their onward voyage by thirty more contributed by allied cities, the Athenian generals took up their station off the islets of Argennoussai with a fleet of not less than 150 triremes. Hearing of their approach, Kallikratidas had posted himself with 120 vessels off the Malean cape, distant ten miles to the west of Argennoussai, leaving Eteonikos with fifty triremes to maintain the blockade at Mytilene. He had not been there long before the camp-fires on the opposite coast announced the presence of the enemy. His plan was to attack at once, and so to take them by surprise; but the attempt which he made to set out at midnight from Malea was frustrated by a severe storm with thunder and heavy rain. Early in the morning the Spartan fleet advanced to the encounter. Of the battle itself not much is to be said. If Xenophon be right, there were some in the Spartan force who did not like the thought of encountering 150 triremes with 120; and Hermon, the Megarian

Blockade of
the fleet of
Konon at
Mytilene.
406 B.C.

The battle
of Argennoussai.

sailing-master in the ship of Kallikratidas, openly suggested the prudence of retreat. Kallikratidas replied briefly that flight would be shameful, and that Sparta would be none the worse inhabited if he were himself slain.¹ For a time the battle was carried on by the two fleets, each with its whole force massed. Afterwards, as in the last terrible conflict in the harbor of Syracuse, the combatants were broken up into detached groups. In one of these groups the ship of Kallikratidas came into contact with the enemy with such force that the Spartan admiral was hurled into the water and never seen again. At length the left wing of the Spartan fleet gave way, and the flight soon became general. The Peloponnesian fleet was practically destroyed. Of the ten ships furnished by Sparta herself one only escaped; of the vessels contributed by her allies more than sixty were lost. On their side the Athenians lost five-and-twenty ships with their crews,² a few more being driven on the land without further injury to their men. So died in the first bloom of youthful manhood³ the only Hellen who had yet learnt practically that the duty of men, sprung from the same stock, speaking the same language, and loving the same equality of law and freedom of speech, was to make as little as possible of points of difference, and as much as possible of all that they had in common.

Whether the Athenians spent any time in chase of the flying enemy, we know not.⁴ According to Xenophon the generals entrusted the trierarchs Theramenes and Thrasyboulos with the charge of recovering from the wrecked and disabled ships such of the crew as might still be living, while they themselves were anxious to sail at once and destroy the blockading squadron of Eteonikos at Mytilene. A heavy tempest of wind and rain, it is said, compelled them to give up this enterprise; but if they had wasted many hours in pursuing the flying ships of the enemy, they would have found him already gone. As soon as the fate of the battle was decided, the admiral's pinnace conveyed the tidings to Eteonikos, who bade the crew hold their peace, go back again to sea, and then return singing the pæan of victory for the complete destruction of the Athenian fleet. His command was obeyed; and Eteonikos, having gravely offered the sacrifice of thanksgiving for a triumph which he knew to be achieved by the enemy, ordered his crew to take their meal at once, and then sail to Chios conveying thither the merchants with their

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 6, 32.

² It must be inferred that, if some might be sunk altogether others would be waterlogged and unmanageable; and that of these the crews might be recovered by friendly ships, or, if they were within ac-

cessible distance, might save themselves, as they frequently did, by swimming ashore.

³ *νέος παντελῶς*. Diod. xiii. 76.

⁴ Diod. xiii. 100, asserts the fact of the pursuit. Xenophon does not.

trading-ships. He then set his camp on fire, and withdrew with his land force to Methymna.¹ The wind was blowing fair, that is, from nearly due north, when they set out for Chios, but with what strength we are not told. That the breeze must have been violent may be inferred from the statement that, although Konon found the blockading fleet and the besieging army thus suddenly withdrawn, he could not venture to join the Athenians, on their return from Argennoussai, until the force of the storm had somewhat subsided.

CHAPTER X.

THE PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR, FROM THE BATTLE OF ARGENNOUSSAI TO THE SURRENDER OF ATHENS.

IN the terrible scenes which followed the victory of the Athenians at Argennoussai we cannot but feel the greatness of the loss which has deprived us of the guidance of Thucydides. Of these events in their broad outlines we know little beyond the fact that the eight generals who won the battle were condemned to death, that six of them were executed for failing to save the crews of the disabled ships, and that the plea of severe weather as preventing the discharge of this duty was emphatically rejected by the demos. On this cardinal point our informants furnish us with no adequate testimony. The strength of the wind, we are told, had made it impossible for Kallikraidas to surprise the enemy in the morning; and although after the battle the fleet of Eteonikos was able to make its way due south to Chios with a fair breeze, it is at least possible that triremes might sail with a wind astern which it might be dangerous to encounter directly. Nor did Konon venture, even when the course was clear before him, to leave the harbor of Mytilene until the strength of the breeze was somewhat lulled. It is also possible, and even likely, that the pinnace of Kallikratidas may have set off on its way to Mytilene as soon as the issue of the day was decided, but while the Athenians were still compelled to do what might be needed to make the victory complete. We cannot therefore from this narrative determine whether before the Athenians could reach Argennoussai after the fight (if they returned to it at all before the orders were given for attempting the rescue of the distressed seamen) the wind may not have risen to such a height as to make a return to the scene of action impracticable.

¹ Diod. xiii. 100, makes him go to Pyrrha.

Beyond this a greater or less degree of uncertainty hangs over all the facts. If we follow the narrative of Xenophon, we shall perhaps infer that the generals returned to Argennoussai as soon as the battle was over;¹ that they there held a council to determine their course of action; that Diomedon urged the immediate return of the whole fleet for the purpose of rescuing the crews of the disabled ships, while Erasinides insisted that all should sail at once to the relief of Konon;² that Thrasylos proposed a division of the fleet for the accomplishment of both objects at once; that accordingly it was agreed that, while the rest should sail forthwith to Mytilene, thirty-seven triremes, including three ships from each of the divisions commanded by the eight generals, should go to the help of the disabled vessels; that among the officers told off for the latter duty were the trierarchs Thrasyboulos and Theramenes; that while these arrangements were being made and the ships from the several squadrons collected, the wind was rapidly rising, and that when at last they were ready to set off the storm was so violent that they could do nothing. The remissness and inhumanity implied in this narrative in great part disappear, if we can give credit to the story of Diodoros. If, as he seems to state, the council of commanders took place on the scene of action, and if before there was any time for carrying out their decision the force of the rising wind compelled them all to return hurriedly to Argennoussai,³ they are chargeable with no other fault than that of debating at all where a generous and kindly feeling should have rendered all debate superfluous. But the Hellenes generally were, if not a cruel, yet a grossly selfish people. It is useless, therefore, to repeat the emphatic condemnation which applies to the commanders at Argennoussai no more perhaps than to Athenian or Spartan leaders generally; and that they were bound in the first place to make their victory decisive, will probably be disputed by none.

But the fact remains that twenty-five vessels belonging to the Athenian fleet were more or less disabled in the course of the action; and by the admission of Euryptolemos twelve of these ships were still above water when the order was issued for sending the seven-and-forty triremes to their rescue.⁴ It would follow that in the interval between the beginning of the battle and the issuing of this order thirteen ships had disappeared altogether; but we cannot infer either that it had been possible to aid the crews of these vessels or that none of them escaped. A large proportion of these ships

Measures taken by the Athenian generals for rescuing the crews of the disabled ships.

Numbers of the men lost in the disabled triremes.

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 6, 33.

² *Ib.* *H.* i. 7, 29.

³ Diad. xiii. 100.

⁴ Xen. *H.* i. 7, 30.

might go down bodily in the battle: from others the crew might escape by swimming. But we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that at the lowest possible reckoning 1,500 men were allowed to die who might without much difficulty have been saved, if the generals after the final dispersion of the enemy had instead of debating set to work to rescue them. Comparisons of Greek warfare with that of our own day are unhappily useless, and most useless of all are comparisons of Athenian with British sailors. English fleets are provided with the means of rescue and help in some fair proportion to their awful powers for destruction; the ancient triremes had no such provision. The English seamen in the hour of victory would despise himself if he could bestow a thought on his own success while it was possible to save a drowning comrade: for Athenians or for their enemies self-congratulation could lead them without an effort to the revelry of conquerors, whatever might be the condition of some who had helped them to gain the victory.

A few more points relating to this disastrous inquiry seem to be brought out with sufficient clearness. The first dispatch of the generals gave the tidings of the victory and stated the amount of loss on the Athenian side, adding that the severe storm immediately following the battle had put it out of their power to rescue the crews of the disabled triremes.¹ The report caused at Athens both joy and grief. For the victory they received the thanks of the people, who at the same time deplored the disaster caused by the storm. But there were many who were not disposed to let the matter drop with mere censure; and the indignation thus fanned into flame led the generals, it is said, to send a second dispatch in which they stated that the task of visiting the wrecks had been deputed among others to Theramenes and Thrasyloulos,² who had already come to Athens while the generals, having left Mytilene, had established themselves in Samos and were making plundering excursions in the neighborhood.³ By Theramenes and perhaps also by Thrasyloulos the second dispatch was treated, it is said, as a mere trick on the part of the generals to transfer to others the blame of inaction for which they themselves were wholly responsible. They boldly denied the fact of the storm, and denied at the same time the fact that they with others had been commissioned to rescue the drowning men.⁴ The inquiry therefore resolves itself into the one question whether certain men, Theramenes and Thrasyloulos among them, were ordered to visit the wrecks or whether they were not; in other

¹ Xen. *II.* i. 7, 4.

² Diod. *xiii.* 101.

³ Diod. *xiii.* 100.

⁴ Both these denials are distinctly implied in the statement of Xenophon, *II.* i. 7, 4.

words, it becomes a question of the trustworthiness of these men and their partisans against the credibility of the generals. But the issuing of this order was not mentioned in the first dispatch of the generals; and we cannot be sure that the alleged second dispatch was ever sent. The generals probably knew nothing of the storm which was brewing at Athens, until at Samos they received a peremptory order to return home after handing over their command to Konon, to whom Adeimantos and Philokles were sent as colleagues.¹ Suspecting mischief, Protomachos and Aristogenes followed the example of Alkibiades when recalled from Sicily. The other six went back with the confidence of men who had done nothing to deserve ill-treatment at the hands of their countrymen. According to Xenophon the first step in the matter was taken by Archedemos, a popular orator, who, as demarch, it would seem, of Dekeleia, charged Erasinides with neglecting to bury the dead belonging to his own demos. This charge, coupled with an accusation of embezzlement, was brought in regular form before the dikastery, which ordered the imprisonment of Erasinides. His colleagues were now introduced to the Senate of Five Hundred; but their answers, we must infer, were regarded as unsatisfactory, for on the motion of Timokrates they were all imprisoned to await their trial before the people. Thus far, it would seem according to Xenophon, no mention had been made of Theramenes and Thrasymboulos as having had anything to do in the business; but in the assembly which followed their appearance before the Senate the generals were allowed to speak each in his own defence, and all, it seems, agreed in asserting that these men had with the other trierarchs been charged to rescue the distressed crews, adding also that they would not suffer the accusation brought by Theramenes to tempt them into a lie. They had no intention of retorting on him the imputation of guilt which he so loudly urged against them. The storm had rendered all action impossible, and neither the generals nor the trierarchs who were their deputies were to be blamed for results wholly beyond their power.² This simple and straightforward answer, backed by the testimony of witnesses whose trustworthiness there were no grounds for calling in question, produced its natural effect. The people were fast becoming convinced of their innocence; many were eager to offer bail on their behalf; and Theramenes, as having denied the fact of his commission, stood convicted of a lie. But it was now late in the day, and it was resolved to postpone the discussion to the next assembly, the Senate in the meanwhile being ordered to consider how the trial of the accused should best be conducted. Theramenes,

¹ Diod. xiii. 101. Xen. *H.* i. 7, 38.

² Xen. *H.* i. 7, 6.

however, was resolved that they should not escape, and he employed the interval in maturing his conspiracy.

We need surely go no farther before attempting to determine the measure of belief to be accorded to the generals and to their accusers. It is not a question of their magnanimity or their self-devotion. They may have possessed and exhibited neither the one nor the other. But in their dispatches and their answers we can trace no contradictions, not even any equivocation. They stated in their first letter that the storm had prevented the rescue of the wrecked seamen. In their second letter (which, if sent at all, was written, according to Diodoros, to counteract the efforts of enemies of whose activity they had been informed) they named two of the men to whom among others the charge of visiting the ships had been by them intrusted. In their answer before the assembly they repeated the statement and only added that neither before nor then were they accusing anyone of neglecting duty which it was not in human power to fulfil. But how stands the matter with Theramenes? It would need a reputation for truthfulness such as few men have ever attained to warrant a belief that a body of generals, not all agreed as to the course which they ought to take, would combine to invent and maintain a lie which could be brought home to them by hundreds and by thousands. In truth the fact of the commission having been given was not doubted; nor can we find in all history many things more astonishing than the change which came over the Athenian people after the first assembly and which led them not merely to punish the guiltless but to acquit or rather deliberately to screen the guilty. If Theramenes denied, as he undoubtedly denied, the alleged difficulty of the storm, still, having received the commission, he and his colleagues were alone to blame if they failed to do their duty; and on his own statement that there was no storm to hinder them he and they were doubly and trebly guilty. But for the new direction into which the popular feeling was driven in the second assembly, the one question would have been to determine whether the commission was given or not; and with the answer to this question the trial, so far as it concerned the generals, would have come to an end. As it was, the trial turned on this amazing issue, that there was a delay in going to the rescue of the wrecked seamen, that this delay was not due to any danger arising from stormy weather, that a number of ships with their officers and men were told off for this duty, and because these failed to do their duty, therefore the generals were to be put to death, while their accusers, the very men who had thus failed to obey orders, were to be regarded as benefactors to the state. Nor is this all. The whole career of Theramenes absolutely

Intrigues
and conspi-
racy of The-
ramenes.

reeked of villainy. He had been a traitor to the constitution and laws of his country. He had been the willing and the able instrument of Antiphon and his fellow-conspirators in their plans of organised assassination ;¹ and because he had failed to reap from their crimes and his own the fruits which he had desired, he had betrayed his confederates and for the sake only of his personal interests had thrown in his lot with men whom he despised or hated. He was now bent on murdering men whom he had accused at first only perhaps in order to enhance his own importance : but the story which he told now was not the last version for which we are indebted to his fertile fancy. When, in the last struggle which closed the tragedy of his life, Kritias reviled him as the murderer of the six generals, Theramenes replied vehemently that he had never come forward as their accuser, but that, having laid on himself and others the duty of rescuing the drowning men, they had charged him with disobedience to orders for their failure. They had failed, he pleaded, but only because the storm had made it impossible not merely to visit the wrecks but even to leave their moorings ; and he charged the generals with deliberately laying a plot for their destruction by insisting on the practicability of the task and then taking their departure. Putting aside, therefore, his evidence as absolutely worthless, we are brought at once to the definite conclusion that the statements of the generals are consistent and substantially true ; that they were to blame for holding council on a matter in which action should have been spontaneous and immediate ; that their debate ended in telling off a large number of men and ships for the rescue of the distressed crews ; and that before they could set off on their task, the wind which had been gaining strength from a time probably preceding the end of the battle had become a tempest which the triremes could not face. If these facts may be regarded as practically certain, it is further likely that the council of the generals was held in the immediate neighborhood of the field of battle, and not, as Xenophon seemingly implies, after their return to Argennoussai. If, again, this be so, the time of inaction is greatly circumscribed, and it becomes likely that the wind increased to a storm almost immediately after the battle. If, lastly, the statement of Diodoros be true that Theramenes with his party was busy at Athens inflaming the public feeling against the generals before their arrival from Samos, we can scarcely avoid the conclusion that he had returned home deliberately bent on bringing about their disgrace and death. On Theramenes the liar not the slightest dependence can be placed : and we cannot therefore tell how far he may have looked upon these generals or upon some of them as hindrances to

¹ See p. 430.

his own future career. In any case, his own position would be indefinitely raised, and his influence vastly increased, if the people could be made to believe that to him they were indebted for the vindication of their deepest affections at a time when their generals had openly and studiedly insulted them. Such an object was enough for Theramenes; and his plan was wonderfully helped on by an accident which perhaps he may have foreseen but of which assuredly he eagerly availed himself.

The postponement of the discussion from the first assembly had this result,—that the matter could not be opened again until after the festival of Apatouria. When we say that this feast was most closely intertwined with the polity of Solonian and pre-Solonian Athens, we assert in effect that the sentiments which it was likely to awaken ran in a groove altogether different from that of the Kleisthenean and Perikleian constitution. Popular tradition, which never failed to invent false etymologies, ascribed its foundation to the treacherous murder of the Boiotian Xanthias by the Athenian Melanthos; but the name points with sufficient clearness to the unions of the ancient Eupatrid phratriai.¹ In this festival, then, there was all that could bind the citizen to the old order of things, nothing to attach him to the new. In it he was carried back into a region of sentiment in which the family was everything, the state nothing.² Here as they met in the phratrion or common chamber of the clan, or gathered round the banquet spread out in the house of the wealthiest clansman, the talk of the guests turned necessarily on their own interests and on the fortunes of their kinsfolk. Here then was the hearth on which Theramenes might kindle the flames which should devour his victims; and his emissaries were everywhere busied in the unhallowed task. Athenians were not to be done to death with impunity; and their clansmen would be bringing shame on their ancient homes if they failed to stand forth as avengers of murder. The generals must die; and the kinsfolk of the men whom they had slain must besiege the assembly clad in the garb of mourning and with their heads shorn, until the great sacrifice should be decreed to appease the dead. The drama was well got up. Kallixenos, one of the Five Hundred, was to play his part in the council chamber, while others would work on the religious instincts of the assembly. In the senate all went smoothly; and seemingly without opposition Kallixenos carried his monstrous proposal that without further

Violations
of Athenian
law in the
proceedings
against the
six generals.

¹ The name *ἀπατούρια*, thus mistakenly connected with *ἀπαταν*, to cheat, but denoting the children sprung from a common sire, may be

compared with the nouns *ἀδελφός* and *ἀμαζών*, as applied to children of the same mother.

² See p. 5 et seq.

discussion the demos should at once proceed to judgment, on the ground that the accusers and the accused had been heard when last they met together. Two vessels placed for each tribe should receive the secret votes of unsworn citizens deciding the question of life and death for six generals of the commonwealth. When the hour for the assembly came, the dark-robed mourners were there, like beasts of prey thirsting for the blood of their victims; and the excitement created by their cries and tears was aggravated to fury when a man came forward to say that he too had been among the drowning seamen, till he had contrived to escape upon a corn-barrel, and that as he floated away, the last sounds which he could hear were intreaties that he would, if saved, tell the Athenians how their commanders had treated the bravest and best of their countrymen. In the false issue thus given to the inquiry, if such it can any longer be termed, there is something which would have been scarcely less loathsome to Athenians of the days of Perikles than it is to us. In this horrible outcry not a voice is raised on behalf of justice and truth. Not an attempt is made to determine the only two points which called for a judicial decision,—these points being the reality of the commission given to the trierarchs, and the severity of the storm which made it impossible for them to obey orders. The first being proved, the generals stood blameless: if the second were disproved, the persons to be punished would be not the generals but Theramenes and his colleagues. We cannot doubt that this unscrupulous liar saw before him the rock on which he might yet go down, and that his fear suggested a treason to the law of Athens as flagrant as any in which he had been partaker in the days of the Four Hundred. Athenian law demanded that no citizen should be tried except before a court of sworn jurymen; that he should receive due notice of trial; and that, having had sufficient time for the preparation of his defence, he should be brought face to face with his accusers. All these forms, of vital moment for the due administration of justice, were summarily set aside by the propositions of Kallixenos. But there were yet some, although every moment left them in a more fearful minority, who were determined that if the law was to be defied it should be defied under protest from them and that they would not be sharers in the guilt. The proposer of unconstitutional measures was liable to indictment under the writ *Graphê Paranomôn*; and Euryptolemos with some others interposed this check to the madness which was coming over the people. Unless this difficulty could be overruled, the trial of the generals must be conducted according to the constitutional forms; in other words, the acquittal of all must be insured. But it was too late. The shaven mourners in their

black raiment raised the cry, taken up by the majority of the citizens present, that the demos must be allowed to do what they liked and that any attempt to defraud them of this undoubted right was monstrous.¹ Theramenes had, indeed, triumphed. A spirit was abroad in the assembly which was determined that, all laws and usages to the contrary notwithstanding, the six generals should drink the hemlock juice that day after the going down of the sun. They were not to be deterred by threats of prosecution on the score of unconstitutional proposals: and Lykiskos bluntly and tersely informed Euryptolemos that unless he withdrew his menace, he with his aiders and abettors should share the deadly draught with the generals. It was decided that the proposition of Kallixenos was one which might be submitted to the people; but the question could not be put without the consent of the Prytaneis or fifty presiding senators, and of these some (we are not told how many) protested against its shameful illegality. The partisans of Theramenes were not to be thus balked. Kallixenos assured the protestors that opposition would end only in their own inclusion in the number of the proscribed (no other term can with strict truth be used), while others with loud shouts insisted on the names of these senators being made known. Of these senators one only was prepared, if need were, to sacrifice his life for the vindication of law, and that one was Sokrates. For him the clamor of the multitude had no terrors, and he returned to his home unhurt. It was decided that the question should be put; and when it had been formally submitted to the demos, Euryptolemos rose to avail himself of the last resource left to him by the laws which had been thus grossly outraged, and to urge its rejection. Of the accused generals Perikles was his kinsman, and Diomedon his intimate friend; and on their behalf as well as on that of the state he felt bound to lay before them his honest convictions. These two, so he asserted, had dissuaded their colleagues from informing the people about the commission given to Theramenes and his fellow-trierarchs,² and for this he held them to be deserving of censure; but this censure must be directed not against their neglect of duty, for, having delegated it to competent hands, they were on this score guiltless, but against their good-natured desire to screen the officers charged with the execution of their order.³

¹ Xen. *H.* i. 7, 12.

² Xen. *H.* i. 7, 17. It is possible that Erasinides might have been specially anxious that this circumstance should be introduced into the dispatch, if only to cover his own previous opposition to the making of any effort for the rescue

of the drowning crews.

³ Euryptolemos was speaking as an advocate; and this sentence, if he uttered it, was not a happy one. The generals had said all along that no one was to blame, as the decision had been no sooner arrived at than the storm rendered all action impos-

For the rest, he intreated them to take no step for which they could not adduce the distinct sanction of law, far less to take one which, being irrevocable, could be followed only by a repentance as unavailing as it would be bitter. He had no wish to save even his dearest friends if these should be found guilty of a well-defined crime against the state. He was even willing and anxious that his kinsman Perikles should be tried first, and, if convicted, punished; but in the name of law and constitutional usage he demanded that a day should be given to the consideration of each case separately. To his warnings he added a short account of the facts as in his belief they had really taken place, and his conviction that the violence of the storm had not been exaggerated. This could be proved not only by those who were in the ships of the victorious fleet, but by many who had managed to escape from the wrecks. Among those who were thus saved was one of the generals themselves who now stood before them charged with the crime of abandoning others to the death which he had well-nigh shared with them. Lastly, he reminded them that they were about to pronounce judgment on men who had won for them a victory which had all but settled the war at a stroke and which might easily be made to read to the re-establishment of the Athenian empire; and these men, he emphatically asserted, deserved not to be put to death but to be crowned as conquerors and honored as benefactors of the city.

To this speech the multitude (the name of Demos they no longer deserve) were willing to listen with patience, if not with attention.

It needed no special sagacity to see which side had the majority in the assembly; and the partisans of Theramenes knew that, if only the proposition of Kallixenos were put to the vote, it must be carried. This end was insured so soon as Euryptolemos was compelled to withdraw his threat of indicting the proposer under the *Graphê Paranomôn*. When, then, the amendment of Euryptolemos was put to the vote, and the show of hands declared by the Prytaneis to be in its favor, they could even yet wait patiently. It was not likely that the presiding senators, some or many of whom had protested against the measure of Kallixenos as illegal, would not avail themselves of every means for preventing its adoption; and so conscious were they of the trick by which they had hoped to save the people from the commission of a great crime that when Menekles rose to insist that the amendment should be put to the vote again, they made no opposition to the demand.¹ The proposal put forth by the senate was

sible; and Euryptolemos would have done more wisely had he confined himself to their statements.

¹ Dr. Thirlwall, *Hist. Gr.* iv. 132, believes that the motion of Euryptolemos 'was carried probably by a

adopted, and there remained only the task of judging all the generals by one vote. But in a case like this judgment must be carefully distinguished from trial; and without hearing any further witnesses or any defence from the prisoners the Athenians proceeded to give their decision by placing their votes whether for acquittal or condemnation in the two urns belonging to each of the ten tribes. The result was, of course, that for which Theramenes and his fellow-conspirators had so earnestly striven. All the eight generals were condemned and on that night the six who were present were murdered; and thus Athens requited the lifelong labors of Perikles by slaying his son.

A feeling of disgust, if not of loathing, may fairly be forgiven, when we read that no long time passed before the Athenians repented of their madness and of their crimes, but that, yielding still to their old besetting sin, they insisted on throwing the blame not on themselves but on their advisers. As they had done in the days of Miltiades, and as they had done after the catastrophe at Syracuse, so did they now. It was easy to decree that these evil counsellors should be brought to trial; but the Athenians were falling on days in which they were no longer to do as they liked. Kallixenos and some of his partisans were bailed by friends who did what they could to secure their presence at the time appointed for the trial; but they contrived to make their escape during the tumults which attended the illegal prosecution of Kleophon. Kallixenos returned to Athens after the end of the war, and, hated of all men, died of hunger. Very wicked

very small majority.' Surely, if it had been really carried, the Prytaneis would have been encouraged to resist the demand of Menekles; and a bold front, justified by a real though small majority, might and not improbably would have stayed the current of the popular madness. Besides, this statement implies that, when the amendment was put a second time, some who had voted for it before now voted against it, and insufficient numbers at least to convert a small majority into a decided minority. Now these citizens, who were simply holding up their hands amongst a multitude, were personally safe, and had no motive for changing their minds and their votes. The Prytaneis had a very strong motive for wishing that the amendment of Euryptolemos should be carried. Mr. Grote, *Hist. Gr.* viii. 275, thinks that the two

propositions were put to the vote, one after the other; and that the Prytaneis decided, after witnessing two shows of hands, that there was a majority for that of Euryptolemos, and a minority for that of Kallixenos. But although it is just possible that a large minority might in the one case be represented as a majority, it is impossible to believe that on the first voting more hands were held up against the proposal of Kallixenos than for it, or that the Prytaneis would have dared to represent as a minority that which was a real majority in favor of the scheme of Kallixenos. The whole history of this fatal day shows that from the first a considerable majority of the people had abandoned themselves to the clan feeling which set all law and order at defiance.

he may have been ; but all who had voted for the murder of the six generals were not less guilty than he and should be not less deeply disgraced.

The Athenians had repented ; but all their sorrow could not do away with the fact that the growing habit of tampering with law and constitutional forms had lowered their character and the character of their servants. The people were losing confidence in those whom they employed, and their officers were compelled to feel more and more that no benefits which their services might secure to the state would insure them against illegal prosecutions and arbitrary penalties. Corruption was eating its way into the heart of the state, and treason was fast losing its loathsomeness in the eyes of many who thought themselves none the worse for dallying with it. For the moment Athens was again mistress of the sea ; but the crime committed against the generals who conquered at Argennoussai was speedily avenged at Aigospotamoi. One thing only we have to remember throughout this terrible history. The execution of these ill-used men was not, primarily, the work of demagogues. The excitement was stirred up and the flames were fanned by men who were oligarchs at heart, who had subverted the constitution once, who were going to subvert it again, and who in the mean season found it convenient to use the demos as an instrument for attaining their own ends.

Such was the sequel of the last battle in the Peloponnesian war. Of the victorious generals two were in banishment, six were dead ; and this was all that Athens had gained from a victory more decisive than that of Kyzikos. Whatever the Spartans may have done after their disaster at Kyzikos, we have no grounds for supposing that they now repeated the proposals which Endios is said to have made to the Athenians for the ending of the strife. The Athenian fleet had fallen back upon Samos ; and with this island as its basis the generals occupied themselves with movements not for crushing their enemies but for obtaining money. These leaders were now six in number : for to Philokles and Adeimantos who had been sent out as colleagues of Konon there had been added Kephisodotos, Tydeus, and lastly Menandros, who with Euthydemos had helped by clogging the hands of Demosthenes to bring about the catastrophe at Syracuse. The shooting of one admiral may perhaps be a convenient mode of encouraging the rest : but if the judicial murder of Byng had been accompanied by the execution of a batch of his colleagues, the experiment would probably have been followed by a dangerous decline in the zeal both of officers and seamen. It was not in human, far less in Athenian, nature, that the six generals now serving in the Eastern waters of the Egean should not feel their ardor damped by a consciousness of the gross injustice with which their country-

Difficulties
of Eteoni-
kos in Chios.

men were ready to treat them, even if nothing be said of the deliberate treachery with which some of them were afterwards charged. But if the Athenians were thus miserably employed, not much at first was done on the other side. Having with singular presence of mind made his escape from Mytilene where he was besieging Konon, Eteonikos established himself at Chios, where the oligarchs felt that at whatever cost their revolt against Athens must be maintained. But his resources were miserably deficient. He could neither pay nor clothe his men, and during the summer these were content to support themselves with field labor: but when the crops were all gathered and they again felt the pressure of want, they resolved to turn their arms not against their enemies but against their friends. A straw carried on the person was to point out to each other the men who were prepared to take part in attacking and plundering the Chians. Such friends had Chios gained in exchange for the protection which while they were allies of Athens had never failed them. Sorely troubled by the discovery of this conspiracy, Eteonikos at first knew not what to do. Suppression by force was not to be thought of. He resolved by a swift blow to appeal to the personal fears of the conspirators. Attended by fifteen men carrying daggers he walked down the street of the city, and seeing a straw on the dress of a man who was returning from the house of his physician, he gave the signal for putting him to death. To the crowd which gathered round eagerly asking the reason for this summary execution the simple answer returned was that he was wearing a straw. Each straw-bearer, as he heard the news, flung away the sign which might at any moment bring on him the same doom: and the plot being thus broken up, Eteonikos, summoning the Chian oligarchs, pointed out to them frankly the dangers involved in military discontent if it should pass a certain limit, and the absolute need of relieving the wants of the men by an immediate and large contribution. His advice was taken, and having ordered his men to man their triremes he sailed round his fleet, distributing a month's pay to each man, without uttering a word or making a sign which implied knowledge of the conspiracy.

The policy of Lysandros now worked as he had intended that it should work. Eager embassies, sent not only by the members of the clubs which he had set up but by Cyrus himself, demanded his re-appointment. Refusing to grant their request in form, the ephors complied with it in substance. Spartan custom forbade the appointment of the same man more than once to the office of admiral; but Arakos might be sent out nominally in the command which should be really exercised by his scribe Lysandros.¹ Early in the

Appointment of
Lysandros
as secretary
of Arakos.
405 B.C.

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 1, 7.

year the secretary took zealously in hand the work of reconstruction. The unbounded trust of Cyrus in his incorruptibility was displayed by making the Spartan secretary master of all his private revenues and of all his reserved funds. One condition only, not altogether in accordance with the spirit of earlier days, he imposed upon him. Lysandros must promise not to engage the Athenian fleet unless the advantage of numbers was decidedly on his own side.¹

The activity of this commander stands out in singular contrast with the slowness or even idleness of the Athenian generals, to two of whom at least this inaction must have been both galling and humiliating. While Lysandros was busied in the cities of the Asiatic coast and while he even found time for a hurried voyage to the coast of Attica to concert measures with Agis at Dekeleia, they were doing nothing. Borne down by the majority of their colleagues, Konon and Philokles perhaps never suspected that the vast resources placed by Cyrus in the hands of Lysandros might be better employed in corrupting Athenian admirals than in building ships and assaulting cities; but they must have felt with a sinking of heart that the political condition of Athens even more than the failure of her revenues and the breaking up of her confederacy was chilling the zeal of her children, if not fostering treachery in her camps and fleets. At last when from Rhodes Lysandros sailed to the Spartan station at Abydos and thence advanced to the assault of Lampsakos, the Athenian fleet followed him, keeping on the seaward side of Chios. They had reached the entrance to the Hellespont and were taking their morning meal at Elaious, when they received the tidings that their allies of Lampsakos had been conquered and the town plundered. Their next meal was taken at Sestos, their evening meal at Aigospotamoi, the Goat's Stream, whence that goodly fleet of 180 triremes was never to return. At daybreak on the following day Lysandros gave orders to his men to man the ships with all speed, but in no case to break the order of battle by advancing to attack the enemy. The orders of Lysandros made it impossible to repeat the tactics of Alkibiades at Kyzikos;² but it was manifestly a case in which nothing could be gained and much might be lost by delay. Such, however, was not the opinion, or at least not the expressed opinion, of Adeimantos, Menandros, Tydeus, and Kephisodotos. The evening was closing in when, having faced its enemy to no purpose all day, the Athenian fleet fell back on Aigospotamoi, followed by a Peloponnesian squadron under strict orders not to return until the crews of the Athenian triremes were all fairly landed; and not until he received these

Surprise and capture of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi.

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 1, 14.

² See p. 450.

tidings, did Lysandros allow his own men to leave their ships and take their evening meal. The monotony of this ceremony, useless for the Athenians but eminently useful for the plans of Lysandros, was unbroken for four successive days. The Spartan fleet was supplied from Lampsakos ; and his triremes could be manned almost at a moment's warning. The Athenian station was merely on the open beach, and the nearest town, Sestos, was distant nearly two miles. Over this wide extent of ground the men were daily scattered in order to get their food, and the fleet was left dangerously unguarded. From his forts on the Chersonesos Alkibiades could see distinctly the rashness and perils of these dispositions. Going down to the camp¹ he remonstrated with the generals for retaining their ships in a place where they had not the protection of a harbor and a base of supplies from a city close at hand, and earnestly intreated them to fall back on Sestos, from which they could at their pleasure advance to attack or to engage the enemy.² His advice was rudely rejected, and Tydeus and Menandros dismissed him with the rebuff that they were now generals, not he. On the fifth day Lysandros resolved to carry out the plan for which we can scarcely doubt that he had been making his preparations on both sides of the strait. Each day had increased the confidence and added to the carelessness of the Athenian army ; and if there were traitors among their leaders, these would take care to encourage to the utmost that contempt for the enemy which led them thus rashly to neglect discipline. On the fifth day the order given to the squadron which, as usual, followed the Athenian fleet to Aigospotamoi was to wait until the enemy was thoroughly dispersed over the country, and then, as they came back, to hoist a shield as a signal. At the sight of this token the order was issued for instant and rapid onset, and every man was at once in his place and the whole fleet in motion. In a few minutes the work was done. Konon alone was at his post. Philokles perhaps was also close at hand : but these could do little or nothing. Such as were within reach hurried back to their ships ; but of the triremes thus manned some had only two banks of rowers, some only one, while by far the greater number were empty. It is absurd to speak of this surprise as a battle. A few blows may perhaps have been struck : but of these no account was taken. The army of Athens had been cheated, and their whole fleet was insnared. Konon saw at a glance that nothing could be done ; and while the Spartans were

¹ The narrative of Xenophon, *H.* ii. 1, 25, implies a personal interview.

² No man is wholly evil : and in this instance we may give Alkibi-

ades credit for disinterested counsel in the manifest interests of his country. He had, indeed, at the time no motive for giving any other.

busied in capturing the ships and surrounding the prisoners on the shore, he hastened with eight vessels besides his own, the sacred Paralian trireme being one of them, to Abarnis, the promontory to the east of Lampsakos, and thence took away the large sails of the Peloponnesian fleet. He thus greatly lessened their powers of pursuit, and then making his way down the Hellespont while Lysandros was still employed at Aigospotamoi, he hastened to his friend Euagoras in Kypros (Cyprus), while the Paralian ship went on its miserable errand to Athens. With greater speed the Milesian privateer Theopompos set off on his voyage to Sparta, charged by Lysandros to convey the good news to the ephors; and almost before eight-and-forty hours were passed, he had reached the Lakonian coast. Not long after him Gylippos followed with the spoils. Fifteen hundred talents of silver were placed in his keeping, put up in sacks, each of which furnished the ephors with the means for ascertaining the amount deposited in them. Knowing nothing of this Gylippos unripped the bags, and having taken out thirty, some said three hundred, talents, handed over the rest as the full amount intrusted to him; and the career of the man who had ruined the Athenians at Syracuse closed with a sentence of death for theft.¹

The Athenian triremes and their crews, with the exception of those who contrived to escape to Sestos and some neighboring forts, were carried to Lampsakos; and there Lysandros summoned a council to determine how the prisoners should be dealt with. At once all tongues were let loose against the Athenians. Not only were their iniquities in times past laid again to their charge, but terrible things were said of mutilations which in the event of their being victorious at Aigospotamoi they intended to inflict upon their enemies. There is absolutely no justification for a charge which in the absence of all proof may be dismissed as a horrible calumny. Nevertheless, it was decreed that Philokles with all the Athenian prisoners, 4,000 we are told, in number,² should be put to death. The general

¹ It was said that he died by starvation: but whether the story of Pausanias was in his case repeated, or whether he died in exile, we cannot say. Diod. xiii. 106. Plut. *Nik.* 28. *Lys.* 16-17. *Athen.* vi. p. 234.

² Paus. ix. 32, 6. It seems on the whole most unlikely that the number of prisoners exceeded six or seven thousand; nor can we be sure that the number of Athenians captured amounted to 4,000, merely because we are told so by Pausanias.

As most deeply interested in the safety of the fleet, they would probably be nearer at hand than their allies; but if Adeimantos was with some of his colleagues a traitor, he and they would take care that their men should be well out of the way of offering any resistance. For this very reason, however, they would be nearer to a place of refuge. Philokles doubtless did what he could to prevent the mischief, and the greater number of the prisoners belonged probably to his divi-

arrayed himself in white garments, and having heard the question by which Lysandros asked him what a man deserved who had opened the gates of lawless wickedness against Hellenes,¹ was taken away at the head of the long procession to the ground of slaughter. The language of Xenophon implies that to the question of Lysandros Philokles vouchsafed no answer; but whatever reply he might have made would assuredly have been suppressed by the historian who wrote in the interests not of truth but of Sparta. The fact is that, with little kindness, probably, and with less mercy, Philokles was faithful to his country. His name is therefore blackened. Adeimantos was spared from the slaughter because he had, as many felt sure and some openly said, betrayed the Athenian fleet to Lysandros; and as it was needful to cloke his treachery and to assign a decent pretext for suffering him to live, it was said that he opposed himself to the alleged brutality of his colleague.² Lastly Xenophon has carefully drawn a veil over the details of this shameful catastrophe. If the surprise was accomplished by Persian gold on the one side and Athenian greed on the other, the result might bring a blush even to the cheek of the conqueror: but if it be so, then the treachery could not be confined to one man alone. If Adeimantos only had been acting in the interests of Lysandros, he would have been in an impotent minority, and his constant and factious opposition to his colleagues could scarcely have failed to throw suspicion on his motives and his conduct. But if the number of the traitors were nearly equal to that of the faithful generals, the energy of the latter might be paralysed without any appearance of dishonesty or disaffection. A still better color might be thrown over their advice or suggestions, if they should happen to be in the majority; and this good fortune seems to have befallen Adeimantos. Of the six generals Philokles and Konon are beyond suspicion; of none of the others have we any evidence that they were put to death after the battle. Of Adeimantos it is expressly said that he was saved from the massacre. Xenophon, who says that others were taken besides Adeimantos and Philokles, is specially careful to avoid saying that they took all their colleagues (with the exception, of course, of Konon): nor does he any more than Diodoros distinctly speak of the execution of any other general than Philokles. According to Pausanias Tydeus was bribed not less than Adeimantos;³ and

sion. The only commander who was at all sufficiently on his guard got away with nine ships, that is, with at least 1,800 men.

¹ ὑρξάμενος εἰς Ἑλληνας παρανομεῖν. Xen. H. ii. 1, 32.

² It is obvious that Xenophon could have no authority for this

alleged fact beyond that of Adeimantos himself. We could not believe Adeimantos, even if he had solemnly sworn to the fact; nor can we believe the historian in a matter which must be represented to the credit of Lysandros.

³ Paus. iv. 17, 2; x. 9, 5.

Lysandros could scarcely afford to keep his faith, such as it was, with one and to break it with the other. There remain only Menandros and Kephisodotos; and it is significant that of these two the former should have associated himself with Tydeus in his insolent rejection of the counsel of Alkibiades immediately before the betrayal of the fleet was accomplished. Of Kephisodotos nothing can be said, because nothing has been recorded; but we are assuredly not justified in asserting that he was slain along with Philokles without a distinct warrant for the statement. It was the conviction of Konon¹ that Lysandros planned and Adeimantos deliberately wrought the destruction of the Athenian fleet. If his conviction was right (and while everything seems to tell in its favor, assuredly nothing tells against it), the whole narrative of this horrible and disgraceful catastrophe becomes luminously clear. On any other supposition it is an astounding and insoluble riddle.

The news of the ruin wrought at Syracuse was conveyed by no official dispatch, and its terrors were in some slight degree lessened by the gradual awakening of the people to the knowledge of their loss. The tidings of the catastrophe at Aigospotamoi came upon them with the suddenness of a thunderbolt. When the men of the Paralian trireme, sailing into the harbor, told their dismal story, the cry of agony and despair, as it passed along the double line of walls, rose into a piercing wail when it reached the city. All that night the mourning went up to heaven, for none could close their eyes in sleep. Nothing more could be done. There remained only the fearful expectation of a doom very soon to be inflicted on them by an enemy not likely to forgive or to deal kindly with prostrate foes absolutely in their power. For in their power they felt themselves already. They might still be able to close their harbor gates; they might still man their walls and hold out within the city; but famine would do the work of Lysandros far more effectually than it could be accomplished by fleets or armies. In this hour of overpowering dismay, through the blackness of which not a ray of light could pass, their thoughts turned with terrible distinctness to their own misdeeds in the days that were past, to iniquities which they had ruthlessly committed and to others which they had all but wrought. The wide prospect revealed not a gleam of comfort. Those frightful usages of war on which in their time of strength they had acted without scruple forbade the hope that their enemies would bestow a thought on all the good which in spite of much evil Athens might have done to Hellas. But if they could no longer hope that endurance might

Utter dismay at Athens on receipt of the tidings from Aigospotamoi.

¹ Dem. *de fals. Leg.* p. 401.

be rewarded by victory, an unconditional surrender which would enable the Spartans to slay every Athenian citizen and to send their wives and children into slavery was still out of the question. An assembly held on the day after the arrival of the Paralian trireme decreed that the entrances to the harbors should be blocked up, one only remaining open, and that every preparation should be made for undergoing a siege.

Meanwhile Lysandros had better things to do than to hasten with his fleet to the doomed city. He knew that Athens must yield or starve, and it was his business to see that the pressure of famine should make itself felt at once. The submission of Chalkedon and Byzantion followed of necessity the disaster at the Goat's River, and the Athenian garrisons in these or in other towns he sent straight to Athens, telling them that their lives would be spared only on the condition that they should take up their abode within the city walls. His own immediate work was the establishment of that Spartan supremacy to which the members of the Athenian confederacy had been exhorted to look as the greatest of blessings.

Operations of Lysandros in the Egean and the Hellespont.

In Athens the pressure of famine was daily becoming more dreadful. Imports indeed there were; but these were their own Klerouchoi or settlers established in the Chersonesos, in Melos, Aigina, and elsewhere, their possessions in these places being restored to such of the old inhabitants as Lysandros was able to find and send thither, or granted to Spartan citizens. The misery would have passed the bounds of endurance, had not some encouragement been given by the restoration of greater harmony among the citizens. The Psephisma of Patrokleides embodied the wholesome lessons taught by extreme suffering. By this measure a complete amnesty was given to all except those of the Four Hundred who had gone into exile in order to avoid trial and to those who were lying under sentences passed by the court of Areiopagos. For all others it was decreed that the documents relating to their condemnation or recording their disgrace should be destroyed; and the restoration of a large number of dishonored citizens to their full rights was followed by a kindly feeling and sympathy between all classes in the city which seemed to promise that, though the day must go against Athens, it yet should not close in utter shame.

Pressure of famine at Athens.

At last Lysandros set out for the city. To the ephors at Sparta and to Agis at Dekeleia he sent messages announcing his approach with a fleet of 200 ships. The tidings were followed by the hasty departure of the full Peloponnesian force under the Spartan king Pausanias, the Argives alone refusing to take part in the enterprise. Having crossed the

Siege of the city, and negotiations for peace.

isthmus, they advanced straight along the Eleusinian road and took up their position in the Akademia close to the city gates; and shortly afterwards, Lysandros, having ravaged Salamis, appeared before Peiraeus with 150 ships and blocked up the entrance to the harbor. Scarcely more than ten years before, there had issued from this harbor that fleet (more magnificent and more splendidly equipped, if not so large) which was to establish the supremacy of Athens over Sicily, and to win for her, as it was hoped, a Panhellenic empire. Now it was a question of days which should determine whether Athens could insist on any terms at all, or whether she must submit without conditions to the conqueror. The first embassy sent to Agis, when famine had begun to reap its dismal harvest of death, offered free alliance with Sparta, reserving to Athens the possession of Peiraeus and the Long Walls. By Agis they were referred to the ephors, who on hearing from the envoys at Sellasia on the Lakonian frontier what they had to offer bade them go home again and, if they cared to have peace, to return with more reasonable conditions. This rebuff seemed to crush such spirit as still remained in the hearts of the beleaguered people. It was taken as a sign that the Spartans would be satisfied with nothing less than their complete destruction: but whatever doubt there might be on this point, there was none that hundreds or thousands must die of starvation before any terms could be proposed and accepted. One condition there was on which the Spartans had declared their readiness to treat; but no man dared to urge compliance with this requisition for pulling down one mile in length of each of the Long Walls, until Archedratos urged that it was better to do this than that all the people should die.¹ To this shame they could not yet bow themselves; but the increasing intensity of the famine convinced them that something must be done: and if Theramenes dared not propose the demolition of the walls, he could offer to go to Lysandros, and ascertain whether this condition was demanded simply as a guarantee of fidelity on the part of the Athenians or whether it was to be used as the means for reducing them to slavery. The question was superfluous. If peace and independence were promised on a given condition, even Sparta would be held bound to secure to them that independence if this condition should be accepted. The mere putting of the question was indeed a virtual admission that, if the Spartans insisted on it simply as a pledge of good faith, the walls should be pulled down. But in their distress the Athenians chose to shut their eyes to the obvious fact, and Theramenes departed on his mission. Three months of frightful misery had passed before he was seen again. He then

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 2, 15.

came to say that during all this time he had been detained by Lysandros, who had now sent him back with the answer that terms of peace could be taken into consideration only by the ephors. There could now be no longer any holding back. An enemy was within the walls which could not much longer be resisted; and it was better, while time permitted, to obtain, if they could, something better than slavery from the enemy without.

Intrusted with full powers, Theramenes set out with nine colleagues on the mission which was to decide the fate of Athens. At Sellasia they were called upon to answer the question which had been put to the envoys of the previous embassy; but on the announcement that the Athenians would be bound by the stipulations of their commissioners, whatever these might be, they were allowed to go on to Sparta. Here they were brought face to face with the representatives of the great confederacy to which the power of Athens had long been a rock of offence: and along with many others the voices of the Corinthians and Thebans were raised for her utter destruction. Against this savage demand that no terms should be made with their ancient enemy the Phokians made a noble protest;¹ and the point was overruled by the Spartans, who declared that they would never allow a city to be enslaved which had done so much good to Hellas in the season of her greatest need. It may be fairly doubted whether, as they said this, they thought so much of the benefits conferred by Athens at Marathon, Salamis, and Mykalé as on advantages which they might receive from her in times yet to come. It might for the present suit Sparta to set up her Harmostai with their dependent committees in the several towns of her confederation: but none knew better than the Spartans that the materials with which they had to deal were not the most manageable in the world, and it was possible that at no very distant day the existence of Athens might be of more value to them than that of Thebes, even if Athens should not be needed to help them against Thebes. The discussion ended with the decree (it can scarcely be called by any other name) that the Athenians must pull down their walls, must yield up all their ships except twelve, must consent to receive back their exiles, and must follow implicitly the biddings of Sparta. As Theramenes and his colleagues made their way with these tidings from Peiraieus, crowds thronged round him to learn whether their miseries were now to end or to be borne until none should be left to bear them. They were told, doubtless, that their lives and their freedom were safe; but not until on the following day the citizens were met in their assembly were the precise terms imposed on them made known. These terms, Theramenes briefly

¹ Dem. *de fals. Leg.* p. 361.

told them, they must accept; none others were to be had. A few still raised their voices against this last humiliation; but they were borne down by the vast majority. The submission of Athens was made; and the long strife which, dating from the surprise of Plataiai by the Thebans, had lasted for seven-and-twenty years, was at an end. Into that harbor from which had issued but a little while before the fleet which Adeimantos decoyed to its own ruin and the ruin of Athens Lysandros now entered with the fleet of Sparta, bringing with him those exiles whose crimes had made their names infamous for all time. While the arsenals were dismantled and the unfinished ships in the docks burnt, the demolition of the Long Walls was begun to the music of flute-players and the measured movements of dancing women. Twelve ships only were left in the desolate and dismantled harbor: and so began, according to Spartan phrase, the first day of freedom for Hellas.¹

Thus passed away the most splendid phase of Athenian history. The great empire which Themistokles had shaped and which Perikles sought to surround with impregnable safeguards was for the time utterly brought to naught. No other end could be looked for so soon as it became clear that the great Dorian state with its allies was determined to resist and, if need were, to fight against the idea which underlay the polity of Athens. This polity even in its crudest and most imperfect form was a protest against that spirit of isolation under which the old Eupatrid houses had sprung up to power.² To the form of society thus created the Spartan clung with vehement tenacity, and in this attitude he had the sympathy of the Hellenic world generally. Even when the Athenian empire had reached its greatest extension and her power seemed most firmly cemented, when moreover her allies felt that they received from her benefits and rights which they could never have secured for themselves, these allies still felt a certain soreness at her interference with those autonomous instincts which they invested with an inviolable sanctity. Their dependence upon her, although they might be utterly unable to defend themselves, was still, to whatever an extent, an evil; and only when after allowing oligarchical factions to seduce them into revolt they found that the freedom with which they had been lured onwards was but a specious name for grinding tyranny, did the demos in many cities set itself sedulously to undo the mischief and make common cause with the imperial city which had proved itself the only bulwark against the despotism of an exclusive order. But the empire of Athens was aggressive. It could not be otherwise. The necessities which gave birth to the Delian confederacy and

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 2, 23.

² See p. 12.

which through this led to the more highly-developed supremacy of Athens¹ compelled the imperial city to interfere to a certain extent with the freedom or rather the license of states which, although they might be able to do little good, could yet be powerful for mischief, and which, if they did nothing, would reap the same benefits with those members of the confederacy who did everything. How slight on the whole that interference was, how jealously Athens guarded the liberty and rights of her allies against her own citizens, how great a protection her course afforded to these allies in their disputes with one another, and how carefully she shielded them against the attacks of foreign powers, the whole course of this history has shown. Briefly,—with all their faults and with crimes the stains of which no tears could ever wash out, the Athenians were fighting for a law and an order which, they felt, could not be maintained at all if it was to be confined within the bounds of a single city. So far as they went, they were working to make a nation: but into a nation the Hellenic tribes and cities were determined that they should not be moulded. The resistance which Athens encountered compelled her to keep her allies more closely under control, and imparted to her government an appearance of despotism which, however, was at its worst a slight yoke indeed when compared with the horrors of Spartan rule. She had attempted great things for which the world was not yet ripe; and the states which had been induced to band themselves against her awoke for the most part to the conviction that they had suffered themselves to be cheated by a lie. In her relations with her allies Athens exhibited a dignity and a justice which, if they have marked the dealings of any other people, have marked those only of England.

But from the tragic drama which we have now traced to its catastrophe we cannot turn without the feeling (more painful far than that with which we read of the last fearful days of the Athenians at Syracuse), that we have gone through the history not of the people but only of the smallest fraction of it. From the narrative of political events, of a real and for the most part wholesome political growth, the curtain is from time to time lifted to reveal a picture so horrible that duty alone can constrain us to keep our eyes fixed upon it at all. We have had to watch the growth of a civilisation founded on that instinct of isolation and despotism which marks the beast in his den;² and this stamp, even in the midst of the splendor, the grace, the learning and wisdom of the age of Perikles and Plato, Greek life, even at Athens, never loses. When Aristagoras visited Athens, he found there three myriads of citizens not indis-

¹ See p. 246.

² See p. 6.

posed to take up his cause.¹ What the proportion may have been in his day between the numbers of the free citizens, the resident foreigners, and the slaves, we know not; but respecting all the vast throng except the men who possessed the franchise and ordered the state history keeps an ominous silence. For their occupations, their pleasures, and their pains, the free citizen had a profound disregard or contempt; and to them were abandoned as coarse and degrading those tasks of commerce and manufacture which constitute the very kernel of modern English and European prosperity.² Defeat in battle and the sack of cities may exhibit to us thousands of men slaughtered in cold blood on the field or departing into a hopeless slavery. Athenian gentlemen, refined and delicate, nurtured amongst all the glories of the highest art, trained in the schools of the highest science, were thrown to rot in the quarries of Syracuse, and taken out to be classed henceforth among those whom wise men like Aristotle vouchsafed to regard as animated machines. Based really on the tiger-like system which limits action strictly by power, Greek slavery was only in the false and ridiculous philosophy of a later age made to rest on distinctions to which nature was every day giving the lie. With the refutation of the monstrous falsehoods which characterise the special pleadings of Aristotle on this subject we are not here concerned: but it is the business of the historian to note that of all the inhabitants of a given land nineteen-twentieths are never heard of, or that, if they appear at all, it is only to be tortured in courts of justice for the benefit of free citizens. Behind this same dark and almost impenetrable veil are hidden the wives, sisters, and daughters of the men whose names are familiar sounds in every land. Nowhere among the Hellenic tribes was the idea conceived which Englishmen attach to the life of the family. The quiet happiness of well-ordered English homes had never dawned upon the Hellenic mind. In its place there was the degrading companionship of female slaves, the more refined but not less sensual society of the Hetairai, and, most prominent of all, the loathsome and unnatural debauchery which drew down the scathing condemnation of the great Apostle of the Gentiles.³ It is shameful to be driven even to speak of such things; but we have no real grasp on the history of the people if we fail to see that in the days of Perikles, and even earlier, those dreadful evils were at work of which Polybios bitterly deplored the results in the decay and extinction of families, in the desolation of the country, and the degeneracy of its soil.

¹ Herod. v. 97. See p. 139.

² For the *βάνανσοι τέχναι*, see Döllinger, *The Jew and the Gentile*, ii. 225. The horrible evils of Hellenic slavery generally are brought

out with sufficient clearness in the *Charikles* of Bekker, Excursus to Scene vii., on the Slaves.

³ Rom. i.

BOOK IV.

THE EMPIRE OF SPARTA.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE SURRENDER OF ATHENS TO THE RETURN OF XENOPHON FROM ASIA.

THE fall of Athens rendered inevitable the subjugation of the Hellenic race by some foreign power. The victory of Sparta was virtually the assertion that a Greek nation should never be called into existence; and from this point the history of the several Greek states becomes again, what it had been before the rise of the Athenian empire, the history of a number of centrifugal units, by whom the principle of isolation was regarded not merely as a safeguard, but as the very essence of freedom. The supremacy of Athens was indeed succeeded by the supremacy of Sparta: but the former, as it became gradually extended, would first have softened and then have removed those ancient prejudices which lay as a cankerworm at the root of Greek political life. The establishment of Spartan supremacy soon dispelled the illusion that the only hindrance to Hellenic freedom lay in Athenian power. With the snaring of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi the mask was thrown off, and Sparta through her administrators entered on a course of tyranny at which even oligarchs stood aghast. In each city the oligarchical party, which in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred had shown itself at Athens in its true colors, knew that they had in Sparta an ally which would not fail to back them up in systematic and high-handed oppression. The seed thus sown soon bore an abundant harvest, and the reapers appeared in the sovereigns of Macedonia.

Establishment of Spartan supremacy. 404 B.C.

To all who had taken part in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred or approved their policy, the entry of Lysandros into Athens was a day of rejoicing. Even the more moderate oligarchs looked forward now to a government in which the culture of refined gentlemen would stand out in marked contrast with the vulgarity of popular debaters. To such

The tyranny of the Thirty at Athens.

a society Theramenes, who had never liked the idea of things going farther than he wished, was most willing to join himself; and when, along with Kritias, Onomakles, Aristoteles, and Drakontides, he became a member of the board of thirty men chosen to draw up a new constitution for the city, he may have thought himself sufficiently rewarded for all his lies, treacheries, and murders. This board had been appointed, we are told,¹ by a vote of the people; but it was a vote extorted by the declaration of Theramenes that such was the will of the Spartans, and by the warning of Lysandros (who himself appeared in the assembly), that their failure to destroy the Long Walls within the given time had left them wholly at his mercy. The task of drawing up a constitution was left to a more convenient season: the business of cutting down political opponents was at once begun bravely, and by none more bravely than by Theramenes. He was, in fact, anxious to show by his zeal how intensely he hated the democracy which had been overthrown: but he had sense enough to see that there was no use in slaying men from whom they had nothing to fear, and from whose goodwill they had much to gain. He was, therefore, a strenuous member of the new Board, so long as it busied itself in appointing a new senate of subservient partisans, in setting up another Board of eleven to preside over the police (in other words, to carry out judicial murders), and finally in sweeping away those citizens who had distinguished themselves by their attachment to the old constitution. He thought it time to draw back when some of his colleagues declared that the good work would not be brought to an end without the aid of a Spartan garrison. But Kritias was not to be withheld, and his envoys brought from Sparta a force of hoplites, who under Kallibios as their Harmost were installed in the Akropolis. The Thirty were now free to get rid of all whom they were pleased to term Malignants:² and among these victims were the brother and the son of Nikias who had been slain at Syracuse, men as innocent of any democratic leanings as that general himself. Among them also was Leon of Salamis whom Sokrates with four other citizens was bidden to apprehend and bring before the Thirty. With commendable prudence these tyrants had hit upon the clever plan of making men who disliked their policy participants in their crimes. Sokrates behaved now as he had behaved during the trial of the generals after Argennoussai; and his disregard of their commands was allowed to go unnoticed. Like the rest, Leon was made to drink the hemlock juice not because he loved the old laws, but because he had money which could be lavished on the Spartan assassins in the Akropolis. This was opening a mine which, as it seemed to Theramenes,³

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 2.² Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 13.³ Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 39-41.

it might be dangerous to work too far. For him, the point of danger was determined by the power of the rulers. So far as these could not sustain themselves by force, they must depend on the affections of the people, or they must fall. For such expostulations Kritias had a brief answer. No despot ever counted himself safe in his seat, until he had got rid of all who on any grounds might be obnoxious to him : and if Theramenes thought that they were not tryants because, instead of being one man, they were thirty in number, he was a simpleton. In no way daunted by this rejoinder, Theramenes insisted that the Thirty could not maintain themselves without adequate support. Kritias answered him by putting forth a list of enfranchised citizens containing three thousand names. Theramenes was not to be thus blinded. He denied that there was any magic virtue in the number chosen, and he denounced the list as a sham now, as he had in like manner dealt with the invisible Five Thousand, when he had grown tired of doing work without pay for the Four Hundred.¹ Even if the Three Thousand should be trustworthy, the power of the Thirty would be by no means what it ought to be, if they wished to insure their safety. Theramenes wished to enfranchise a larger number of the people ; Kritias resolved to disappoint him by disarming them. The weapons seized by a stratagem were placed in the Akropolis : and all check to the lust of the Thirty was finally removed. The daggers of their bravoes settled scores with all whom they hated or whose money they wished to steal. Thus far they had found their victims amongst the citizens : they now thought that a raid upon the *Metokoi* or resident aliens might be turned to good profit. Each one of the Thirty was to pick out his prey among the wealthiest of this industrious class, and to cement more closely with the blood of these victims their fellowship of iniquity. Theramenes alone, it would seem, refused to join in this infamous scheme. The *Sycophants*,² whom Kritias regarded with special hatred, did not murder those whom they plundered : the Thirty, it seemed, wished to slay only because they were resolved to steal. The plain speak-

¹ See p. 439.

² All constitutions have their faults. One grave defect in the Athenian constitution lay in the system of the *Dikasteries*. When the citizens were paid for each day spent in the Jury Courts, the temptation to multiply accusations was not easily resisted. Heavy penalties, it is true, were assigned for prosecutors who brought frivolous charges ; but these could not unfrequently be evaded by men who were not ashamed to stoop to any mean-

ness and who had no character to lose. At Athens this class was unhappily large. They went by the name of *Sykophantai*, i.e. men who accused citizens of exporting figs, the law against such exportation having been continued long after the need of it had ceased to be felt, and when, therefore, the application of it had come to be looked upon as malicious. Hence all frivolous charges became included under the head of *Sycophancy*.

ing of Theramenes roused the fears of the Tyrants : and the mind of Kritias was made up. It was clear that Theramenes was walking on the path which he had already trodden in the days of the Four Hundred, and either he must fall or they. The senate was summoned to the council chamber, round which the Myrmidons of the Thirty with hidden daggers kept guard, while Kritias proceeded to warn the senators that he and they were exposed to a common danger and that this danger came from Theramenes. No revolutions could be achieved without bloodshed, least of all at Athens where the number of the citizens was so extravagantly large and where they had for ages grown up with a prejudice and a liking for freedom. Between themselves and this liberty-loving Demos there could be only war to the death, and with a view to their destruction they had set up a more wholesome government with the aid of their saviours the Spartans.¹ From this government Theramenes wished to withdraw, just when the passions of the people were most roused by the strong remedies applied to reduce them to order. In this he was doing just what they might look for. His whole career had well won for him the name of the buskin which might be placed on either foot at will.² He had led on the Four Hundred against the Demos, until it became convenient for him to betray them, and he had sacrificed the generals to his vengeance because he had failed to carry out their order to rescue the shipwrecked crews at Argennoussai.

Theramenes felt himself to be in deadly peril ; but he felt also that it would be his wisest course to take the last charge first. He denied emphatically the fact that the accusation of the The death of Theramenes. 404 B.C. generals came from him. They were their own accusers, as blaming Theramenes and his colleagues for not rescuing the men, when the violence of the storm made the task impossible ; they had asserted that to be practicable which was not so, and had straightway departed, leaving their lieutenants to their fate.³ But he was more concerned with the present than with the past ; and he was anxious to open their eyes to the gulf which was yawning at their feet. They were acting on a policy which would win little favor at Sparta. Did they suppose that Kallibios and his soldiers would have been sent to Athens if the Spartans were to get no good from so doing ? The Thirty were simply destroy-

¹ τοῖς περισώσασιν ἡμᾶς. Xen. H. ii. 3, 25.

Kothornos.

Xen. H. ii. 3, 35. On this frightful coil of lies enough perhaps has been said already, p. 467. It is possible that the report of Xenophon may not be accurate ; but if it be

it is hard to understand how the Thirty could without laughter listen to a story which charged the generals with quietly sailing away during a storm which made it absolutely impossible for Theramenes and his colleagues to carry out their orders for the rescue of the men.

ing the city ; and the Spartans could have done this without the least trouble by prolonging the siege for a few weeks longer. The charges of Kritias were all false. He and they who worked with him were the real foes of the state, by multiplying their enemies and lessening the number of their friends. They had driven into exile men like Thrasyboulos and Anytos ; and by their lawless violence they were really strengthening the hands of these fugitives, whose hopes of bringing back the old state of things would fade away if the Thirty would administer true judgment and obey the laws. The truth and force of this reply called forth the cheers of the senators, and alarmed the Tyrants ; but Kritias was prepared for everything. Going out of the chamber, he ordered his bravoes to advance to the bar within which the senators sat, and then returning, told them that it was his duty not to allow his friends to deceive themselves. The gentlemen on the other side of the railings were determined that the man who was seeking to upset the oligarchy should not escape ; nor could he deny that they were right. The need was, in short, urgent. By one of the laws passed since the happy conquest of the city, the Thirty were empowered to put to death without trial anyone not included in the list of enfranchised citizens ; and Kritias took it on himself to expunge from that list the name of Theramenes. On hearing these words the victim leaped to the altar, and, protesting against this violation of justice, warned the senators that that which was now done to him might at any moment be done to them. The only reply of Kritias was a command to the Eleven executioners to seize Theramenes. ' We hand over to you,' he said, ' a man condemned according to the law. Do ye what is needful.' Theramenes was dragged from the council chamber through the Agora, protesting loudly against the monstrous iniquity done in the sight of gods and men. ' It will be the worse for you, if you will not be silent,' cried Satyros, the leader of the Eleven. ' And how will it be the better for me if I obey you ?' answered Theramenes. In the dungeon he presently drank the hemlock juice, casting out the drops which remained in the cup with the parting salutation, ' This for the handsome Kritias.'

The day of retribution for the Thirty was drawing nigh, and the vengeance was to come from the exiles named by Theramenes ; but for the time being his death left them in a very paradise of license. The gates of the city were shut to all whose names were not included in their list of citizens ; and the owners of property in the country were dragged from their homes and slain, because Kritias wished to have their lands himself or to bestow them on his accomplices.

Occupation of Phylé by the exiles under Thrasyboulos.

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 56.

Those who could escape fled, and the neighboring cities were filled with fugitives. Of these Thrasyboulos with a small company setting out from Thebes, where the old hatred of the Athenian demos was fast turning into sympathy, seized the fortress of Phylé which, like other outlying posts, had been dismantled by the Tyrants; and Kritias learnt that a body of exiles was in possession of an almost impregnable rock, jutting from the main range of Parnes with which it was joined by a narrow and precipitous ridge. At once he set out with the Three Thousand and the Horsemen or Knights. The day was brilliantly fine, but his expectations of immediate victory were signally foiled, and they were preparing for a siege when a heavy fall of snow drove them back to the city. Two tribes of Horsemen were, however, sent with the Lakonian garrison to check any raids of the exiles; but Thrasyboulos had now 700 men on his rock, and going down by night he fell on them in the early morning. Some were asleep; others were grooming their horses. The attack was completely successful, and the oligarchic force was driven off with the loss of more than 120 hoplites.

The Tyrants now thought it best to look out for a refuge, in the event of their being expelled from Athens. Kritias fixed on Eleusis, and going thither with his colleagues, summoned all the Eleusinians of military age to give in their names. Each citizen, as he did so, was sent out by a postern gate opening on the beach, where he found himself between two files of horsemen and was immediately bound. All were taken to Athens, where Kritias, summoning the Three Thousand and the Knights, told them that they must share the perils as well as reap the fruits of power. 'In short,' he said, 'you must sail in the same boat with us. Here are these men; you must condemn them to death.' Condemned they therefore were, and slain. The votes were given openly, and open voting at Athens was always regarded as voting under restraint. The issue, we are told, was well pleasing to those citizens, in whom lust of gain and delight in thievery had swallowed up all other passions.

Thrasyboulos and the exiles now marched to Peiraieus; and the demolition of the walls, on which Sparta had relied for the suppression of popular government, became the direct means of its restoration. The temple of Artemis in Mounychia, approachable only by a steep flight of steps, furnished a strong post, from which darters could shower their weapons over the heads of their own hoplites on the advancing enemy. The latter wavered, and the hoplites, rushing down, put them to flight. Seventy or more were slain, and among the dead was Kritias. Instead of attempting to carry off the bodies by force, the soldiers of the Tyrants demanded the usual truce for burial, and the

Massacre of
the Eleusi-
nians by the
Thirty.

Victory of
Thrasybou-
los and death
of Kritias.

two parties were thus thrown together. Among the exiles was Kleokritos, the herald of the class called *Mystai* in the Eleusinian mysteries. Exerting a voice of singular power he besought silence, and then, in simple words, asked why his countrymen should seek his death and that of his fellow-fugitives. 'We have done you no harm; we have taken part with you in the most solemn feasts; we have been your comrades in peace and war. Why should you obey the Thirty, the most impious of tyrants, who seek to keep up an endless civil strife, and who, in eight months, have slain more Athenians than all the Peloponnesians killed in ten years of war? Be sure that those of you whom we have this day been compelled to strike down have cost us as many tears as they have cost you.'

So manifest was the impression made by these words that the Thirty gave orders for an immediate retreat into the city. On the following morning they found but a scanty attendance of senators in the council chamber, while the Three Thousand, broken up into groups outside, were engaged in vehement debate. Those who had abetted the despots in their iniquities insisted, of course, on the extermination of the exiles; the more moderate protested against the ruining of the state by the scoundrels who were now in power. The upshot was the deposition of the Thirty, who fled to Eleusis, and the election of a new Board of Ten, one from each of the tribes. This election was a compromise, and it was a compromise which settled nothing. Of these ten two had been among the Thirty; all probably desired anything rather than the restoration of democracy, and, believing that each man had his price, sought to bribe Thrasyboulos and his comrades to desert their party and join the oligarchs. The offer was spurned, and the strife went on; but the exiles in Peiraiæus daily grew stronger both in men and arms, nor had many days passed before envoys were sent out from the Ten in the city and from the Thirty in Eleusis to pray for Lakedaimonian help, on the ground that Athens had revolted from Sparta. Lysandros, eagerly supporting the request, urged that he himself might be sent with an army by land, while his brother Libys should sail with a fleet of forty ships to blockade Peiraiæus. His proposal was accepted, and the man who, ten months before, had left Athens in ruin, stood once more within the borders of Attica.

This general had, in the meanwhile, crushed the resistance of the Samian Demos which refused to submit when the Athenian fleet had been ensnared at Aigospotamoi. The Samian people knew well what they had to expect from the men whom Xenophon calls the ancient citizens,¹ that is, from the oligarchs whose treacherous schemes had been discon-

Return of
Lysandros
to Athens.

December,
404 B.C.

Operations
of Lysan-
dros in the
Egean.

¹ Xen. *H.* ii. 3, 7.

certed by the revolution in favor of Athens eight years before.¹ But, although they held out against a blockade of many months, the triumph of the Eupatrids was certain. The Demos agreed at length to surrender on condition of being allowed to depart each man with one garment. The city with all its contents was handed over to the oligarchs, who found themselves under the yoke of a board of ten Spartans, with Thorax for harmost or governor. So ended, in a distant island, the long struggle which had begun, nearly eight-and-twenty years earlier, with the surprise of Plataiai by the Thebans. But Lysandros had not merely ended the strife. He had secured for himself personally a power such as no Greek, thus far, had ever attained. The Dekarchiai, or Boards of Ten, left in the conquered cities, were all his creations, prepared to carry out his will to the uttermost, and to resist any men or any measures to which his inclinations might be opposed. He now sailed home with the prow-ornaments of all the ships captured at Aigospotamoi, with a vast assortment of golden crowns voted to him in different cities, and with the huge sum of 470 talents, the residue of the money which Cyrus had placed in his hands for the purpose of humiliating Athens. With his fleet came the whole Athenian navy with the exception of the twelve triremes which alone remained in the basin of Peiraiæus. The empire of Sparta was established; but Lysandros was fully resolved that her empire should be empire for himself also.

The success of his plan depended, necessarily, on the continuance of the sentiment which had animated the allies of Sparta to the close of the Peloponnesian war. That sentiment had root in the notion of city autonomy, and was sustained simply by fear of Athens. With the fall of the imperial city, the bond which held Spartans, Thebans, and Corinthians together was really loosened, although, in the first moments of vindictive rage, the Theban and Corinthian leaders insisted that Athens should be treated as Plataiai had been treated by Archidamos. The feeling rapidly cooled down when it became apparent that the promises made by the Spartans were a mere cheat, that by means of the harmosts and the dekarchies Sparta carried out a system of tyranny such as the Hellenic world had not yet seen, and that Athens was needed as an instrument for counteracting the power which had overwhelmed her. They had further causes of offence. Sparta had used them freely to do her hard work; but, if she allowed them the empty honor of statues and inscriptions, she steadily refused to share with them the golden harvest which she had reaped during the war. Nor was it likely that the pre-eminent glory and power of Lysandros would be agreeable to the Herakleid kings of his own city. The honors heaped

March of Pausanias, the Spartan king, into Attica.

¹ See p. 418.

on the successful leader roused the jealousy and the wrath of Pausanias, one of these kings ; and Pausanias, when Lysandros had set out for Eleusis, prayed that he too might be allowed to lead a Spartan force into Attica. For this expedition contingents were furnished by all the allies except the Thebans and Corinthians. A few months had sufficed to strengthen in them the suspicion that Sparta meant to make Athens a mere dependency on herself, and so to encroach on the freedom of her neighbors. They refused therefore to join, on the plea that the convention made after the surrender of the city had not been violated.

The presence of Pausanias, although Lysandros stood by his side, encouraged many to express freely their opinion of the tyrants who had fled to Eleusis, as well as of those who still held sway in Athens. In the complaints thus made the king probably saw fresh evidence of the schemes which had awakened his jealousy ; but his first act was to summon Thrasyloulos and his followers to disperse.

Victory of Pausanias, and suppression of the tyranny at Athens.

Their refusal was followed by a series of slight engagements, ending with one in which the exiles lost 150 men. Pausanias was thus victorious, and he could therefore afford now to act on his better judgment. Under a truce granted by him envoys were sent by the exiles to Sparta, and with them went two citizens belonging to the party opposed to the Ten within the city. On their side the Ten, who in the opinion of Xenophon constituted the state, dispatched messengers offering the unconditional surrender of the city, and demanding the like submission from the exiles in Peiræus, if these were sincere in their desire for peace. The Spartans answered by appointing fifteen commissioners to settle matters along with Pausanias. The convention agreed upon restoring the exiles to their homes, and secured an amnesty to all except the Thirty with their Eleven executioners, and the Ten who had done what they could to carry on the work of the expelled tyrants. Eleusis was left as an independent town which might be used as a place of refuge by such as feared to remain at Athens. But if the exiles were ready to forgive, the Thirty were not disposed to abandon their conspiracy. The fact became known that they were enlisting an army of mercenaries, and the people, who had just restored the old democratic constitution as it stood before the surrender of the city, marched against them. Their generals who

403 B.C. Spring.

came out to ask for a conference were seized and slain ; the survivors of the Thirty fled from Attica ; and the other Athenians in Eleusis accepted the peace which the Demos again offered to them.

Restoration of the democracy.

The Athenian demos had been guilty of great crimes. They had fallen during the last generation into the perilous habit of mind which sets lightly by

constitutional forms, and by doing as they liked in the case of the victors of Argennoussai they had sealed their downfall : but both after the overthrow of the Four Hundred¹ and on the expulsion of the Thirty and the Ten, they behaved with a deliberate and settled moderation to which it is not easy to do full justice. The amnesty embraced all citizens except the tyrants themselves and their executioners ; and even these might, if they pleased, resume their citizenship on passing the usual trial of magistrates at the end of their term of office. The assembly which restored the old constitution decreed also, by the Psephisma proposed by Tisamenos, that the laws which bore the names of Solon and of Drakon should be amended wherever their provisions were found inconsistent with the recent amnesty. All laws and decrees of the people passed before the suppression of the Demos were pronounced to be valid ; all legislation effected during the usurpation of the Thirty and the Ten was declared to be illegal and void. By this decree all lands reverted at once to the owners who possessed them before the surrender of the city to Lysandros ; but there remained, as rankling wounds in those who had suffered from them, the wholesale thefts of money and movable property, by which the Thirty had enriched themselves and their partisans. With a moderation which by some might be mistaken for apathy, the people, who were at the moment smarting under the effects of these iniquities, decreed that no prosecutions for damages should be allowed which had reference to offences committed before the Archonship of Eukleides, which marked the new birth of the Athenian constitution—the archonship of Pythodoros during the rule of the despots being stigmatised as the Anarchy. Anyone against whom such an action might be brought might plead in bar of it the special provision of the amnesty, and if the plea were admitted, the accuser would not merely be debarred from proceeding with his suit, but would have to pay to the defendant one-sixth part of the amount of his claim. This decree, of course, interfered in no way with the decisions of cases settled under the old democracy ; but it effectually sheltered the robbers of personal property who worshipped the Spartans as their saviours. The despots whom these men put down had glutted themselves with the spoils of the rich : the victorious exiles received no other reward than the wreath of olive which expressed the gratitude of their countrymen, together with the sum of a thousand drachmas for a common sacrifice to the gods. Finally, the Ten had borrowed from Sparta a hundred talents to be employed against the exiles in Peiraiæus. It might fairly have been pleaded that this money should be repaid by those to whom it had been lent or by their representatives. The people insisted

¹ See p. 443.

on treating the debt as a public one, and discharged it as soon as their treasury enabled them to do so. As a foil to this picture, than which we can find nothing more to the credit of any people in any age, we might be disposed to set the exclusive spirit which by the psephisma of Aristophon restricted the citizenship to the sons of parents who both were Athenian citizens. In the days of her maritime empire Athens had been content to insist only on the citizenship of the father, and had granted the right of intermarriage with people beyond the borders of Attica. She was then carrying out a plan which slowly but surely would soften and remove the bitter feelings of exclusiveness inherited from the earliest Aryan society, and in the end make the distinctions between Spartans, Boiotians, Corinthians, and Athenians just those distinctions which exist between the men of Cornwall and Kent, of Sussex and Northumberland. That empire had fallen, and with it had faded away those larger aspirations which would in the end have unfolded themselves into the ideas of national unity in place of city autonomy. Athens was again a single city and nothing more; and the centrifugal spirit which marked all other Hellenic cities reasserted its dominion here.

Before the victory of Thrasybulos had been achieved at Athens, the stormy life of Alkibiades had been ended by murder. After the disaster of Aigospotamoi he felt that his forts ^{Last schemes and death of Alkibiades.} on the Thracian Chersonese would be but a poor defence against his Spartan enemies, and taking refuge ^{404 B.C.} with Pharnabazos, he soon saw through the schemes of Cyrus for dethroning his brother Artaxerxes who had succeeded his father Dareios Nothos. These schemes he was eager to reveal to the monarch himself at Sousa, and for this purpose he besought the satrap to send him thither with the Athenian envoys¹ who after a detention of three years had found their way down to the coast. With this request Pharnabazos, not liking the Spartans and specially jealous of Lysandros, was not indisposed to comply; and had he gone to the capital, it is probable that the attempt of Cyrus which led him to his death at Kunaxa would never have been made. But the eyes of that prince were as keenly watchful as those of Alkibiades: and the Spartans must have known the dangers which they might incur from his intercourse with the men expelled from the various cities by the Lysandrian Decemvirates. Yet it is not likely that Pharnabazos would be determined even by the most urgent remonstrances of Sparta to take the life of a man whom he had received as a guest and to whom he had assigned an abode within his satrapy. The command of Cyrus must have been added to the requests from Sparta: and in obedience to the

¹ See p. 453.

former the order was given for his assassination. The murderers, it is said, were afraid to enter the house where he lived in a Phrygian village, and set it on fire. Their victim rushed out armed only with a dagger, and was struck down by a shower of arrows.

So died the greatest perhaps, and the most systematic, of traitors. From first to last, this brilliant and daring man was his own god; and in order to exalt the object of his worship he stuck at no crime and cared for no law. The most enormous treachery cost him no effort; the most frightful calamities brought about by that treachery caused him no remorse. He had a right, which nothing could take away, to avenge himself of his enemies, and his vengeance must be on a scale proportioned to his own importance. Of any duty to his country or to her constitution he knew nothing. If the conferring of a benefit upon her should be to his own interest, the boon should be bestowed; nay, her generals should even have the benefit of his good advice, if no selfish considerations interfered with the giving of it. Down to the time when the Athenian camp was formed in Samos, his whole career may be described as uniformly infamous. From that time, as some have thought, he was animated by a real patriotism and deserved well of his country. How far such an opinion may be maintained, the facts related in the past history may perhaps show. He cheated his countrymen to the destruction of their constitution by telling them the lie that the Persian king longed for their friendship and was repelled only by their popular government.¹ In order to cover this falsehood, he was compelled to lie again when, taking him at his word, the Athenian envoys appeared before Tissaphernes.² When he had found it convenient to take up the cause of the democracy which he had professed both to despise and to hate, he again cheated the Athenians by assurances, which he knew to be false, of the sincere and profound friendship felt for them by Tissaphernes.³ By falsehood, again, he took credit to himself for preventing the Phœnician fleet from appearing on the side of the Spartans, when he knew that the satrap had made up his mind that it should not appear on the scene of war at all.⁴ In no one of these instances were his acts disinterested or his professions sincere; and with his long course of fraud and falsehood his conference with the generals at Aigospotamoi stands out in solitary contrast. Here beyond doubt he was right; but he was an exile from his country, he was under the ban of Sparta, and he knew that he had an enemy in Tissaphernes. From the two latter he had nothing to expect: in Athens he might yet hope to gain a footing, and his own interest would prompt him to utter a protest against the infa-

¹ See p. 427.² See p. 431.³ See p. 438.⁴ See p. 445.

tuation which was flinging away the Athenian navy. The actions of his whole life were in harmony with the creed of a man who knew no deity but himself.

The schemes which Alkibiades was anxious to reveal to the Persian king were destined to bring about a series of events, which, if they do not belong strictly to Greek history, yet throw a wonderful light on certain characteristics of Greek military life, as well as on the state of things generally at the end of the Peloponnesian war. The close of the long strife left without employment large bodies of men who had been engaged in warfare so long as to feel little desire for more peaceful work. Of all the good qualities of Hellenic soldiers no foreigner was so thoroughly aware as Cyrus. His dealings with Lysandros and the forces under his command had shown him the steadiness of their obedience under discipline, their powers of endurance under hardship, and the sturdiness of their self-dependence in circumstances of difficulty and danger. Of these splendid instruments he resolved to avail himself, when on his father's death he found that the prize which he coveted had slipped from his grasp. Dareios had not declared him his successor, and Artaxerxes,¹ his elder brother, though not born like himself in the purple, sat on the throne. Burning with rage, Cyrus made his way to the Egean coast, with the determination of avenging himself first on Tissaphernes who had charged him with plotting against his brother and then of sweeping that brother from his path. The war which he now openly carried on against Tissaphernes led the Ionian cities to revolt from that satrap and submit themselves to Cyrus, while it blinded Artaxerxes to the further designs for which that war served as a cloak. Miletos was still in the hands of Tissaphernes; and the siege of this city might be made an excuse for raising forces to be used hereafter in more serious undertakings. He might still further promote his own ends by seeming to spend his money solely in the interest of his friends. For this purpose he found a thoroughly congenial spirit in the Lakedaimonian Klearchos who, having been banished, it is said, for gross insubordination to the Ephors as well as for execrable tyranny while Harmostes of Byzantion, was eager to engage himself in any service which promised to feed his appetite for war. The large sum of 10,000 dareiks placed in his hands by the prince enabled Klearchos to raise a mercenary force which he employed against the Thrakians of the Chersonesos, but which was to be at the orders of Cyrus in the event of his needing them. Similar gifts to Aristippos the Aleuad² procured another large force in Thes-

Pleas of Cyrus for the dethronement of Artaxerxes.

405 B.C.

¹ Called Mnemon, it is said, from the excellence of his memory.

² See p. 25.

saly : others were raised by the Arkadian Sophainetos, the Achaian Sokrates, and the Boiotian Proxenos, to be led, so Cyrus declared, against the Pisidian rebels.¹ The army thus raised could be increased by withdrawing from the forces under the command of the Arkadian Xenias all except those which were absolutely needed for the protection of the Ionian cities of Asia Minor. All the troops thus enlisted were gathered at Sardeis, when Cyrus determined to play out his game. He saw around him a hundred thousand non-Hellenic troops whom he despised, and upwards of seven thousand Greek hoplites whose presence was to him a sure pledge of victory. In this brilliant array was the future historian of the expedition and of the more famous retreat which followed it. On the invitation of Proxenos, Xenophon, the friend of Sokrates who still lives for us in his pages, had left Athens where life probably was not altogether a paradise for the men belonging to that class of Knights (Hippeis) who had been the foremost supporters of the detested Thirty. Lured by the highly colored pictures of his friend who spoke of Cyrus as immeasurably dearer to him than his country, Xenophon

401 B.C. appeared before the prince at Sardeis² and was induced to join, as one of the few Greek horsemen in his camp, under the assurance that he was marching to punish the Pisidians and that at the close of the expedition he should at once return home with an ample recompense for his toil. This delusion was shared by all the Greek commanders except Klearchos, who was alone admitted to the secret from the first, and who had, it would seem, declared himself fully able to meet any opposition which might be made when his real object should become known. On reaching the Phrygian city of Kolossai the number of the Greek troops was increased by the arrival of 1,000 hoplites and 500 pel-tasts under the Thessalian Menon. A review of his army at Kelainai, through which his forefather Xerxes was said to have led his millions of slaves, delighted the more keensighted Cyrus with the knowledge that he was the leader of more than 11,000 Hellenic freemen. Taking much the same track which was afterwards to be followed by the crusaders under Godfrey and Tancred, Cyrus found that the impregnable pass of the Tauric range, known as the Kilikian gates, had been left without defenders. The Kilikian chief, bearing the hereditary name Syennesis, had fallen back on learning that Menon had managed to cross the mountains by the pass in his rear, and that the coast was threatened by a Peloponnesian fleet under Samios.³

¹ Xen. *Anab.* i. 1 ; ii. 6.

² Xen. *Anab.* iii. 1, 9.

³ Xen. *H.* iii. 1, gives the latter fact as the real cause of the failure

on the part of Syennesis to defend the mountain pass. The facts related certainly seem to imply that his resistance was chiefly for the

On reaching Tarsos the Greek mercenaries necessarily discovered that they had been drawn thus far by a mere feint. They had left the Pisidians far behind them. The real object aimed at must therefore be the overthrow of the Great King himself. But they had been hired for no such purpose, and they shrank from plunging into a mysterious country which would place a thousand leagues between them and the sea. Klearchos was the only man in the secret, and when the order came to march on, it was met by a flat refusal which called forth summary punishment. But the army was not in the humor to be deterred even by the harshest measures, and the cruelties of Klearchos would disgrace a savage. Violence provoked resistance, and Klearchos, having narrowly escaped being stoned to death, thought it prudent to take another course, and summoned his men to a general assembly. There is something ludicrous in the picture in which Xenophon represents this terrible ruffian as standing before them for a long time weeping like a woman. Hideous in face, timber-toned in voice, he had brought his men by a studied system of severity to fear himself more than they feared the enemy.¹ Beyond the excellent discipline which he maintained he had no title to their consideration; and yet he knew that something might be gained from Greek soldiers by showers of crocodile's tears before he began his address. The whole scene was a sham. He had told Cyrus that such a mutiny was to be looked for as soon as the men should begin to see that Pisidia was not to be the limit of their march, and he had assured him that he knew thoroughly how to deal with it. Thus prepared he began amidst sobs and tears to inform his silent and astonished hearers how keenly the present state of things distressed him. He owed Cyrus a heavy debt of gratitude. The prince had bestowed on him 10,000 dareiks, which he had spent not on himself but in levying men and in providing for their comfort and efficiency. Their refusal to march on would therefore compel him either to be ungrateful to Cyrus or to be treacherous to them. He could have no hesitation in choosing. He should abide by their decision; but for obvious reasons he could do so only as their comrade, not as their leader. He would

sake of keeping up appearances, if Artaxerxes should be successful in resisting Cyrus,—an event which he probably did not expect. His wife Epyaxa had joined the prince on his march through Phrygia, bringing him a large sum of money which relieved him from almost overwhelming difficulties. Nor can much more be said, perhaps, for the earnestness of the Spartans in the matter. The Ephors refused to engage in any contest with the Persian king; but when Cyrus urged his claim on their gratitude for his help in their struggle with Athens, they could not help sending the fleet under Samios with orders to aid Cyrus, if there should be need of so doing.

¹ Xen. *Anab.* ii. 6, 9.

become one of them, and obey whatever officer they might elect. They were to him country, friends, allies, his all, for without them he was worth nothing, without them he could neither injure an enemy nor help a friend. In this sense his words were undoubtedly true. His address was received with hearty cheers, and more than 2,000 men left the encampment of Xenias and Pasion and took up their position by that of Klearchos.

The tidings of the mutiny caused to Cyrus deep perplexity. He sent for Klearchos: but that leader, while he refused to go, Reluctance of the Greeks to march with Cyrus. sent a private message to assure him that he would set everything straight in the end, and requested him to repeat his summons again and again in order that, again and again, he might refuse to comply with it. In a second assembly the resolution was taken to ask Cyrus plainly what he wished and intended to do. By his answer they might decide whether to go on or not. Cyrus, instructed, we cannot doubt, by Klearchos, told them that he must advance some 300 miles further to the Euphrates, where he had to punish his enemy Abrokomas. If they should find him there, he would punish him; if Abrokomas should have fled still further,—why, then, they would consider what it might be best to do. The soldiers knew well enough what the excuse meant; but they had not been told in so many words that they were marching against the king, retreat was practically impossible, and their reluctance was in some measure overcome by a promised increase of fifty per cent. to their pay.

The sequel of the story to the catastrophe at Kunaxa exhibits little more than the incompetence of Persians in contests with a The march to Kunaxa. disciplined enemy. Mountain passes, rivers, canals, all of them presenting barriers almost insuperable, are successively abandoned, to the astonishment and the benefit of the invader. At Thapsakos on the Euphrates the army was plainly informed that the enemy whom Cyrus wished to punish was not Abrokomas but Artaxerxes. The announcement was received with murmurs; but these were confined to an expression of their dissatisfaction at having been deceived and to a demand for a recompense such as that which Cyrus had given to his Hellenic guards when he went to see his father Dareios in his last illness. Cyrus promised them a donation of five silver minas (nearly 20*l.*) each as soon as they should reach Babylon, together with full pay until they should again reach Ionia. In a review which he held soon afterwards Cyrus bade his Greek soldiers act worthily of their freedom,—a blessing for which he heartily envied them, and in exchange for which he would gladly yield up all that he possessed.

In the course of the march the prophet Silanos had told Cyrus that no battle would take place for ten days, and the prince had promised to give him 3,000 dareiks if his words should prove true. The ten days had passed without any engagement, and Cyrus fulfilled his promise. He had well-nigh convinced himself that Artaxerxes had given up all intention of fighting; and this impression was strengthened when he found that not a man had been left to defend a trench, thirty feet broad and eighteen feet deep, which had been dug specially to oppose the Cyreian army, and which extended for a space of about forty English miles, as far as the wall of Media, along the plain lying between the Euphrates and the Tigris. Between the former river and the trench a passage of only twenty feet in width had been left; and a few well-armed and well-disciplined companies might have held such a passage against a host. Having passed this narrow inlet, Cyrus saw, not indeed his enemy, but clear traces of his recent flight. He began to look upon his prize as won without a blow. On the second day after passing the trench the army was approaching the station appointed for the noon-tide meal, when the tidings were brought that Artaxerxes was advancing across the plain with his army in order of battle. One or two hours still passed before the cloud of dust was seen which shrouded the royal squadrons, and the Cyreians had thus ample time to form in fighting array. The dispositions of Cyrus were simple and judicious. His object was to strike straight at the centre of the Persian host which surrounded the king; and this work of paramount importance he assigned to the Greeks, whose first interest it was to secure the safety of Cyrus. But the tendency of Greek hoplites in a battle was always to work to the right; and in the battle, while his Greek troops had already won an easy victory and were pursuing the enemy opposed to them, the force surrounding the king stretched away to the left and threatened to outflank the army of Cyrus, who instantly charged with his guard of six hundred horsemen. The onset was thoroughly successful. The ranks of the royal troops were broken, and the Cyreians hastened away in pursuit, leaving the prince attended only by a small knot of men. At that moment Cyrus caught sight of his brother, and the feeling of personal rage, thus roused to boiling heat, cast to the winds all restraints of prudence. 'I see the man,' he cried, as he dashed at the king, wounding him through the breastplate. In the next instant he was himself struck down by a severe blow in the eye, and in a few moments more he was slain with eight of his bravest men.

The head and the right hand of Cyrus paraded in the front

ranks of Artaxerxes showed to the native army of the prince that the strife was at an end, and the discovery of his death was followed by their immediate flight to the station which they had occupied the night before. The Greeks were three or four miles distant pursuing the Persians whom they had routed, when they heard that the enemy had been victorious on the left. Hurrying back, they found the king's troops moving towards them in order of battle; but the onset of the Greeks again filled them with terror, and these also fled in dismay. Still nothing was known of Cyrus, and vain guesses were made of the reasons which might keep him out of sight. At length going back to the camp, the Greeks found it plundered, although the ravagers were gone. The suddenness with which the battle began had left them no time for their noonday meal, and there was nothing forthcoming for their supper. On the next morning they learnt that Cyrus had been killed and that their own victory had been won in vain. But when Phalinos, an Arkadian Greek, appearing along with the surgeon and historian Ktesias, as an envoy from the king, bade them lay down their arms, Klearchos answered that such commands were not usually obeyed by conquerors, and asked Phalinos what advice he, as a Greek, would under the circumstances give to his countrymen. 'If I could see but one chance in your favor out of ten thousand,' was the answer, 'I should urge you to hold out to the uttermost; but I see none, so I counsel you to take what you can get.' 'That is what you think,' retorted Klearchos; 'now go and tell the king from us, that if he wishes to have us as his friends, we shall be of more use to him with our arms than without them, and if he would treat us as enemies, we shall with our weapons be of more use to ourselves.' Phalinos, promising to take back this message, added that the king proclaimed a truce so long as the Greeks remained where they were, while any change of position would be regarded as a declaration of war. 'What am I to say about this?' asked Phalinos. 'Say that we are of the same mind with the king.' 'And what mind is that?' he asked again. 'Why, that there is to be truce, if we stay where we are, and war, if we move.' At best their situation was full of danger. On hearing of the death of Cyrus, they had sent to Ariaïos the commander of his native army, offering to place him on the Persian throne, as, being the victors, they had both the right and the power to do. This offer Ariaïos had declined, on the ground that the Persian grandees would never submit to such an arrangement, and he had announced at the same time his purpose of immediate retreat. The only course open to them, as it seemed, was to retreat along with him. A solemn compact made with Ariaïos was followed by a resolution to march onwards with the utmost speed. Before

the day closed they saw, as they thought, the main body of their enemies. The night was spent in a state of noisy confusion which so frightened the army of Artaxerxes that in the morning not a man or beast was visible; and the wholesome effects of this alarm were seen in the arrival of heralds who came not with demands for surrender but with proposals for a truce. Klearchos received the offer with the rejoinder that before the truce there must be a battle, for his men were hungry and they must have something to eat, and no man should dare to talk to them about peace who failed to furnish them a dinner. The answer, allowing the justice of their demand, was brought back with a speed which convinced the Greeks that the king or his responsible agent must be close at hand: and the concession showed that the best method of dealing with Persians was bravado. At the end of three days Tissaphernes appeared, charged, as he said, by the king to ask why the Greeks had come up against him. Klearchos answered in words perfectly true in every mouth but his own, that they had set out without the least idea of their destination, that Cyrus had led them on by vague pretexts and promises from one stage to another, and that the Greeks, having received much good at his hands, shrank from deserting a benefactor in the hour of his need. Cyrus was now dead; with the king they had no quarrel, and their only wish was to return home without doing him any harm, if they should be suffered to depart unmolested. Tissaphernes promised to deliver their message, and bound them to observe the truce until they saw him again.

Twenty days passed, and still there was no sign of the coming of the satrap. The king and his advisers had probably taken the true measure of their position. The presence of the Greeks was dangerous chiefly in the effect which it might have on the Babylonians. The memory of their ancient independence and of previous revolts against the Persian king might quicken their impatience of the inordinate burden laid on them in the shape of yearly tribute. It was therefore of the first consequence to isolate the Greeks and to bring home to them the overwhelming perils by which they were surrounded. The first step was to detach from them the native army of Cyrus, and this was done by offering to the latter a complete amnesty for the past. The estrangement thus caused between them and the Greek mercenary force clearly revealed the purpose of the king: but when the Greeks expressed their fears to their general, Klearchos could only insist on the difficulty or the impossibility of retreating against the will of the despot, and on the unlikelihood that Artaxerxes would have entered into a solemn compact with them, if his only desire was to destroy them. Such

Efforts of Artaxerxes to prevent the Greeks from marching to Babylon.

treachery would make his name vile among Greeks and barbarians alike.

At length Tissaphernes came, fully prepared for his returning to his satrapy, and the whole Cyreian army set out on its retreat.

Treachery of Tissaphernes, ending in the murder of Klearchos and other Greek leaders. The Greeks marched as a distinct body and with the utmost caution; but in spite of the care with which their leaders sought to keep them asunder, their foraging parties would from time to time come into collision, and thus aggravate the evil feeling already awakened between them. They were now moving nearly due east.

Three marches brought them to the wall of Media, two more to the flourishing town of Sittakê on the Tigris, not far from the present Bagdad. From this point, after crossing the river, four marches in a northwesterly direction brought them to the city of Opis near the river Physkos. A halt of three days on the banks of the Great Zab was marked by so manifest an increase of suspicion and irritation between the Greeks and the forces of Tissaphernes, that Klearchos resolved to do what he could to bring this wretched state of things to an end, and demanded an interview with the satrap. His words taught Tissaphernes how to lay his snare. Exaggerating, and beyond doubt with a set purpose, the means which he had of annoying and ruining them, he cordially invited Klearchos with all his generals and chief officers to a conference in his tent on the following day. With astonishing simplicity Klearchos promised to bring them all, and with infatuation still more marvellous refused to be turned from his purpose, when warned that Tissaphernes was not to be trusted. On the following day he appeared at the tent-door, accompanied by the Thessalian Menon, the Arkadian Agias, the Achaian Sokrates, and the Boiotian Proxenos. Twenty Lochagoi or captains with 200 men, forming their escort, remained outside, while the generals had entered the tent. Presently the signal was given. The generals were seized and bound, the officers and soldiers outside were cut down. One man only, Nikarchos an Arkadian,¹ escaped into the Greek camp with a ghastly and fearful wound, and told the terrible story. Fearing instant attack, the Greeks flew to their arms. There can be little doubt that by an instant onslaught the Persians might have crushed them through sheer fright and force of numbers; but here, as elsewhere, they showed themselves impotent for all active opposition. Nothing followed beyond a visit from Ariaaios and some other grandees with a guard of about 300 men, who demanded to speak with the Greek leaders. In the absence of the Spartan Cheirisophos, the Orchomenian Kleanor and Sophainetos of Stymphalos came forward

¹This man lived to desert his countrymen soon afterwards. Xen. *Anab.* iii. 3, 5.

with Xenophon and were informed that Klearchos had paid with his life the penalty of his treachery, while Proxenos and Menon were to be highly rewarded for revealing his crimes. The speaker wound up with a demand for the instant surrender of their arms, and was met by an outburst of indignant wrath at the monstrous and godless conduct of Tissaphernes. 'If Klearchos was a traitor and has met a traitor's doom,' said Xenophon, 'be it so. But you say that Proxenos and Menon are your benefactors. They are also our leaders. Send them to us, and then everything can be settled.'

The Persians had thought that the power of the Greeks lay only in the generals, and that if these could be cut off like the locks of Samson, the giant would be powerless in their hands.¹ They were wholly mistaken. For the moment, indeed, there was universal depression. The men lay about, as chance placed them, thinking little of the duty of keeping guard or the need of preparing food, but lost in a vain yearning for the homes, the parents, wives, children, kinsfolk, whom they dared not hope to see again. Scarcely a man in the army closed his eyes in sleep, and among these weary watchers was the Athenian Xenophon. Having joined as a simple volunteer, he had no official rank; but none the less the common peril pressed heavily on his heart. 'Why do I lie here?' he asked himself. 'The night is creeping on. The morning, it is likely, will bring the enemy, and defeat will be followed by insults, tortures, and death. Yet here all lie, as though it were a time for rest; and am I to wait until some officer comes forward to give counsel and to act? To whom am I to look for this, and am I not old enough for the task? Assuredly I shall be but little the older, if this coming day sees me a captive.' Rising up hastily and summoning the captains who had served under his friend Proxenos, Xenophon with manly courage and good sense told them that on the whole the present state of things was better than that which had preceded it. The treaty made with Tissaphernes had hampered and clogged them; the atrocious treachery by which the Persians had broken the compact had at least left them free, and they could now trust to the strength of their weapons and their muscles, and to the help of the gods who fight against the perjured. For himself he was willing, he added, either to follow or to lead. One voice only was raised against the general shout which summoned Xenophon to take the command; and that voice spoke of the impossibility of escaping unless they came to terms with the king. The reply was obvious. So long as he thought that he could do so with safety, the king had tried to bully them into surrender; on their blunt refusal he had at once offered a truce. Again, Klearchos and his

Energy of Xenophon, who is appointed one of the new generals.

fellow-generals had trusted Tissaphernes, and what had been the issue? It was idle to talk of peace: and the man who had proposed it was thrust out of the assembly. The rest went throughout the army, summoning the officers who had not followed Klearchos into the snare. When these were gathered, to the number of perhaps a hundred, midnight had already come. At the request of the Eleian Hieronymos, Xenophon again addressed them. Dwelling on the splendid opportunity which they had of doing a righteous work, he exhorted them to display a double portion of zeal and self-sacrifice.

A stronger contrast could scarcely be drawn between the presence of mind and readiness of resource with which Xenophon met an emergency wholly unlooked for, and the utter incapacity and helplessness by which Nikias at Syracuse not only lost a series of golden opportunities, but in spite of all the efforts of his colleague Demosthenes dragged to ruin a far larger and more magnificently equipped armament. In fact, the genius of that gifted and conscientious leader, who but for Nikias would have brought the whole Athenian force in safety from Sicily, is largely reproduced in Xenophon. In both there is the same power of grappling with circumstances, the same simplicity of expression, the same endurance under pressing difficulties. In the council which followed the election of the generals, Xenophon told his colleagues that if they had behaved as brave men while they were seeking to place Cyrus on the Persian throne, their duty was increased tenfold now that the safety of the whole army was at stake. They must show the Persians not only that they mean to go home, but that they are fully able to carry out their purpose, and that in place of the one Klearchos whom they had entrapped the Greeks had now a thousand. Time pressed; they must hasten away. To do so with the greatest chance of success they must have as few incumbrances as possible. The waggons and all superfluous baggage must be burnt, as so to leave the largest number of soldiers available for action. The effect of these energetic counsels was seen on the arrival of another Persian deputation headed by Mithridates, who began to preach on the old text of Tissaphernes and Ariaïos. It was decided at once that no more messages should be received, and that all heralds should be sent away unheard.

The Greeks now crossed the Zab; but they had not advanced far when they were attacked by Mithridates at the head of a force of slingers and mounted bowmen, whose weapons went much further than those of the archers and javelinmen in the army of the Greeks. An attempt to repel them by an attack of hoplites ended in severe loss; but like Gylippos

Passage of
the Zab
river.

at Syracuse,¹ Xenophon took on himself the full discredit of the defeat, and urged the formation of a new force of Rhodian archers and of cavalry who might be supplied with such horses as could be spared from indispensable service as baggage carriers.

When on the following day Mithridates hung on their march with 1,000 horsemen and 4,000 archers and slingers, under the conviction that with this force he would make them all prisoners before the day was done, he found himself speedily undeceived. Many of his people were slain, and the Greeks, to frighten them more thoroughly, hacked and mutilated their bodies. But the march of the Greeks was still perilous and toilsome; nor could anything have brought them safely through, had not Xenophon acquired over them a moral ascendancy, which called forth an obedience highly creditable to men so situated. The real struggle came when, about fifty miles to the north of the Great Zab river, they approached the terrible rocks and defiles which sheltered the fastnesses of the Karduchian mountaineers. In these fierce hillmen they encountered enemies very different from the Persians whose despot reigned only over the plains, and whose armies had in vain striven to assail their terrible strongholds. Here there was nothing to save them from destruction but a swiftness of movement which should put them in possession of one commanding height above another before the barbarians could reach them. In each instance the feat was successfully accomplished. At length they found themselves in the Armenian satrapy of Tiribazos, a man far more formidable than Tissaphernes. Nor was this the only addition to their dangers. The table lands of Armenia stand high up among the mighty chains of mountains which rise into their most tremendous masses between the Euxine and the Caspian seas. These bare regions are exposed to merciless winds and fearful snowstorms; and the Greeks were crossing them in the depth of winter. But in spite of all obstacles they not only held on, but struck hard blows at their enemies. The camp of Tiribazos was attacked, his men put to flight, his tent taken with a rich booty of goblets and other vessels. The successful crossing of the Euphrates,² not far from its source, was followed by weather so bad and by a wind so piercingly cold that the prophets offered a sacrifice to the wind god. The remedy, we are told, was instantly effectual. The storm went down and the temperature rose; but the snow was six feet deep, and men and beasts alike suffered miserably.

The enemy was close behind them and might fall at any moment

¹ See p. 388.

² The Eastern branch, now called the Murad.

on their sick. By a feigned attack, to which the frost-bitten soldiers added what effect they could by shouting and clashing their shields, Xenophon frightened off the natives in the rear. By careful treatment of the headman of a village where they found both food and quarters, he obtained a guide whose services were lost to them a week later by the imprudence of Cheirisophos. The Spartan leader had allowed the man to walk unbound, and had struck him for his failure to bring them to fresh villages. The headman naturally ran off during the night, and the Greeks made their way as they could after five marches to the banks of a stream which Xenophon calls the Phasis.¹ This river they crossed only to find themselves somewhat further on face to face with the tribesmen of the Chalybes, Taochoi, and Phasianoi, who blocked the pass to the plain beyond. The advice of Cheirisophos was that they should defer their attack to the following day; Kleanor advised them to eat and then fall on at once, unless they wished to double the confidence and probably the numbers of their enemies. More cool, and taking a better view of the position, Xenophon told them that an immediate attack would be not only most perilous but wholly superfluous. It was easier to find some other path in the darkness of night than to fight their way up a pass by sunlight. His advice was taken, and the pass was carried. The barbarians fled, leaving not many dead but a large number of wickerwork shields, which the Greeks rendered useless by cutting them with their daggers.

Five marches brought them from this pass through a plain, the villages of which yielded fair supplies, to a stronghold in which the Taochoi had gathered their women, their children, and their cattle, trusting simply to the strength of their unfortified position. The cattle seized on this fastness supplied the army with food till they reached the river Harpasos, after the passage of which four marches brought them to the large and flourishing city of Gymnias. A guide sent to them by the headman of this place gaged his life as a forfeit if he failed to bring them within five days to the sight of the sea; but they had not marched far before he besought them to ravage and destroy the surrounding country. His zeal was now explained; but he also kept his word. On the fifth day the mountain called Thêchês rose before them. As the foremost men reached the summit, they saw far away the waters of the Euxine stretching out into the blue distance. The shout of joy with which they greeted the longed-for sight swelled to tumult as others hurried up after them. To Xenophon the din seemed to betoken a sudden onslaught of enemies in front, for the in-

¹ This stream cannot be identified. It was, of course, not the same as the Phasis of the Kolchian land.

Journey of
the Greeks
to mount
Thêchês.
400 B.C.

habitants of the country which they had burnt and harried hung on them in the rear. Hurriedly mounting his horse, he spurred on with the cavalry. As he approached the summit, he could distinguish the exulting cry, the Sea, the Sea, which seemed to give the assurance that their long toil was already ended. The vehement southern nature, repressed thus far or borne down, burst out in sobs and tears. Officers and men threw themselves weeping into each other's arms. Then, as the baggage train came up and all were now in safety, a sudden impulse drove the soldiers to gather stones, and a mighty cairn was raised to mark the spot where the sea greeted the Ten Thousand on their wonderful march from the plains of Babylon.

On the opposite side of the stream which bordered the country of the Makrónes, a large gathering of natives threatened an opposition which the nature of the banks, rough with stones and brushwood, might render serious. Happily a man in the army, who had been a slave at Athens and had perhaps been among those who made their escape to Dekeleia, professed to recognise in their speech his own mother tongue, and was commissioned to ask them the reason of their opposition. 'Simply because you are invading our country,' was the answer; and the reply that the Greeks wished only for a passage to the sea on their way to Hellas after making war with the Great King converted them from angry enemies into zealous friends. Further on the Kolchians offered a more stubborn resistance, but were put to flight, and the army reached at last the Hellenic city and Sinopean colony of Trapezous (Trebizond).¹ The sojourn of a month in the neighboring Kolchian villages, gave time not only for rest and refreshment but for plundering forays into the surrounding country.

They had reached the sea,² but their troubles were not at an end. The feeling of disgust at long-continued hardships broke out in the passionate exclamation of the Thourian Antileon. 'I am sick of running, drilling, keeping guard, and fighting. I will have no more of these worries: what I want is to lay myself down in a ship and be carried to Hellas stretched out in the slumber of Odysseus. His words

¹ See p. 57.

² The line of the Greek march from Kunaxa can be traced with tolerable clearness and certainty until they enter the mountain regions of the Karduchians or Koords. From that time until they reach Trapezous, the tracks assigned to them are in great measure conjectural. The chief rivers which Xenophon represents them as crossing on

their northward marches, are the Kentrites, the Teleboas, the Harposos, and the Euphrates. The first of these is in all probability the Buhtan-Chai, which after a westerly course falls into the Tigris. The Teleboas may be the Kara-su (Black Water) which runs into the Eastern Euphrates or Murad, and the Harposos may be the Tchorkuk-su. The only warm spring known

were received with shouts of applause: but whatever their wishes might be, ships were not forthcoming, and Cheirisophos undertook to go and get them from his friend Anaxibios, the harmost of Byzantion. His departure left to Xenophon the task of regulating the whole army until his return. To all his counsels about the discipline of the camp and the arrangement of foraging expeditions they gave unanimous assent: when in the event of other means failing them he urged the need of insisting that the inhabitants of the maritime cities should put the roads in good order for their march, his proposal was met by angry and even wrathful murmurs. They would not stir a step by land: they were quite willing to gather a fleet of transports by seizing such merchant vessels as might be passing. Many were thus seized, their rudders taken off and their cargoes put under guard, to be restored to the owners together with a fair recompense in money for the use of the ships when they should be no longer needed. Time passed on. Their wants were supplied chiefly by inroads into the lands of hostile tribes; but Cheirisophos did not return, and the hated march by land was seen to be inevitable for all who could not be taken into the merchantmen. Room could be found only for the sick, for the women and children, and the men who might be over forty years of age. These were accordingly embarked, and three days later the fleet and the army reached Kerasous,¹ another colony from Sinope. During the ten days spent here, a review showed that they could still muster 8,600 heavy-armed men, making up with the light-armed troops a total exceeding a myriad. No such Greek force had been seen in the countries bordering on the Black Sea, and no Greek force had performed with so little loss an exploit altogether unparalleled in the history of Hellenic warfare. The

to exist south of the Bingöl-dagh has been naturally supposed to be the hot spring mentioned in the narrative of the retreat. With more likelihood the city of Gymnias has been identified with the modern town Gumisch-Khana, notable for its silver mine, which would account for the size and prosperity of the ancient city. The name Thêchês seems to be preserved in that of the mountain-range known as the Tekieh-Dagh; but the spot where the soldiers first caught sight of the sea is not determined. Beyond these conjectures, with their different degrees of likelihood, we can speak with confidence only of the general direction of their march, which must at first have been

northward and then, after the crossing of the Euphrates, westward. If the time spent on the march seem long, this impression will be at once removed when we take into account the enormous difficulties of a winter journey even for modern travellers among the mountains of Armenia; and the Greeks were frequently without guides, fighting their way through the territories of hostile clans, and dependent for their support on what they might get either by purchase or by force.

¹ The fact here stated proves of itself that this Kerasous is not the town which now bears the same name. The modern Kerasoun, it is asserted, could not be reached from Trebizond in less than ten days.

lives of 2,000 men,¹ or more, had it is true been sacrificed in the march between Sardeis and Kunaxa, among the Karduchian defiles and in the deadly cold of an Armenian winter; but few retreats, nevertheless, have under like circumstances been effected at so small a sacrifice. The fame of this great achievement preceded them from one Hellenic city to another; but admiration for the skill of the leaders and the endurance of the men had a hard struggle with the stronger feelings of suspicion and fear. Their intentions and wishes could not be known until they were clearly announced; and even then the harsh measures forced upon Xenophon and his followers in order to obtain the indispensable supplies of food might seem to give the lie to their professions. This uncertainty as to their character might at one moment make the inhabitants of the cities which they approached nervously afraid of admitting them within their walls, and at another feverishly anxious to be rid of guests so burdensome and so formidable.

Passing on from Kerasous, the army reached the borders of the Mosynoikoi, who by their messenger the Trapezuntine Timesitheos declared that they would not let the Greeks pass through their land, if they came with any hostile intent, but added that they would not be sorry to have their services against some neighboring enemies. The bargain was struck; but the discipline of the Greeks was no longer what it had been, and the first enterprise undertaken ended in something like ignominious defeat. The attack had been irregular, and Xenophon expressed himself as rather gratified than vexed at a reverse which showed to them the true character of their guides and the paramount need of maintaining order among themselves. A second foray carried out with their old discipline yielded abundant booty, and the stores of bread and grain sustained the army on their march through the lands of barbarous tribes, until they reached another of those isolated settlements which Greek enterprise had scattered far beyond the bounds of Continuous or Continental Hellas.² At this city of Kotyora, a colony from Sinôpê, the Cyreians ended their land march, but not their troubles. Eight months had passed since the prince who had lured them to the great Mesopotamian plain had flung away his

Protest of
the envoys
from Sinôpê.

¹ The total numbers of the Greeks gathered at Issos fell short of 14,000 by only 100. But one thousand had, by whatever means, disappeared before the battle of Kunaxa. If the numbers reviewed at Kerasous amounted to about a myriad (Xen. *An.* v. 7, 9), includ-

ing the peltastai and other light-armed troops, the men who had dropped away in the interval would be not far short of 3,000,—a loss which, if desertions be taken into account, is in no way surprising.

² See Book I. ch. 8.

life on the field of Kunaxa, and during those months they had worked or fought their way over not less than 2,300 miles. Here for five-and-forty days the army rested, while processions and games, celebrated according to the usages of the several Hellenic tribes represented among the troops, expressed their gratitude to the gods. The fame of their achievements and the tidings of their arrival at Kotyora roused at Sinôpê feelings of fear, bordering on dismay, which found vent in angry remonstrances. As spokesman of their envoys, Hekatonymos, beginning with compliments on their valor and endurance, charged the Cyreian generals with forcing their way into an Hellenic city and plundering its territories, and threatened to bring on them the forces of the Paphlagonian chief Korylas, if this offence should be continued.

The Sinopeans had made a false move. Among the leaders of the Ten Thousand was, as we have seen, one whose fertility of resource and readiness of speech never failed him : and Reply of Xenophon. in Xenophon, true Athenian by training, though not in temper, they found their match. 'If the men of Kotyora,' he replied, 'have suffered any hurt at our hands, it is they who are to blame. They shut their gates against us, and would not admit us to market, letting us know at the same time that they were acting by the orders of the Harmost whom you set over them. We insisted, it is true, that they should receive our sick, and when they refused, we forced an entrance for them ; but the men so brought in are living at their own charges. As to Korylas, your threats are thrown away. We know that there is nothing which would please him more than to become master of your city and of the sea coast ; and we can easily gain his friendship by promising to help him in the matters which he has at heart.'

Knowing that there was but too much truth in these words, the colleagues of Hekatonymos hastened to disclaim all complicity in his unfriendly speech, and to say that their mission Alleged difficulties of the land march from Kotyora. was not merely to promise them hearty hospitality when they reached Kotyora, but to relieve abundantly their immediate wants. On the following day when the Cyreian generals in full assembly consulted the Sinopean envoys on the course which they ought to take, Hekatonymos apologised for his intemperate threats, and hastened to give his disinterested advice. Enumerating the perils which they would encounter, whether from hostile tribes or in the passage of impetuous rivers, he insisted that the land journey was not merely difficult but impossible ; but to Sinôpê and thence to Herakleia they could go by sea, and at the latter place they would find no lack of vessels to take them wherever they might choose to go.

Of the hearers of Hekatonymos some thought that he spoke in the interests of Korylas, others that he was fishing for bribes for himself, others again that he wished to prevent their harming the Sinopean territory by a land march. Nevertheless, the decision was in favor of the sea voyage.

When at length the army landed at Sinôpê,¹ they were received with some show of hospitality; but the corn and wine which refreshed their bodies could not make them forget that their purses were empty. Here they were, fast approaching the boundaries of the Hellenic world, and they were no richer than when they had left Sardeis. The mischief of having many masters seemed to be the cause of their poverty; the remedy therefore lay in giving absolute power to a single general, and their choice fell upon Xenophon. He received the invitation with a natural feeling of pleasure in the thought that his fame would now travel quicker to Athens, and that he could return home a greater man. There was, further, the more generous desire of improving the fortunes of his comrades; but his habitual caution warned him that he might pay dearly for this pre-eminence, and again following the advice of his master, Sokrates, he sought by sacrifice to ascertain the will of Zeus the King. The vision of an eagle sitting down made his path still more clear: had he seen the royal bird on the wing he might have stretched out his hand to grasp the sceptre offered to him. As it was, he told the Cyreians, when next they met, that as an Athenian he could not presume to take the supreme command over the representatives of the imperial city which had humbled Athens in the dust. In his place the soldiers chose the Spartan Cheirisophos, who had returned, not, as they had hoped, with a fleet, but in a single trireme, charged with specious compliments from the Byzantine harmost Anaxibios and with vague promises that the army should be taken into pay so soon as they reached the Propontis.

At Chrysopolis Xenophon received proposals from the Thracian chief Seuthes, who begged him to bring the Cyreians across the sea and engage them in his service. His reply was that their passage was already determined on, that he himself meant to leave the army, and that Seuthes might make what agreements he pleased with those who remained behind him. The Cyreians reached Byzantion cheered with the hope that their troubles were ended; but they were never more mistaken. The harmost Anaxibios had promised them pay from the moment of their landing: his only anxiety, when they

Election of Cheirisophos as general with supreme power. 400 B.C.

Treachery of Anaxibios, and consequent tumult at Byzantion.

This city was a colony from Miletos.

entered the city, was to get them out again with the utmost speed. Xenophon was accordingly charged to summon them to a muster without the walls; and Anaxibios was explaining to the generals the arrangements which he had made for their payment on their reaching the Chersonesos, when by some means or other the soldiers who were without the city learnt how they were to be again cheated. Eteonikos, whom we have already met at Chios and on the Thraceward coasts,¹ stood at the gate, ready to shut it as soon as the last man should have passed out. With cries of anger the soldiers seized their arms and hurried back to the gate only to see the ponderous doors closed in their faces and hear the bolt shot home. Their threats were seconded effectually by other Cyreians who, not having yet left the city, split the bars with hatchets and let their comrades in. In wild terror Anaxibios ran to the sea and getting into a boat made his escape to the Akropolis, while the indignant soldiers besought Xenophon to avail himself of the golden opportunity. 'Now,' they said, 'you can help us indeed, and we can make you great. You have a city, you have triremes, you have money, you have an army.' With a presence of mind which probably no other of the generals could have maintained, Xenophon, pretending to throw himself into their humor, commanded them to resume at once their strict military array. His order was obeyed, and he then went on to show them the desperate straits to which successful violence must bring them. With the readiness of Athenian eloquence he bade them remember how completely the power of Sparta must in the end bear down any opposition which they might make to it. Athens had entered into the struggle with her confederacy, relying on the wealth of an empire such as the Hellenic world had never yet seen; the issue had been the demolition of her walls and the complete establishment of Spartan despotism. For himself he would rather be ten thousand fathoms underground than lead them to certain ruin.

By his advice the Cyreians sent a messenger to inform Anaxibios that they had entered Byzantion not with any purpose of violence but solely as relying on his promises, and that *Intrigues of Anaxibios.* now they would go out peaceably, not because he had deceived them, but because they acknowledged the constraints of duty and law. We cannot doubt that the people of Byzantion were thus saved from indiscriminate pillage, and the Spartans from the necessity of wreaking a terrible revenge on the men whom their officers had goaded into frantic wrath. The prevention of so great a calamity was a worthy ending of the many good deeds done by a man in whom Athenian culture had not strengthened the love of his native state. Although the dark cloud still

¹ See p. 474 et seq.

lowered over the remnant of the Ten Thousand, and they were still to encounter much distress and danger, the sequel of the story was to exhibit Xenophon in the light of the successful adventurer as well as in that of the general who has to hope against hope in his struggle with overwhelming difficulties. For the present, Xenophon left the army and returned with Kleandros into Byzantion, having bidden his comrades, as he thought, a final farewell. For these the prospect was far from encouraging. They were tempted in the first instance by the proposals of the Theban Koira-tadas, a professional leader of Condottieri (a class of men of whom we now hear for the first time); but the matter ended only in disappointment, and disappointment led to angry disputes among the leaders. Some wished to enter the service of Seuthes; Neon, who on the death of Cheirisophos had been chosen to take his place, was anxious to march to the Chersonese; Timasion was eager to cross back into Asia and thence to sail home; and the number of desertions seemed to make it likely that the great Cyreian army would soon melt away. Such a result Anaxibios in his present mood most heartily desired; but his feelings were soon to undergo a great revulsion. On his voyage from Byzantion he met Aristarchos, who had been sent from Sparta to succeed Kleandros as governor of Byzantion, and who told him that he himself was to be superseded by Pólos. Resolved to sting where he could not strike, Anaxibios as he parted with Aristarchos charged him to sell all the Cyreians whom he might find within the walls of the city. These were the sick to whom Kleandros had gladly furnished shelter: by Aristarchos all (and their number was at least 400) were sold into slavery. We seek with loathing to escape from an atmosphere laden with intolerable selfishness. No sooner has Anaxibios insured the commission of this wrong against the sick Cyreians in Byzantion than he turns to the plan of employing their former comrades in a private war against Pharnabazos, who had treated him with contempt when he found that the sceptre of office had fallen from his hands. As eagerly as he had before sought to break them up, so now he earnestly besought Xenophon to get them all together and bring them to Perinthos for immediate transportation into Asia. Crossing the Propontis from Parion Xenophon appeared again among the Cyreians, to their great delight. The scheme of Anaxibios was agreed to with hearty readiness, and the army marched hastily to the place of embarkation. But Aristarchos, the new harmost of Byzantion, although he was ready to sell Greek freemen into slavery, had no friendly feeling for the man who suggested the crime. Hurrying to Perinthos, he forbade the passage of the troops across the sea: and when Xenophon replied that he was acting by the orders of Anaxibios,

Aristarchos answered briefly, 'Anaxibios is no longer admiral, and if I catch any of you on the sea I will sink you.' The plan was thus foiled, for the attempt to cross in face of the Spartan fleet would be madness. But Aristarchos was not to be thus contented, and when he summoned all the Cyreian officers to his presence, Xenophon understood the meaning of a warning which he had received against entering the walls of the town. Remaining outside under pretence of sacrificing, he learnt that Aristarchos had dismissed his colleagues with orders to come again in the afternoon. The trap was set not by a Persian satrap but by a Spartan harmost; and Xenophon might have been forgiven if he had supposed that a Greek would scarcely stoop to the treachery which had lured Klearchos to his doom.¹ More cautious than the victims of Tissaphernes, Xenophon set out at once for the camp of Seuthes, and there entered into engagements which seemed to promise not merely maintenance but wealth for the Cyreians. Disappointment again awaited them. The pleasures of attacking and burning Thracian villages were not heightened by the bitter cold of a Thracian winter; and when the paymaster of Seuthes, a Greek named Herakleides, offered them as payment for a month the wages of twenty days, Xenophon lost the favor of that chief by insisting on the rights of the soldiers, while the latter were led to believe that the man to whom they owed their salvation after the fight of Kunaxa was enriching himself at their cost. Months thus dragged their weary length along, until at last messengers came with the tidings that the Spartan state needed their services in the war which the Spartans had declared against Tissaphernes. The news filled Seuthes with the hope that he might avoid paying the money due to them, while it let loose among the Cyreians the tongues of all who suspected or hated Xenophon. The charges brought against him were not only triumphantly rebutted, but by the dexterity of an Athenian named Polykrates were turned against Herakleides. That worthy man lost no time in warning Seuthes that prudence suggested instant flight for both. Mounting their horses at once, the chief and his paymaster hurried away.

But the power or the fear of Sparta was too great even for Seuthes. Threats of determined action in case of refusal extorted from him the wages due to the Cyreians, whose numbers were now reduced to 6,000, and the army at length crossed to Lampsakos, where Xenophon found an old friend in the Phliasian prophet Eukleides. The latter, expressing his joy at seeing him safe, asked him how much money he had. 'I have sold my horse,' was the answer, 'for fifty dareiks, to furnish me with the means of getting home.'

Operations
of the Cy-
reians in
Asia Minor,
and return
of Xenophon
to Athens.

¹ See p. 506.

The seer, supposing that he must have returned laden with wealth, could scarcely believe him ; but when on questioning him further he learnt that Xenophon, although he had sacrificed to Zeus the King, had offered nothing since he left Athens to Zeus the Kindly,¹ the mystery was explained. The kindly god must receive a whole burnt offering : and a slaughter of little pigs in his honor was followed at once by a distribution of pay to the army and by the restoration of his favorite horse, which the Spartans had repurchased and for which they refused any recompense at his hands. He thus had not only his horse but more than a year's pay in advance. The kindly Zeus was indeed working zealously on his behalf : but when, having marched by Antandros to Atarneus, the army reached Pergamos, a prospect of still greater luck was opened for Xenophon. His hostess, Hellas, the wife of Gongylos,² told him that he might win a splendid prize by seizing the tower or castle of a wealthy Persian named Asidates. The sacrifices at once favored the enterprise ; but a vigorous attack by 600 of his comrades ended in a retreat which at the cost of wounds to nearly half their men enabled them to bring back about 200 captives and some cattle. On the next day the assault, repeated with the full force of the army, was followed by the capture of Asidates himself with his whole family and all his property. 'Thus came true,' says Xenophon, with a faith which nothing can daunt or shake, 'the signs of the victims offered before the first attack : ' and thus also were more than realised any visions of wealth which may have floated before his eyes as he started on the eastward march from Sardeis. With eager gratitude his comrades bade him make his own choice out of all the spoil ; and Xenophon returned to Athens³ a rich man, to find that the great teacher whose wisdom he revered and by whose counsels he was guided had drunk the fatal draught of hemlock a few days or a few weeks before his arrival.

¹ Zeus Meilichios. Xen. *An.* vii. 8, 4.

² This was a descendant of the Eretrian Gongylos who in the Persian War had taken the side of Xerxes. Xen. *H.* iii. 1, 6.

³ The signification of the expedition and retreat of the Ten Thousand is pretty much that of the campaigns of Alexander. If neither can be said strictly to belong to the history of the Greek country, they both form part of the history of the artificial Greek people which comes into prominence just as the ancient Hellenic cities dwindle away and

lose all political existence. This fact alone justifies the careful study of a narrative which otherwise might have been passed by with a very brief notice. It must further be remembered that this expedition of the Ten Thousand, although owing to the death of Cyrus it failed to dethrone Artaxerxes, left on the Hellenic world generally a profound impression that the Persian empire could not possibly withstand the determined assault of a Greek army well disciplined and well provided, under the command of an able and am-

CHAPTER II.

SOKRATES.

SOKRATES had already reached an age of more than seventy years,¹ when three Athenian citizens, the leather-seller Anytos, the poet Meletos, and the rhetor Lykon, brought against him three charges, the first of rejecting the gods worshipped at Athens, the second of setting up new deities of his own, the third of corrupting the youth of the city. Of these three men Anytos, as many would have it, had escaped condemnation for his failure to relieve the garrison at Pylos only by bribing the jurymen who tried him.² During the tyranny which ensued on the fall of Athens he had been nearly ruined in his estate: and his eagerness to retrieve his broken fortunes roused in him a feeling of indignation when he was told that Sokrates had spoken of his son as far too fine a youth to be put to an unsavory trade. The other two had, so far as we can learn, no further causes for antipathy to Sokrates than those which affected the classes to which they severally belonged. Of these classes Sokrates, for whatever reasons, had incurred the determined enmity.

As a citizen, this illustrious man had lived a life not merely blameless but deserving the gratitude of his countrymen. He had behaved with credit among the Athenian hoplites at Potidaia and Delion; with righteous zeal he had firmly opposed the madness of the people whom Theramenes was hounding on to the murder of the generals after Argennoussai;³ with the same fearless composure he had gone quietly home when the Thirty despots commissioned him with four others to arrest and bring before them the Salaminian Leon.⁴ Of his earlier life there is little to say. He may have followed for a time the occupation of his father Sophroniskos, and he may have carved the group of Charites which were shown in the Akropolis as his work. Some said that as a young man he had lived viciously; but,

bitious general. This conviction, expressed again and again by rhetoricians like Lysias and Isokrates, tended greatly, we cannot doubt, to determine the purpose of Alexander the Great; and thus the masterly retreat of Xenophon became directly a cause of the expedition, which carried the name and the language

of Hellas to the plains of the Penj-áb.

¹ *Ἐτη γεγονώς πλείω εβδομήκοντα.* Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 17. This fact may be accepted without entering here into questions concerning the genuineness of the celebrated Apology. ² See p. 452.

³ See p. 471.

⁴ See p. 488.

Charges brought against Sokrates by Anytos, Meletos, and Lykon.
400 B.C.

Early life of Sokrates.

although with his thorough frankness he admitted that the work of self-discipline was with him a severe struggle, there seems to be no ground for the imputation. That he betook himself with some eagerness to the study of physics may fairly be gathered from the Platonic dialogue in which Sokrates is represented as receiving the instructions of Parmenides. By that philosopher he is said to have been counselled to test all theories and inferences by the method of his pupil the Eleatic Zenon,—in other words, not merely to assure himself that the conclusion was warranted by the premisses, but to weigh carefully all that could be urged against the latter.

Such tests, it is obvious, might be used to upset the system of which Zenon was so vehement a champion. It was almost impossible that Sokrates could fail to discover the verbalism in which the Eleatic philosophers often involved themselves; nor in the hypotheses maintained by one philosopher after another could he well see much more than a series of guesses of which the latest held its ground only until some other thinker came forward to prove its absurdity. Beyond all doubt, the formation of these theories by exploding the old mythological creed vastly aided the growth of the human mind; but it would have been strange indeed if some one had not sooner or later risen to protest against the multiplication of hypotheses for which it was impossible to adduce the manifest evidence of fact. Such a thinker arose in Sokrates, in whose mind the contradictory conclusions of the philosophers (or, as they were called, Sophists) caused a revulsion never to be overcome. The uncertainty of the explanations offered for the motions of the planets or the changes of the seasons was for him the proof that they who attempted to explain such things were invading a region into which the gods would allow no prying. Whatever astronomical knowledge might be needed for navigation or other practical purposes might, he thought, be easily learnt from night-watchers and pilots; but attempts to determine the distances of the planets and the modes of their revolution betrayed impiety of the same kind which led Anaxagoras to assert the identity of Fire and the Sun.

Turning, therefore, with disgust from the wranglings of philosophers who reviled each other with the fury of lunatics,¹ Sokrates beheld before him, as he thought, a vast field in which the plough had scarcely turned a single furrow. If it was impossible for man to determine what were the constituents of the sun, it was surely not impossible for him to ascertain the conditions of his own life, the laws which he must obey, the nature of his relations to other men, and the character of

Sokrates and
the science
of Physics.

Sokrates and
the science
of Ethics.

¹ Xen. *Mem.* I. i. 14.

human action. Starting with the assured conviction that the gods were everywhere present, and that from them nothing was hid even to the thoughts and intents of the heart, he held it to be his duty to ascertain the boundaries which separated the province of human reason from that of the divine government of the world. Nor was he at any loss to find them. Although the interference of the gods in human affairs was constant, it was exercised only in matters the results of which were uncertain ; and it was absurd, if not impious, to ask for their help where the suppliant needed only to exercise the faculties with which they had endowed him. From the time of his boyhood he had heard an inward voice which, without telling him what he should do, warned him against any given action.¹ This was styled by some of his disciples the *Daimonion* or *Dæmon*, which, by revealing to him dangers to be avoided, made his way plain before his face. It was a divine guide of which he spoke not less familiarly than of other personal characteristics ; and as he made no mystery of it in his own case, so it must at the least be noted that he nowhere explicitly speaks of it as a privilege peculiar to himself.

He was still a young man (how young we know not) when the sense of a divine mission, binding him to devote his whole life to the service of his fellows, broke upon his mind. As with the youthful Hebrew prophet who saw the Lord upon his throne, high and lifted up,² the profoundest sense of personal unworthiness was blended with unhesitating eagerness to obey. The rigid application of the Zenonic method to his own conceptions had convinced him of his absolute ignorance of matters in which true knowledge was of vital moment to his moral health, and had perhaps made him suspect that the knowledge vaunted by others was not more solid or real than his own. But, however this might be, it was his duty henceforth to proclaim himself the Apostle of Truth, not in the sense which would claim for him the possession of truth, but only as attesting the devotion of his life to its discovery and its promulgation. Abandoning his occupation as a sculptor, retaining, it would seem, no means of making an income, he made it his business to put all men to the test, so that the reality or the hollowness of their professions might for their own higher good and happiness be made known to themselves and to the world. If the acquisition of Truth, that is, of real knowledge, be the one thing needful, the conceit of knowledge without the reality must be the greatest of all evils. The presence of this conceit, wherever it exists, must be made manifest in con-

¹ This is the account put into his mouth by Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 31. According to Xenophon, *Mem.* iv.

3, 12, its commands were positive as well as negative.

² Isaiah vi. 1.

fusion of thought, if only the probe be pushed home with sufficient vigor and pertinacity. For himself he had nothing to fear or to hide. He went forth (as a man knowing himself to be ignorant and having, as he supposed, emptied himself of all prejudices and preconceptions), to ascertain whether or how far others who talked glibly about freedom and forms of government, about science and art, theory and practice, law and justice, really attached a clear meaning to the words which they used and regulated their lives by their conceptions. In the discharge of this mission he might be seen at all times of the day in all places of public resort, seeking the conversation of all and shunning none. In the Agora and the Gymnasium his voice might be heard, asking those who chose to listen to him what they meant by speaking of certain things as just or expedient or beneficial, and of certain other things as inexpedient or unjust or hurtful. The perfect frankness of the man, the ingenuous confession of his own ignorance, the dexterity with which by flank movements he led his hearers to make statements conclusively proving their mere pretence to knowledge, the earnestness which convinced them that, if he exposed their shallowness, it was only in order that they might work their way to the real treasures which awaited all disinterested seekers, could not fail to gather round him knots of listeners, of whom many became his disciples or, as he would prefer to have them, his friends. The impression thus made led some to regard him as a man of whom the world had not yet seen the peer; and the resolution to ascertain the truth of this fact by a reference to the Delphian oracle was the natural consequence of this conviction.

The answer brought back by Chairephon from the shrine of Phoibos was that of all men Sokrates was the wisest. In Sokrates himself these words awakened no feeling of self-gratulation, but merely a desire to solve that which he felt sure must be a riddle or enigma. He was at once conscious of his own ignorance and convinced of the perfect veracity of the god. He betook himself therefore to a statesman of wide repute for his wisdom, but he soon satisfied himself that his supposed knowledge was a mere mask. When, however, he sought to convince the statesman of this fact, he found that he had only made him his enemy; and he returned home, assured that thus far the Delphian priestess was right. His own ignorance and that of the statesman were on a par; but he was conscious of it and as eager to acknowledge it as the statesman was to deny it; and so far he was the wiser man. The experiment was tried on others (reluctantly and with pain and fear, because he saw the strength of the resentment which he roused), and always with the same result. He went to the poets, with something like the

Sokrates and
the Elenchos
or system
of cross-ex-
amination.

assurance that they could explain the principles of their art and analyse the merits of compositions which charmed the world. To his amazement he found that their poems were thrown off under a species of enthusiasm which left them on a par with sibyls and soothsayers. He visited and talked with the artisans; but if he discovered that they were masters of many curious processes of which he himself knew nothing, he saw also that they regarded their technical skill as a justification for pronouncing judgments on questions with which they had no acquaintance whatever. Hence when he asked himself whether he would exchange his own general consciousness of ignorance for the partial knowledge which sought to pass itself off as omniscience, he was constrained to answer the question in the negative, and so to admit that the Delphian priestess had spoken the truth to Chairephon.¹

The course which Sokrates had adopted would, it is obvious, win for him the esteem and gratitude only of those in whom the love of truth, although possibly dormant, had not been choked by a slavish submission to popular beliefs and prejudices. It is not less clear that in cities which did not allow large scope for the discussion of opinions and the criticism of persons and acts his career would have been summarily cut short. In Sparta the mere idea of a man standing forth without let or hindrance in the market-place to question the nature of family relations and the limits of state authority would be ludicrous and absurd. In other cities the fire which he sought to kindle would speedily have died out for lack of fuel. In Athens the causes which had contributed to the growth of democracy gathered round him a band of devoted followers, and at the same time roused feelings of opposition which ended in his trial and condemnation. In no other city had the people generally received an intellectual education so stimulating to the analytical powers of the human mind. In a theatre capable, it is said, of holding 30,000 spectators they listened to the wonderful dramas which year by year shed a dazzling splendor over the great Dionysian festivals. In the choric odes of these dramas they heard the most exquisite of lyric strains, which ranged with the most graceful or the most powerful touch over the whole scale of human emotion, wakening the mind to the subtlest harmonies of form and color, feeding the sense of beauty with images glorified by the radiance of Hellenic sunshine, raising the heart to that holy abode of purity and peace which is the source of the Eternal Law of Righteousness, and filling it with yearnings for a more intimate communion with Him who is the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.² In the

¹ Pl. *Apol. Sokr.* p. 23.

² It is scarcely necessary to specify any of the thousand passages which justify the assertions made

discourse of the actors (for the Greek tragedy was rather a discourse about action than an exhibition of the action itself) they listened to discussions which touched and even went to the root of some of the most momentous questions affecting the interests or the duties of mankind. The pleadings of love were blended in *Antigonè* with a consciousness of duty which shrunk not from resistance to the supreme power of the state: the same sense of obedience to a law which can never fail constrained the benefactor of mankind to defy the majesty of Zeus himself, and to endure his utmost vengeance on the desolate crags of Caucasus. There was, in short, scarcely a problem arising out of the varied circumstances and conflicting duties of human life which was not at the least discussed by the Greek tragic poets.

Nor was this the only mode in which the tragic drama influenced the life of the Athenian citizen. The law of Athens did not allow the employment of professional advocates. A man might, if he pleased, betake himself to the rhetoricians who like *Lysias* and *Antiphon* made their livelihood by writing speeches for others: but in his own person he must accuse and in his own person he must plead his cause before a court consisting of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of his fellow-citizens. At the least he must learn by heart the speech of the rhetor, if he had money enough to pay for it; but the delivery of such a speech would be a hard, if not an impossible, task for one who had had no previous rhetorical training. No one could be sure that he should not be called upon either to face an accuser or to bring a charge against a man who had injured him: in either case lack of readiness in speech and argument might involve not merely failure but ruin. If an Athenian citizen so failed, the blame lay at his own door. He was a member of the only parliament known to Athenian law, and he had the invaluable privilege of listening to the greatest of human orators. The education which he thus received was supplemented by the tragic drama. The great masterpieces exhibited year by year furnished him with examples of almost every form of case which could be brought before a court of law. In the speeches whether of accusation, defence, or explanation, which taken together made up the body of the tragedy, he had specimens of finished pleading in which the arguments were arranged in the modes most sure to persuade and in this sentence. Among the most beautiful and perhaps the most stirring are such choruses as those of the *Oidipous Tyrannos*, 862 *et seq.* of *Sophokles*. But when we consider that we possess now only a few fragments of the vast treasure which was yearly multiplied, it might almost seem, without effort and without toil, we may rise to some faint idea of the ennobling influences of the tragic drama on the Athenian mind.

convince the hearer or to rouse his feelings of indulgence or sympathy. The tragic drama thus supplied abundant material of the highest kind for the political education of the Athenian citizen; and of this education the two most important branches were, necessarily, rhetoric and dialectic.

These two terms denoted simply the materials employed in discussion and the garb with which they were clothed. The business of the former was to impart not merely readiness of Rhetoric and Dialectic. speech but the graces of consummate eloquence, to analyse the emotions of the human mind, to determine the methods most sure to awaken them, and to draw out systematically the lines of argument to be used under any given circumstances. These lines of argument were termed *Topoi* or commonplaces; and the task of arranging these Topics and of imparting a careful training in the art of Rhetoric generally would furnish occupation enough to fill up the whole time of a teacher. The burden would become overwhelming, if in addition to this he were compelled to discuss with his pupil all the problems which had exercised the ingenuity and subtlety of philosophers. The two things undoubtedly converged. It was vastly to the advantage of the orator that he should be able to detect and hunt out a fallacy, to draw out all that could possibly be said against his own hypotheses or conclusions: but his business in a court of law or a popular assembly was not the business of philosophical disputants in the groves of the Academy. For him the goal to be aimed at was Persuasion: for the latter it was the discovery of truth, or the exposure of falsehood as a necessary step to that discovery. Hence, although Rhetoric and Dialectic were complementary parts of the same training, and although instruction in both might have been given by the same teachers, the two occupations in point of fact diverged, until the two classes became not merely distinct but vehemently opposed to each other.

Between the objects aimed at by the Sophist, the Rhetor, and the Dialectician there was no real inconsistency. The provinces of Influence of the Sophists. all three were included in the vast scope of the tragic drama; each had to analyse from his own point of view the masterpieces of eloquence, learning, and wisdom which yearly delighted them in the great Dionysian theatre. The influence of all three tended in one direction, and that direction was a wholesome one. Unprincipled men, like Alkibiades and Kritias, might employ their eloquence to pervert justice and deprave the public mind; but this evil was counterbalanced by the greater power imparted to those who desired to use aright the divine gift of speech. The teacher of philosophy might possibly venture to preach a lax morality; but the success of such men is almost in-

finitely rare, and failure would for them be financial ruin. The dialectician might waste his time in trying to make bricks without clay; but the mischief would soon work its own cure by driving away all who had no mind to tire themselves by efforts to fill the sieve of the Danaïdes. As a rule, all three classes of teachers worked conscientiously each in his own sphere, and the sophists deserved as little as the dialecticians to be held up to contempt and ridicule. They were so held up, it must be remembered, not by Sokrates but by Plato. To that great man, who declared war on all society as it then existed and who made no secret of his wish to remodel it, two characteristics of the Sophists were especially repulsive. They would not trouble themselves with abstract speculations and sublime ideas, and they taught for pay. For these two crimes they were stigmatised as seeking to corrupt the public mind for the sake of reaping a larger harvest, with deliberately maintaining beliefs which they knew to be false, and with familiarising their pupils with arguments which would make the worse appear the better reason. So persistently were these charges repeated that in later times at least the name Sophist has been supposed to denote teachers who led men to act deliberately on sordid motives and to make influence, wealth, and power the one object of their lives for the sake of promoting not the interests of others but their own. The worth of the charge is best measured by an appeal to facts; and in thus turning to facts, we have only to remember that one or two instances of mean-minded or dishonest Sophists, furnish no justification for imputing meanness and dishonesty to Sophists as a class.

But in truth the need of such an appeal is not urgent. In his ideal picture of a Commonwealth Plato¹ asserts emphatically that his quarrel is not with the Sophists but with the existing framework and order of society. In such a state of things the faults of the teachers must answer precisely to the faults of the system in which they find themselves entangled. If they rose greatly above it, their trade would be at an end. Clearly they must take things as they are, doing all that they can to improve them without coming into direct collision with authority, unless indeed they are prepared like Sokrates to give up not merely worldly goods but life itself in defence of the truth. In these words we have a full refutation of the charge which insinuates that the degeneracy of the Athenian people during the Peloponnesian war, such as it may have been, was directly the result of the teaching of the Sophists. That a change for the worse had come over them, can scarcely be denied:² but this change was due not to the evil influence of any

¹ *Rep.* vi. 6, p. 492 &c.

² See p. 448.

class of teachers, but primarily to the abandonment of the policy earnestly enjoined on them by Perikles, and in the next place to that disregard of constitutional forms which first made the revolution of the Four Hundred possible, and at last in the terrible tragedy which followed the victory of Argennoussai brought forth as its fruit the doctrine that the Demos had a right to do as it pleased them.

It is scarcely necessary to go further. Criticisms of the doctrines ascribed to the most eminent of the Sophists may lay bare ethical assumptions similar to those which underlie the doctrines of Sokrates and Plato himself; but they will scarcely do more, and to some of these doctrines it is possible that we may attach a wrong meaning. The position of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things existing or not existing, may possibly be at bottom in agreement with the axiom which Des Cartes makes the foundation of his reasoning. If again it be said that Prodikos was spoken of as a corrupter of youth, we have to remember that the same charge was urged against Isokrates and proved fatal to the greater teacher whom Plato puts forward as a foil to these pestilent money-getters. But it is more important to note that in Prodikos we have a man whose teaching, although perhaps less profound, is both wider and more generous than that of Sokrates himself. With the latter the one end of the good man is the formation of his own character. Virtue is a thing to be learnt; and although virtue when learnt will make a man act by others as he ought to act, still it is to the acquiring of knowledge that his whole mind and heart is in the first instance to be turned. With Prodikos virtue lies in no consideration of ends, in no thought of the happiness which it may bring to the actor; it is something which must spring directly from the generous and unselfish spirit, spurred on wholly by the desire of doing good to others. To say that the exquisite Apologue of this Sophist, known as the Choice of Herakles, holds out political power as the prize of exertion, is to assert simply that which is not true. If influence and power be the consequence of a perfectly righteous life, we cannot deprecate these consequences without desiring further that virtue and righteousness should be something different from what they are. But assuredly no such ulterior objects are set before the youthful Herakles by the being who seeks to turn him away from the seductions of *Kakia* or Vice who lures him to idleness and self-indulgence. 'I have no fair words,' she says, 'wherewith to cheat thee. Nothing good is ever reached without labor; nothing great is ever won without toil. If thou seekest for fruit from the earth, thou must tend and till it; if thou longest for the love of men, thou must do them good.' If this apologue have

¹ See *Tales of Ancient Greece*. The Toils of Herakles.

any meaning, it is that the object of virtue is not reputation, but the benefit of others; not power and influence, but the answer of a good conscience. Four-and-twenty centuries have passed away, and during nineteen of these Christianity has been at work in the world: but we have reached no higher theory of life than that of Prodikos, and for the picture which he drew of the righteous life we are indebted to the pages of Xenophon.¹ It is a mere prejudice which prevents any from seeing a spirit not less lofty in the assertion of Protagoras that the great lesson to be learnt is the right management of our own households and the most efficient action in the concerns of the state;² and we may be sure that the counsel which Hippias is said to have put into the mouth of Nestor in his colloquy with Neoptolemos would be not more acceptable to the natural man than the self-sacrifice enjoined by Prodikos.

It is true indeed that in the Platonic dialogue in which Pölos not without rudeness takes his stand on the popular opinion and feeling of the time, Kallikles is also introduced as propounding a theory of what he calls natural justice which might seem to show the worthlessness of law.

Ethical
theory
ascribed to
Kallikles.

His position is that law is an artificial restraint put by the weaker multitude on the stronger individual, who at starting found absolute right in his absolute might. These gigantic creatures submit to the shackles imposed by the multitude only because they cannot help it; but if circumstances should put it in their power, they will vindicate their own ability and stand forth the avowed assertors of a philosophy which has their own pleasure for its single aim.³ There is after all nothing very terrible in this theory, which may be accepted as in tolerable accordance with fact. Such noble savages might be found in many an Hellenic city; they are to be found still, too frequently, in our large towns, and when these assert their liberty, society drags them before its bar, tries, condemns, and hangs them. But whatever may be the worth of the theory, Kallikles, it must be noted, was not a sophist; and the fact that he vaunts his own boldness in giving utterance to opinions which Pölos the Sophist was constrained to dissemble if he entertained them, proves conclusively that such doctrines could not be safely preached at Athens and therefore that the preaching of them cannot be laid to the charge of the Sophists.

The accusations brought against the Sophists amount therefore to no more than this, that some Sophists may have been uncon-

¹ *Mem.* ii. 1. Sokrates is here represented as reciting the Apologue to enforce his warning against sloth. 'Avoid soft things lest hard things fall upon thee.' There is no

objection to this application; but this lesson is not the main object of the Apologue.

² *Plat. Protag.* c. 9, p. 318 E.

³ *Plat. Gorg.* c. 38, p. 482 E.

scientious and some greedy: but the instances of proved dishonesty are rare, nor is there any reason for supposing that their avarice exceeded that of the paid teachers of the present day who are not supposed to disgrace themselves or corrupt others because they receive a recompense for work done. That in the matter of money the feeling of some was highly honorable is proved by Plato himself, who represents Protagoras as telling those who think his demands too great that he is ready to accept whatever they may consider a fair equivalent of his toil, asking them only to go into a temple and there make oath that this is their conscientious opinion.¹ But we have evidence in their favor of another kind. All the influences with which we have been thus far concerned must have tended, if the charges against the Sophists as a class be dismissed as unfounded, to raise the tone of popular feeling at Athens, to bring into action the highest powers of thought, and thus to render them better citizens as well as better men. But at Athens, as elsewhere, there must always be some, few or many (and it is well if they be not an overwhelming majority), to whom all mental exertion is irksome, all examination of evidence an unwelcome task, all search for truth an intolerable burden. There, as elsewhere, men would not be wanting who would oppose at the least a passive resistance to all studies tending to enlarge the sphere of thought or to upset generally received opinions. To such men the past is always a golden age the serenity of which was undisturbed by any influx of new ideas; and it is always this increase of mental activity which rouses their fiercest wrath. To the freedom of discussion which is the indispensable condition of this growth such men are vehemently opposed; and at Athens they professed to look back with fond regret to the happy time when, instead of indulging in endless talk and hair-splitting distinctions, the good mariners of Peiræus and Mounychia could do nothing more than call for their bannocks and cry out 'Ruppapai.'²

This party of inert resistance, where open opposition was impracticable, had its stronghold in Attic comedy, an institution of which the spirit was wholly in harmony with its origin. In all Aryan tribes, and probably among all the families of mankind, the imagination was first impressed by the phenomena of death and reproduction; and the active and passive principles of Nature were denoted by emblems sufficiently significant.³ So sprang up the Mysteries of

¹ Plat. *Protag.* c. 16, p. 328 B.

² The Yo-heave-O of English seamen. The Frogs of Aristophanes, who puts this sentiment into the mouth of Æschylos, was exhibited

in 405 B.C., the year of the fatal catastrophe of Aigospotamoi.

³ See *Mythology of the Aryan Nations*, Book II. ch. ii. section 12.

which those celebrated at Eleusis were to Athenians the most familiar. From indefinitely early, perhaps from the earliest, times, the dialogue which accompanied the celebration of these Mysteries was marked by biting gibes and jests of the coarsest kind, having their relation at first to the grief of the Mourning Mother for the absence or loss of her Summer-child, and thence passing on to rude abuse or slander of the spectators. These outbursts of Fescennine licence gradually received a more regular form at the hands of men who with the love of unmeasured ridicule united high poetical power. Eleven plays of Aristophanes are all that remains of that rich harvest of raillery and wit, of incisive sarcasm and keen dissection of character, of delicate grace and touching tenderness, which delighted even those against whom the shafts of the poets were aimed. These plays furnish abundant evidence of the freedom with which the comic poets ranged over the field which they regarded as their own. This field had practically no bounds. The gods themselves were no more safe from their ridicule than the meanest speaker in the Athenian assembly, while many of their most telling jests were directed against the Athenian constitution. More particularly all novelties were treated with merciless severity; and in the period of unparalleled growth which preceded and even accompanied the struggle with Sparta Athens had every year something new to show, especially in the regions of philosophy and science, the great objects of their fear and hatred.

The stream which flowed from this source came from no fountain of sweet waters. It began with wanton insolence and furious fun, and its course was swollen by tributaries of slander and falsehood. If in the history of the twenty years Slanders of the comic poets. which immediately preceded the Peloponnesian war anything be clear, it is the fact that the struggle was forced on Athens against her will and in spite of singular moderation and forbearance in her relations with the Spartan confederacy. The consciousness of this fact pressed heavily on the Spartans, who after the peace of Nicias candidly confessed that in the war which preceded it the Athenians were in the right and themselves wholly in the wrong.¹ Yet Aristophanes could hold up Perikles to the hatred of his countrymen as the sole cause of a strife which but for him would never have been begun, and as having brought it about not to increase the greatness of Athens or to carry out any definite policy, but from mere blind rage at some offence given by the Megarians to Aspasia. With not less contempt for truth Kleon, the man who might rather be described as bullying the people into acts of barbarous cruelty, is represented as pandering to their vices by mean and fulsome flattery.² He is further de-

¹ See pages 267, 390.

² See p. 299.

scribed as thrusting himself into the office of general and reaping another man's harvest, when one of the most disgraceful scenes ever witnessed in the Athenian assembly had made it notorious that the office was thrust upon him sorely against his will, and when the poet knew further that at Sphakteria he had insisted on acting as the subordinate officer of Demosthenes.¹ Peisandros, again, one of the chief agents in carrying out the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, was a man not without his vices, and his treason to Athens was of the deepest dye: but if Thucydides is to be trusted, he executed his miserable task with remarkable readiness and courage.² In the pages of Aristophanes he is a mere coward. For the historian contradictions thus flagrant fully justify the rule that no statement of any comic poet affecting the policy or the personal character of public men shall be accepted unless these are borne out by the distinct testimony of other contemporary writers. For those to whom such unsupported accusations seem to furnish the true reading of the history the pages of Aristophanes will furnish abundant resources; but it is well to know that the result of groping among them will only be to make every man filthy and all the purposes of life ridiculous. It is well also to know (and indeed too great stress can scarcely be laid upon the fact), that the assaults of the comic poets had no effect either in bringing about constitutional changes or in assisting the growth of physical research or of moral or metaphysical philosophy. They succeeded at the utmost in awakening or strengthening the feelings of suspicion, dislike, or resentment against individual men; and perhaps their greatest success was achieved at the cost of Sokrates.

The time during which Sokrates busied himself with matters of physical science must have been brief indeed; and those of the Athenians who listened to his incessant public conversations must long have known him to be the most uncompromising opponent of such investigations, when Aristophanes was overcome by the irresistible temptation of putting his ugly face upon the stage to be hooted by all whose worst enemy was philosophy. The picture which the spectators were invited to look upon was that of a man slung up in a basket, peering at the sun with the hope of understanding its constitution and addressing his prayers to the clouds whom he was pleased to worship as his deities, or else as surrounded by pupils not less mad than himself, and in their company poring over astronomical diagrams inscribed on the sand at his feet. The picture is as much the reverse of the truth as are the caricatures of Perikles, Kleon, and Peisandros; but in the case of Sokrates the calumny told powerfully on the large body of men who have a vested interest in

¹ See p. 323.

² See p. 428 et seq.

Aristophanic caricatures of Sokrates.

ignorance and for whom increase of knowledge means starvation. So lasting in this instance was the effect produced that, if the Platonic Apology is to be trusted, Sokrates admitted a greater difficulty in dealing with these old slanders than with the recent charges of Meletos, Anytos, and Lykon.

The lampoons of Aristophanes may have been a secondary cause of the prejudice of which Sokrates candidly confessed the strength: but we must look elsewhere for the real causes which gave it strength, if they did not call it into being. When under the conviction of his divine mission he first appeared in the Athenian Agora, he addressed his questions to the humbler citizens who would be likely to fall into conversation with a man comparatively unknown. The answer brought by Chairephon from Delphoi compelled him to take another course, if he wished to reconcile the truthfulness of the god with his own everpresent and overpowering sense of ignorance. Henceforth he must question the greatest statesmen, the most famous poets, and the most illustrious philosophers of the city; and he proceeded to do so with a subtlety and pertinacity which invariably succeeded in showing either that the man interrogated knew not his own science or art, or that the knowledge of some one thing had led him to regard himself as knowing everything. In the method which he employed there was nothing strictly new. Philosophers who had gone before him or were then living had insisted on the need of the most careful definitions, and had maintained that these definitions must be founded on facts. It had been their aim and effort, as it was his own, to wage war not only against the pretence to knowledge without the corresponding reality (in other words, against delusion or wilful falsehood), but against the illogical credulity which will accept as true that which at best is doubtful, and which refuses to weigh everything that may be urged against any proposition whatsoever. But all these were men who had imparted such knowledge as they possessed only to their pupils, and had done so for a price; and the number of such pupils would not be oppressively large. Not one of them had held it to be his mission to stand up in the market-place and lift up his voice against the hollowness of popular beliefs and the hypocrisy of self-styled philosophers. When, then, Sokrates, not as a teacher but simply as one aware of his own ignorance and anxious only to learn, addressed to statesmen and men of scientific reputation questions on the simplest elements of the subjects with which they professed to deal, and gradually drew from them the humiliating confession that even of those elements they had no real knowledge whatever, it was natural that the feelings of surprise and mortification should pass rapidly through the stage of

resentment into that of abiding hatred. That such an admission should be extorted from them with regard to matters of the utmost moment to mankind and most nearly concerning themselves, was most of all irritating. The Athenian was in the constant habit of talking about Law, Justice, Equity, Freedom, Expedience, and of speaking about them with a positiveness which showed not only the importance of the subject but his firm persuasion that his knowledge of it was solid and adequate. The cross-examination of Sokrates brought to light a multitude of discordant opinions and a blind obstinacy in maintaining them. In short, all these things which they professed to know so well were for them, (whatever might be their intrinsic value,) mere idols of the market-place or the cave, objects to be religiously worshipped and to be stoutly defended against all who might assail them. That which happened in the days of Sokrates has become for historians, if not for men generally, a familiar phenomenon. Of the hearers whose dislike he thus incurred some contented themselves with abusing him, others pelted him. But there is much Sokratic work to be done still, and for the most part it receives a corresponding recompense. A very large proportion of the names or nouns which we use are either abstract or general names. Of both these classes of words we pick up some vague and crude notions in the days of childhood and youth: as years go on, we attach to them the idea which may be in vogue amongst our friends and companions, our religious or political party. Of few, perhaps of none, can we give a clear and exact definition; and yet perhaps every one of them is the subject of vehement and long-continued controversy. We have but to put together a list of such words, and we shall see at once how we should be likely to fare if we were submitted to the searching scrutiny of the Sokratic Elenchos. Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief,¹ Sacrifice, Atonement, Punishment, Propitiation, Person, are all, with many more, terms in constant use, and yet scarcely less frequently employed with inconsistent, if not contradictory meanings. They are, moreover, terms which are rending the world asunder, nor is the generation yet born which will see the end of the long and painful conflict involved in the task of defining them.

If the process of having our notions of abstract or general names taken to pieces and exhibited in their naked crudeness and poverty would be for many at the present day a highly irritating process, we must remember that at Athens it would be even more likely to annoy all whom it might fail to conciliate. Happily for the advancement of truth the

Influence of
Sokrates on
the young.

¹ Max Müller, *Lectures on Language*, ii. 526.

number of those who were not repelled by it was not small. At all times some will be found in whom the pain of giving up old prejudices and abandoning old beliefs, if these are proved to be untenable, is cheerfully encountered at the call of duty. Great though the struggle may be, it is followed and more than compensated by the pure delight which a man must feel when he becomes conscious that he has no secondary motives to gratify, no propositions in reserve which must be maintained at all costs,—that henceforth his one object is to ascertain the truth, to test every conviction or belief by fact, and to accept the conclusions established by fact without regard to consequences. This most ennobling of all pleasures was the reward of those Athenians, mostly young men, who were not to be scared by the heavy yoke of self-examination which Sokrates sought to put upon them. In these his method, cold and negative though it might seem to others, kindled a glow of esteem, admiration, and love. It pulled to pieces their flimsy fancies, but it did so only to show them that there was solid truth within their reach, and that the purifying of the intellect was the necessary condition for attaining to it. Defeat left them encouraged, not depressed. Henceforth they knew how to search, and they set about the task with eagerness increased tenfold.

But the noblest weapons may be turned to vile uses ; nor would such men as Alkibiades and Kritias be slow in perceiving that they might employ for the furtherance of merely selfish ends the readiness of argument which they might acquire by intercourse with Sokrates. That they resorted to him from this motive alone, we could scarcely fail to gather from the whole of their later history, even if Xenophon had not emphatically asserted the fact. But the ill repute which their long course of insolence and crime brought upon them reacted upon their teacher ; and the men whose vanity or self-esteem he had offended were not likely to ask themselves whether they were justified in holding all instructors responsible for all the misdoings of all their pupils.

Nor would the dispositions of the Sophists as a class towards the great wielder of the Elenchos run counter to the feelings of dislike or anger kindled in more vulgar minds. Sokrates and Not a few of them probably would be under little Intercourse of Sokrates with Kritias and Alkibiades. the Sophists. temptation to quarrel either with his philosophy or with his method. Many of them were familiar with the dialectic of Zonon ; and all that can be said is that Sokrates used to better purpose the weapon which that dialectic placed in his hands. But although under other circumstances they might have been ready to admit that he did with vastly more of thoroughness the work which they were striving to do to the best of their powers, they were not

ready to admit this in the case of a man whose mode of life, whether designedly or not, threw a slur on their whole class. For them teaching was their means of livelihood; and Sokrates obstinately, and as they would have it, ostentatiously refused to receive money for his instructions and thereby, as he said, to forfeit his absolute independence and bid farewell to an uncompromising devotion to truth. This mode of putting the matter involved for them an imputation of the most galling kind. It implied that they were slaves to the desire for wealth, that they had deliberately renounced their freedom, and made up their minds to get their living by upholding a system which they knew to be imperfect and half suspected to be rotten. It implied further that the disinterested search for truth had for them no charm: and they had no notion of having this slight put upon them by a man who chose to proclaim himself the divinely-commissioned apostle of Righteousness and Truth.

But when we come to the trial in which the jealousies smouldering for five-and-twenty years burst into flame, we are constrained to admit that our knowledge is unfortunately scanty. Of the speeches of the accusers we have no further information in detail than the notices in the two Apologies which bear respectively the names of Plato and Xenophon. The genuineness of the latter is not beyond question: and how far the former represents the defence actually made by the philosopher, must remain, to say the least, uncertain. In the Platonic Apology Sokrates is made to confess his total want of practice in speaking before a public assembly; in the Xenophontic treatise he is described as telling his friend Hermogenes that in obedience to the warning voice of the Daimonion he had abandoned all thought of preparing any defence. Yet, if we are to believe Plato, he defended himself not merely with astonishing readiness (for this from his consciousness of innocence and of general uprightness we might have looked for) but with the peculiar eloquence of which Plato was the unrivalled master; and moreover he spoke after a fashion which assuredly seems to represent rather the thoughts of Plato writing many years later than those which would probably have passed through the mind of Sokrates. If we are to credit the alleged report of Hermogenes, we must admit that he approached the tribunal with a temper dangerously near to that of the suicide, unless we allow that under certain circumstances a man may be justified in resolving, if it be possible, to bring about his own conviction. In the Platonic Apology he deliberately ascribes his holding aloof from politics to the conviction that otherwise his life would be the forfeit. 'Any man,' he says, 'who should dare to speak truthfully of your many iniquities would

The trial
and defence
of Sokrates.

assuredly be soon put to death ; the man therefore who desires to be a champion of justice must live the life of a private citizen, if he wishes to live at all.¹ This is strange language indeed from one who in the same defence recounts with honest satisfaction his resistance to the fury of the multitude which demanded the slaughter of the six generals, and who but four years before his trial had quietly disregarded the orders of Kritias and his fellow tyrants. In short, if Sokrates spoke thus, he must have spoken falsely : and for such a supposition there is no room. But whatever may have been his real defence, sufficient ground for believing that to it he owed his condemnation seems to be furnished by the fact that the verdict was carried by the small majority of thirty out of more than 500 jurymen. When the number of those who actually acquitted him was so large, we can scarcely doubt that many more would have followed their example had not something in the tone of the defence changed the current of their feelings. It is at the least certain that men not violently prejudiced against him would admit that the first two charges of the prosecutors were triumphantly rebutted, or rather that they had not even a colorable foundation. Sokrates was accused of rejecting the gods worshipped by the city,—and it was proved that they had no more assiduous worshipper ; of setting up new deities of his own,—and it was proved not only that this could refer merely to the warning voice which he had heard from the days of his childhood, but that he emphatically disclaimed on the score of this voice the possession of any peculiar privilege or any relation to the Divine Being different in kind from that vouchsafed to others of his countrymen.² There remained only the third charge ; and this, we may remark, specified no definite offence. It was urged that he had corrupted young men by teaching them not to respect their parents and by leading them to regard with contempt the constitution of their country. As to the former plea, he had told them that parents who were mad might be rightly put under restraint by their children ;³ but he had also told them that if they desired to have the love of their fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, they must not rely on the mere fact of kinship but must prove the reality of this desire by the actual offices of love.⁴ On the latter head it was argued that the contempt which Sokrates had openly avowed for the system of choosing any public officers by lot would have

¹ Plat. *Apol. Sokr.* ch. xix. p. 31.

² This, at least, is the statement of the Xenophontic Apology, 13. All that he says is that he regards this voice as indicating the will of the gods more surely than signs or omens or any other form of divina-

tion ; but he carefully avoids the assertion that the Divine Will which is made known to himself may not be made known to others.

³ *Xen. Mem.* i. 2, 49.

⁴ *Ibid.* i. 2, 55.

for its natural consequence lawlessness and violence in those who heard him. The argument is one which cannot be sustained except on the theory which would lay a ban on all political discussion; and least of all was it tenable at Athens, where the Demos had for years endured with calmness the cutting ridicule of comic poets. But beyond this Sokrates might appeal to the consistent obedience to law which had marked his whole life and which alone had prompted the resistance which he had offered, once to the Demos, and once to the Thirty Tyrants. Nor can we doubt that among the jurymen there were many more than six or seven so far wavering in their opinion as to be accessible to all considerations of any force in his favor. But undoubtedly there were many more who took their places on the seats of the *Dikasts* with feelings of extreme irritation against a man who baffled, perplexed, and worried them. How should they understand a teacher who seemed at one time to speak of the marvellous powers of Themistokles or Perikles as divine gifts which with all their efforts and by the aid of the best instructors they could not transmit to their offspring, and at another to insist that all wrong action was the result of ignorance, and that if men knew thoroughly what would be the consequences of their deeds, they would act rightly, since only by right action could a man insure his own happiness, and since no man was willingly his own enemy, or, to put it otherwise, sought his own misery? What were they to make of a philosopher who told them in one breath that virtue sprang up spontaneously in some men and refused to grow in others, and in another that virtue was knowledge and therefore could be imparted by teaching? This too was the man who had been going about, during the lifetime of a generation, entangling high and low, rich and poor, in the meshes of his subtle logic, and compelling all to confess themselves fools and madmen. In such men the antipathy which through so many years had been gaining strength would eagerly seize on inferences gathered from isolated or distorted passages, and would impel them to get rid of a man whose society was so manifestly unwholesome and so specially fatal to the young. The latitude allowed by the law of libel, as it stood not long ago in this country and still stands elsewhere, would make the task of conviction in such a case easy and light. On this subject Athenian opinion claimed even a larger freedom of interpretation; nor would Sokrates himself have denied any more than John Huss that the mischievous teacher was a man who should be put down.

If to men in such a temper as this Sokrates spoke at all as he is said to have spoken in the Platonic or Xenophontic Apology, the smallness of the majority which condemned him becomes the

real and perhaps only matter for astonishment. Athenian jurymen beyond all doubt were fully impressed with a sense of their own dignity, and we have seen more than once that they were flattered by the exhibition of feelings which betrayed an awe of their power. They were accustomed to hear impassioned appeals to their sympathy, enforced by the tears of the accused and the entreaties of his kinsmen or his friends. With a dignity which should have been more forcible than mean prostrations and piteous prayers for mercy, Sokrates told them, it is said, that for him there should be no such efforts to divert the question to a false issue. If he had offended, he was ready to pay the penalty. If he had not, it was their duty to acquit him. But if thus far his words did honor to his judges, the case was altered when he went on to tell them that he had come into court without having bestowed a thought on his defence, and that there was no need to do so, partly because his want of practice in speaking before a public assembly would make preparation of little use and partly because his whole life disproved completely all the charges brought against him. When further he went on to tell them that far from having broken any law he had spent his life in trying to open men's eyes to the nature and obligations of law, and that thus he had been their greatest benefactor,—when he assured them that if they condemned him they would hurt not him but themselves only,—when he warned them that, as they had thus far had none who had devoted themselves without pay or reward to promoting the highest good of their citizens by assailing the strongholds of ignorance and vice, so if they should put him to death they would find none to take his place and to carry on a work indispensable for the welfare of the commonwealth, he was stringing together a series of considerations each of which would weight the balance more and more heavily against him. Their irritation would reach its highest pitch when with the deliberate design, it is said, of extorting an adverse verdict he warned them that their sentence, whatever it might be, would be a matter of indifference to himself. Of death he knew nothing, and it was absurd to fear that which might be the greatest of all blessings; but if they fancied that acquittal could win from him a promise to change his mode of life, they were altogether mistaken. 'If you tell me,' he said, according to the Platonic Apology, 'that you will acquit me on the condition that I pledge myself to abandon the search for truth which is the work of the philosopher, and that death should be the penalty for the breaking of my word, my answer will be that I must obey God rather than you; that while there is breath in my body, I must go on, testing and probing every man I meet, whether citizen or alien, but the citizens

most of all because they are nearest to me : that I must do this in obedience to my divine mission, and that this my disinterested work is for you the greatest and the most lasting benefit, as it is for me a task in which I dare not suffer myself either to flag or to fail.'

A defence such as this in outline seems to be needed in order to make the result of the trial intelligible. Of the jurymen who came into court with wavering minds not a few would be turned against the defendant when he told them that his business was to offer an apology not for himself but for his judges,¹ and that acquittal would but set him free to prove yet again that reputations for wisdom were cheaply earned by a pretence of knowledge without the reality. It is true that irritation at the language of the accused and the establishment of his guilt are two wholly different things, and that if the Athenian dikasts acted from the former feeling, they were guilty of judicial murder when they passed sentence on Sokrates. In a strict view of the matter the admission must be made : but severity against the Athenians for this great wrong cannot be justified unless we condemn still more severely the thousand iniquities perpetrated by English juries through a long series of centuries.

But even if we accept these general outlines, the details of the picture as filled in whether in the Platonic or Xenophontic Apologies must remain uncertain, if not, to a large extent, incredible. A man at the age of seventy is scarcely justified in getting himself condemned to death, because he prefers to die in the plenitude of his powers rather than to live on until he loses his teeth or his powers of digestion, argument, and memory. The philosopher who addresses his judges with a very faint hope, but with not the least wish, of procuring an acquittal, and who does so because he has convinced himself that death inflicted by the state, while it must add to his reputation, may save him from long-continued sickness and wasting pain, is prompted, we might fairly say, by not the most lofty or disinterested motives. At a more advanced age, when the powers of his body, if not those of his mind, were failing, Faraday in answer to a friend who asked him how he was, could answer gently, 'Just waiting.' The meekness of the English philosopher stands out in marked contrast with the haste of the Athenian to escape the feebleness and the annoyances of old age. If by so saying we seem to reflect harshly on Sokrates, we have to remember that we are judging him by a portraiture the exact fidelity of which we have no means of ascertaining.

¹ Plat. *Apol. Sokr.* ch. xviii. p. 30, 3.

Even after condemnation Athenian custom allowed the defendant to make a counter proposal, in mitigation of the penalty demanded by the accuser. But of the two penalties thus put before them the jurymen must choose one: it was not in their power to impose any other. Hence it was to the last degree unlikely that they would ratify the proposition of the criminal, if by naming a merely nominal punishment it practically reversed their verdict of guilty. Here again we have a picture which, we can scarcely doubt, has been, to say the least, largely touched up by the master hand of Plato. If it can be trusted, we should be bound to admit that Sokrates did his best to inflame the animosity of his opponents and to alienate the waverers. Ending his speech with the statement that all his worldly goods would not exceed the value of a mina, but that Plato with some others of his friends wished to become sureties for the payment of a sum of thirty minai, he proposed this fine as a substitute for the penalty sought by Anytos and his colleagues. Had he done this without preface there can be little doubt that of the small majority which condemned him many would gladly have accepted it. The infliction of any penalty would stamp with the seal of public disapprobation the practice of setting verbal traps to catch the ignorant or the unwary; and even if Sokrates should persist in the practice, they could affect to discern in it such modifications as would confine it within decent limits, and to wait patiently the end of a long life, which could not now be far off. But, if we may believe Plato, Sokrates was determined that his judges should pass the capital sentence unless they chose to become his converts. All minor penalties, he told them, would for him be intolerable. Prison life with the Eleven for his only visitants would be a burden greater than he could bear: and the idea of his living in exile would be absurd. Wherever his abode might be, there must he be instant, in season and out of season, in the great work for which he carried about with himself a divine commission. If his own countrymen with all the tolerance of Athenian society, with all the benefits of Athenian intellectual discipline, had been unable to put up with the searching scrutiny which had exposed the hollowness of their pretensions to knowledge, was it likely that he would fare better in cities where forbearance was a thing unknown, and where departures from the old paths were regarded as offences to be summarily punished? But in truth why should he be punished at all? At least how could he with any honesty admit the justice of any sentence passed upon him, when he was not more conscious of his existence than he was of the fact that he had devoted his whole life with absolute disinterestedness to the promotion of their highest good? He was old

now, and the weakness of age must soon creep upon him and might perhaps demand a less severe mode of living than that to which he had hitherto subjected himself. But under whatever conditions leisure was for him a matter of the first moment,—leisure which should enable him to pry into the mental state of all whom he might meet, compelling them to take stock of their supposed stores of knowledge, to keep only that which was real and to cast away the counterfeit. Such leisure it was in their power to insure to him by ordering that henceforth he should be maintained in the Prytaneion at the public cost. This, it is true, was a rare and exceptional honor granted only to the most distinguished of their citizens; but had he not deserved it far more than men who were supposed to shed lustre on the city because their horses and chariots had won prizes at the great Olympic festival? ‘Such victories,’ he said, ‘merely make you seem to be happy; I make you happy in reality, or strive to do so. You would not wish me to deceive you or to say less than the truth; and if I must put a value on myself or rather on my life as a citizen, the recompense which I have named is that to which I regard myself as fairly intitled.’

His words did their work. By what majority we know not, the Dikasts passed sentence that Sokrates should be dealt with by the Eleven. The result, we are told, was that which he had looked for and, indeed, desired. Now that the end had come, he had the satisfaction of knowing that through his trial, as in his previous relations with his countrymen, he had acted rightly. Not once, since it began, had the warning voice bidden him hold back a single utterance. It was the divine will that he should now depart, and to that will he yielded a hearty and glad submission. With the exquisitely beautiful address which gives the parting benediction of a spirit wholly absorbed in the love of others and yearning for union with the eternal righteousness, all are familiar whether in the Greek of Plato or the scarcely less stately Latin of Cicero. With a hesitation scarcely to be expected after the undoubting conviction expressed in the *Gorgias*¹ he tells them that death is either a sleep in which the senses which trouble us are at rest for ever, or else a gate through which the upright pass to the society of just men made

¹ lxxxii. p. 526. Sokrates, it is true, is represented as saying that his picture of the judgment of the dead might be despised as a myth or an old woman's tale; but he insists that such contempt can be justified only if we can produce a better picture in its stead. Clearly the detail's

are needed only to make the fact which underlies them apprehensible by the human mind: but that a spiritual scrutiny awaits men after death and that men are responsible for the state in which they approach it, he expresses himself as thoroughly assured.

perfect. In the former case it is at the least no evil : in the latter it is the greatest of all blessings. The dying, he added, were supposed to see further than other men ; and they must forgive him, if, looking, as he now could, into the future, he told them that any hopes which they might have of arresting his work by his death must be disappointed. In the course of his defence he had indeed uttered a warning not easily reconciled with his dying prophecy. He had told them¹ that by getting rid of him they would lose the only man who would stick to the city like a fly to a high-bred horse which needed a sting to keep it from lapsing into sluggishness. He now told them² that his work would be carried on with tenfold greater zeal by a band of young disciples whose youthful energy would render their assaults both more frequent and less agreeable. For themselves his death was a mistake. The true method of avoiding humiliating confessions of ignorance was not by slaying others but by giving themselves up to the task of self-improvement in obedience to the precept inscribed in the Delphian temple, 'Know thyself.' But that which for them was a blunder was for him the happiest of all events. Whatever death might be, no harm could ever befall the good ; and he trusted that they too might face death with the supreme consolation imparted by this conviction. Lastly he commended to them his children as persons needing the friendly discipline which he had applied to all. 'If they fancy themselves to be something when they are nothing, and follow their own desires, treat them as I have treated you : and you will then have given me an abundant recompense for all my toil. But it is time for me to go to my death, for you to return to your active life. Which of these two things is the better, no man can say. God alone knows.'

By a singular accident the sentence was passed on the day which followed the crowning of the Sacred Ship before its departure for Delos. Each year this trireme, bearing on its stern the garland placed upon it by the priest of Apollon, went on the pilgrimage to that holy island in memory of the deliverance wrought for the tribute children by the slayer of the Minotauros. From the moment when this wreath was put in its place to the hour when the vessel again entered the haven of Peiræus, no capital sentence could be executed ; and Sokrates thus remained for some thirty days, chained in his cell, but cheered, if his serene soul needed any comfort, by the devotion of his friends who were allowed free access to him. To these his

The death of
Sokrates.
399 B.C.

¹ Plat. *Apol. Sokr.* ch. xviii. p. 31 A. See ch. iv.

² Plat. *Apol. Sokr.* ch. xxx. p. 40 A. The difference between the two statements may fairly be taken

as amounting to a contradiction, and may aid us in determining the accuracy of the picture drawn for us in the Platonic Apology.

sentence was not so gratifying as it was to himself, and Kriton, we are told, had arranged a plan for escape to be carried out by bribing the gaoler. With some indignation Sokrates rejected a proposal which would fasten on him the guilt of disobeying the law,—the very crime for which he had been tried and of which up to that time he knew himself to be wholly guiltless. The days which might still remain to him, be they few or many, must be spent in meditation on the eternal truths, which formed the unailing inheritance of those who sincerely sought them. Of that solemn time the Phaidon of Plato has left to us an imperishable monument. Unruffled by a single disturbing thought, Sokrates poured out for his friends those treasures of positive knowledge of which during his public career he had been regarded as somewhat chary; and when at last he had taken the hemlock juice and his eyes grew heavy, he bade Kriton remember that he owed a cock to Asklepios. With the gentle playfulness of one who felt that in all conditions he had a home in God he prayed his friend by no means to forget the debt. The cock was the bird which heralded the return of light and life to the darkened earth, and Asklepios was the Great Healer whose voice brought back the dead from their graves. So, with the conviction that the life here is the portal to the life hereafter, passed away the man who in the words of his disciple was of all men the most excellent, the most wise, and the most just.

If we are compelled to admit that neither in the method of Sokrates nor in the matter of his philosophy was there any absolute originality, the enormous power with which he wielded the weapons employed by his predecessors, the unflinching honesty with which he applied his principles so far as he felt that their sphere extended, and the profound impression which he left on the minds of his companions remain not the less unquestionable facts. The rule of submitting all propositions to a searching test, and of weighing all that could be said against as well as for them, was certainly not struck out by himself; but if by the Sokratic Elenchos we mean that examination by short oral questions which ended with convincing his hearers of their ignorance even on common subjects, then we must allow that he not merely devised this mode of negative analysis but carried it to perfection. In fact, it was never again used with the same systematic perseverance and the same unailing subtlety. Nor could it be so used except by men who chose to submit to the hard conditions which Sokrates imposed upon himself. No one could hope to achieve anything like the same success, unless like him they devoted their lives to the one work of addressing all men indiscriminately, unmasking hypocrisy, pretence, and falsehood,

whether in the most eminent of their countrymen or the most humble. At all hours they must be ready to put or to answer questions, and the long toil of untwisting the tangled fallacies which held together the tottering body of popular opinion and traditional belief must be undergone without pay, for with the touch of coin the charm of the questioner would lose its power. In this complete abandonment of himself to his work Sokrates stands alone; and the Platonic dialogues, which may give us some idea of his wonderful conversations, alone remain to show how much may be done not merely to expose falsehood but to impart positive knowledge by short questions on the most ordinary topics, all directed with consummate skill to a predetermined end.

Nor must we forget that this ruthless tearing off of the mask behind which Folly and Falsehood passed themselves off for Wisdom and Truth was with Sokrates the mere prelude, yet the indispensable prelude, to the real work of construction without which the negative process would be of no profit. His negative and positive teaching. Speaking always not as the teacher but as the learner, sifting the opinions of his hearers with the one purpose of clearing the ground for the reception of truth, he so tempered the pain which he could not help inflicting as to make it a stimulus to earnest and patient search; and with those who at bottom were honest and truth-loving men he never failed. Failure ensued only when the hearer had committed himself to a system from which he derived profit, and which he was resolved to uphold at whatever cost: and with such men the name of Sokrates stirred up feelings of dangerous animosity. Thus doing thoroughly what other philosophers had done only in part, he succeeded in pulling to pieces a vast mass of error which was yearly swelling to more gigantic proportions. Nor was this all. He showed that in the study of mankind and of society there was a boundless field in which the careful observation of fact would yield an abundant harvest of positive knowledge, and that the attainment of this knowledge was the indispensable condition of human well-being. That any knowledge could be gained without careful and unprejudiced study and search, he denied altogether; that a man could do just, or temperate, or brave acts without first knowing what Justice, Temperance, and Bravery were, he denied not less strenuously. But he asserted with unwearied iteration that in ascertaining the nature of these and all other moral qualities there lay a province of inquiry which would always yield solid results.

He held, in short, that the field thus marked out was the only one in which the human intellect could be legitimately exercised. In the method by which he would have this field surveyed he was in perfect harmony with the philosophy of Bacon. The assump-

tions by which he sought to shut the gates against physical research, and the over-sanguine hopes which pictured to him a coherent fabric of ethical science almost as a present reality, sprang naturally from the state of philosophy in his earlier years. The absurd and random guesses by which men of the highest eminence sought to explain natural phenomena were put forth in a succession of theories not much more long-lived than the gourd of the prophet which sprang up in a night and died in a night. From the labyrinth of contradictory conclusions which was becoming continually more intricate, what inference could a really unprejudiced and honest thinker draw than that they who troubled themselves with such things were altogether on the wrong track? Without pausing to consider whether the alleged facts on which these theories were built had been really observed, or still more whether a vastly larger array of facts must not be brought together before any theorising at all could be justified, he jumped to the conclusion that the absurdities of natural philosophers were a righteous punishment inflicted by the gods for intrusion into their own hallowed and inviolable domain. Having assumed thus much, he naturally assumed still more. If there could be no science, properly so called, of things physical, yet a large amount of practical guidance in the affairs of human life was vouchsafed through the less usual phenomena of nature. In oracles, in signs and portents, in the bodies of animals offered in sacrifice, in visions and dreams men were brought into direct communication with the deity; and thus, although his countrymen could scarcely be brought to believe it, Sokrates was almost a bigoted adherent of the traditional religion of Athens. The man who wielded the Elenchos to such terrible effect in the wide field of human duty could not see that he was stringing together a multitude of assumptions respecting a theology of which Thucydides fully saw the hollowness and the mischief.

During the centuries which have passed since his death the conditions of the two great controversies into which he plunged have been strangely reversed. The laws or rules by which the movements of suns with their planets are regulated have been read with an accuracy which has led to the discovery of worlds unseen. The nature of human sensation, the relation of the mind to the brain, of morality to religion, the origin of law, and the true purpose of society are, with many other questions, debated now more vehemently than in any earlier age; and it may perhaps be not unfairly said that the new forms recently given to old discussions arise from the reapplication of the method of Sokrates. That method was to prove fatal not only to his assumptions, but to not a few of his

Protest of
Sokrates
against phy-
sical re-
search.

Modern as-
pects of
ethical and
physical
philosophy.

conclusions in Ethics which he regarded as resting on unassailable foundations of fact. But after all qualifications he performed a mighty work, a work not the less astonishing because, in spite of the genial and loving nature of the man, it was addressed rather to the head than to the heart. It may be easy to show, as he insisted, that right action could spring only from right knowledge, and that no man can be truthful or generous or just until he can give an accurate definition of justice, truth, and generosity. Yet such teaching as this will go but a little way towards lightening the agony of human life. There was no such insistence on this purifying intellectual process in the words of Him who cheered the weary and heavy-laden with the glad tidings that they were all children of their Father who is in heaven. The Sermon on the Mount has been the consolation of millions; the Sokratic philosophy has at best ennobled the minds of a scanty band of earnest thinkers.

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE RETURN OF THE TEN THOUSAND TO THE BATTLE OF LEUKTRA.

FROM the departure of Xerxes to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war Hellenic history is the history of an attempt to maintain a confederacy which tended to mould isolated tribes into a nation, and of a determined opposition which at length ended in its destruction. From the day when the Long Walls of Athens were overthrown down to the hour when the hoplites of Kleombrotos were crushed by the mighty mass of the Theban phalanx at Leuktra, the history of Greece is the narrative of a tyranny without principle, save indeed that of lawless self-gratification,¹ and of a single effort in the direction of national union which might have changed the fortunes of the Hellenic world, had it not been put down in blood. In short, from first to last, Greek history during this whole period lays bare the enormous mischief wrought by a political theory that will not apply to cities the rules which each city scrupled not to enforce on its individual citizens.

Character of Greek history from the fall of Athens to the battle of Leuktra.

¹ This statement is that of Xenophon himself, *Anab.* vi. 4, 12. In its worst moments the Athenian people had never propounded a worse doctrine than the theory which asserted that the Demos had a right

to do what it liked, see p. 471. But the acts of the Demos, even if iniquitous, must be preceded by a vote of the majority. Under the Spartan empire each Spartan citizen was the law to himself.

Six months, perhaps six weeks, sufficed to show the most vehemement of the Spartan allies what sort of bargain they had made and what kind of work they had been helping to do. The day which saw the downfall of the Athenian walls was for them the triumph of the gospel which Brasidas had preached,¹ and it was not convenient for them to ponder then the parable of his address to the people of Akanthos. Their eyes were opened when a few days or a few months later it became plain that the freedom which they had helped to win meant freedom only for the Spartans, and that the Spartans used the term to denote the power of doing what they chose themselves and of compelling everyone else to do the same. They had been looking forward to a time when each city should be left to manage its own affairs, without visits from Athenian or other tribute-gatherers: they now found each city assessed in sums the total of which yielded a thousand talents, while the Akropolis became the stronghold of a Peloponnesian garrison under a Spartan harmost. These garrisons were not indeed introduced by the mere force of Spartan power. The triumph of Sparta was in each city the triumph of the few who vaunted themselves as the aristocracy of birth and wealth. The events which happened at Athens exhibited only on a larger scale the course which events were taking elsewhere. In each city the leaders of the oligarchical party seized power for the expressed purpose of enjoying themselves at the expense of the people, and were abetted in their evil-doing by the members of their clubs, as the Thirty at Athens were supported by their zealous comrades, the Knights or Horsemen.

In Asia Minor the Greek cities had at first been surrendered to the Persian king,² Abydos alone remaining under the rule of the Spartan harmost Derkyllidas. But Lysandros, foiled in upholding the rule of the Thirty at Athens, found that he had plenty to do when he was dispatched by the Spartans to the eastern coasts of the Egean. His zeal on behalf of the Dekarchies which he had established called forth complaints not only from the cities but from the satrap Pharnabazos. The latter could not be disregarded, and Lysandros, recalled home, found the position of a simple citizen so intolerable that he besought leave to undertake a pilgrimage to the Libyan oracle of Amoun.³ His visits to fate-giving temples were not confined to this distant shrine. He was seen at Dodona and at Delphoi; and at each he sought encouragement for the plan which, as he hoped, might make him one of the Spartan kings. The goal,

Support given to the Spartans by the oligarchic factions in Athens and other cities.
404 B.C.

Intrigues of Lysandros.
403 B.C.

¹ See p. 335.

² For the treaties on this subject see pp. 417, 422.

³ See p. 120.

we might think, was not much worth the effort of seeking it; and even the intrusion of a man not belonging to the stock of the Herakleids into the lines representing the houses of Eurysthenes and Prokles could scarcely be dignified with the name of a political revolution. Sparta was ruled not by the kings, but by the ephors,¹ whose commissioners now hampered their action even in the command of the Spartan armies. Still it was possible that by a man of vigorous intellect and powerful will the office might be made the means of exercising a largely extended influence. Unable to secure it for himself, he used all his strength to bring about the election of one on whose hearty obedience he felt that he could count. He found himself signally mistaken.

The punishment of the Eleians for affronts and wrongs done to Sparta twenty years before was the last work of King Agis, under whom the Spartan force at Dekeleia had dealt a fatal blow to imperial Athens. The Eleians had dared to exclude Sparta from the great Olympian festival in the year marked by the magnificent display of Alkibiades;² they had broken away from her confederacy, and had appeared amongst her enemies in the fight of Mantinea. For these offences their land was twice invaded by a Spartan army. An earthquake cut short the first expedition: the second ended in a discomfiture, which might have been rendered more humiliating had the Spartans listened to the request of the men of Pisa that the presidency of the games might be transferred to themselves.

About twelve months later their conqueror Agis died; and on the suggestion of Lysandros, who would have secured the succession for himself if he could, Agesilaos, his younger brother, stood forth to dispute the title of his son Leotychides, a boy now about fifteen years of age. The old scandal was revived which represented him as the son not of Agis but of Alkibiades; but probably the eloquence of Lysandros on behalf of Agesilaos was aided more powerfully by the reputation which Agesilaos, with his genial countenance and affable manner, had acquired as a zealous disciple and champion of the military monasticism of Sparta. Faithful in his friendships and too ready to overlook in his friends iniquities which he would have shrunk from committing himself, he had only one defect which threatened to stand seriously in his way. He was lame in one leg, and the subtlety of Lysandros was needed to explain away the prophecies which warned Sparta against allowing her power to be endangered by a lame reign. Events were to occur before his death which in the belief of many fully justified the old prediction. For the present the objection was set aside on the ground that the

¹ See p. 30.² See p. 35.

oracle spoke not of any bodily blemish but of the reign of one who had not in his veins the blood of Herakles. The ephors at least were soon won over by the new king. Far from showing the haughtiness by which some among his predecessors may have sought to make up for scanty prerogative, Agesilaos always rose at their entrance, while he sought their goodwill by frequent gifts which the wealth inherited from his brother Agis enabled him freely to bestow. Clad in the garb of an ordinary citizen, he still subjected himself to the public discipline, and thus showed that in his own person at least he was not corrupted either by his own fortune or by the vast treasures poured since the catastrophe of Aigospotamoi into a city where the possession of gold or silver money was a capital offence.

In spite of all enactments, however, the influx of this wealth had an immediate effect in aggravating the inequalities, already great enough, which threatened to produce a terrible harvest of discontent and hatred. Failure to pay the contributions needed for the public messes had long been multiplying the number of the Inferiors, or Hypomeiones,¹ by thrusting down among them men whose citizenship, although not lost, was in abeyance, and who, if fortune favored them, might under the title of Mothakes resume the franchise. These men, smarting under bitter feelings of disappointment, would see themselves shut out from the splendid prizes bestowed on the more powerful citizens in the various parts of the great Spartan empire. While their own property was being continually absorbed into that of richer men, they would look on Spartans for whom influence, not merit, had secured office, in other words, boundless wealth abroad. That the dull and rigid routine of Spartan life tended to foster an irrepressible yearning (in vulgar English phrase) to have their fling elsewhere and to create an inordinate appetite for money among men who were allowed to use only heavy lumps of iron, cannot be denied. The luxurious sensuality to which the conqueror of Plataiai² abandoned himself was but the first symptom of the disease which brought home to the Spartans the conviction that their citizens were not much deserving of trust away from home. That such a state of things was full of danger for Sparta we learn on the clear testimony of the philo-Lakonian Xenophon, who mourns that greediness for foreign service which pointed to a desire for luxuries not allowed at home, and was the cause of a degeneracy not unlike that which the austerer citizens of Rome deplored in the later ages of the commonwealth. The men debarred from these easy modes of enrichment simply because they had failed to pay their yearly subscription to the Syssitia would be

¹ See p. 32.

² See p. 478.

dangerous companions for the Neodamodes or enfranchised Helots as well as for the great body of subject Lakonians over whom through the Krypteia¹ the state exercised a ceaseless and most anxious supervision.

Agesilaos had been king for scarcely a year when as he was offering a public sacrifice the prophet announced that the victims clearly revealed the existence of a dangerous conspiracy. The signs furnished by a second victim were even more alarming. When the third was slain, the prophet declared that according to the tokens they were in the very midst of their enemies. That a plot was being arranged, the sequel sufficiently showed. Whether the prophet thus warned Agesilaos or whether, if he so warned him, he was himself possessed of the secret, it might be rash to say ; but lapse of time was never held to invalidate the force of heaven-sent signs,² and some five days had passed before some man (who he may have been, we are not told) came forward to denounce Kinadon as the traitor. It is possible and even likely that this man may have offered himself and been accepted as an accomplice in the conspiracy ; but it is absurd to put faith in the tales which such miscreants may be pleased to tell, and the story of this informer exhibits Kinadon simply as an infatuated fool. That a man who had been constantly employed by the Ephors on secret missions should pick out this informer for the expressed purpose of taking him through the Agora and begging him to count the Spartiatai there present, in order that he might see who were to be assassinated and who were to be assassins, is altogether incredible. It is enough to say that the Ephors acted with more than their usual craft and secrecy. Kinadon was dispatched on a secret errand to Aulon ; but the men sent with him were ordered to seize their commander at some distance from the city. To the question by which the Ephors demanded the reason for his enterprise his answer was that he was determined to be the peer of the first man in Sparta. It is almost superfluous to add that torture was used to wring from him the names of his accomplices, and that with them, with his hands manacled and his neck laden with a heavy wooden collar, he was scourged and goaded through the city and then beheaded.³

When the Spartans, if the tale be true,⁴ had by a treachery which would do credit to Belial himself got rid of the Helots who had ventured their lives to succor the hoplites in Sphakteria, they thought it prudent to send

The conspiracy of Kinadon.

Spartan operations in Asia Minor.

¹ See p. 32.

² See p. 519.

³ Xen. *Hellen.* iii. 3.

⁴ I have expressed my doubts of

this story. But if its truth be granted, it stands amongst the most heinous in the catalogue of human crimes. See p. 329.

on foreign service those who might be disagreeably inquisitive or dangerously indignant at home. The same policy now prompted them to dispatch Agesilaos to Asia, where Sparta had been compelled to take a course very different from that to which she had pledged herself in her covenants with Tissaphernes. By aiding Cyrus she had incurred the enmity of the Great King, and even prudence seemed to justify her in using for the benefit of the Asiatic Greeks the survivors of the Ten Thousand whom Xenophon was bringing back with him from the field of Kunaxa. But Thim-

bron, sent out with a large army, failed everywhere and
 399 B.C. in everything, was recalled and banished, and Derkyllidas put in his place. This officer was doubly favored. First, it would seem that Xenophon returned with him to take the command of the Cyreian troops; and, secondly, all difficulties as to the payment of his men were removed by the lucky accident which made him master of the vast wealth of Mania, widow of Zenis who had governed Aiolis under Pharnabazos. This spirited woman, who had succeeded to her husband's power on her promise of discharging all his duties, had with her son fallen a victim to the greed of her son-in-law Meidias, who thought by the murder to become master of the cities of Skepsis, Gergis, and Kebrên. The first two of these he occupied; the third the governor insisted on holding for Pharnabazos, but the garrison surrendered to Derkyllidas, who went on to Skepsis and there got possession of Meidias himself. Henceforth the task of the Spartan general was an easy one. Meidias was compelled to order the gates of Gergis to be opened, to draw up an inventory of his own property (which he made as large as possible), to admit that Mania was a dependent of Pharnabazos, and that her treasure therefore escheated to Derkyllidas with whom the satrap was at war. The murderer was dismissed to live as best he might in his father's house at Skepsis, and Derkyllidas became possessed of a sum equal at least to a year's pay for 8,000 men.¹

In the following spring while he was at Lampsakos,
 398 B.C. commissioners arrived from Sparta to tell him that his command was continued for another year, and to express the satisfaction of the Ephors with the improved conduct of the Cyreians. When this announcement was made to the troops, their leader (we cannot doubt that it was Xenophon himself) answered that the change lay not in the men but in the new Spartan commander. Probably the wealth of Mania, by smoothing the way of Derkyllidas, had much to do with winning for him the delicate praise implied in these words.

The next year was spent chiefly in the siege of Atarneus. Its reduction in the eighth month of the blockade (397 B.C.) was fol-

¹ Xen. *H.* iii. 1, 28.

lowed by larger operations in Karia where Derkyllidas found himself opposed to the combined forces of Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes. On the banks of the Maiandros [Meander] the satraps had a splendid opportunity for dealing a heavy blow on their enemy; but Tissaphernes, deaf to the intreaties of his colleague, insisted on a conference, and in the minds of the Greeks the impression was strengthened that promptitude of action was not to be expected from Persians. The conference ended only in a truce. Derkyllidas demanded the independence of the Greek cities: the satraps insisted on the departure not only of the Peloponnesian army but of all Spartan harmosts from the territories of the Great King. The former would agree only to refer the question to the Ephors; but the truce had not been long made when Agesilaos was dispatched, with thirty Spartiatai and a large force of Neodamodes and allies, to settle the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks. He was accompanied by Lysandros, who reckoned on being the real master of the thirty Peers and on directing through them all the actions of the King. But Agesilaos set out with hopes and plans inspired by an ambition wider even than that of Lysandros. The latter was intent on re-establishing his hateful Decemvirates: the former dreamt of nothing less than a march to Sousa and the overthrow of Persian power. With his heart set on this great enterprise, he resolved like Agamemnon to offer sacrifice at Aulis, before he invaded the country of the Great King. There accordingly he landed, and the ceremonial was actually being carried out when a body of horsemen sent by the Boiotarchs forbade the sacrifice and hurled the victims from the altar.

Mission of
Agesilaos to
Asia Minor.
396 B. C.

The Thebans thus followed up by a serious insult the refusal which they had already given to a request for troops to serve with Agesilaos in Asia. In this refusal they were supported not merely by the Athenians but by their old allies the Corinthians, in conjunction with whom they had sought to deal with Athens as they had dealt with Plataiai. These acts now belonged to a past which they were anxious to forget. The freedom for which they had lavished their money and their blood during seven-and-twenty years had vanished into thin air. Nay, they had already to face the stern realities of a tyranny with which the yoke of imperial Athens, taken at its worst, was a light burden indeed. The victory which they had helped to win had brought to the conquerors not only vast power but vast wealth; and of this immense treasure Spartan greed allowed not a fraction to be shared among the allies. Of these allies Thebes and Corinth alone had the courage to demand their right; and the contemptuous refusal given to the request of

Discontent
of the The-
bans and Co-
rinthians
with Sparta.

these once powerful cities kept all the others silent. Sparta was indeed enriching her citizens : but she was to pay a heavy penalty for her folly by and by.

The cloud was gathering even now. The tidings which had made the Spartans anxious to send Agesilaos to Asia with all speed disclosed an ominous picture of the activity manifest in Phenician and Kilikian ports. Triremes were being rapidly manned or repaired or built ; and the fleet, when ready, was to be under the command of a man of whose ability and energy they were well aware and whose hatred they had just cause to fear.

Activity of
Konon under
the protection
of
Euagoras,
despot of
Salamis.
398 B.C.

During the seven years which had passed since the great treason of Aigospotamoi¹ Konon had been quietly biding his time under the protection of Euagoras, despot of the Kyprian (Cyprian) Salamis. Six years before Konon brought to his harbor the triremes which he had saved from the general wreck, this Hellenic prince, of whom Isokrates speaks in terms of the loftiest eulogy, had surprised and slain a Phenician who had won his place by murder and who sought the life of Euagoras himself. Acknowledged as despot, he ruled with a beneficence rarely seen in Hellenic autocrats, administering an evenhanded justice and seeking most of all to plant in his city the highest forms of Hellenic culture. Athenians driven away from the Chersonesos or elsewhere by the stern orders of Lysandros found a ready refuge within his walls ; and the fact that Spartan power could not follow them thither sufficiently attests his strength. At a later time he was to become the antagonist of the Great King, to achieve some great successes, to come out of the contest without much humiliation, and to be struck down finally by an assassin's dagger. But for the present his alliance with Persia, involving the payment of tribute yet not otherwise affronting his dignity, greatly promoted the plans of Konon and the reaction which he was striving to bring about in favor of Athens.

The appearance of Agesilaos on Asiatic soil was not without its immediate effect on the two satraps. To his demand of inde-

Mission of
Lysandros
to the Hel-
lespont.
396 B.C.

pendence for the Greek cities they replied by asking a further armistice which would enable them to refer the matter to Sousa. The truce granted for three months seemed to Lysandros to furnish an excellent opportunity for reasserting the influence which he had exercised during the lifetime of Cyrus. His old partisans hurried in crowds to Ephesos ; but Agesilaos had no mind that any other should hold court in his presence, even though that other be the man to whom he owed his throne. Hence all who sought an introduction to him through Lysandros were dismissed with a peremptory refusal

¹ See p. 476.

to their petitions. Stung by these manifest slights, Lysandros exclaimed bitterly, 'You know well, Agesilaos, how to put down your friends.' 'Indeed I do,' was the answer, 'but only in the case of those who wish to put me in the shade. I should be ashamed of myself if I did not know how to show my gratitude to those who give me due honor.' Lysandros had the good sense to see that the contest was vain, and at his own request he was sent on a mission to the Hellespont, where he did good work for Sparta.

The three months assigned for the armistice had not come to an end when Tissaphernes, emboldened by large reinforcements to his army, insisted on the immediate departure of Agesilaos from Asia, under threat of war in case of refusal. Defeat and death of Tissaphernes. Thanking the satrap for thus setting the gods against him by his perjury, the Spartan King plunged eagerly into a contest which brought him not a little booty and enabled him to exhibit the more generous features of his character in the treatment of his prisoners. On the Persian side Tissaphernes achieved practically nothing, and a victory won some months later by Agesilaos near Sardeis seems to have filled up the 395 B.C. measure of his iniquities in the eyes of the Persian King. Availing herself of the present temper of Artaxerxes, Parysatis seized eagerly the opportunity of avenging herself on a man whom she regarded as the murderer of her son Cyrus. At her entreaty Tithraustes was sent down with an order for his death, and Tissaphernes was beheaded at Kolossai.

The new satrap was able to disclaim all connivance in the treachery which had led to the recent contest, and in his turn he insisted on the departure of Agesilaos, pledging him- Anti-Spartan changes in Rhodes. self that the Asiatic Hellenes should have full auto- 395 B.C. nomy on the one condition that they punctually paid their tribute. Pending the reference of this question to Sparta, Agesilaos agreed to a truce for six months, and received from Tithraustes the sum of thirty talents to remove his troops from his satrapy to that of Pharnabazos. By such slender links was the ill-cemented mass of the Persian empire held together.¹ Meanwhile Konon had not been idle; and Pharnabazos, the most high-spirited and generous of all the Persian rulers whom the history of this age brings before us, had obtained for him the command of a fleet of forty triremes with which he sailed to the port of Kaunos. Here he was blockaded by a fleet of 120 vessels under the Spartan Pharax, until the reinforcement of 40 Persian ships drove Pharax to Rhodes, only to learn that the Spartan tyranny was there rousing a dangerous spirit of resistance. His fleet was still, partially at least, in the Rhodian harbor, when the people, rising in revolt, com-

¹ See p. 127.

pelled him to hurry away. We can scarcely lay too great stress on the fact that whenever the oligarchic factions in the cities of the Athenian confederacy had determined on an alliance with Sparta, they waited not merely until all Athenian ships were absent, but until a Peloponnesian force was present strong enough to overcome the philo-Athenian demos. In the present instance the Spartan admiral found himself ignominiously thrust out, while his enemies without a blow gained a rich and unlooked-for booty. The mercantile fleet, sent by the Egyptian King Nepheres with corn and other stores for the benefit of Lakedaimonians, entered the Rhodian harbor, knowing nothing of recent changes, and was seized as a prize by Konon. At Sparta the tidings of these events roused vehement indignation. The Rhodian Dorieus, whom the Athenians had not merely spared but honored when he stood a prisoner before them,¹ seems at this time to have been somewhere near the Peloponnesos. With the revolt he had nothing to do; and with the memory of his splendid victories at the Olympic and other festivals was linked the remembrance of his enthusiastic zeal in the service of Sparta, a zeal which had brought on him a sentence of banishment at the hands of his countrymen. But gratitude and generosity found no genial soil in Sparta. Dorieus was arrested, brought to Sparta, and there murdered.

Yet the Spartan commander may well have regarded the revolt of Rhodes and the reappearance of Konon as matters of no great significance. Months passed on, and his fleet did nothing. The Persian officers had little inclination to serve under a Greek, while the satraps had no mind to waste their own revenues on the war. Little, it was clear, could be done without a decisive order from Sousa, and to Sousa accordingly Konon hastened, not indeed to prostrate himself at the feet of the king of kings, but to convey to him, through his friend the physician Ktesias, his conviction that the maritime empire of Sparta might be easily overthrown, if only the King chose to engage heartily in the contest. Artaxerxes listened with more than willingness. The Spartans had abetted his brother Cyrus in his treason, and were now keeping from him Greek cities which might yield him rich tribute. Konon received not merely the order which he sought, together with a large grant of money, but the power of naming any Persian officer as his colleague. His choice fell naturally on Pharnabazos, who was eager to settle scores with Agesilaos for the ravaging of his satrapy. He was aided not less zealously by his generous friend Euagoras, who served in person with his own triremes.

Increased
power of
Konon.

B.C. 394.

¹ Paus., vi. 7, 2.

The expectations of Konon were more than justified in the first battle which followed this vigorous alliance. Acting on full powers received from home, Agesilaos had named as admiral of the Spartan fleet his brother-in-law Peisandros, a young man whose ambition and confidence far exceeded his skill as a general.¹ The advantage of numbers was, it seems, on the side of Konon; but had the disparity been even greater than it was, Peisandros was well aware that he could not afford to decline an engagement. The Greek cities on the mainland were retained in the Spartan confederacy against their will: and a confession of inferiority by sea would lead in the islands to something more than discontent. But it was beyond his power to impart his own courage to others, and seeing themselves outumbered, his Asiatic allies fled on the attack of Konon without striking a blow. Peisandros might, like the crews of many of his ships, have made his escape to land; but following the old Spartan tradition, he chose rather to die fighting. So with the loss of more than half the fleet ended the battle fought off the promontory of Knidos at the southern end of the Keramic Gulf. By Xenophon it is dismissed in a parenthesis; but in reality it destroyed the maritime supremacy of Sparta, and had further consequences which were soon felt throughout her land empire. Ten years only had passed away since the catastrophe of Aigospotamoi: but the Spartans cannot be charged with failure in compressing into that short period the largest possible amount of misgovernment and tyranny.

In the West also dangers had long been thickening, and Agesilaos was to witness some resolute assaults on that fabric of power which when he became king seemed to defy all attack. Sparta had then her harmost in the Boiotian war between Thebes and Sparta. Thessalian Pharsalos, and the colony of Herakleia which a few years previously had been only a source of weakness now served as the stronghold for the maintenance of empire in those distant regions. But fear, jealousy, and hatred were soon to kindle a flame nearer home. Persian money sent by the satrap Tithraustes strengthened the hands of the anti-Spartan party in Thebes and Corinth; and if the Rhodian Timokrates who acted as his envoy did not visit Athens, he may have felt that in that city on which the hand of Sparta had fallen most heavily there was little work for him to do. Elsewhere his mission was the more successful because the money which he brought was bestowed and received not as a bribe but honestly as the means of rendering resistance possible. A quarrel between the Phokians and Opountian Lokrians for a piece of

Battle of
Knidos.
394 B.C.

Boiotian
war between
Thebes and
Sparta.
Death of
Lysandros.
395 B.C.

¹ Xen. *H.* iii. 4, 29.

borderland brought about open strife between Thebes and Sparta. The Lokrians appealed to the former: the latter, taking up with vehement eagerness the cause of the Phokians, resolved that the war thus begun should end in the humiliation of Thebes. Orders were given that Lysandros should start from Herakleia on the north with as large a force as he could muster from the tribes in the neighborhood of Oita, and that King Pausanias should meet him on a given day in the territory of Haliartos on the southern shore of the Kopaic lake. Whether from over haste on the part of Lysandros or slowness on that of Pausanias the meeting never took place. Marching from Herakleia, Lysandros found his way into Boiotia made easy by the revolt of Orchomenos from the Theban confederacy; but he was disappointed in his hope that the Haliartians would on his summons take the same course. Pausanias was not yet come; and Lysandros, too impatient to wait, advanced to the wall and was searching for a place where the assault might be made with most effect, when the sight of a Theban force hurrying towards the city encouraged the Haliartians to throw open their gates and sally out against the enemy. Lysandros, taken by surprise, was amongst the first to fall; and although the loss in the battle was not large, his army melted away during the coming night. The men composing it had been brought and held together chiefly by his personal influence; and this spell was broken by his death.

The army of Pausanias might of itself have turned the fortunes of the day against the Boiotians taken singly; but on approaching Haliartos he found that the men led by Lysandros were gone home, and on the day following a large Athenian force of hoplites and horsemen made its appearance under Thrasyboulos, the hero of Phylé and Peiraieus. The ambition and tyranny of Sparta had thus united Thebes with the city which until Sparta began her reign of freedom she had hated with the bitterest enmity. The Thebans had no sooner heard that they were to be attacked by two armies, the one from the north, the other from the south, than they sent to Athens envoys charged to say that their city was in no way responsible for the ferocious sentiment expressed by the Theban who happened to be present at the debate which after the surrender of the city was to determine the fate of Athens. That man spoke on his own authority alone: Thebes had since that time shown her real disposition by refusing to aid the Spartans against Thrasyboulos and his fellow exiles. She had thus a title to the gratitude of the Athenian Demos, and she counted with not less confidence on the goodwill of the Athenian oligarchs. So far as the Spartans were concerned, these

Alliance between
Thebes and
Athens. Re-
treat of Pau-
sanias from
Boiotia.
395 B.C.

had been abandoned without scruple to the vengeance of the people, and if they were still living, it was owing only to the singular moderation which chose to draw a veil over the feuds and iniquities of the past. The arguments of the Theban envoy might betray rather a selfish fear than a generous patriotism; but the Athenians, the oligarchs not less than the people, contented themselves with reminding him that the aid of the Thebans had been only passive, and decreed a defensive alliance with Thebes. It became, therefore, a serious question for Pausanias whether he should risk a battle with enemies thus strengthened with aid from Athens, when even victory could do no more than enable him to recover the body of Lysandros, while defeat in the present temper of the allies might be followed by serious, if not disastrous, results. In the council held to decide whether by asking a truce for the burial of the dead they should virtually acknowledge their defeat, a few Spartans insisted that the only thing to be feared was disgrace; but they were overborne by the vast majority who saw that the allies were not to be depended on. The issue proved that they were right: for when the request for a truce was sent and the Thebans had granted it on condition¹ that they should immediately quit Boiotia, the allies received the news with undisguised satisfaction, and submitted with meekness even to the blows of the Thebans who watched their retreat and struck all who strayed from the ranks into the cultivated grounds on either side of the road.

Pausanias himself throughout the business was at least as guiltless as the Athenian generals at Argennoussai: on reaching Sparta he found that the popular temper threatened him with the fate of those unfortunate men, and he promptly took sanctuary at Tegea. Here he spent the rest of his life under the sentence of death which was passed on him in his absence, his son Agesipolis being chosen king in his place. In the bitter sorrow of the moment the Spartans may have felt that in Lysandros they had lost their tutelary genius; and the feeling may have been strengthened by the tidings that Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos were united against them in a confederacy which embraced among others the Chalkidians of Thrace, the Euboians, and the Akarnanians, and that the Theban Ismenias had succeeded in wresting from them their colony of Herakleia. In the synod of the confederates held at Corinth the language of the speakers was full of eager confidence. The mightiest rivers sprang from scanty sources; and the stream of Spartan power could easily be cut off at its head, although the influx of tributaries might swell it to an irresistible

¹ Greek morality required that be granted unconditionally. See truces for burying the dead should p. 332.

volume at a distance. So said the Corinthian Timolaos, adding that as men who wish to destroy a wasp's nest apply fire to it while the wasps are within, so should Spartans be attacked in Sparta. The confederate army set out accordingly for that mysterious city; but they had not advanced beyond Nemea when they learnt that the Spartans had already passed their border. Falling back on Corinth, they awaited the coming of the enemy. In the battle which ensued the Spartans with little loss to themselves bore down all opposed to them, but their allies were not only defeated but showed by their lack of firmness how little their hearts were in the cause for which they were fighting.

The indecisiveness of the battle fully justifies the step which the Ephors had already taken of recalling Agesilaos. Their decision reached him just when the full tide of success was carrying him onwards, as he hoped, to Sousa. The dream would in any case have been rudely disturbed so soon as he should learn the catastrophe of Knidos; but at the moment it seemed both to himself and to his friends that he was called away from a work which would requite on the barbarian the wrongs done to Hellas by Xerxes. In the first stirrings of their grief his allies were eager to accompany him to Sparta; and although many drew back when they remembered that he was returning to fight not against barbarians but against Greeks, yet a large body resolved to cast in their lot with his. Among these were many Cyreians, headed by Xenophon.

On his outward voyage Agesilaos had likened himself to Agamemnon. On returning from Asia he was constrained to follow the line of march taken by Xerxes. At Amphipolis Derkyllidas met him with tidings of the victory won at Corinth; the thought of the task which he had been compelled to abandon left no room for any feeling but that of grief that so much blood had been shed to so little purpose. Bearing down all opposition made to his onward march, he reached the Boiotian Chaironeia. Here an earthquake filled him with gloomy forebodings which were realised a few days later by the news of the battle of Knidos. Taking in at once the full significance of this great event, Agesilaos, by a device not unlike that of Eteonikos after the disaster at Argennoussai,¹ informed his army that the Lakedaimonian fleet had won a great victory, but that he had to mourn the death of his brother-in-law Peisandros. His next march brought him to the scene of the memorable battle which fifty-five years ago finally dispelled the dream of Athenian supremacy in Boiotia.² Here in the plain of Koroneia (a name associated for the Athenians with that of their luckless

¹ See p. 462.

² See p. 253.

general Tolmides) the confederate army awaited his coming, with hopes undoubtedly raised high by the tidings of Konon's success, if these had then reached them. Their confidence availed them but little. The weight of the Peloponnesian hoplites was still a force too mighty to be withstood by any but troops of the first quality. The division of Herippidas, including the Cyreians under Xenophon, bore down the men opposed to them, while on the side of the confederates the Argives without striking a blow fled up the slopes of Helikon. Thither the Thebans, who had put to flight the Orchomenians opposed to them, resolved to force their way on returning from the pursuit. Their path was barred by the hoplites of Agesilaos; the two masses met in direct encounter; and a conflict ensued which marked a new era in the history of Greek warfare. It was a strife in which the front ranks of men all of tried courage and skill received a tremendous impetus from the weight of the hinder ranks consisting of warriors not less formidable. The ghastly sight presented the next day by the battle field attested the desperate ferocity of a struggle which had been carried on not with wild and piercing cries but with the subdued murmur of men intent on business which they knew to be deadly.

In a certain sense Agesilaos had won a real victory. He was master of the battle ground, and even the Thebans formally admitted their defeat by asking a truce for the burial of the dead; but the latter on the other hand had fully carried out their purpose of forcing their way through the Spartans to the high grounds where their allies had taken refuge, and in the mind of Agesilaos the sense of their tremendous power was even deeper than that of his own success. That success, moreover, brought him no solid fruit. He returned home by way of Delphoi and across the Corinthian Gulf, as he might have done without fighting this dreadful battle. At Sparta he was received with profound respect. The simplicity with which he still submitted himself to the public discipline not only showed that the man was unchanged, but won for him a deference not so readily paid to men like Lysandros.

The victory of Konon at Knidos warned the harmosts of the Hellenic towns on the Egean coast that they would do well to seek a refuge elsewhere. Their rule rested, they knew, only on terror, and this they could no longer inspire. For their good fortune but for the mischief of Sparta Abydos remained obstinately faithful to the Peloponnesian cause. To Abydos therefore the harmosts fled, and there with the townsmen they held the place against all the threats and efforts of Pharnabazos. The satrap vowed vengeance and he kept

Return of
Agesilaos to
Sparta.
394 B.C.

The rebuild-
ing of the
Athenian
Long Walls.
393 B.C.

his word. Embarking with Konon, he sailed first to Kythêra, then to the Corinthian Isthmus, through waters where no Persian ship had been seen since the day of the fight at Salamis. Here he cheered the allies not only with promises of hearty support but with substantial aid in money, and then left his fleet with Konon for the execution of a more momentous work, which nothing but an astonishing combination of circumstances during this particular year rendered possible. The way by sea to Athens was barred to the Spartans by the destruction of their navy: the way by land was blocked for the present, but for a few months only, by the confederate lines at Corinth; and Konon availed himself of this precious opportunity to rebuild the walls thrown down by Lysandros.¹ The Peiraiæus thus again formed with Athens a single fortress, and this vast gain for her power and her commerce was directly the result of the tenacity with which Abydos held out against the satrap Pharnabazos.

But the Greek world generally had by its incessant feuds been now brought to this pass that any special benefit secured by one city was sure to excite the fears or the jealousy of others; and thus the rebuilding of the Athenian walls reawakened at Corinth the suspicions which had been only lulled by the more immediate pressure of Spartan injustice and tyranny. The philo-Lakonian party thus stirred to activity were forming designs for betraying the city, when the ruling oligarchs anticipated them by a massacre from which some of them escaped with Pasimelos who succeeded in seizing the Akrokorinthos. Solemn promises of amnesty secured the submission of these men; but the close alliance subsequently formed with Argos again roused their wrath, nor did Pasimelos feel any scruples in betraying the city to the Spartans, who by pulling down portions of the Long Walls which joined Corinth to its port Lechaion on the Corinthian Gulf left a way open across the isthmus to Attica and Boiotia. The danger to which they were thus exposed determined the Athenians to repair the breach thus made. With the rapidity which had astonished and alarmed the Syracusans² they built up the shattered portion of the western wall, leaving it to their allies to restore the other. A few months only passed before they were again thrown down by the Lakedaimonians; and ambassadors appeared at Sparta both from Athens and Thebes to treat for peace. For the time the negotiations came to nothing: but the destruction of a Lakedaimonian

¹ Konon rebuilt the two parallel walls joining Athens to the great harbor. The restoration of the

third or Phaleric wall was rightly judged to be unnecessary.

² See p. 383.

Mission of
Antalkidas
to the Per-
sian king.
392 B.C.

391 B.C.

force by the peltasts or light-armed mercenaries of the Athenian Iphikrates awakened in the Spartan mind feelings not unlike those with which they heard of the slaughter of their hoplites in Sphakteria by the light-armed troops of Demosthenes and Kleon.¹ In their alarm they determined to send envoys not to the cities confederated against them, but to the Persian king whom they were ready to worship as the supreme arbiter in Hellenic affairs. Hitherto they had used the term freedom in the sense most convenient to themselves: but the effort to inforce this interpretation had failed, and the time was therefore come to play another card in the game which must at whatever cost be made to end in the profit of Sparta. This card was the absolute autonomy or independence of every Hellenic city,—in other words, the suppression of every local confederacy, except, of course, her own. Henceforth Thebes and Athens, Corinth and Argos were not to have any allies; and in theory the pettiest townships of Boiotia and Attica were to stand as completely by themselves as the most prominent cities of the Hellenic world. With these propositions the Spartan Antalkidas was dispatched to Tiribazos, satrap of Armenia during the retreat of the Cyreians, now viceroy of Ionia in the place of Tithraustes. For the present his only success was the arrest and detention of the Athenian Konon, which he secured through his influence with Tiribazos. So ended the public career of a man whose loss to Athens was irreparable. He escaped, it would seem, to Kypros (Cyprus) and there died in the house of his friend Euagoras.

The gratitude of Athens to the Salaminian prince led soon to another loss scarcely less severe than that of Konon. The relations of Euagoras to the Persian court had undergone a great change; and the Athenian ships which in company with the Salaminian triremes had worked in alliance with the Persian fleet were now needed to fight in his quarrel with Artaxerxes. With forty triremes Thrasyboulos sailed first to Byzantion, and again made Athens the mistress of the Bosphoros,² and thence coasting along the eastern shores of the Egean met his death at Aspendos at the hands of natives irritated by the wrongdoing of some of his men. Athens had thus lost not only the man to whom she owed her Long Walls, but even the more devoted citizen who in the hour of his victory had deliberately chosen to throw a veil over the long catalogue of iniquities by which the Thirty and their minions had earned their title to the lasting hatred of their countrymen.

These losses were sustained at a time when Athens could little afford to bear them. Aigina, the eyesore of Peiraieus,³ was again

¹ See p. 323.

² See p. 450.

³ See p. 278.

held by such of the old inhabitants of the island as Lysandros could find after the fall of the imperial city. These Aiginetans whose inclinations would have kept them quiet were goaded by the Spartan harmost to assaults on Athenian shipping. By way of reprisal the Athenian Chabrias, on his way with ten triremes to the aid of Euagoras, landed on the island and taking the Spartan troops under Gorgôpas by surprise, slew their leader and put them to flight with severe loss. Defeat and lack of pay roused among these troops a discontent which threatened to be dangerous, when Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaos, sent from Sparta to quiet them told them that brave men had always a ready mode of winning their pay by their swords, and pledged himself to win it for them if only they would agree to follow him. Their destination was the Peiraieus, but unlike Brasidas' Teleutias kept it a secret, and leaving Aigina after nightfall found himself before dawn close to the entrance of the harbor, open still as in the days of Brasidas. No such attacks were looked for, nor had any preparations been made to meet them. The cries of those who even at that early hour chanced to be stirring sent the news through Peiraieus: from Peiraieus it was carried to Athens where the general belief was that the harbor had been actually taken. But before the hoplites could hurry down, Teleutias had sailed away with many merchant ships, with some triremes, and with enormous plunder.

Oppressed with the burden of carrying on a wearisome and unprofitable war, the Athenians became almost helpless against Spartan intrigues. On all sides there was a widespread feeling of mingled disgust and fear; and when at length Antalkidas returned with a peace sent down, so the phrase ran, from Sousa, it was accepted by all in the sense which Sparta chose to put upon it. The Thebans alone claimed to take the oath in the name of the Boiotian confederacy. The claim seemed to Agesilaos to furnish that opportunity for revenge against Thebes for which he had long been yearning. 'If you do not swear for yourselves and yourselves only,' he said, 'you will be shut out from the treaty.' In the feverish hope that they would thus bar themselves, he hastened to lead an army across the border. At Tegea he was met by Theban envoys who declared themselves ready to swear for Thebes alone. Agesilaos was balked of his vengeance in blood; but he had the satisfaction of knowing that he had left the proud Boiotian city a mere unit amongst a crowd of paltry towns and villages.

The Persian king chose to regard the acceptance of the peace by the Spartans as an act of submission not less significant than

¹ See p. 292.

the offering of earth and water.¹ In the disgrace which it involved the one was as ignominious as the other ; but Sparta had now not even the poor excuse which long ago² she had put forward for calling in the aid of the barbarian. She was no longer struggling for self-preservation. The fear that Athens might be once more on the road to empire, absurd though under the changed conditions of the Greek world such fear must be, may together with the consciousness of her own unpopularity have prompted that cession of the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, which gave to Athens a faint semblance of maritime power. Otherwise the purposes of Sparta were fully achieved. She had obtained the sanction of the Persian king to a policy which isolated the Hellenic cities, at a time when there was no confederate empire to break up except her own ; and that the provisions of the peace should be applied within the limits of her own alliance was no part of her intention. Freedom and independence were words which she still used, which she had always used, in the sense which, as Perikles had told his countrymen, meant nothing but her own aggrandisement. That the people in each city was to determine its own form of government, was a thing not to be thought of ; and refusal to pay the yearly tribute was to be punished as treason or rebellion. In short, by Sparta the peace of Antalkidas was adopted with the settled resolution to divide and govern ; and all those of her acts, which might seem at first sight to have a different meaning, carry out in every instance this golden rule of despotism. It was the curse of the Hellenic race, and the ruin ultimately of Sparta itself, that this maxim flattered an instinct which they had cherished with blind obstinacy, until it became their bane. But for Sparta, the consolidation of the Athenian empire would long ago have restrained this self-isolating sentiment within its proper limits. When the Lesbians meditated revolt, their envoys at Olympia had nothing more to say for themselves than that Athens had offended this feeling ;³ and we shall see by-and-by in a signal instance how thoroughly even the men who professed to resent this offence most keenly were conscious of its transient and therefore worthless character. In theory the Spartans by enforcing the peace of Antalkidas restored to the several Greek states the absolute power of managing their own affairs, and of making war upon one another. In practice Sparta was resolved that their armies should move only at her dictation, that into her treasury should flow the tribute the gathering of which was denounced as the worst crime of imperial Athens, and that in the government of the oligarchical

¹ See p. 147.² See p. 275.³ See p. 296.

Effects of
the Peace of
Antalkidas
on the posi-
tion of
Sparta.

factions she should have the strongest material guarantee for the absolute submission of the Greek cities.

To secure this result the Hellenic states of Lesser Asia were abandoned to the tender mercies of Persian taxgatherers, and left to feel the full bitterness of the slavery from which Athens had rescued them some ninety years ago. The work was not so easy as the Spartans had hoped that it might be. Thebes had been willing, if not eager, to see Athens humbled: but she was not willing to give up her own Hegemonia over the Boiotian cities,—a primacy which she claimed by a title as ancient as that of Athens to her demoi or townships, and in which, with the exception of Thespiæ and Orchomenos, all the existing towns readily acquiesced. There was danger in the disaffection of these cities; and the Spartans resolved therefore on a measure which they might proclaim as an act of homage to the dearest feelings of the Greek heart. The fugitive Plataians had been driven by Lysandros after the catastrophe of Aigospotami from their abode in Skione.² They were now living in Athens, when they were invited to return with their families to their old home under the heights of Kithairon. If the Plataians returned thither with any thought of enjoying again the measure of freedom which their alliance with Athens had secured to them, they soon found themselves mistaken. Their city was restored simply to be a thorn in the side of the Thebans: and a Spartan garrison enforced its obedience to the rules imposed on Spartan allies.

Their hand fell next on the Mantineians, who were accused of friendly feelings towards the Argives, shown by supplying them with corn in time of war, and by their evident satisfaction at such reverses as befell the Spartan arms. Nothing more was needed to justify the appearance of envoys at Mantinea with a demand not merely that the walls of the city should be thrown down, but that four-fifths of its inhabitants should make for themselves a home in four distinct townships. The rejection of these terms was followed by a siege which Agesipolis speedily brought to an end by damming upon the lower side the stream which flowed through the town. The walls and houses, built of sun-dried bricks, were tottering on their foundations when the Mantineians yielded to their fate, to find themselves soon, as Xenophon would have us believe,³ vastly the better and happier for the change. They were now freed from the rule of their hateful demagogues, and Sparta, instead of the single city of Mantinea, had five distinct allies to each of which

¹ The Thebans had done little to win their love, and much to excite their wrath. Thuc. iv. 133.

² Thuc. v. 32.

³ Xen. *II.* v. 2, 7.

she paid the compliment of sending her Xenagos.¹ If his picture be true, it is strange that after the fight at Leuktra, barely fifteen years later, they should run with such feverish haste to restore the city from which they had been driven.

Elsewhere things were going not altogether as the Spartans would have wished. Athens, strengthened by the possession of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, was gradually increasing her scanty fleet. The harbor of Peiraiæus with its crowd of merchant vessels exhibited something like the stirring industry of former times. The islanders of the Egean, vexed by the raids of pirates who, in the absence of any dominant maritime power, could sweep the seas almost at their will, were learning that tribute paid for the protection of Athens whose interest it was to put down these marauders was a less costly burden than tribute paid to Sparta which cared nothing whether they were put down or not. Thus the influence of Athens was becoming constantly more widely felt, when Kleigenes, sent with other envoys from Akanthos, appeared at Sparta with the air of a man oppressed with a mysterious and dreadful secret. The Spartans could not be aware, he thought, of the terrible things then going on in Hellas, or of the dangers which threatened them if they failed to take strong measures of repression. The danger came from no less a city than the Chalkidian Olynthos,² a city which had taken advantage of the troubles of the Makedonian King Amyntas to lay the foundations of a confederacy, which extended to all its members the benefits of a common law and a common citizenship, of unrestricted intermarriage, of unfettered commerce and acquisition of property in land. These terms were gladly accepted by some of their weaker and by some too of their less insignificant neighbors; nor were they less cheerfully welcomed even by the Makedonian cities which had known hitherto no other system than that of despotism varied only by a somewhat frequent change of masters.

The paramount need of securing a free area for the action of the new confederacy had after this great success compelled the Olynthians to invite the adhesion of Akanthos and Apollonia; but the people of these cities had no mind to give up the theories of which Brasidas during his sojourn among them had been so earnest a preacher.³ They wished to keep strictly to their own customs and to have nothing to do with their neighbors. Nor was this all. The Spartans might in some measure estimate the peril of the crisis,

Formation of the Olynthian Confederacy. 334-3 B.C.

Opposition of Akanthos and Apollonia. 333 B.C.

¹ This officer commanded the contingents furnished by the allies or subjects of Sparta.

² See p. 64.

³ See p. 335.

when they learnt that Boiotian and Athenian envoys were already at Olynthos, and that the Olynthians had resolved to add their own voice to that of Thebes and Athens in calling upon all the Greek cities to enter into the new alliance. In any case they could not but see the absurdity of trying to keep the Boiotian cities disunited, while they allowed the Olynthians to form a society which, if not broken up, must become an empire. Let the Spartans look to it. It would soon be too late : but at present many of the members had not yet shaken off the true Greek sentiment of self-isolation, and might easily be detached from the pernicious company of the Olynthians. Still if anything was to be done, it must be done at once. The exclusive bigotry of the good old times was a plant apt to wither away under a moderate amount of sunshine ; and if this sentiment failed them, there would be nothing left to which the Spartans could appeal.

The picture drawn by Kleigenes was strictly true. It brings before us one of the few honest efforts of the more soberminded Greeks, which make us for the moment dream that a real Hellenic nation might have been formed, and a barrier raised against the overgrowth of Makedonian and Roman power. It was quite true that the Olynthians had resolved to defend themselves and to rescue their neighbors from oppression, at a time when a horde of Illyrian savages had driven off the usurper Amyntas, who had worked his way to the Makedonian throne by murder. Amyntas had slain Pausanias the son of Aëropos, and Aëropos had slain Orestes, the infant son of Archelaos, who, having for years ruled the country vigorously, had fallen a victim to the passions of two young men with whom he had been connected in an unspeakably loathsome intimacy. But Archelaos had become King only by slaying his brother, the legitimate son of his father, that King Perdikkas whose chief contributions to Athens took the form, it was said, of shiploads of lies.¹ These usurpers and murderers belonged, it is asserted, to the royal race ; but, however this may be, the Amyntas with whose subjects the Olynthians had to deal is at least notorious as the father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great.

It is painful to think of the bright dawn of the Olynthian confederacy as closing in darkness and blood ; but in such a case the Spartans were not likely to hesitate. The picture drawn by Kleigenes was one every detail of which would rouse their fiercest antipathy. The work which it depicted was the work of Athens, purged, it may be, of many defects and some blots which the circumstances attending the growth of her empire made it impossible for

Amyntas
King of
Makedonia.

Resolution
of Sparta to
suppress the
Olynthian
Confederacy.
383 B.C.

¹ See p. 352.

Athens to avoid¹, but the same work still as extending to all alike the benefits of law, compelling all to sacrifice just so much of their independence as was needful for the general welfare, and insisting on the co-operation of all towards the maintenance of an order essential to the safety alike of the rich and the poor. To use the metaphor of the Korinthian Timolaos² the Spartans resolved to burn the wasps in their nest ; and circumstances singularly favored the enterprise.

The great hindrance which lay in their way was Thebes ; and so long as she did not break the terms of the Peace of Antalkidas, the task of dealing with her might seem perhaps perplexing. But Spartan zeal was not easily baffled. While Eudamidas was ordered to lead his men with the utmost speed to Olynthos, his brother Phoibidas, who was to bring on the rest of the army, received secret instructions to do what he could for Sparta as he passed Thebes. There Leontiades with the philo-Lakonian party was eagerly awaiting him ; and Phoibidas was lucky in the time of his coming. During his stay the day came round for the feast of Thesmophoria, and according to the old usage the Kadmeia was given over to the sole occupation of the women. On that day Phoibidas, intending to set out on his northward march, was called back by Leontiades, who, leading him straight to the Akropolis, opened its gates.

Hastening to the senate-house where the council was assembled, Leontiades addressed them as Polemarch, telling them that the Spartans had possession of the citadel and of all their women, but that no one would be the worse for the change except traitors. Of these, he added, Ismenias, the head of the anti-Spartan party, was the chief : and by his orders Ismenias was arrested and dragged away. Of those who sided with him 300 took refuge at Athens, while Ismenias himself, arraigned before a court consisting of three Spartan commissioners and one from each of the allied cities, was charged with being the foremost man in stirring up the war which had ended with the peace of Antalkidas. Neither by the terms of that peace nor on any other grounds had the court any jurisdiction : but his death was a necessity for Leontiades and his partisans, and Ismenias accordingly was condemned and executed.

Phoibidas had done a service to his country scarcely inferior to that of Lysandros at Aigospotamoi : and both acts were alike in the blackness of the treachery by which they were accomplished, unless it be urged that the arm of Phoibidas was directed against a city with which Sparta professed to be at peace. In Sparta the tidings called forth expres-

Seizure of
the Theban
Kadmeia by
Phoibidas.
332 B. C.

Seizure and
execution of
Ismenias.

Suppression
of the Olyn-
thian Con-
federacy.

¹ See p. 246.

² See p. 560.

sions of indignation which in a few may have been sincere ; and the secrecy of the Spartan system enabled the Ephors to disavow instructions which had probably specified no service in particular. With his usual straightforwardness Agesilaos cut the matter short by telling them that the only question for debate was whether the action of Phoibidas was for the welfare of Sparta or whether it was not. In the former case, he deserved only gratitude. No law forbade any man to benefit his country without orders. Phoibidas was removed from his command and sentenced to a fine probably never paid ; and here, so far as the Spartans were concerned, the matter ended. Their garrison continued to hold the Kadmeia ; and their army was enabled to act against the Olynthians without dread of a formidable enemy in the rear. Even thus the task of subduing them was not

easy. The army of Eudamidas was reinforced by a still larger army under Teleutias ; but the spring of the following year found the Olynthians not less energetic in their defence. In a battle which they provoked Teleutias was slain, and his army scattered ; but the Spartans remained only the more resolute in their purpose. Agesipolis, dispatched with a third army, died of fever brought on by the summer heat ; but by his successor Polybiades the Olynthians were shut up within their city. Famine did its work. Olynthos submitted, and became a member of the Spartan confederacy. Her Makedonian allies passed again under the sway of Amyntas who had both pleaded and fought against the Olynthians with the utmost earnestness. His zeal was amply justified. The confederacy thus overthrown would have been probably an insurmountable barrier in the way of his ambition and of the more daring energy of his successors. The Spartans had indeed done him good service : they had not the less sealed their own ruin. Unhappily this ruin embraced others besides themselves. The sacrifice of Sparta alone would have been but a poor offering to the Genius of Exclusiveness. East and West alike were to feel for a long series of centuries the results of her systematically selfish and treacherous policy.

Nor can it be said that even at the time there were wanting men who saw the real nature of the work which she was doing.

In the oration read before the Greeks assembled for the celebration of the 99th Olympiad the rhetor Lysias found it convenient to express his astonishment that Sparta could quietly sit still while in the east the Persian king was master of a Greek fleet more powerful than her own, while in the west Dionysios the despot of Syracuse possessed a navy still more formidable, and while on the north the Makedonian Amyntas was building up a firm empire in his own country, inroaching on

Orations of
Lysias and
Isokrates.
334 B.C.

the territories of the Greek cities, and enslaving these cities themselves. We cannot suppose him to have been ignorant of the fact that Sparta had deliberately played into the hands of all these three despots, and that to her they owed a very large measure of their power. As things then stood, it was perhaps an act of sufficient boldness in the presence of the representatives of Dionysios himself to declare that the Greek world was on fire at both ends and that Sparta was doing nothing to quench the flames. Four years later before the same august assembly Isokrates could in language as vehement as it was plain charge the Spartans with deliberate treachery for conduct at which Lysias had expressed only surprise. He not only saw but could tell them that they were aiding Artaxerxes, Amyntas, and Dionysios to eat the very life out of Hellas and leaving it absolutely helpless against any powerful foreign invader. Finally, Xenophon, the great worshipper of Sparta, could treat the act of Phoibidas in surprising the Kadmeia as Thucydides treats the massacre at Melos by the Athenians.¹ It is for him the great turning-point of their history, marking the moment at which the gods who have their eye on all wicked men intervened to put them down.² The enthusiasm even of Xenophon was quenched by an act of treachery committed against a Greek city in time of peace; and his eyes became suddenly opened to the fact that Spartan promises of independence and freedom were nothing but a cheat and a snare.

Visible signs of Divine Judgment were, in his belief, not long wanting. At no time, to all appearance, had the empire of Sparta been more mighty; at no time had her heel pressed more heavily upon her allies, or in truer phrase her slaves. The only city of which she had a genuine dread was kept down by a Spartan garrison aided effectually by a faction ready at all costs to maintain her supremacy and thus to secure for themselves unbounded license. In this very city their power was to receive a terrible blow, and seven men alone were to inflict it. Of these men the most conspicuous were Pelopidas and Mellon. With their fellow-exiles at Athens they had waited long in the hopes of some more open resistance: but the bounds of their patience were now reached, and they resolved to do by assassination the work which they could not achieve in open war. We shrink, and shrink with a righteous horror, from the thought of employing such devices; but if ever such an attempt might be palliated or condoned, the more merciful sentence would be justified in the case of Pelopidas and his comrades. But for the iniquitous usurpation of Leontiades and his abettors Thebes would now have been at war with Sparta; nor can it well be denied that

¹ See p. 359.

² Xen. *II.* v. 4, 1.

for the Thebans the Spartans had put themselves beyond the pale of law by seizing their citadel in time of peace and without the faintest plea of offence or injury. As to Leontiades and his partisans, it would be almost a bathos to speak of them as murderers; but if their enormous crimes cannot be held to justify the use of the dagger against their persons, so neither can we deny that no criminals ever more righteously deserved a harder punishment. Of the attempt itself it may be enough to say that the conspirators had the aid of Phyllidas, the secretary of the polemarchs, in gaining access to their victims, two of whom, Archias and Philippos, they were thus enabled to slay at a banquet. Leontiades after a hard struggle was killed in his own house.

With the secret conspiracy Epameinondas would have nothing to do; but when the tyrants had ceased to live, he was among the first to appear in the Agora and among the most zealous in calling the people to arms. The shout of exultation which ran through the city as the tidings became generally known, brought dismay to the Spartans in the Kadmeia. The garrisons of Thespiæ and Plataiæ could not reach them, and their enemies were being hourly reinforced by volunteers from Attica and Thebans returning from exile. Availing themselves of the enthusiasm of the moment, Pelopidas and Mellon, who with a citizen named Charon had been appointed Boiotarchs, resolved to carry the citadel by assault: and the order for attack had been already given when the Spartan commander proposed a capitulation. The Thebans willingly allowed them to depart with the honors of war; but no honors awaited them at home. Two, if we are to believe Diodoros,¹ were put to death; the third was punished with a crushing fine; and Kleombrotos, now king in place of his brother Agesipolis, was dispatched to take vengeance on the Thebans. His line of march took him close along the frontier of Attica; and while the sight of his men revived in the Athenians the old feelings of horror with which they had regarded the occupation of Dekeleia, Kleombrotos availed himself of the impression thus made to demand the punishment of two of their generals who had aided the enterprise of Pelopidas and his comrades. The charge, if we may follow the story of Xenophon, was undeniably true. These men had acted on their own responsibility, and therefore had run the risk of involving their countrymen in a war which they had not sanctioned. The Athenians might have retorted that in the case of Phoibidas Agesilaos had laid down a principle capable of general application. They may have felt indeed that the retort must be backed up with a force which they knew that they did not possess; but in putting

Surrender of
the Spartan
garrison in
the Kad-
meia.
379 B.C.

¹ xv. 27.

the two generals on their trial it is more likely that they acted from an honest sense of duty. The formalities iniquitously set at naught in the case of the victors of Argennoussai now secured to each a separate trial. The first general was condemned and executed; the second, before his trial came on, contrived to make his escape, and was sentenced to exile in his absence.

With one-third of his forces Kleombrotos had left at Thespiæ the harmost Sphodrias with orders to do all that he could against the Thebans. The memory of the recent exploit of Teleutias made him think that more might be done against Athens. In short he resolved to attempt by land what Teleutias had achieved by sea. But he started from Thespiæ too late to reach Peiræus before dawn. The morning found him at Eleusis, nearly ten miles from the harbor. He at once retreated, doing, however, as much mischief as he could to the inhabitants by the way. The Spartan envoys who had come to complain of the two generals had not yet left Athens. When brought before the indignant Demos, they answered forcibly enough that had they been abettors of the enterprise they would have taken care not to be found in the enemy's city. The act of Sphodrias, they assured the Athenians, would be regarded, as they themselves regarded it, with not less horror than astonishment; and death would be the penalty of his crime in attacking a state with which Sparta was at peace. Satisfied with this assurance, the Athenians foolishly let the envoys go. Their forbearance was rewarded by the acquittal of Sphodrias, strictly because his son Kleonymos stood to Archidamos son of Agesilaos in the infamous relation of Carr, Viscount Rochester and Earl of Somerset, to James I.¹ The argument of Agesilaos went straight to its mark.

¹ It has been urged that too great stress should not be laid on the personal vices, or, as some would prefer to call them, the tastes and appetites of kings or other rulers,—that so far as such personal attributes influence the conduct of government, they should be brought into the picture, but no further. This is probably not less just than true. But the case of Sphodrias is distinctly one in which war results from the monstrously vicious relations of two young men. In the same manner, of James VI. it may be said that his tastes led to the murder of Alexander Ruthven, and not merely this, but to the extirpation of his family, to the infamous farce which ended with the execu-

tion of the notary Sprot, and to the forging of the Logan or Restalrig letters in order to cover the infamy of this execution. In short, the personal tastes or vices of James led to a series of violent interferences with law, and went far towards establishing that theory of despotism which plunged the nation into years of war and brought his son to the scaffold.

It may be true that the historian is not justified in parading private vices merely as vices, and it may be argued that 'the wives of Charles I. and Lewis XVI. did just as much harm publicly by their operation on the course of government as the mistresses of Charles II. or of Lewis XV.' But even if the former propo-

The guilt of Sphodrias, he said, could not possibly be denied ; but it was not the less impossible to put to death one who, whether as boy, youth, or man, had stood among the foremost of his countrymen. Sparta could not spare such citizens, and justice must in such cases give place to expedience.

The decision saved Sphodrias : but it called into existence a new confederacy in which Thebes gladly enrolled herself under Athens. In its general purpose this society closely resembled the old Athenian empire to which the Athenian Confederacy. Thebans had shown themselves the most determined enemies ; but as little as possible was said of those duties which had bred jealousy and disaffection among the old allies of Athens. There were to be no more Klerouchiai,¹ and no Athenian under any pretence was to become a landowner in the territories of any city enrolled in the new alliance. Along with Timotheos the son of Konon and the orator Kallistratos Chabrias had such success in the Egean islands and elsewhere that Athens soon stood at the head of seventy confederate cities. But between the old state of things and the new there was this difference, that Athens had no coercive power, and that the allies were not really bound to do more than they liked. The circumstances of the moment created a vehement enthusiasm ; but the flame soon died out, and Athens herself regarded with more than coldness the successes of the most powerful amongst her allies.

For the moment there was nothing to excite her jealousy even in the ardor with which the Thebans organised the celebrated body of troops known as the Sacred Band, and in the singular ability displayed by their leader Epameinondas. It is impossible to believe that the shameful intimacy which linked together each couple in this brilliant company could tend to keep alive all that was generous and high-minded in their disposition. Were it so, the emphatic assertion of Aristotle that true friendship cannot possibly be founded in wickedness would be signally disproved. The loathsome vice thus thrust on our notice was in truth the bane of Hellenic society ; but we may mark with thankfulness the better impulses which in whatever measure counteracted this dreadful evil. It is enough to say that it did not impair their courage, and they were happy in having as their leader the noblest of all Theban citizens. Sprung from the ancient stock of the Spartoi, the children of the dragon's teeth

sition be allowed to pass unchallenged, to the latter it must be replied that the minions of James I. were more powerful than any of these, and that his history is a blank without them. In like manner the

conduct of the Spartans in the case of Sphodrias cannot be understood or explained without a reference to the personal tastes or appetites of Archidamos and Kleonymos.

¹ See p. 94.

sown by Kadmos, Epameinondas had attained an eminence in art and science very rarely acquired by his countrymen. Born to no great inheritance, he had made no effort to amass wealth ; and this merit of personal integrity, always appreciated in Greece,¹ was happily combined with the strength of mind in which men peculiarly incorruptible have sometimes been found, like Nikias, fatally deficient.

If during the next five years the Spartans strove resolutely to prop up their tottering empire, the course of events went slowly, perhaps, but steadily against them. The year which followed the attempt of Sphodrias witnessed a Spartan invasion of Boiotia and the more significant sight of Peloponnesian hoplites even under Agesilaos declining to cross spears with the troops of the Athenian Chabrias. On his return home Agesilaos left Phoibidas at Thespiæ ; before many weeks were past, the hero of the Kadmeia was slain and his troops scattered by the Theban cavalry. During the next year Agesilaos again took the field ; he returned home, after doing but little, stretched on a couch, from which for a long time he was unable to rise. Some injury to his sound leg had been aggravated by lack of skill on the part of the surgeons who attended him. Nor was his successor Kleombrotos more fortunate by land, while in a battle fought off Naxos the Spartan admiral Pollis was utterly defeated by the Athenian Chabrias. Eight of the Peloponnesian ships were taken with their crews, four-and-twenty more were destroyed, and Chabrias might have made the ruin as complete, so Diodoros tells us,² as that of Argennoussai, had not the recompense dealt out to the commanders in that memorable conflict withheld him from pursuing the enemy while Athenian seamen were needing his help.

This great success added largely to the power not of Athens only, but of Thebes. To the former besides 3,000 prisoners and more than 100 talents in money it brought the adhesion of seventeen cities to her new confederacy : to the latter, by clearing the Egean of all hostile forces, it insured the safe transit of the corn needed to supply the crops ruined by two successive invasions. But the jealousy of Athens was already awake, and it found open expression when the Thebans refused to contribute towards the expenses of the war by sea. They were probably unable to do so ; but the Athenians, not easily convinced of this, would hear with increased dissatisfaction that the Theban Pelopidas had defeated the Peloponnesians under Gorgoleon and Theopompos in the open field, slaying their two commanders ; that Thebes had practically

Decline of Spartan power. 378 B.C.

377 B.C.

376 B.C.

Renewed jealousy between Athens and Thebes.

374 B.C.

¹ See p. 311.

² xv. 35.

recovered her Hegemonia over the Boiotian cities, and that she was preparing a fleet at her port of Kreusis on the Corinthian Gulf.

Under the fatal conditions which Spartan supremacy had imposed upon Hellenic life nothing more was needed to make Athens seek peace with her deadly enemy. The proposal was happily timed, at least for Sparta. Only eight years before, she had forcibly put down the confederacy which might have served as a permanent bulwark against Makedonian aggression; and in that short time her power had been so shaken that she found herself compelled to reject the prayer of the Pharsalian Polydamas, and allow a zealous ally to strengthen the hands of a hostile despot.

This despot was Iasôn of Pherai. During the few years which had witnessed the decay of Spartan power almost all the Thessalian cities of any importance had become his allies or his subjects with the exception of Pharsalos: and to Polydamas as its most powerful citizen he now proposed a convention which, as he asserted, would make Thessaly the dominant power in Hellas. Polydamas answered that he could do nothing without consulting the Spartans; and before these he laid the exact facts of the case. 'We cannot help you,' was the answer, 'you must make for yourself the best terms that you can.' The Olynthians had been crushed because they had striven to lay the foundations of a society which might have grown into a Greek nation. If vengeance be worth a thought, they were fully avenged when the Pharsalians, bidden to look to themselves, added their votes to those which made Iasôn of Pherai the Tagos of all Thessaly.

An opportunity for doing Sparta a mischief soon presented itself, and Iasôn readily seized it. Korkyra had again become the ally of Athens. As in the old days¹ there were not lacking exiles of the oligarchical faction who sought to gain their ends by bringing Lakedaimonians into the island; and these, too, made their petition at a suitable time. The recent peace with Athens had been broken almost as soon as it was made. Timotheos had landed on Zakynthos some exiles belonging to that island who had been serving in his fleet. The Zakynthians forwarded a vehement complaint to Sparta, and Sparta, at once declaring war against Athens, dispatched Mnasippos to blockade Korkyra and to ravage its lands.

The long peace which the island had now enjoyed had restored it to the splendid cultivation which made Chios a paradise until

¹ See p. 309.

the Chians chose to throw in their lot with Sparta.¹ The luxuriant crops were now destroyed, the vines cut down, the farm buildings levelled with the ground. But 600 Athenian peltasts, conveyed across Thessaly by Iasôn of Pherai, ^{Operations in Korkyra. 373 B.C.} managed to effect their entrance into the town, and making a sally with the inhabitants routed the besiegers and slew their general. At this moment signals announced the approach of the Athenian fleet, and the Peloponnesians at once left the island. This effectual aid ought to have been given before ; but Timotheos had been busy in the Egean, and, as it seems, he returned to Athens to find that the great success which he had achieved would not condone his delay, and that a second fleet had already set off for Korkyra under Iphikrates, Chabrias, and Kallistratos. On reaching the island these generals found that not much was left for them to do : but Iphikrates had heard that ten triremes belonging to the Syracusan despot Dionysios were on their way from Sicily. These ships he determined to seize. The scouts posted on the hills had no sooner notified their approach than he swooped down on them with twenty triremes, and of the ten vessels one only escaped.

To the Spartans it seemed that things were going against them not on the earth only but in the heavens. The great lamp or rod of flame suspended in the sky for many days together portended some grave disaster, and fully justified a ^{Seizure of Plataiai by the Thebans. 372 B.C.} fresh appeal to the despot who ruled at Sousa. A re-script from the Great King once more ordered the Greeks to settle all their quarrels and live peaceably each in his autonomous city ; and this time Athens was scarcely less anxious than Sparta to abide by his decree. The power of the latter had been sensibly diminished by land, and had in fact vanished from the sea. This was of itself enough to bring about a change in the public opinion of Athens towards her old enemy ; but the steady progress of Thebes was strengthening a feeling of positive jealousy, which likewise told in favor of Sparta. The re-establishment of Plataiai with a Spartan garrison might seem a measure not much to the liking of the Athenians : but these may have felt that the ties which bound the Plataians to their Peloponnesian benefactors would prove less strong than the spell of a friendship unbroken for more than a century. Such at least was the feeling of the Thebans who complained that the new town was simply a hostile stronghold set up in their own land, and if we may accept the narrative of Diodoros,² even charged the Plataians with a deliberate plan of surrendering their city to the Athenians. The Thebans accordingly resolved to do what they had done before, and the precautions of the Plataians were foiled

¹ See p. 416.² xv. 46.

by a stratagem which shut them out from their city and compelled them to take refuge once more in Athens.

The new disaster which thus befell their ancient friends roused at Athens a deep indignation. An appeal was made, it would seem, to the conditions laid down by the Peace of Antalkidas; but the reply was ready that at the time when that peace was promulgated Plataiai was not in existence, and could have no title to independence by the terms of that convention. The answer was conclusive; but it strengthened the resolution of the Athenians to put an end to the war, and their envoys headed by the orator Kallistratos appeared in the congress now held at Sparta to propose a division of power which the circumstances of the time rendered both reasonable and necessary. No city could for the present dispute the pre-eminence of Athens on the sea; but if Athens was content to allow to Sparta precedence on land, she must insist that the terms of the peace should no longer be a snare and a delusion, that the autonomy of cities should mean real independence, and that Spartan harmosts and Spartan garrisons must at once become things of the past. Consenting to abide by these terms, Sparta nevertheless took the oaths for her allies as well as for herself, while Athens and the cities in alliance with her took them separately. When they were tendered to Epameinondas, the envoy of Thebes, he replied that he must take them as representing not Thebes alone but the Boiotian confederacy. To the retort of Agesilaos that the Boiotian cities had as much right to swear separately as Thebes herself, Epameinondas, waving the obvious rejoinder that Sparta had sworn for all her allies, replied by basing the Theban claims on reasons which filled his hearers with dismay. Thebes was for Boiotia what Athens was for her Demoi and what Sparta perhaps was for the townships of Lakonia. The right of the latter might be more questionable if, as Brasidas affirmed, it was based simply upon conquest;¹ the title of Thebes to her supremacy stretched back to days long preceding the dawn of history, to days as distant perhaps as those of Theseus, the founder of the present Athenian commonwealth. The controversy was one into which the Spartans would not and dared not enter. Leaping from his seat in rage, Agesilaos bade him say out distinctly whether he would leave the Boiotian cities autonomous or whether he would not. 'Yes, we will, if you will leave Lakonia independent in like manner.' Agesilaos answered by wiping out the name of Thebes from the treaty and by a declaration of instant war. Three weeks later Epameinondas took signal vengeance by shattering the empire of Sparta on the field of Leuktra.

Declaration
of war by
Sparta
against
Thebes.
371 B. C.

¹ Thuc. iv. 126.

The terms of the peace required that all armies now in the field should be disbanded; nor could those terms be regarded as being kept with tolerable decency, if this ceremony should not be gone through. Caring nothing for such scruples, ^{March of Kleombrotos to Leuktra.} the Spartans sent orders to Kleombrotos, then at the head of a Peloponnesian army in Phokis, to turn his arms at once against the Thebans. No one doubted the issue. The only question discussed related to the mode in which Sparta would treat the rebellious city. The history of Mantinea and Plataiai suggested effectual methods of punishment, unless indeed Sparta should be pleased thus late in the day to enforce the sentence passed against the Thebans a hundred years ago for taking the part of Xerxes. With this serene sense of superiority Kleombrotos encamped his army on the high ground near Leuktra between the mighty masses of Helikon and Kithairon. From this point his way lay open to Thebes and to the port of Kreusis in his rear; and the advantages which he thus gained were fully appreciated by the Thebans who but for Epameinondas would have made up their minds to withdraw within their walls and try the chances of a siege. The dislike of facing the redoubtable warriors of Sparta was heightened by alarming signs which Nikias would have interpreted as tokens of divine displeasure. It was the worthier task of Epameinondas to read them in a more cheerful sense, and to make the most of such favorable omens as might be reported whether from Thebes or from the shrine of Trophonios at Lebadeia. As it so happened, close by their camp stood one of those memorials of infamous wrong which rose up not unfrequently in the track of the Spartan conquerors. The daughters of Skedastos, subjected to shameless outrage, had slain themselves; their father, having vainly sought redress at Sparta, came back and slew himself also. Not the most earnest eloquence of a tried and fearless general could appeal to their inmost heart with the force of this silent monument of high-handed and pitiless iniquity. Crowning the tomb with wreaths, the Thebans resolved to exert their whole might in the effort to punish their murderers. On their side, the Spartans impetuously clamored for instant conflict. Although the temper of their allies was not altogether to be trusted, they felt sure that attack would be rewarded with victory, and they made ready for battle according to the old methods of the Lykourgean discipline. But they had to deal with a general who refused to be hampered by traditions. To Epameinondas it was plain that his force must be concentrated with the utmost possible weight on the chief strength of the enemy,—in other words, on the Spartan hoplites to whom the right wing belonged by prerogative. If these could be over-

borne, he needed to trouble himself but little with the not overzealous efforts of the Spartan allies along their whole front. The heavy-armed men were therefore drawn up to the depth of fifty shields, to give welcome to the Spartan King. At their head stood the Sacred Band under Pelopidas.

Wholly unaware of this change of tactic, the Spartans, drawn up twelve deep, saw with comparative unconcern the ineffectual onset and confused retreat of their cavalry. But as the main mass of the Spartan hoplites came to close quarters with the enemy, they felt at once that for whatever reason the encounter would strain their powers to the uttermost. With the dauntless bravery which none had ever called into question they thrust themselves against the wall of shields which bore down upon them with increasing weight. To their amazement they found that they were laboring against a mass vastly exceeding their own in mere physical momentum. All that brave and strong men could do they did; but all was done in vain. The Sacred Band, pushed on by men as heavily armed and as determined as themselves, were hurled onwards with the weight of an avalanche; and the Spartans lay crushed beneath the advancing mass. Wounded early in the fight, Kleombrotos was carried back to his camp a dying man; and when such as escaped the carnage were there gathered again beyond the enemy's reach, it was found that three hundred genuine Spartans were all that remained of the seven hundred who had descended the hill with the conviction that they were marching to immediate victory.

The Divine Nemesis had done her work. A Spartan king, the first since Leonidas, had been slain; and with the polemarch Deinon the treacherous Sphodrias and his son Kleonymos were among the dead. A few Spartans, caring nothing perhaps for life after defeat, or dreading still more the reproaches of their countrymen, insisted that they should renew the battle and thus recover the slain. The rest saw that if they fought they would have to fight alone, for to many of their allies their disaster was a cause for anything but grief, while all were eager to get away. There was no help but to confess themselves beaten men by asking for the burial truce. The prayer was granted on the condition that the Peloponnesian allies should bury their dead before the Spartans,—a precaution which showed how shrewdly the Thebans suspected the real facts, and how warmly they appreciated the personal bravery and prowess of the genuine Spartan citizens. The task of the allies was soon over. They had very few dead to bury. The whole brunt of the battle had fallen on the Spartans, nor could the latter throw a veil over the calamity which had befallen them. The bodies of the warriors were given up: their shields were

Battle of
Leuktra.
371 B.C.

Loss of the
Spartans.

carried away and hung up in the temple of Dêmêtêr Thesmophoros at Thebes.

So ended the fight which left Epameinondas the first general of his age, and so fell a power which had fully earned its title to stability, if grinding tyranny and law-defying oppressiveness could confer such right. If we had nothing more than the dry record of Xenophon, we should never have known that Epameinondas saw the fight at Leuktra, nor should we have known the full significance of the Spartan defeat. It was to him some satisfaction to think that at the first his friends had been victorious, for only in that case could they have borne Kleombrotos alive from the field; that the tidings of the great catastrophe, brought to Sparta during the celebration of the Gymnopaïdai, were by the orders of the Ephors received without a sign of emotion; and that on the morrow they who appeared with cheerful faces and exulting mien in the Agora were the kinsfolk of the dead, while the kindred of the survivors bore themselves like men oppressed by the deepest ignominy. As he wrote the words, the historian, we can scarcely doubt, had in mind his own narrative of the awful night when the long unbroken wail rising from Peiraicus carried to Athens the tidings of the treachery which had ruined them at Aigospotamoi.¹ The Lykourgean discipline, which crushed all that imparted grace and beauty to life at Athens, would indeed have been worth little if it had failed to produce the semblance of an unconcern which treated the more generous and tender instincts of humanity as the worst of vices.

Another act in the great drama had been thus played out; and the whole Hellenic world had at length learnt that the promises of freedom made by Sparta had been from beginning to end a lie,—a lie scantily veiled at first by the rhetoric of Brasidas, but put forth afterwards in the nakedness of unblushing effrontery. Not a single pledge had she redeemed: not a single burden had been removed, not a single abuse redressed. She had hailed the downfall of Athens as the beginning of a golden age for Hellas, and in order to realise it she had aided and abetted her victorious generals in setting up everywhere societies of murderers.² Her enemies were prostrate; and she trampled on them without a touch of commiseration. Her

¹ See p. 480.

² I have been charged with being over-severe to Sparta. I would gladly be convinced that I have been: but until I am so convinced, I cannot modify my words. I am speaking here chiefly of the Lysandrian Decemvirates, but scarcely

less of the oligarchical factions who governed by means of the Spartan garrisons. Lysandros in his own person is charged by Plutarch, *Lys.* c. 19, with countless murders. The language of Plutarch could hardly be made stronger.

Reception of
the tidings
at Sparta.

Character of
Spartan go-
vernment.

allies were too much overpowered by the consciousness of their inferiority really to dispute her will : and she refused to share her spoils with the partners of her robberies. She had put down the Athenian empire with the courts which at the least offered to the free or the subject allies the means of redress for wrongs inflicted or received ; and by way of improving matters she had with gigantic cruelty let loose upon them a crowd of rapacious and lustful tyrants, against whom she would hear no complaint. Well might the blood of the Thebans boil in their veins as they looked on the graves of Skedasos and his daughters on the field of Leuktra ; and well may we contrast the merciless iniquity of the Spartan government with that judicial impartiality of the Athenian demos which even a general who had done the good service of Paches dared not to face.¹

In short, the supremacy of Sparta had been from first to last the supremacy of high-handed violence and wanton tyranny. The inevitable results of Spartan principles of action. philo-Lakonian Xenophon could speak of it as a system under which each individual Spartan could do as he pleased, and none could say him nay without insuring his own immediate ruin.² Nor could it have been anything else but what it was. Much has been said of the golden opportunities which the course of events offered to Sparta, and which she deliberately threw away, opportunities presented first in the unlimited freedom of action which followed the seizure of the Athenian fleet at Aigospotamoi, and again when the return of the Cyreian Greeks placed her at the head of a splendid army in her involuntary conflict with the Persian king. But in truth it is absurd to speak of opportunities of feasting on the loveliest of landscapes to the man who has extinguished in himself all sense of beauty, of opportunities for generous action to the man whose whole life exhibits nothing but the working of unvarying and consistent selfishness. Whether after Aigospotamoi or after the return of the Ten Thousand, it was impossible for Sparta to do anything towards establishing a real Panhellenic union, in other words, a real Greek nation, without reverting in greater or less degree to the work of Athens. Any such union must involve the imposition of limits on the action of individual cities, the endurance of common burdens, the inforcement of a common law. All this with whatever failures Athens had striven to do and had in part done. To go back to any such system would be for the Spartans what the changing of his skin would be to the Ethiopian, or of his spots to the leopard.

¹ See p. 303.

² Xen. *Anab.* vi. 4, 12.

BOOK V.

THE RISE AND CULMINATION OF THE MAKEDONIAN POWER.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE BATTLE OF LEUKTRA TO THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS.

FOR nine years after the battle of Leuktra Epameinondas remained the tutelary genius of Thebes; and only Spartan bigotry could deny that he guarded her interests with a largeness of mind which strove to promote the permanent good of Hellas generally. But although the two great political measures with which his name is most closely associated were conceived in something like the generous and far-seeing spirit of Perikles, their fruits were inevitably blighted by the deadly influences fostered by Spartan supremacy. Of course, these measures annoyed and hampered the Spartans. They were designed to do so, for Epameinondas well knew that there could be but one effectual mode of dealing with their system; and this mode was its complete suppression. If the Athenians could have remained true to the principles which guided the policy of Perikles, the founding of Megalopolis and the restoration of Messênê sixty years earlier might have repressed for ever the miserable jealousies which rent the Hellenic world asunder, and have helped Athens to finish her great work without offending fatally the prejudices which had their root in pre-historic ages. But the very fact that Sparta could no longer trample on her subjects or her allies sufficed of itself to change the current of popular feeling towards her. If Sparta was humbled, this must mean that some other city which thus punished her was set up on high; nor would anything more be needed than this exaltation to convert friendship into fear and fear into hatred. Thus in the years which passed between the fight at Leuktra and the last exploit of Epameinondas at Mantinea the quarrels arising out of the suspicions and jealousies of a hundred cities, each acting on its own theory of the balance of power, involved not unfrequently compli-

General
policy of
Epamei-
nondas.
371-362 B.C.

cations as intricate as they were profitless. But if the Greeks chose to indulge in the warfare of kites and crows, they were only doing the work of the eagle which the avenging Atê would sooner or later let loose upon them.

For the present, there was little commiseration felt anywhere for Spartan suffering; and these sufferings were severe enough.

Hitherto Sparta had shown her magnanimity by treating with studied cruelty and contempt such of her citizens as might return home after defeat. The hoplites taken in Sphakteria were degraded from their citizenship;¹ nor would anything have saved the comrades of Kleombrotos from systematic insult but the fact that their number was too great. The Lykourgean polity had long tended to thin the ranks of the Spartiatai, and the men thus thrown down to the level of enfranchised Helots were tempted to become more anti-Spartan than the Helots themselves and to make common cause whether with them or with the discontented Perioikoi. The conspiracy of Kinadon had taught the Spartans a wholesome lesson: and they now made a virtue of necessity by suspending in this instance and in this instance only the penalties due to men beaten on the field of battle.

The sudden disruption of the Spartan empire was followed naturally by vehement commotions in the Greek cities generally.

Like snow melting before the summer sun, the Spartan harmosts vanished with their garrisons from the allied cities; the decemvirates who had ruled by their means were put down, and their partisans for the most part deprived of their property and banished.

In all cases these changes were attended naturally with outbursts of vehement feeling which might easily run on into injustice and bloodshed; and the Spartans, hurled from the plenitude of power, found themselves compelled to watch events in silence, while the streets of Argos ran red with the blood of philo-Lakonian citizens. In the first flush of triumph the strongest impulse of the Thebans was to avenge themselves on their enemies: and of these the Orchomenians and Thespians seemed the chief. The former had befriended Kleombrotos in his last invasion: the latter had shrunk from taking part in the fight at Leuktra. Happily the influence of Epameinondas saved the Orchomenians for the present from the fate which Kleon designed for the Mytilenaians;² the Thespians,³ driven from their city, found refuge at Athens.

But the humiliation of Sparta was not confined to the expulsion of her harmosts, the ruin of her friends, or even the authority

¹ Thuc. v. 34, 2. ² See p. 298. Thespians after the fall of Plataiai,

³ For the harsh treatment of the see Thuc. iv. 133, 1.

Treatment
of the hop-
lites of Kle-
ombrotos
at Sparta.
371 B.C.

Punishment
of Orchome-
nos and
Thespiæ by
Thebes.
371 B.C.

assumed by Athens as guardian of the Peace of Antalkidas. While many of the Greek cities (how many or which, we cannot say) undertook to maintain this peace under her presidency, the Thebans appealed to a tribunal of whose action we hear nothing during the whole of the weary struggle between Athens and Sparta.¹ The duty of watching over the interests of the Delphian temple might easily be held to involve the duty of punishing all offenders against religion; nor could any offences against religion well be more heinous than the attempts to seize or injure an Hellenic city in time of festival or without a formal declaration of war. Athens might thus have demanded judgment against Sphodrias and his partisans for their iniquitous designs on Peiraieus: but Thebes, it seems, actually pleaded before the Amphiktyonia for a verdict which might vindicate the divine justice against the men who had seized their Akropolis. The assembly sentenced Sparta to a fine of 500 talents: and although no notice was taken of the sentence even when the fine was doubled, the purpose of the Thebans was fully answered. The verdict of the most august Hellenic tribunal had marked her as an offender against divine not less than human law: and not a voice had been raised in her defence.

When the city of Mantinea was broken up by the Spartans, the historian Xenophon found it convenient to say that after a little while the citizens vastly preferred the new state of things to the old. He must therefore have felt a surprise which he does not care to express when, immediately after the Theban victory, the Mantineians abandoned their villages and with the fraction which had been allowed to remain set about the re-establishment of their old home. Keenly feeling the blow, the Spartans could only send Agesilaos to entreat that they would wait for the formal sanction which Sparta was ready to give them. The haughty King was rewarded with the reply that the ceremony was superfluous, since the decision to restore the city had been already taken. Nor was this all. The resolution of the Mantineians had quickened throughout the country the desire for a Pan-Arkadian union. The opposition of Tegea, the ancient ally of Sparta, was set aside by a revolution which drove out the philo-Lakonian party; and an invasion of Arkadia by Agesilaos was followed immediately by overtures from the Arkadians, first to Athens, and then, on their rejection by the Athenians, to Thebes.

For this invitation which he felt sure must come Epameinondas had been eagerly waiting. He had convinced himself that Spartan ambition could be effectually repressed only by setting up a counter-

¹ See p. 23.

acting force which would give to Spartan armies enough to do without crossing the Corinthian isthmus ; and he had determined on the measures by which, as he thought, this result could most certainly be obtained. But he entered the Peloponnesos, not prepared for the more daring enterprise which was to push to its furthest limit the mortification and ignominy of Sparta. The splendid appearance and discipline of his Boiotian troops and the manifest efficiency of his allies awakened in the Arkadians and others who joined him an enthusiasm as deep as that which the sight of Italy from the Alpine pass excited in the followers of Hannibal. Eagerly assuring Epameinondas that the road to Sparta lay open, they besought him to strike a blow on that tyrant city whose mysterious territory no invading army had thus far entered. The bait was tempting ; and although the danger of advancing thus far into an unknown land, and the knowledge that the plan could not be carried out within his legal time of command, seemed to justify Epameinondas in rejecting their prayer, the order for the march was again given, and in four different streams the invaders poured into a region hitherto regarded as inviolable. In vain Ischolaos strove to stem the torrent : he was swept away by the Arkadians who hurried on to join the Thebans at Karyai. The flames which consumed Sellasia heralded the approach of the enemy to the very citadel of Spartan power. The spears and helmets of the Theban soldiers flashed near the bridge which spanned the Eurotas, and marked the progress of the ruin which swallowed up houses, crops, and cattle until it reached Amyklai.

The destroyer thus stood at the very doors of the oppressor, who had good cause to fear the rottenness of the materials with which he had chosen to construct his home. The fear of the still greater wretchedness which invasion might involve for them led 6,000 of the Helots, it is said, to rise at the call of Agesilaos for the defence of the country ; but many nevertheless either looked on passively or made common cause with the invader. The old king had not merely to defend the villages of his unwall'd city¹ but to put down conspiracies within it, while such of the allied cities as wished to give help were unable to approach it. The lion, shut up in his den, was constrained to wait patiently for aid, if aid should ever reach him. Spartan envoys appeared at Athens, imploring the Demos to forget the wrongs of fifty years and strike a blow on the traitors who had prostrated themselves before the barbarian Xerxes. There still remained unexecuted the sentence which Athens and Sparta had passed upon them for their treason to the liberties of Hellas : nor

¹ See p. 233.

Invasion of
Lakonia by
Epameinon-
das.

370 B.C.

Appeal of
the Spartans
for aid to
Athens.

369 B.C.

would the Athenians ever have a better opportunity for wiping off old scores against men who, when Lysandros was conqueror, would have swept Athens from the face of the earth, if Sparta had not protested against such outrage. Struggling with some natural reluctance, the Athenians resolved to take the part of their ancient enemies. The men who now besought their favor or rather their mercy were men who had assuredly not treated them well in their prosperous times : but as Athens could not hope again to exercise her old imperial power, she was bound to set due limits to the aggrandisement of Thebes.

It was possible that the army of Epameinondas might even have carried the streets of Sparta itself by assault. But it was not possible to foresee what the enemy, pushed to bay, might do in his despair, and it would be folly to encounter the risk while more important work summoned him elsewhere. Formation of Megalopolis. 369 B.C. Marching southwards from Amyklai, he ravaged the land until he reached the Lakonian port of Gytheion. The seizure of this place would have made him master of the poor fleet then possessed by Sparta ; but his efforts to reduce it failed and he resolved to hasten back into Arkadia. He had already passed the Lakonian border, before Iphikrates, heading a large force of volunteers, could set out from Athens ; and he now addressed himself to the task of building up permanent bulwarks against Spartan aggression. On the plain contained in the angle lying between the Alpheios and the Helisson, he laid the foundations of the Great City, Megalopolis, which was to serve as a centre of common action not supplied by Tegea or Orchomenos. Here was to meet under the name of the Ten Thousand the synod in which probably every citizen of the allied towns was intitled to take his place. The men belonging to forty Arkadian townships furnished a population for the new city which was to remain for a hundred and fifty years a memorial of the wise statesmanship of Epameinondas.

But infinitely more galling to Spartan haughtiness was the sight of their ancient slaves, as they chose to call them, re-established in the home which even Aristomenes had been unable to defend.¹ The fall of Athens had been followed by the expulsion of the Messenians from Naupaktos, Pylos, and Kephallenia ; and in scattered companies this unfortunate folk had been driven to seek asylums in places as distant even as the Libyan Hesperides. From this remote Greek colony or from nearer abodes they now hurried back to their old country at the call of a hero as great as Aristomenes and more successful ; and the new city Messênê (no such common centre had ever as yet existed) rose on the summit of Ithômê, and

Restoration of the Messenians and building of Messênê. 369 B.C.

¹ See p. 36.

looked down from its height of 2,500 feet on the happy plain of Makaria. The divine sanction for the choice thus made was signified in a dream vouchsafed to the Argeian leader Epiteles;¹ and the bitterest enemies of Sparta were thus established firmly through the whole region lying between the Neda on the north and Cape Akritas in the south. The injury inflicted on Athens by the fortification of Dekeleia was more than requited by the restoration of the Messenians. A refuge was again opened for discontented Helots: and they hastened to avail themselves of it with an eagerness which showed that in their opinion slavery was not an excellent thing.

So mighty was the work which Epameinondas had achieved, when, having beaten back the troops of Iphikrates under Mount Oneion, he stood before the Theban assembly to defend himself for retaining his command four months beyond the legal time. Anticipating any charges which might be brought against him (and he knew that many would rejoice in his disgrace and ruin), he pleaded on behalf of his colleagues as well as for himself the necessities of a case in which they, as servants of the state, could avail themselves of a golden opportunity only by breaking the letter of the laws which bound them. The humiliation of Sparta, begun on the field of Leuktra, had been completed by the desolation of the whole valley of the Eurotas, by the re-establishment of Mantinea, by the foundation of Megalopolis, and the restoration of the Messenians. For the first time in their history the Spartans, if bent upon aggression, would have to fight their way before they reached the Corinthian isthmus. All this had been achieved at the cost of a technical irregularity, and it remained for the Thebans to grant or refuse a decree of indemnity. This straightforward statement succeeded at least in keeping his enemies silent, while from the people he with his colleagues received an enthusiastic acquittal. The following year again saw Epameinondas and Pelopidas among the number of the Boiotarchs.

Elsewhere the course of events seemed chiefly to bring into clear light the thousand elements of dissatisfaction and discontent, of jealousy and suspicion. These are seen at work now here, now there,—the only certainty being that the prosperity of one city is sure to excite the ill-will of another. The alliance of Iason of Pherai with the Thebans sufficed of itself to make the Makedonian chief gravitate to Athens, and the same reason tended to win the favor of the Athenians for Amyntas. This prince was struggling with many grave, if not alarming, difficulties, unconscious that the unpopularity which

Reception of
Epameinon-
das at
Thebes.

Relation of
the Athe-
nians with
Amyntas.
370 B.C.

¹ See p. 33.

Athens was provoking by ill-judged revivals of ancient claims or usages were surely doing his work, and that his son Philip would reap the fruits of a policy which her allies were beginning to regard as unjust and oppressive. For the present Athens was specially anxious to recover the long-lost Amphipolis; and she was deluding herself with the thought that this result would be furthered, if Perdikkas acknowledged the justice of her claim. This admission was made; but the Athenians were no more prepared now to put forth their full strength in the enterprise than they were in the days of Kleon, and the people of Amphipolis had no heart except for their second founder Brasidas. While the former put off all strenuous action, the aspect of the Hellenic world was suddenly changed by the assassination of the Pheraian despot and the death of the Makedonian Amyntas. At Pherai Iasôn was succeeded by his sons Polyphron and Polydoros: the former killed the latter and was himself slain by another brother, Alexandros, whose reign seems to have been one unbroken course of iniquity. In Makedonia, another Alexandros, the son of Amyntas, was after two years murdered; and Eurydike, the widow of the latter, hastened with her two younger sons, Perdikkas and Philip, to implore the protection and aid of the Athenian Iphikrates. This help was vigorously given; and thus was established the dynasty which a few years later was to sweep away the autonomy of the Hellenic cities and give a new direction to Hellenic energy.

Assassination of Iasôn of Pherai.
370 B.C.

State of affairs in Makedonia.

Meanwhile after a long debate Athens and Sparta had agreed, on the proposal of Kephisodotos, to share alternately the supreme command both by land and sea for periods of five days; and a large force of Athenians and other allies of the Lakedaimonians intrenched themselves under Mount Oneion, resolved seemingly to bar the way for any Theban army. Epameinondas determined at once to test their purpose. Taking them at unawares, he brought his main strength to bear on the Lakedaimonians as holding the weakest position. These were beaten off, and his roadway left clear by the retreat of the Spartan Polemarch, who confessed himself defeated. But a more serious danger menaced him from Arkadia. There, as elsewhere, success fostered ambition, and the Ten Thousand listened eagerly to the pleadings of one of their number, who insisted on their right to share the supreme power with the Thebans. 'If you do not urge your claim,' he said, 'you will find that the Thebans are only Spartans under another name.' Such language tended, not less than the triumphant march of the Arkadians to Asinê, a port a few miles to the northeast of Cape Akritis, to turn the goodwill of the Thebans to suspicion and dislike.

Alliance between Athens and Sparta.
369 B.C.

The disturbing elements were multiplied when Philiskos, the envoy of the Phrygian satrap Ariobarzanes, appeared at Delphoi to insist on the maintenance of the Peace of Antal-
The Tear-
less Battle.
368 B.C. kidas. Sparta at once made her submission to this proposal dependent wholly on the surrender of the Messenians to their ancient lords; and their indignation was heightened when in the Olympic festival from which they were excluded a Messenian youth was registered as conqueror in the footrace for boys. But the feeling of humiliation was suddenly changed for that of deep and overpowering joy when the tidings were brought to Sparta that aided by a force sent over by the Syracusan despot Dionysios Archidamos had without the loss of a man slain ten thousand Arkadians at Midca. The Spartans might well call the fight the Tearless Battle, and feel that the bitterness of Leuktra had in some measure passed away.

Nor was the chastisement thus dealt out to the Arkadians altogether irritating to the Thebans. These saw in the event not merely a wholesome lesson for Arkadian arrogance but a proof that their own presence was needed again in the Peloponnesos. Once more crossing the Corinthian isthmus, Epameinondas appeared on the scene of his former exploits, and added the Achaian cities to the Theban confederacy. The moderation which withheld him from interfering with the government of these towns would have made them hearty in the new alliance; but the Thebans insisted on setting up democracies in all of them, the oligarchic citizens thus driven into exile found themselves strong enough to effect their restoration by force, and the Achaians again became allies of Sparta.

Looking on these defections as signs that their own power was on the wane, the Thebans resolved to adopt the favorite method of the Spartans; and their envoys, Pelopidas and Ismenias, appeared at Sousa as suppliants for a royal rescript. Armed with the authority of the Persian king, they returned to proclaim the supremacy of Thebes and the complete independence of Messênê. But when the Theban allies were invited to swear to peace thus enjoined, it became manifest that the appeal to Persia was not likely to make the sky clearer in Hellas. The Arkadians insisted that the allies ought to meet in the country which was the theatre of war, while the Corinthians refused to take any oaths which pledged them to engagements with the Persian king.

On all sides feelings of ill-will were growing apace. The Athenian town of Oropos, seized by some exiles, was handed over to the Thebans; and the anger of the Athenians was followed by

their allying themselves with the Arkadians, and by an ineffectual attempt to seize the friendly city of Corinth. The only result of this faithless act was to excite in the Corinthians a desire for peace, which could not be repressed by Spartan protests against any arrangements recognising the independence of Messênê. Others besides the Corinthians were weary of the contest, and these all signed at Thebes the peace which insured to the Messenians their freedom and to which therefore Sparta could be no party.

Peace between Thebes and Corinth with other cities. 366 B.C.

Amidst the complications which must arise from the conflicting interests of independent cities the recovery or conquest of Samos¹ by Timotheos seemed to afford a better promise for the permanent revival of Athenian empire. It quickened in the Hellenic cities of Lesser Asia the wish to shake off the Persian yoke, and tempted even Persian satraps to renounce their allegiance to the Great King. But like all other advantages gained by the Athenians after the establishment of Spartan supremacy, it came too late. Forty years of Spartan or Persian rule had effectually quenched the spirit which during the tyranny of the Four Hundred had been the mainstay of Athenian freedom.² The victory of Timotheos was followed by the expulsion or flight of many citizens of the oligarchical party, into whose lands the Athenians, forgetting or breaking their recent pledges to the contrary, introduced a large body of Klerouchoi.³

Recovery of Samos to the Athenian alliance. 365 B.C.

Nor was it in Samos only that the Athenian citizens found a home. By the help of the satrap Ariobarzanes Athens had again obtained a hold on the Thracian Chersonesos, and the possession of Sestos went near to placing in her hands the key to the corn-growing lands of the Euxine. In the struggle with the Thracian prince Kotys, who claimed the whole Chersonesos as his own, her general Timotheos was opposed for a time even in the field to the Athenian Iphikrates, the son-in-law of that savage chieftain. For three years Iphikrates had been the Athenian general on the northern coasts of the Egean; but his chief instruments had been not Athenian citizens fighting the battles of their country in a cause which they believed to be righteous, but the mercenaries who under the Euboian Charidemos hired out their strength to the highest bidder. So deeply had the canker eaten into the more generous feelings even of ordinary Athenians in the days of Perikles.

Operations on the Thracian Chersonesos.

¹ Timotheos recovered the island from the Persian satrap Tigranes; but how or when Tigranes got possession of it is not known.

² See p. 436.

³ See pp. 94; 574.

While Timotheos was striving to extend the maritime influence of Athens and making vain efforts to recover Amphipolis, the Thebans by the urgent advice of Epameinondas were building a fleet which should contest the mastery of the sea with the Athenian navy. That fleet actually appeared in the Hellespont, and might have appeared again to better purpose, had not the great Theban leader been summoned away to his old field of action in the west. Thither his friend Pelopidas was not to accompany him. At the head of a Theban army this brave and upright citizen had marched into Thessaly to punish the cruel tyrant of Pherai. After an obstinate fight at Kynos-kephalai, the Hound's Heads,¹ his forces were already winning the victory, when he saw the Pheraian Alexandros trying to rally his broken troops. The sight of the man who had seized him treacherously in time of peace and kept him shut up for months in a dungeon, roused in him a paroxysm of fury equalled only by the rage of Cyrus on finding himself close to his brother on the field of Kunaxa. With headlong eagerness Pelopidas, flinging away all thought of others, rushed upon his enemy, to die by the spears of his guards. By his death Thebes lost her left hand: she was soon to lose her right. But in the meanwhile a larger army avenged his death, and for the moment Thebes was supreme in Thessaly as well as in Boiotia.

In Peloponnesos the antagonistic interests of hostile states or cities were producing their natural results. In alliance with the Arkadians the men of Pisa had succeeded in enforcing their claim to the presidency of the Olympian festival, and in excluding the Eleians from the scene of their ancient greatness. In the midst of the games the dispossessed Eleians appeared in arms, and vindicated at least their bravery against their enemies. The death of their leader and their manifest inferiority in numbers compelled them to retreat: but the mere struggle sufficed to rouse a strong feeling in their favor; and this sympathy was deepened when the men of Pisa sanctioned the robbing of the temple treasures to pay the troops of their Arkadian allies. It was easy to speak of such acts as sacrilege; and the Mantincians found it convenient under cover of this term to express their jealousy and dislike for the people of Tegea and Megalopolis, and their desire for the friendship of Sparta which had broken up their community not many years ago. Even the Council or Synod of the Ten Thousand entered their protest against the robbing of the temples; and the cutting off of supplies naturally roused a dislike for military service among the poorer citizens. Seeing their way

¹ The name may be compared with that of Kynos-sema. See p. 447.

to revolution, the wealthier men hastened to fill the places thus left open, and to work for union with Sparta, the great friend of oligarchs. The popular leaders, filled with fear, earnestly besought help from Thebes; but the Ten Thousand by a majority repudiated the invitation thus sent, and resolved on a peace which restored the guardianship of Olympia to the Eleians.

Such was the result of the grand effort of Epameinondas to raise up against Sparta a permanent bulwark to the north and to the west. Instead of the union which he had hoped to see among the men of Tegea, Mantinea, and Megalopolis, he had found little more than jealousy of Theban ascendancy, and the alienation of the Achaians by measures in complete discordance with his own. This was the reward of the Thebans for entering the Peloponnesos five years ago at the intreaty of the Arkadians themselves to free them from a bondage which they declared to be intolerable. 'Well may we call such conduct treachery,' was the indignant reply of Epameinondas to the envoys of the Ten Thousand; 'you may be sure that we shall come again, and with the aid of our friends carry on the war in your land.'¹

Resentment
of the The-
bans against
the Arka-
dians.
362 B.C.

With the full purpose of striking a blow as severe as that which he had dealt on the enemies of Thebes at Leuktra, Epameinondas entered the Peloponnesos at the head of all the Boiotian and Euboian contingents, and with a body of Thessalian troops amongst which were the soldiers of the humbled despot of Pherai. He had hoped to cut off at Nemea the Athenian troops which were going to join his enemies; but these came not, and the tidings that they had given up the idea of the land march and were going round by sea determined him to hasten on to Tegea. Here he would be joined by his allies the Argives and the Messenians, together with the Megalopolitans and other Arkadians who refused to throw in their lot with the Spartans; and hither would hasten all the troops which Sparta could muster to aid her in repelling the invader. Ready and eager for the great encounter, Epameinondas yet knew that a bloodless triumph won by skill was far more glorious than victory won through the carnage of a battle-field. The whole army of Sparta under Agesilaos, now 80 years old, was hurrying northwards by a circuitous route, while Tegea, where the Theban troops were comfortably lodged, was on the direct road to the once imperial city. That city, in the words of the philo-Lakonian Xenophon,² was now left like a mere nest of fledglings abandoned by the parent birds; and thither Epameinondas led his men with a speed which must have insured its destruction, had not a Kretan runner, exerting his utmost

March of
Epamei-
nondas to
Sparta.

¹ Xen. *H.* vii. 4, 40.

² *H.* vii. 5, 10.

strength, warned Agesilaos of the imminent ruin. The return of the Spartans averted the catastrophe. No one had ever impugned their bravery, and it was no part of the Theban leader's plan to waste time and toil on a task in which success would bring results in no proportion to its risks. The Spartans, so far as there was any opportunity for fighting, fought bravely; and Xenophon records the defeat of some Theban hoplites by Archidamos, the son of the old king, with an outburst of exultation over the fire-breathers who were ignominiously driven back. But the historian does well to take no notice of the extravagant story which tells how the naked Isidas rushed with shield and spear alone upon his enemies, who suffered him to take his fill of slaughter and return to his friends unhurt. Fables not less absurd had been told of Brasidas on the shore of Pylos,¹ and were to be told again of Epameinondas on the field of Mantinea. Such myths, harmless though they may be, are best treated by silence. But in fact there was no more work for Epameinondas to do at Sparta. He had been foiled in a scheme which might have ended the war at a stroke; but if he must fall back on his original plan of a pitched battle, it might yet be possible to secure by skill and speed an advantage which would leave his enemies at his mercy.

With a rapidity equal to that of his southward march he hurried back to Tegea. His men needed rest, and under ordinary leaders they would all have insisted on having it. But Epameinondas saw that for his horsemen there could at Tegea be no repose. He told them that Mantinea was now practically undefended, as its troops had joined the Spartan army in their rear, and that by a sudden onset they might not only occupy the city but seize on the free people who with their slaves and property would still be in the open country. At the bidding of no other man would they have set out, wearied themselves and with tired horses, on a ten miles march; but at his command they went cheerfully, believing, as he believed, that they would meet with no resistance. He had every reason for so thinking; but as it so happened, the Athenian cavalry had just been admitted within the walls of the town, and were preparing their first meal when the Theban horsemen were seen within a mile of the gates. At the intreaty of the Mantineians the Athenians mounted their horses and sallied forth. Tired though they may have been, they encountered men even more fatigued than themselves, and drove them back. Thus was foiled the second of two admirably laid plans, either of which, if successful, would have decided the issue of the struggle, but of which the failure left Epameinondas simply where he was when he crossed the Corinthian isthmus. His resolution was for

¹ See p. 316.

immediate battle, and it was made known to men who were as eager for it as himself. There was no time to be lost, says Xenophon. His term of office would soon come to an end; and if he departed without changing the condition of things, it would be a virtual abandonment of his Arkadian allies to the vengeance of their enemies. The words of the historian imply rather than assert that Epameinondas was anxious and perplexed: but any such charge is refuted by his own narrative. The Theban general had made up his mind to apply here the tactic which had done such execution at Leuktra, and his men, remembering the achievements of that memorable day, looked forward to the battle with unclouded confidence in his genius.

At a distance nearly midway between the cities of Tegea on the south and of Mantinea on the north the great plain (now known by the name of Tripolitza), shut in on all sides by mountains and reaching in its broadest part a width of Battle of Mantinea. 362 B.C. eight miles, narrows until it leaves a passage barely a mile wide. A little to the north of this pass and about five miles to the south of Mantinea were drawn up the Spartans with their allies,—whether under either or both of their Kings, we cannot say. Issuing from the northern gate of Tegea, Epameinondas advanced straight towards this narrow neck; but the impression on the mind of the enemy that he meant to close with them at once was weakened when they saw him turn up the slopes of the Mainalian range to the left. From that point they watched him move onwards until the form of the ground brought him very near their right flank; but the order issued to the Thebans to ground their arms and perhaps some simulated signs of encampment effectually blinded the eyes of the Spartans to his real design. They broke up their army and laid aside their weapons, while the cavalry took the saddles and bridles off from their horses. In the midst of this disorder in the enemy's camp the mighty mass of the Theban Phalanx was set in motion. During the few minutes which passed before the clash of battle, the Peloponnesians hastened as best they could to resume their fighting order. The Mantineians and Spartans on the right, exposed to the full brunt of the tremendous charge, stood their ground with a firmness never surpassed in the palmiest days of their history. But the Theban wedge came on, as the historian puts it, with the impetus of a trireme, and once more even Spartan valor gave way before it. The issue of the day was almost decided before the Theban allies joined battle with the forces opposed to them. Here also the event was not doubtful. Much had been expected from the Athenian cavalry whose timely presence had saved the city of Mantinea; but they were effectually kept in

check by a reserved force which was ready to attack them in the rear if they attempted any forward movement.

Retreat was fast becoming flight, and the memory of the Spartan victory in this same valley in the days of Alkibiades¹ seemed likely to be clouded by a catastrophe as terrible as that of Leuktra, when Epameinondas, cheering on his men to the pursuit, was struck by a spear, the head of which broke off and remained in his breast. The wound was mortal; and the tidings that Epameinondas had seen his last fight ran like fire through the whole army, producing everywhere the same absolute prostration of strength and will. Had he lived, even his influence would at this instant of decisive victory scarcely have restrained them from the fury of pursuit; yet the mere knowledge that their general must die so paralysed their arms that almost in strictness of speech not another blow was struck, nor a single effort made to complete the work which lay nearest to their leader's heart. The system which required the Hellenic commander to charge on foot at the head of his troops clothed in their armor and bearing their weapons may in its working have been rather mischievous than beneficial. At Syracuse, by the death of Lamachos, it involved possibly the ruin of the whole Athenian armament;² but there is perhaps no other instance in which men in the full swing of success showed that their enthusiasm and their very powers of action were bound up with the life and safety of their leader. This astonishing paralysis of energy was a sinister omen for the future history of Thebes; and the moral mischief of the temper which led men thus to depend on their commanders was to be illustrated once and for all on the fatal field of Chaironeia. Here on the Mantineian plain the exultation of victory was exchanged in a moment for bitter but unavailing sorrow, as they crowded round the dying chief, whose life must end, so the surgeons said, with the drawing of the spearhead from the wound. Three questions only he asked. The first was about his shield, which his shield-bearer held up before his eyes; then he desired to know how the day was going, and when he learnt that the Boiotians were the conquerors, he asked lastly for Iolidas and Daiphantos, adding a wish to see them. He was told that they were both slain. 'Then you must make peace with the enemy,' he said, and ordering the spearhead to be drawn from his breast, died with the serenity of a brave man who has done his duty.

So passed away the Hannibal of Thebes, the leader with whom the power of his city may fairly be said to have begun and ended. From first to last his political and military career, extending over sixteen years, exhibits scarcely a point for censure, unless an

¹ See p. 354.

² See p. 384.

exception be to be made against his plan of establishing a Theban navy. Not willing to take part in private conspiracies, he devotes himself to the defence of his country which the assassin's dagger has delivered from an odious tyranny ; and with this self-devotion there is mingled nothing of that personal ambition through which the Spartan Lysandros covered himself with infamy, nothing of that lust for money which brought on Gylippos the punishment of a common thief, nothing of that savage vindictiveness which would lead men like Kleon or Agesilaos to condemn a whole people to death or slavery. With a mind trained by the best teachers of the age and opened to all the ennobling influences of the most splendid literature which the world has ever yet seen, Epameinondas astonished his countrymen with an eloquence never heard before and never to be heard again from Boiotian lips, with a generosity and forbearance which led them to commit their crimes in his absence and without his knowledge, and with a military genius which upset the traditional system of men who held that that system could never be supplanted by any other. Amid the shifting scenes of the interpolitical intrigues, jealousies, and feuds, which make up the general course of Greek history after the fall of the Athenian empire, the far-seeing wisdom of Epameinondas devised a scheme which, if honestly and thoroughly carried out, might have made something like national union possible for cities which now spent their time in hating and injuring each other. Free, moreover, from the gross superstition which even a man like Sokrates fostered in himself and in his pupils, he could face dangers in the generous spirit of the Homeric Hektor, and nerve his comrades to the utmost endurance when the besotted credulity of a man like Nikias would have left them powerless for thought or action. 'You die childless,' said a friend to him in his last moments,—his voice choked by his tears. 'Nay,' said Epameinondas, 'I leave two daughters, the victory of Leuktra and the victory of Mantinea.'

CHAPTER II.

FROM THE DEATH OF EPAMEINONDAS TO THE BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA.

So small, says Xenophon,¹ was the effect of the last battle fought by Epameinondas, that the confusion and disorder which prevailed

¹ *H.* vii. 5, 27.

before it was increased rather than lessened. The assertion is not true, unless it be held to mean that no settlement was worthy of being taken into account, which either had not the full approval of Sparta, or failed to secure to some one city the power of tyrannising over or at the least dictating to all others. Neither of these results, it is true, followed the battle, in which, although the death of the Theban leader put a stop to all pursuit and so enabled the Spartans with some color to set up a trophy, the latter nevertheless acknowledged their defeat by asking a truce for the burial of their dead. It is true, too, that the victory brought to Thebes neither any new territory nor any addition to her power; but it enabled her to secure a peace which established the independence of Messênè, and rescued Tegea and Megalopolis from a combination of enemies which must, if unbroken, have ended in their downfall and ruin. In other words, it maintained the great work of Epameinondas, and this, it must be admitted, was a solid gain; but we cannot doubt that the grief with which the Thebans heard of the death of their illustrious general was rendered tenfold more poignant by the thought that if his followers had been somewhat less the slaves of his genius and somewhat more the self-relying servants of their country, the peace, which now secured to each side such possessions as it might have at the moment, would assuredly have led to arrangements of which the good effects might have been felt for generations.

But if in the work of Epameinondas we see a consistent and on the whole a beneficent purpose, a review of the events which during the three years immediately following the battle of Mantinea tended to restore to Athens the appearance rather than the reality of a maritime empire involves little interest except of a painful or repulsive kind. We first find Sparta, seemingly in utter disgust at the position of affairs nearer home, sending Agesilaos to receive the wages of a mercenary leader from one or other of the Egyptian princes in revolt against the Persian king. In the distant land of the Nile her power seems to be so far felt as to enable the man whose cause she espouses to win a victory over his rival. The gratitude of Nektanebis was testified by the gift of 230 talents to the Spartan people: but Agesilaos did not live to carry the splendid present home. Weighed down with the toils of more than eighty years he died on the road to Kyrênê, and his body embalmed in wax was taken to Sparta for the solemn ceremonies which the Lykourgean system assigned for the funerals of Spartan kings. So passed away the greatest man, in whom we may see the genuine result of Spartan discipline acting on the best material. Brasidas, both as a

Results of
the battle of
Mantineia.

Death of
Agesilaos in
Egypt.
361 B.C.

soldier and as a statesman, displayed incomparably higher powers ; but in his readiness of resource, in his versatility, and in his eloquence, Brasidas is as pre-eminently Athenian as the philo-Lakonian Xenophon. A man like Agesilaos could be produced only by the rigid monotony of Spartan routine.

When from Sparta we turn to Athens, we see her sending out general after general to recover some ancient possession or to put down some new enemy, and in almost every case accusing the general, on his return, of inefficiency, negligence, or treachery, and visiting these offences either with a severe fine or more commonly with death. These generals, it must be further noted, are sent out with scanty means, perhaps with none — unsupported or but feebly supported by citizen-soldiers with a real interest in the struggle,—and left to do what they can by means of the mercenary bands who now become the plague and bane of the Hellenic world. Thus scarcely more than two months had passed from the battle of Mantinea, when an Athenian fleet was dispatched under Leosthenes to operate against the navy of the Pheraian despot Alexandros. Leosthenes was defeated, and his enemies, if we may believe the story, repeated not without success the attempt of Teletias¹ on the Peiræus. This failure cost Leosthenes his life. The same fate befell Kallisthenes who had not prevented the people of Amphipolis from surrendering their city to the Makedonian king Perdikkas. Others were accused either of incompetence or corruption ; and if in one or two cases the issue of the trial is not known, there is seemingly but too much reason for thinking that the error of the Athenian jury did not lie in the direction of excessive lenity.

Still in spite of punishments Athens found some who were willing, in whatever way, to serve her, while the assassination of Kotys left to her a far less formidable enemy in his young son Kersobleptes. Poorly supported by the mercenary leader Charidemos, this prince was at last compelled to yield up the whole Chersonesos to Athens, with the exception of the town of Kardia. This surrender marks the greatest extent reached by the second maritime empire of Athens, if we may treat as a reality that short-lived and ill-cemented dominion.

The truth is that the real significance of Greek history at this time lies not so much in the obstacles which the Hellenic cities were raising up or multiplying in the way of national union (for such union had long been, if it had not always been, a mere dream), but in the rapidity with which almost every event was

Decay of
Athenian
generalship.

362 B.C.

Greatest extension of
the second
Athenian
empire.
358 B.C.

¹ See p. 566.

preparing the way for a foreign conqueror. So great and so fierce had become the antipathies felt by rival or subject cities towards each other, that without perhaps a single exception they were ready to invite the interference of an alien rather than make up their own unreasonable but deadly quarrels. The new maritime empire of Athens, such as it was, had been acquired in great part at the expense of the Olynthian confederacy: and the forcible suppression of this confederacy was the removal of the last bulwark against Makedonian aggression.

Growth of Makedonian power.
 359 B.C. The death of Perdikkas, the great ally of Athens in this work of conquest, brought his brother Philip, the future father of Alexander the Great, more than one step nearer to the Makedonian throne.

Relations of Philip (father of Alexander the Great) with the Athenians.
 The road to this high place was still full of dangers, but they were dangers which might be well overcome by a man who cared not how he reached his ends. Philip had three half-brothers. One he killed; the other two escaped him only by flight. He took on himself the management of affairs, at first only as regent for his nephew Amyntas son of his brother Perdikkas; he soon found it necessary to comply with an invitation which prayed him to assume the kingly office in his own person. The Athenians espoused the cause of Argaïos, another claimant of the Makedonian crown; but Philip cooled their zeal in his behalf by offering to surrender to them Amphipolis, the great object of their desires since the day when it was wrested from them by Brasidas. Argaïos, thus left to himself, soon fell into Philip's hands; and the Athenians, soothed by the liberation of the Athenian captives, made peace on the terms proposed by the Makedonian king, whose garrison was accordingly withdrawn from Amphipolis.

Disinclination of the Athenians for personal military service.
 This fact sufficiently shows that Philip expected prompt action on the part of the Athenians for the recovery of their long-coveted colony. A few months later he was compelled himself to besiege the place. But for his own previous act the toil would never have been needed; and unless we affirm that he deliberately incurred superfluous trouble, we must give him credit for a belief that the departure of his own troops would be followed by the forcible entry of the Athenians. Keen-sighted though Philip was, and rapidly as he was gaining experience in the best modes of dealing with his neighbors, he had yet to learn what an enormous advantage for the carrying out of all his plans he would have in the present temper and habits of the Athenian people. The fiery energy which in the days of Perikles seemed to confer on the unwearied Demos almost a character of ubiquity had given way to an inert-

ness which preferred to hire others to fight their battles. With the growing disinclination to personal service was combined a dilatoriness in action which let slip almost every opportunity for striking a vigorous blow, for winning some rich prize, or for recovering some old possession.

This slowness and hesitation in the once imperial people stood out in fatal contrast with the firm will, the astute policy, and the rapid execution of the almost unknown adversary who not many years hence was to be proclaimed leader and lord of all the states of Hellas. They cannot indeed be blamed for failing to discern from the first the genius which in Philip delighted in grappling with and overcoming difficulties and which never alarmed an enemy until he was ready to close with him ; but they knew that he had spent three years as a hostage at Thebes, that there he had been brought into personal contact with Epameinondas, and that thus he had seen how mighty a work might be achieved by the union of eloquence with a strong will, and of a far-seeing policy with the military ability needed for its support. Above all, he, as they knew, had witnessed there the discipline and organisation of the Theban army ; he had seen the tremendous wedge of the Theban phalanx set in motion with the velocity and impetus of a ship of war ; and the contemplation of the new tactic which had proved itself more than a match for the ancient system of Sparta had produced its natural result on a mind above all things practical and animated by the old Athenian conviction that in war as in other things the highest science generally carries the day. The Athenians could not indeed know that the courteous and well-cultured youth would arm his phalanx with a weapon which would bear down even the Sacred Band of the Thebans ; but their whole history taught them the lesson that with such an adversary procrastination must mean ruin. The warning was given in vain. Unable to mark out and to adhere to a definite policy, they found themselves drawn hither and thither by conflicting calls, the prospect of advantage in one direction being balanced by a threatened loss in another, while both the loss and the gain tended to put out of sight some third object which they ought to have regarded as of paramount importance.

During the year which followed the evacuation of Amphipolis by the troops of Philip, dissensions in the cities of Eubœa which since the fight at Leuktra had been enrolled in the list of Boiotian confederates provoked a Theban invasion, and made an opening for Athenian interference. The rescue of Chalkis and Eretria from the doom which seemed impending over them might be the means of restoring the ancient empire of Athens, and the earnest entreaties of Timotheus

Early life
and charac-
ter of Philip.

Recovery of
Eubœa by
the Athe-
nians.
358 B.C.

roused his countrymen to something like their former energy. 'The Thebans are in the island,' he said; 'will you spend your time in thinking of what you should do? Will you not rise up and go straight to Peiraieus, and drag down your triremes into the sea?' In five days, we are told, Timotheos had landed with his army in Euboia, and in less than a month the island was restored to the Athenian alliance.

This great gain preceded at the utmost only by a few weeks or months the outbreak of a strife, known as the Social War, which lasting for more than two years left Athens miserably impoverished, and scattered to the winds the hope that her ancient supremacy by sea could ever be permanently restored. In her new confederacy the several allies had their representatives in the synods held at Athens, while they were freed from the burdens which fifty years earlier had furnished matter for constant and vehement complaint; but even thus so slight was the attachment felt for her by the allies generally, and so strong the attraction which drew them from her, that without greatly caring to explain the reason the cities of Kos, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantion asserted their independence and determined to abide the issue of war. In Chios the dominant oligarchy would gladly seize any occasion for revolt, while the men of Byzantion had their special quarrel with Athens in reference to the transit of corn ships from the Euxine to the Egean: but in all likelihood the deepest and most abiding grievance lay in the mode in which Athens, like most other Greek states, now carried on her wars. Her citizens would not serve: her mercenaries, scantily paid, eked out their pay with plunder, sometimes putting aside the objects of their expeditions for mere marauding forays into the lands even of neutrals or friends. The efforts made by Athens to crush the revolt tended only to weaken herself and to strengthen the Makedonian king. Sent with a fleet to Chios, Chabrias fell in battle; at the Hellespont Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Chares seemed to be preparing for vigorous action when a sudden storm abated the ardor of the two former generals. Chares, insisting that the tempest was not such as to justify hesitation, engaged the enemy and was repulsed with loss, and on returning to Athens charged his comrades with treachery. Witnesses on both sides appeared, the one to assert the fury of the storm, the other to deny it. The result was the acquittal of Iphikrates, although he took upon himself the full responsibility of what had been done, and the condemnation of Timotheos to the enormous fine of 100 talents. The former, it seems, was an orator of no mean merit, with popular and winning manners; the latter, caring nothing for the favor of the people and doing little to consult their tastes, found few to sympathise

357 B.C.

with him in misfortune. The partisans of Iphikrates appeared in arms, it is said, near the court where his trial was going on, and the jurymen discreetly acquitted him: Timotheos had no such help, and judgment went against him. Such was the miserable harvest reaped from the seed sown by Theramenes. The memory of Argennoussai paralysed the arms of the best generals; and the perversion of justice was the natural, if not the necessary, consequence of this fatal state of things.

Thus almost at the outset of a struggle with the most important cities in her confederacy Athens was deprived or had deprived herself of all the generals who might, if they had been allowed fair freedom of action, have served her efficiently. Chabrias was dead; Timotheos was in exile, amerced in a penalty exceeding his powers of payment; Iphikrates, although acquitted, appears no more as a military leader. There remain only Chares and Phokion, the former a man with nothing but his courage to commend him, the latter a man whose virtues were more mischievous to the state than the vices of his colleagues. In Phokion the personal incorruptibility of Nikias was united with more than respectable military talent and an ascetic hardness of life more in accordance with Spartan than Athenian habits. Caring nothing for the luxuries which wealth might procure, he had no motives to court the popular favor for the sake of amassing money, while his bluntness in speech and the freedom of his censure shielded him from all imputations of time-serving flattery. He professed indeed to despise eloquence as much as he despised riches: but Demosthenes spoke of him as the axe which clove his labored oratory asunder, and we may perhaps be not far in thinking that the happy abruptness and pithiness of his speeches were at the least as much the results of studied art as of natural rudeness. Such a man, so thoroughly possessing the confidence of the Athenians as to be elected general during forty-five consecutive years; might, had he chosen so to do, have revived in his countrymen something of the vigor which distinguished the Demos in the days of Perikles. In such a task he would have had everything in his favor, while everything would have tended to increase the difficulties of the only antagonist from whom he had anything to fear. The Makedonian king was fighting his way onwards amongst obstacles which a determined and sagacious enemy might easily have rendered insurmountable. He had to win over or to crush cities which might have been made the steadfast allies of Athens; and Phokion might by advocating an energetic resistance have added to his fame as a general. Whether he felt that his own importance would be increased by a resolute war policy, is, to say the least, most uncertain;

but there can be no doubt that in insisting on a policy of a very different kind he earned for himself the reputation of a man who for the sake of peace sacrifices distinctions which he could not fail to win. Phokion became thus (unwittingly it may be) the most dangerous enemy of Athens. The sternness of his character and the integrity of his private life insured to him a trust fully equal to that which had been reposed in Nikias, and he used it to blind his countrymen to signs of appalling significance and to make them deaf to the warnings which told them that they were walking on the brink of a precipice. He might have dealt a deathblow to the ambition of Philip and changed the course perhaps of European history: but he chose deliberately to foster all that was weak and ungenerous in the Athenian character, to assure them that there was and there could be no need of extraordinary exertion, no need to leave their pleasant home life for the hard realities of warfare, no need to stint their enjoyments in order to provide the means of putting down the sleepless and unscrupulous conspirator who, if he failed to snare his prey, awaited patiently the right moment for springing upon him. Phokion, in short, fell in with the Athenian humor; and the pre-eminence thus cheaply gained sealed the doom not of Athens alone but of the whole Hellenic world.

Things were, in truth, going just as Philip would have them. Sent out with a powerful fleet, Chares instead of fighting with the Reduction of Amphipolis by Philip. 358 B.C. revolted allies took service with the satrap Artabazos; and although he won from him a rich recompense for defeating the troops of the Persian king, the complaints and threats of the latter made the Athenians as willing to concede the independence of their allies as these were anxious to acquire it. Before this exhausting and useless struggle reached its close, Amphipolis had already fallen. Her envoys had appeared at Athens to pray for aid against the besiegers whom by themselves they were unable to withstand: but the hatred of two generations left no room for sympathy with their troubles, and Philip guarded himself effectually against the interference of the Athenians by assuring them that he was besieging the city only because he wished to hand it over to them. The promptness with which he had fulfilled his former engagement to evacuate the place secured ample credit for his present promises, and the Athenians sat still while Philip became master of the gates of Thrace. This time the pledge was not redeemed; but when the Olynthians, fully seeing the results of this momentous conquest, sought to form an alliance with Athens, the partisans of the Makedonian king cheated the people with bright pictures of his friendship for them and of the benefits which they would receive at his hands, and the Olynthian proposal was summarily rejected.

Philip had, again, achieved his purpose. While the wrath of the Olynthians was still hot against the Athenians, he offered himself as their ally, and proved the sincerity of his intentions by putting them in possession of Potidaia. Thus disarming their opposition, he struck blow after blow against the power which alone blocked his way to empire, until Methônê remained the only town on the Thermaic gulf in alliance with Athens. The Greeks were indeed serving him well. His armies were becoming instruments of wonderful power; but he found allies still more potent in the incurable feuds of the Hellenic cities and the personal corruption of Hellenic citizens.

Alliance of Philip with the Olynthians.
356 B.C.

These deadly feuds were now to kindle the fiercer flame of a religious war. Unable to win the hearty support of willing allies, the Thebans had resolved to employ once more for the furtherance of their ends the judicial powers of the Amphiktyonic assembly. The Spartans were already under the ban. The victims now were the Phokians, who on some trifling charge were sentenced to a ruinous fine, and on failing to pay it within a specified time were condemned to the punishment which had been inflicted on Kirrha in the days of Solon.¹ In getting this sentence passed the Thebans overshot their mark. On the suggestion of Philomelos the Phokians resolved to enforce their ancient claim to the presidency of the Delphian temple. Hastening to Sparta, Philomelos found in King Archidamos a friend who, although he could not commit the state in the matter, did what he could to help him by gifts of money and men. His own wealth enabled him to double the sum thus gained, and at the head of an army so raised he seized the Delphian temple and town. His envoys were at once sent round to the chief Hellenic cities, to say that the Phokians were but re-asserting their ancient rights, that the temple treasures should be scrupulously guarded, and the temple itself remain open as in times past for the pilgrim or the inquirer. The result might have been foreseen. Sparta and Athens declared their readiness to support the Phokian claim: the Thebans vehemently denounced it. It was but the old strife in a new and a more deadly form; the quarrel was to be fought out with the added horrors of a crusade.

The Phokians fined by the Amphiktyonic assembly.
357 B.C.

The promises made by Philomelos and his brother or colleague Onomarchos were kept necessarily but for a little while. Thebes was gathering a large army to attack them; from Sparta and Athens it seemed useless to look for active help, and mercenaries must be paid. It was impossible to resist the pressure put upon them. The wealth of

The Sacred War.
356 B.C.

¹ Paus. x. 37.

the temple, taken first strictly as a loan, was afterwards more freely used, until at length the sacrilege ended in confiscation; and long before the ten years of this desperate struggle had come to an end, the ten thousand talents which represented the value of the Delphian treasures had all been spent or wasted.

After some successes won at a fearful cost, the mercenary army of Philomelos was defeated and Philomelos himself slain. With

Defeat of
Philomelos.
355-4 B.C.

the temple treasures his successor Onomarchos merely levied another army but practically made himself despot. When the Makedonian Philip attacked Lykophron the tyrant of Pherai, he found in the Phokian general an enemy vastly more formidable than any Hellenic leader whom he had thus far encountered. The mere fact that Philip could thus turn his attention to the affairs of Thessaly attests the rapid growth of his power. Methônê, the last city remaining to Athens on the Thermaic gulf, was now his; and if he thus had no further hindrances nearer home, he was indirectly aided by the Spartans, who thought that they might now carry out their long-cherished desire of undoing the work of Epameinondas. His Thessalian campaign bade fair at first to be a success; but Onomarchos avenged the defeat of his brother Phayllos in two bloody battles, and Philip was compelled for the time to abandon Thessaly. His army seemed disorganised, and he had to put forth all his powers of persuasion before he could prevail on them to resume the strife.

353 B.C.

His efforts were amply rewarded. Powerfully aided by the Thessalian cavalry, he encountered the Phokians in a battle in which Onomarchos was slain with, it is said, 6,000

Defeat of
Onomarchos
by Philip of
Macedon.
352 B.C.

of his men. Philip was thus the victorious champion of the Delphian god, and the master also of Pherai, which Lykophron, deprived of Phokian aid, was compelled to surrender. Never lingering when there was work to be done, he hastened to besiege Pagasai, the only maritime inlet of Thessalian trade. Once more a prayer for help came to Athens, and this time it was heard. The people resolved that a force should be sent. They kept their word, but it came too late. Philip was already master of the mercantile marine which filled the harbor, master of the large revenues arising from the import and export duties collected there, and master of a singularly strong position from which his privateers might issue for the annoyance of the Athenian coasts and the destruction of Athenian trading ships.

This conquest alone might well excite both fear and anger in a people who could at least look back upon a splendid past; but when it became known that Philip had actually reached Thermopylai and that this narrow inlet into Southern Hellas was all

that remained to save Attica itself from the ravage of his armies, the limits of Athenian forbearance were reached. Rating at its true value the pretence that he came as the champion of Apollon to purge his temple of sacrilegious invaders, they sent out under Nausikles a powerful force, which so rapidly reached and so effectually fortified the pass that Philip gave up all thought of attacking it.

Fortification of Thermopylai by the Athenians.

Nothing more, we might suppose, could be needed to convince them that there was but one way of dealing with this indefatigable aggressor, and that this mode lay in that promptitude and vigor of action which could be secured only by large personal self-sacrifice. Opportunity after opportunity for checking his career had been allowed to slip, and they had already suffered his power to reach a dangerous height: but they should now at least have learnt the lesson that Athens could hold her own only by steady unintermitted watchfulness, and by the constant readiness of her citizens to undergo the hardships of warfare whether against Philip or in case of his death against those who might take his place. At the least their experience at Thermopylai should have taught them that the employment of mercenaries under professional condottieri was not merely a crime but a blunder, and that they were but playing their enemy's game in making use of men whose wages were most irregularly paid, and sometimes not paid at all, and who therefore became a terror rather to their allies than to their adversaries. Events were soon to show how far they had learnt the lesson. Not many months had passed before the tidings that Philip was besieging Heraion Teichos (the wall of Hêrê) near the Thracian Chersonesos renewed at Athens the feeling of lively alarm. The people again resolved on vigorous measures; but Heraion Teichos was more distant than Thermopylai, and more time was allowed to slip by in the task of preparation. In the meanwhile reports came first that Philip was ill, then that he was dead. The first report was true, the second false: but the Athenians could not be brought to see that if even his death should have furnished a strong reason for immediate action, his illness made the same course even more imperatively necessary. Now, if ever, we might have supposed that men like Phokion would have urged them vehemently not to let the grass grow under their feet; but Phokion either was silent or fostered the delusion that they might safely fold their hands and rest. One man only had the wisdom to see and the courage to tell them that with their present temper and habits they would soon raise up against themselves another Philip, even if the Philip whom they had scared away from Thermopylai should be dead.

Report of Philip's illness and death.
351 B.C.

That man was Demosthenes, a man who from the first braced himself to the hardest of all tasks,—the guiding, namely, of a whole people in a path which had become intensely irksome and tedious to them. No loftier image of duty cheerfully faced and in spite of a thousand temptations to easiness and sloth resolutely discharged has ever been furnished by statesmen of any age or country. As compared with a man like Phokion, he had good reason, and, it might be thought, full justification for taking the easier course. Wholly lacking the great bodily strength of that popular general, conscious probably that a weakly constitution left to him no great powers of physical endurance, and knowing certainly that he could pretend to no special military genius, he yet deliberately rejected the policy by which Phokion earned the favor of the people, and he did so because, even before he knew in what quarter the real danger lay, he saw the signs of the fatal disease which was paralysing the whole body of the state. With all the enthusiasm and the self-devotion of Sokrates, he consecrated his life to a work comparable strictly to that of the physician who can save his patient's life only by putting him to excruciating pain. Soon convinced that he had undertaken the mission of Kasandra, he allowed no failure to damp his energy, and was content to toil on in his thankless task, although he knew that every false step (and at this time the Athenians seldom took a step which was not false) rendered it more difficult to apply his remedies and more rash to look for any real benefit from them. Once only in his whole career were the eyes of the Athenians opened fully to the stern realities which had thrown for years their dark shadows across his mind; and then also, the burst of zeal awakened by his words and by the overpowering dangers of the situation came altogether too late. Thus Demosthenes had practically to go through life in a solitude which may well be called appalling,—seeing that the danger to Athens and to Hellas generally lay in the aggrandisement of Philip as clearly as William of Orange discerned the ends for which Lewis XIV. was striving and plotting, yet unable to convince his hearers that his fears had any solid foundation.

Left at the age of seven years on his father's death the heir to great wealth, Demosthenes found on reaching the age of citizenship that the neglect and dishonesty of his guardians had reduced his patrimony to a pittance. With such instruction as he could get from teachers of rhetoric, the boy was compelled to appear before a jury court of his countrymen and plead his own cause. He gained the verdict which he desired; and if he found that even this verdict was in-

Beginning of
the public
life of De-
mosthenes.
353 B.C.

Early life
and training
of Demos-
thenes.

effectual against the hard-hearted men who had robbed him, still it taught him once for all how great a power for good or evil was wielded by the orator. But for the present it left him also with an overpowering sense of his deficiency as a speaker. He could make no boast of bodily strength; the Muse of Eloquence had endowed him neither with richness of voice nor with readiness of utterance. The Phalerean Demetrios speaks of the orator in his later years as telling him that he corrected his stammering speech by declaiming with pebbles in his mouth, and the defects of his elocution by practising long periods at running speed, while he overcame the rudeness of his action by watching his gestures in a mirror. Whether Demosthenes, towards the close of his career, may have exaggerated unconsciously the difficulties with which he had to contend in his youth, we cannot say. The story went that constant declamation on the sea shore removed altogether the nervousness which he had felt in facing a formidable or unruly assembly, and that he completed his training by shutting himself up for months in an underground chamber with half his hair shaved off by way of guarding against any temptations to show himself in public. But whatever his difficulties may have been, we know that they were bravely overcome, and that the instruction of the rhetor Isaios and the teaching, still more valuable perhaps, of the tragic actor Satyros, were supplemented by his unwearied study of the history of Thucydides. Eight times, according to one story, he wrote out the whole of it; according to another, he learnt it all by heart. But however this may be, the Thriasian Eunomos judged rightly when he cheered the youthful speaker in his most desponding moments by telling him that of all later Athenians he approached most nearly to the model of Perikles. How thoroughly he had imbibed the spirit and wisdom of that great man and of his not less illustrious historian, his whole career furnishes abundant evidence. For the restoration of the old Athenian empire he knew that it was useless to hope; and dealing honestly with present circumstances he acknowledged that in the interest of Athens both Thebes and Sparta ought to be kept weak, and contended that Athens ought to reject without hesitation the Spartan request for aid against Megalopolis and Messênê. No bribe which promised to the Athenians the restoration of Orôpos should induce them to lend a hand in breaking the fetters which Epameinondas had placed on the limbs of their ancient enemies. They should, rather, be ready to take those cities under their own protection, or even to ally themselves with the Thebans in their defence. Nor can it be denied that, as things went, he was right. It was this conviction which led him in his first public speeches before the Assembly to quiet the fears of Persian

invasion which disturbed the people at the close of the Social War, and more particularly (in contrast with the day-dreams of Isokrates) to dissuade them from all acts which might give the Persian king a provocation to war. Such a war, he insisted, would be interpreted instantly by the Greek states hostile to or jealous of Athens as an evidence of his kindly feeling towards themselves; nor did the bitterness of this sarcasm one whit exceed its truth. In any case, the one thing of paramount importance was that her citizens should be ready to serve in their own persons, and freely to stint or even to sacrifice the pleasures and luxuries of their city life. Nor could they need any further evidence to assure them of this than the fact that whenever the Athenian people acted jointly, resolutely, and instantly, there had been no instance of failure, and whenever they shrank from such action, no instance of success.

But the noxious plant of treachery, which revealed its deadly power at Aigospotamoi, had from that time taken firm root in Athenian soil, and found there a congenial atmosphere. At no time in Athenian history was there a greater need of upright and incorruptible statesmen; at no time was Athens cursed with a treason so insidious, so persistent, and so ruinous as that of Æschines. That treason was still a thing of the future, and Æschines was yet to display something like the patriotism of Wentworth in the English House of Commons before the fascination of Philip, like that of Charles the First, should convert him into a traitor as dangerous as the Strafford of the House of Lords. But among men of the oligarchical party who had never brought themselves to acquiesce cheerfully in the rule of the people, there were not wanting many in whom a statesman as politic and crafty as Philip would even without direct bribery find most convenient tools. Such men as these opposed more than a passive resistance to the scheme by which Demosthenes proposed to put an effectual check on the aggrandisement of the Makedonian king. The Athenians must have two fleets and two armies to serve with those fleets. The one must be kept in reserve, ready to be called out at a moment's notice, to meet him at any point where he might present himself as an aggressor, or where there was reason for supposing that he meant to strike a sudden and unforeseen blow: the other should be sent out with ample equipments and funds to carry the war into his own territory, and to keep him fully occupied and even distracted with the multiplicity and the constancy of their attacks. To carry out this plan there was need both of men and money. The men must be the citizens of Athens themselves; the money must be supplied by a self-denial certainly not in excess of their powers.

Opposition
of Æschines
and Phokion
to the policy
of Demosthe-
nes.

They must spend less time and money on their festivals, and with their generals they must give themselves to the hard work which had made Athens great after the humiliation of Xerxes. The plan proposed involved no impossible effort; but the self-denial which it imposed was unpleasant, and a man so honest and brave as Phokion saw no need of putting on them this heavy burden. Philip, if not dead, was sick; and if he was not sick, he spoke of himself as a friend who courted only their hearty alliance. It was not a man like Phokion who could see from the beginning the course which things were likely to take, and which under certain conditions they must take. If he had seen it, we may perhaps give him credit for an honesty which would have impelled him to express his convictions. Demosthenes had both the foresight and the honesty; and he had to bear silently the pain which he felt when, his own proposals having been rejected, his countrymen contented themselves with sending to the Chersonesos ^{351 B.C.} the Condottiero Charidemos with a little money and with ten triremes which he was to fill as best he could with mercenaries.

The kindly feelings of Philip for the Athenians and for the Hellenes generally were now to be shown in his conduct to the Olynthians. With these he had contracted an alliance cemented by the cession of Potidaia and Anthe-
Remissness of the Athenians with regard to Olynthos. 350 B.C.
 mous. But when that agreement was made, Athens was still a state whose power might be felt on the Thermaic gulf. With the fall of Methônê she ceased to be an object of dread; and to fall from this high state was commonly, for Hellenic cities, much the same as becoming an object of love to their former enemies. There had been a time when the formation of a true Hellenic confederacy, with Olynthos at its head, nay, even of a true Greek nation, might have seemed, to say the least, just possible. The deadly enmity of Sparta had long since scattered that hope to the winds;¹ and the gallantry which prompted that effort was never again seen among the Olynthians, perhaps never again felt. But although the wealthier citizens might reap benefits many and great from a connexion with Philip, although through him they might amass wealth from Thra-
 kian forests and mines, and although they might find it easy to condone his assaults on other cities for his professions of friendship to themselves, the main body of the Olynthian people was not to be thus cheated. For these Athens remained the only refuge; and the memory of past wrongs was not allowed to interfere with the resolution to ask her aid. That prayer was supported by Demosthenes,² who placed in sharp contrast their present inertness with the

¹ See p. 568.

stands second in the edited order.

² In the Olynthiac oration, which This oration says little or nothing

energy of their forefathers and the restless activity of Philip. The alliance was accepted, but in true accordance with modern Athenian habits no effectual aid was sent; and an arrangement which the Olynthians made without any intention of offering direct provocation to Philip was construed by him as a deliberate offence.

It was not long before Demosthenes was compelled to address his countrymen on behalf of Olynthos not as a city with which friendship was a matter of good policy, but as one which, if conquered, would leave Philip free to turn his arms against Attica itself. Again he repeated the advice which had been already rejected. If they were wise men, they would at once see the paramount need of two forces, of which the one should be sent to defend Olynthos, while the other should distract his attention by attacking him elsewhere. These two measures, carried out together, would insure success; neither by itself would be of much use. In the matter of ways and means he would say only that money must be found, and that the existing law respecting the Theoric Fund, whatever might be its intrinsic

justice or value, could not in the least alter the exigency of the case. Again he spoke to deaf ears, for it cannot be said that the sending of a mercenary force, without funds to pay them, was any substantial compliance with his advice. Such as it was, this force gained some advantages over Philip, which seem to have been treated at Athens as a splendid victory; and it became the duty of Demosthenes to warn them against the folly of thinking that their work was at an end. So far as Philip was concerned, defeat, however severe (and there was no reason for supposing that the present one was really severe), would be simply a sickness which might interrupt his action but would not paralyse his energy; and they would only be cheating themselves if they chose to fancy the contrary. For the breathing time which their victory might give them they might be thankful; but it should at the same time spur them on to redoubled efforts. The crisis was really not less urgent; and their business was to appoint Nomothetai who might remove any laws pertaining to the Theoric Fund or to military service which they might find to be injurious to the true interests of the state.

That this last proposal was not adopted, there can be no doubt. The attention of the Athenians was, perhaps, too soon distracted by the revolt of Eubœia, which had been now for about eight years in alliance with them. Here, too, the partisans of Philip had been

about the power of Philip, nor does it even speak of the Olynthians as hardly pressed. It merely urges the need of embracing an opportunity, thus offered to them, of an al-

liance which might serve to keep Philip in effectual check. It seems impossible to ascribe this oration to any later time.

busy. Among these Ploutarchos of Eretria, under the guise of friendship for Athens, besought her aid. Phokion landed on the island only to find that Ploutarchos was a traitor; but his skill as a general averted the catastrophe, and the Athenians were gladdened by the tidings (brought to them by Æschines, who had here distinguished himself) of a victory won at Tamynai. For the present the war in Euboea, which dragged its weary length for nearly three years, did little more than furnish to Meidias an excuse for brutally assaulting Demosthenes at the great Dionysian festival, and to others a plea for abusing him as a deserter.

In the Chalkidic peninsula the Athenians behaved more vigorously, and the result naturally was a more pressing need for money. Demosthenes had said that under the existing laws no man would be found rash enough to incur the risk of a charge for illegal procedure¹ by making any direct motion with regard to the Theoric Fund. Apollodoros, one of the senators, was, it seems, more courageous; and the

Revolt of
Euboea from
Athens.
349 B.C.

Proposition
of Apollodo-
ros respect-
ing the The-
oric Fund.

¹ The *Graphê Paranomôn*. This suit might be brought at any time within the period of twelve months against the proposer of any law, if his measure should be found to be in antagonism with any existing law. If the charge was not brought within the year, the proposer was scathless; but his law might be indicted and condemned, the distinction being drawn by the preposition employed before the name of the accused, *κατὰ Ἀριστοκράτους* denoting a suit in which the proposer was personally liable, *πρὸς Δεπτίνην*, marking a prosecution brought after the lapse of more than one year. Thus the burden was laid upon the legislator not only of taking care that his own measure was good and wholesome, but of seeing that it contradicted no existing enactments.

In favor of this usage it may be argued that it rendered impossible the massing of vast mountains of legislation (as in the case of the English statutes), of which few may say how much is in force, how much obsolete, how much formally repealed; and that it left no room for that not very grateful portion of the labors of English judges, which consists in so far explaining away

inconsistencies and contradictions as to give to the general body of statutes an appearance of harmony which they do not possess.

In point of fact, the usages thus sanctioned are certainly not amongst the most creditable features of the Athenian constitution.

There can be no doubt that the original intention was to confine these suits to cases of formal contradiction between new and old enactments; and thus far it might be urged that little hardship was inflicted on the proposers of new laws. The case was altered when the inconsistency was said to lie not in the letter but in the spirit of the two laws, and when, further, the plea of illegality in the carrying of a law was made an excuse for running off into general reviews of the political career of statesmen, and holding them up as fit objects for the contempt or hatred of the people. Such an abuse of this charge of illegal legislation brought by Æschines nominally against Ktesiphon called forth from Demosthenes the most splendid speech of his own and perhaps of any other age; but it is not a little to the discredit of the professedly legislative processes at Athens that such

whole senate, we are told, unanimously adopting his proposal, gave him leave to submit to the people a vote which, after the payment of the sums needed for the peace establishment, would devote all surplus revenue to the support of the war instead of to the Theoric Fund. The Demos also, it is said, accepted the plan with enthusiasm, although we can scarcely suppose that the Makedonian party would be so cowed as to register not a single opposing vote. But as the law stood, the proposal was undeniably illegal; and under the usual writ in such cases, obtained by a citizen named Stephanos, Apollodoros was tried and condemned to a fine which, it seems, was actually paid. Thus again was a war starved, the vigorous maintenance of which was of vital moment not only to the welfare but even to the existence of Athens.¹

an occasion should have been furnished at all.

In truth, it is not easy to discover a valid defence of the practice. Mr. Grote regards it as having been rendered necessary at Athens by the impulsiveness of the Demos, which needed to be guarded against being led away by the eloquence or the enthusiasm of their orators. On this Sir Robert Collier justly remarks, 'Whether this is in effect an argument in favor of the *Graphê Paranomôn*, or against the Athenian democracy, may admit of question.' (*Translation of the Oration of Demosthenes on the Crown*, Pref., p. x.) This is the very least that can be said; nor can Sir R. Collier be charged with any undue severity of criticism when he adds that the *Graphê Paranomôn* became 'an engine of warfare wielded against each other by political partisans, who, as they became ascendant in turn, indicted, almost as a matter of course, their principal opponents' (*ib.*). The case of Apollodoros is a signal instance of this; but the privilege was never more grossly abused than in the case of the generals who were victorious at Argennoussai (see pp. 470-472). It is not too much to say that this utterly discreditable manœuvre sealed the doom not merely of the generals but of Athens itself; and it may fairly be doubted whether the plea, in favor of the practice, based on the im-

pulsiveness of the Athenian Demos be not the least tenable of all. It resolves itself simply into the assertion that the Athenians could not be brought to regard themselves as responsible for their own decisions and their own acts. This dangerous, if not fatal, fault is seen repeatedly in their history. It is disgracefully prominent in their dealings with Miltiades, p. 159; it comes out wretchedly in the debates about Sphakteria, p. 322, as well as after the catastrophe at Syracuse, p. 412. In the same fashion, when they came to see that the execution of the six generals, p. 473, was a mere murder, the Demos wished to punish their advisers; and the *Graphê Paranomôn* was little more than a device for thus shifting on others the responsibility which, by approving their counsel or passing an enactment proposed by them, the people had really taken upon themselves.

¹ It is obvious that the people would be set against this diversion of the Theoric Fund, if it became clear that the measure was urged by the wealthier citizens as a device for freeing themselves from direct taxation. This was no part of the scheme of Demosthenes, whose mind was set on three things,—the support of the army by the personal service of the citizens, the maintenance of the revenue both by direct and indirect taxation, and the reservation, for purposes of war,

Of the various steps which led to the great catastrophe not much is known; nor would there, perhaps, be much profit in dwelling on incidents which would only show how well Athenian slackness and procrastination played into Philip's hands. Three years had passed away from the time when he openly declared war on Olynthos before the city was taken. During these years, or during the last two of them, he had seized thirty-two Chalkidic cities, all of which, perhaps, were treated not less severely than Olynthos. Here the people were all sold into slavery, and the town itself, it is said, was dismantled. This great peninsula, once so busy with Greek industry in its most attractive forms, was now a desert in which shattered walls and crumbling houses attested the ancient greatness of cities inhabited only by slaves to produce a revenue for their lords.

The tidings of the fall of Olynthos excited at Athens feelings both of indignation and of grief. Not a few Athenian citizens found in the city were now in slavery, while others, settled in the Thracian Chersonesos, were making their way home, well knowing that nothing remained to save them from the grasp of Philip. For the moment the thoughts of the Athenians turned to the formation of a Pan-Hellenic confederacy, and Æschines was sent with other envoys into Peloponnesos. From the Ten Thousand at Megalopolis his pictures of Philip's iniquities drew forth sympathy and some vague promises of help; and his own indignation against that subtle leader was increased by seeing on his return to Athens the files of Greek captives from Chalkidikê whom their fellow-Greeks were driving before them to slavery. But however intense may have been their feelings of pain and anger, Æschines could not shut his eyes to the dangers of protracted warfare; and it must be admitted that at this moment his convictions were shared by Demosthenes. It was clear that not much help could be looked for from Peloponnesian allies, while there seemed to be imminent danger that Philip might become master of Thermopylai.

Wearied out with a struggle¹ which they found themselves unable to bring to an end by their own strength, the Thebans had resolved to call in the aid of Philip, and Philip was only too ready to give it, and thus to become the recognised leader of a crusade to avenge the wrongs of Apollon. Throughout Phokis this news spread dismay; and an embassy to Athens, beseeching help, roused there the energy which had long been slumbering. But when the Athenian general appeared to take possession of the pass, he found that the invitation of the surplus remaining after the ordinary peace establishment. disbursements necessary for the

Fall of
Olynthos.

347 B.C.

Temporary
agreement
between
Æschines
and Demos-
thenes.
348-7 B.C.

Alliance of
Philip with
the Thebans.

¹ See p. 606.

had come from a party not in power, and that his interference only roused the wrath of the Phokian chief, Phalaikos. This man was the son of Onomarchos, the second of the four Phokian leaders during the Sacred War, and had become general or tyrant four years before on the death of Phayllos. That his refusal to receive the Athenians as guardians of Thermopylai was prompted by no desire to come to terms with Philip is clear from the fact that he protracted the struggle for ten months longer, and then made his submission only because he was led to believe that Athens had pledged herself to carry out, by force if need be, the designs of Philip. But to the Athenians, who knew only that the conduct of Phalaikos was evidence of his ill-will and dislike towards themselves, and who could not be sure of his feelings towards Philip, the slight thus put upon them seemed to justify the strongest suspicions.

For the present, it seemed that no better mode of dealing with the matter could be found than by arranging a peace with Philip, to

Mission of
Æschines
with other
envoys to
Philip.
347 B.C.

whom overtures had been made already. Eleven envoys, ten from the Athenians, one from their allies, were accordingly sent, to ascertain the terms on which a treaty could be made. The wily Makedonian was well aware that negotiations carried on in his own presence were vastly more to his interest than negotiations carried on at Athens; and he might well hope to find new converts among the envoys, of whom three were already his devoted servants. This hope was realised, and realised to the ruin of Athens and to the destruction of Hellenic freedom and independence, if, since the days of Aigospotamoi, such things could be said to exist.

The story of this first embassy comes to us almost wholly from Æschines, and it is impossible to say how far the motives by which

Conversion
of Æschi-
nes.

he was actuated when telling the tale may have led him to garble or to falsify it. Certain it is that the man who went with feelings or professions of righteous wrath returned with sentiments of enthusiastic admiration for the prince whom he had denounced as the common enemy of Hellas, and that from this time forth he steadily played that despot's game. Whether his ears had caught the Siren's strain before he left Athens, it is perhaps impossible to determine; but if we accept the version which he has given us as a true report of the speech which he made to Philip, we may fairly suspect that he was already under the spell before he crossed the Makedonian border. It seems incredible that a man of common sense and common honesty, seeking earnestly to advance the interests of his country, should confront a conqueror in the full tide of victory with a demand utterly extravagant and preposterous. Before a court he might

have insisted not only on the restoration of Amphipolis, although it had now been in Philip's possession for twelve years, but also on complete satisfaction for all wrongs inflicted at any time by Macedonian kings on Athens or on her allies; but it is almost beyond the powers of belief that he should make such a demand now except for the purpose of showing to Philip that he was not in earnest, and of cheating his countrymen into the idea that he had pleaded their cause with singular boldness and devotion, if not with complete success. By his own showing he stands convicted of absolute incompetence as an envoy; nor can we acquit him of folly except by charging him with crime. Hence also it is not easy to decide what may be the real meaning and value of the accusations which he brings against his colleague Demosthenes. It is at the least possible that his alleged intractability, rudeness, and arrogance may be only convenient names for the straightforward conduct of a man who had begun to suspect that he was in the company of traitors.

Some three months later the ambassadors returned to Athens, bringing with them a letter from Philip, couched in honeyed terms, but revealing nevertheless the hard fact that no peace could be granted unless it secured to each party its possessions at the moment of its ratification. If then any arrangement was to be made at all, it was clearly indispensable in the interests of Athens that it should be made at once. Philip was advancing from conquest to conquest, and they might be sure that he would not stay his hand until he had himself taken the oaths, even if he should do so then. The proceedings were accordingly urged on rapidly; and on the proposal of Philokrates the people were invited to consider whether they would make not merely peace but a permanent alliance with the Macedonian king. The proposal was carried, the only clause struck out being one which excluded from the benefits of the treaty the Phokians and the town of Halos. Painful though it may have been to Demosthenes to acquiesce in such a covenant, there can be no doubt that he expressed his approval of it. He might fairly do so. When Euboulos, the friend of Æschines, told the people that, if they rejected the peace, they must submit to personal service, to increased taxation, and to forfeit the Theoric Fund, Demosthenes could not deny that they had no other alternative, and that, if they would not brace themselves up for the effort, nothing remained but to make terms with the conqueror. He might further have said that so long as the Phokians were included among the allies of Athens, Thermopylai was safe, and Attica was safe also; but the envoys sent by Philip to complete the treaty soon made it known that their master would not allow the Phokian name to appear in it, nor can we have much doubt that his

Reply of
Philip to the
proposals
for peace.
346 B.C.

determination was known also both to Philokratés, who had originally proposed their exclusion in terms, and to Æschines.

On no other supposition can we explain the falsehoods by which, when his envoys had discharged their errand, they sought to hoodwink the people to his real designs. Philip insisted on the exclusion of the Phokians, but this was only from his genuine love both for them and for the Athenians. He could not acknowledge the former as his allies, because they were at war with the Thebans, whom he was compelled to style his friends; but the alliance of Athens would so strengthen his hands as to enable him to show his true colors, and then they would see him crush Thebes, set free the subject cities which she now kept down, and even restore to the Athenians the long-lost and dearly coveted Amphipolis. If, then, the latter would swear to the peace without specifying the Phokians among their allies, this would not only be no treachery to them, but a positive benefit, as it would prevent the Thebans from seeing through the real designs of Philip. This omission to specify the Phokians was, it must be noted, a very different thing on any such hypothesis from their exclusion in terms; and if the issue of the whole struggle, if the ultimate predominance of Philip and the downfall of Athens and of Hellas depended on the resolution now taken, the blame of the result cannot be laid upon Demosthenes. If for himself he disbelieved the statements of Æschines, he must have known that without fresh evidence of Philip's double-dealing he could obtain no hearing from the assembly, and that in the lack of such evidence there was little hope or none of inducing them to reconsider the question.

What Philip wanted most of all was time. Every day gained made it possible for him to achieve some new conquest, while

Athens assuredly was not moving onwards to victory. For this very reason it was to her interest to bind Philip by a personal engagement, for there was but too much reason for fearing that he would set aside or evade any pledges which might be given by his envoys. It was therefore the duty of the Athenian ambassadors (the same men who had been sent on the first mission), to hasten with all speed to the place where Philip might be, and there to receive his oaths without the loss of an hour. There is not the slightest evidence even for the suspicion that Demosthenes failed in this duty. The history of the embassy places it beyond doubt that in every case he was outvoted; that his own dispatches to the Athenians revealing the true state of affairs were suppressed; that false reports were sent in their stead; and that when he wished to return home himself, he was forcibly hindered by Philip

Omission of the Phokian name from the treaty.
346 B.C.

Delay of Æschines in receiving the engagements of Philip.

from so doing. We can therefore see at once the drift of the policy which kept Æschines and his colleagues at Athens for nine days after the oaths had been taken by the representatives of Philip; which allowed fifty more days to pass before they had their first interview with him; and which induced them, when they were brought into his presence, to say nothing about the special errand on which they had been sent. It had been provided in the treaty, that all conquests made since the swearing of the oaths should be void; but it was absurd to suppose that Philip would abide by this provision when they had allowed him time enough to subjugate whole countries before they came to him. It is impossible to believe that these delays arose from any other cause than the deliberate purpose of playing into his hands by a preconcerted scheme.

Nearly a quarter of a year had passed before the envoys returned to Athens. They had at last administered the oaths to Philip at Pherai,—in other words, when he was once more with his army close to Thermopylai. Not one of his allies had they taken the trouble to visit; but to shield them from the anger of the people, they carried with them a letter, in which Philip said that he had purposely kept them about him, because he wanted their aid in settling the quarrel between the cities of Halos and Pharsalos. The plea was transparently false; but the envoys had a harder task before them, and it must be allowed that they were found not unequal to it. As a senator for that year, Demosthenes was able at once to make his report to his fellow-councillors. In so doing, he told the plain unvarnished tale, which left on their minds no doubt whatever of the treachery of Æschines, and ended by beseeching them not to allow the Phokians to be betrayed as the Olynthians and others had been betrayed before them. A fleet of fifty triremes was ready to be used on any emergency; and the Senate resolved to propose to the people that it should be used now. But when (probably on the next day) the assembly met, Æschines, feeling that for himself and his fellow-conspirators life and death hung in the balance, hastened to tell his countrymen in one breath that Philip had taken the oath, and was by that time at Thermopylai. But he added with unblushing impudence, that this high-minded and honorable sovereign had come solely to avenge the cause of the Phokians by putting down their deadly enemies the Thebans; that, in fact, he would make the Thebans restore the treasures which Philomelos and his successors had taken from the Delphian temple; and that he would confer on the Athenians sundry benefits, some of which Æschines could not with prudence particularise.

Not only was the plot thickening, but the movement of the

actors in it was becoming more rapid. Fooled with the promise that they should see the humiliation of Thebes, the Athenians who had been induced to omit the name of the Phokians from the list of their allies were by an infatuation immeasurably more gross cheated into the declaration, that if the Phokians would not surrender Delphoi to the Amphiktyonic body, the Athenians would compel them to do so by force. The Phokians were not to be thus blinded. They had listened thus far time after time to speeches which told them that things done apparently for the purpose of destroying them were really done only for the sake of insuring their safety and their welfare ; but they felt that the mask had at length been flung aside when they heard the conditional declaration of war put out against them by the Athenians. Within three days Phalaikos had put an end to the Sacred War by making his submission to Philip ; and Philip, master of Phokis, threw off all disguise and declared himself the hearty friend and ally of Thebes.

The Athenian people were assembled in Peiraicus when the tidings came that the man whom Æschines was never weary of praising was in possession of Thermopylai. At once they passed the vote which at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had brought the country population of Attica into Athens ; but Philip had as yet no intention of attacking them. Without striking a blow, he had broken up the power of Phalaikos, and wrested from him the whole Phokian territory ; but he well knew that, even if he should succeed in conquering Athens, victory must be preceded by a terrible struggle. He was soon joined by Æschines, who went to him through Thebes, although he had lately denounced the Thebans as thirsting for his blood ; and that trusty servant, who probably concocted with him a fresh letter to cajole his countrymen, returned to Athens to say with effrontery seldom surpassed that Philip, sorely against his will, had been constrained by the Thebans to crush the Phokians, and so to give offence to the Athenians, with whom he heartily desired to be at peace. Peace was accordingly made, and the Athenians were left at leisure to contemplate the ruin caused by their persistence in a policy against which Demosthenes had for years, in season and out of season, protested in vain. The cities of Phokis were all broken up ; the vengeance of the Thebans was let loose upon their miserable inhabitants ; and murder, lust, and violence made the whole land a howling wilderness.

Meanwhile Philip was exalted to a greatness which in his most sanguine moments he could scarcely have dared to hope for. He had restored the Delphians to the guardianship of the temple ;

he had summoned together the Amphiktyonic council; and by it he had been solemnly recognised as a member of the Amphiktyonic brotherhood. The two votes hitherto belonging to the Phokians were transferred to him, and he could now interfere and dictate in Hellenic affairs as the chosen champion of the god of Delphoi. For Æschines it may be enough to say that he was content to bask in the radiance of his master's greatness. Thus much at least is certain (as Demosthenes himself puts it), that only on the hypothesis of his treachery can we account for his subsequent behavior. An honest but weak-minded man might be fooled twice or thrice by a wily and unscrupulous plotter; but so soon as he discovered the cheat, his indignation against the man who had thus plunged him in the mire would be the more vehement and lasting. With Æschines, Demosthenes insists, there was no indignation at all. Before the occupation of Thermopylai he had been content to bespatter Philip with indiscriminate praises; but after that time he was eager to proclaim his enthusiastic devotion to his service. Attempts to screen this consummate traitor on the score of ignorance are absurd. Æschines betrays his full knowledge of Philip's designs, when he admits that he had counselled him so to use his power on becoming master of Thermopylai as to protect the Boiotian cities against the cruelty and tyranny of Thebes. Probably he would not himself have journeyed through Thebes had he not taken care to inform its citizens that his expressions were generally to be interpreted by their contraries.

Election of Philip into the Amphiktyonic brotherhood.

The sequel of the story to the dismal day of Chaironeia may be briefly told. With the exception of one or two vivid pictures we know it only in its outlines; and these bring before us only the old struggle of one clear-sighted and honest man against an indifference or an apathy in which treason found its most efficient instrument. While Isokrates was inditing orations urging Philip to lead the combined armaments of the chief Hellenic cities against the Persian king, Demosthenes, with the true moderation of genuine patriotism, besought his countrymen to acquiesce in the peace which they had been constrained to accept. To Demosthenes the avoidance of any offence which, by placing Athens under the Amphiktyonic ban, might give Philip the handle which he needed, was, under the circumstances of the moment, a matter of the first importance: to Isokrates the vain pretence of vengeance for wrongs done by Xerxes brought with it more than a compensation for ignominious subservience to a foreign dictator. To the weaker mind of Isokrates the condition of the slave seemed changed if he were decked out with the trappings of a conqueror; in the healthy judgment of Demosthenes, the only

Day-dreams of Isokrates.

hope of safety lay in the union of caution with promptitude, and the most strenuous effort was amply rewarded by a slight gain, so long as this gain were real. But if Isokrates could banish from his thoughts the degradation of the Greeks at home by framing pictures of Greeks triumphant at Sousa, for Demosthenes this artificial greatness had no value whatever. He could foresee with overpowering vividness the colossal proportions which the Makedonian empire must shortly reach, unless at the eleventh hour Sparta, Thebes, and Athens could lay aside their feuds, and go hand in hand against the common enemy. He could see that in the jealousies which kept the Hellenic cities apart Philip had for the present precisely those conditions which he most earnestly coveted, and that so long as these dissensions were continued, he could safely multiply his conquests in Ambrakia and Thrace, in Elis and Epeiros, in the Corinthian gulf and among the strongholds of Illyrian and Paionian mountaineers. But if Demosthenes had at the first hoped that peace might be permanently maintained, the course pursued by Philip speedily taught him that Athens was left to herself only until he should be ready to crush her; nor could he well fail to see that the catastrophe could not very long be postponed.

A dispute respecting the islet of Halonnesos brought Athens almost to the verge of open war. Philip had seized it, as he pretended, from the pirate Sostratos, and, having so taken it, he offered to hand it over as a gift to the Athenians, who claimed it as their ancient possession. If no modern statesman could be found to listen to such a proposal, we must hold the Athenians fully justified in rejecting it. Nor was it here only that Philip was carrying on war with a people with whom he professed to be at peace. The active alliance of the Byzantians would enable him to cut off the supplies of corn on which Athens in great measure depended; and this alliance he was striving to bring about, when the eloquence of Demosthenes induced them to make common cause with the one city which, if it were not indeed already too late, might break in upon his course of uninterrupted conquest. The anger of Philip showed itself not merely in the siege of Perinthus, but in the march of his army across the Chersonesos. This ravaging of their territories exhausted the patience of the Athenians, who declared war against Philip, while Demosthenes, it would seem, was still absent on his mission. The step was one of which he would gladly have taken to himself the credit; we may, therefore, well believe him when he tells us that it was not taken on his advice.

340 B.C.

The semblance of peace which for six years had tied the hands

not of the Makedonian conqueror, but of his enfeebled enemies, was now exchanged for the reality of open war; and Philip found it convenient to string together a multitude of charges all designed to show that the war was brought about wholly by the provocation of Athens. Her orators made a trade of exciting the people against their most friendly and peace-loving neighbor; and the people, carried away by their love of war, had plunged into a struggle with a king who desired nothing less than their cordial friendship. The form into which he chose to throw his accusations fully proves his talent for biting satire; but he was now to learn for a while that Athenian energy could still weigh down the balance against him. Compelled to abandon the siege of Perinthos, he flew to the assault of Byzantion. He had thought to carry the place by the suddenness of his attack, and here, too, he was baffled. Athens remained mistress of the highway to the Euxine; and Demosthenes, cheered by the gratitude of his countrymen, went manfully onwards in the great work of his life. The Athenians were beginning to see the true character of their adversary, and the need of strenuous resistance. Seizing the opportune moment, the great orator besought them to place on a better footing the system which regulated contributions for purposes of war. Thus far the wealthier citizens, divided into certain classes by fixed limits of income, had been called upon to take part in the equipment of the navy; but all the members in any class were assessed in precisely the same sum. On the suggestion of Demosthenes, each man was now called upon to contribute according to his rated property. The aggregate revenue was thus largely increased, the burden on the less wealthy contributors was sensibly lessened, and the navy was put into a state of efficiency which would have done no discredit to the city in the palmiest days of her empire.

But the evil genius of Athens and of Hellas was now to work busily elsewhere. After the battle which destroyed the army of Mardonios at Plataiai,¹ the Athenians had placed in the Delphian temple some gilt shields, bearing an inscription which marked them as spoils taken from the Persians and Thebans when they fought together against the Greeks. Through lapse of time the gold had become tarnished and the inscriptions so faded as to be almost illegible. The Athenians, therefore, ordered them to be burnished, and the visitors could now read at a glance the words which recorded the ancient treachery of the Thebans. With some fairness and force it might have been urged that this parading of old misdeeds was both injudicious and

Revived
energy of
the Athe-
nians.

Financial
reforms of
Demosthe-
nes.
330 B.C.

Origin of
the Third
Sacred War.

¹ See p. 225.

malignant; but the Lokrians of Amphissa, who stood forth as accusers, chose rather to arraign the Athenians on the ground of impiety for setting up these offerings without going through the usual ceremonies of re-consecration. In the default of the Hieromnemon¹ Diognetos, who was prostrate with fever, it fell to the lot of Æschines to reply to this charge. He might have insisted that from lack of the previous notice, to which all members of the Amphiktyonic brotherhood were intitled, the case could not be heard in the present session of the council; and there can be no doubt that this plea must have insured its postponement. He might also have argued the matter on its merits, and have urged that the Athenians had a perfect right to regild the letters of a faded inscription. He chose to do neither,—in all likelihood because he saw that the Assembly was in a state of dangerous excitement. The element of religious animosity, which had been allowed full play during the ten years of the last Sacred War, was not easily to be repressed; and Æschines, as he tells us, felt instinctively that the charge of impiety would be effectually met only by prompt retort. From the lofty platform of the temple he could look down on the haven of Kirrha enlivened with the ships which brought crowds of pilgrims to the Delphian shrine, and surrounded by the olive groves and corn fields which interposed a girdle of verdure between the city and the dreary desert beyond them. From this pleasant and busy scene he could draw the eyes of his hearers to the brazen plate on the wall, hard by, which recorded the sentence of the Amphiktyonic judges in the days of Solon. That strip of luxurious vegetation was a deadly offence against the Delphian god; the wealth of the Kirrhaian port was amassed in direct defiance of the judgment pronounced by the mouth of his ministers. If he wished to rekindle the slumbering fires of religious fanaticism, he had but to point the contrast between the prosperity of the pilgrims' haven and the desolation to which the whole plain had been doomed for ever. Seeing that he could thus turn the tables on the accusers of Athens, Æschines hesitated not for an instant. There, on the wall before them, was the fatal record; and there, on the plain below, they might see the groves which bore witness to the impiety of generations, and the haven where the dock-owners enriched themselves by tolls the gathering of which was a profanation. 'It is for you,' he said, addressing the Council, 'to take vengeance for the sacrilege; and if you fail to do so, you can no longer with a clear conscience take part in the worship of the god.' His words roused in his hearers an ungovernable wrath: but the day was wearing on, and time was lacking to finish

¹ The secretary sent by each State to the meetings of the Amphiktyonic council.

the work before the sun went down. With the dawn, however, the whole Delphian people must be ready with their pickaxes and their spades, to throw down the accursed walls and uproot the hateful vineyards. Such was the bidding of the herald; and on this errand of destruction the Delphians in the tranquil light of a spring morning streamed forth from their gates, burning with rage against a people for whom but a few hours ago they would have expressed no feelings but those of kindly friendship. In utter amazement the Lokrians of Amphissa beheld the distant flames as they rose from the harbor and the houses of Kirrha. Hurrying down with all speed, they caught the plunderers red-handed and drove them back to Delphoi; but reverence for the Amphiktyonic tribunal withheld them, it is said, from all attempts to wash out the wrong in blood. Such was the issue of the retort of Æschines, and such were the exploits for which he unblushingly claimed the gratitude of his countrymen.

The wrath of the crusaders was now turned against the Amphissians. A special meeting of the Amphiktyons was to determine the measure of the punishment to be meted out to them. These were godless rebels who must be forcibly put down: the Athenians were champions of the god, deserving all honor. The Demos on the return of Æschines were naturally tempted to lay this flattering unction to their souls, and to resent the freedom with which Demosthenes warned them that Æschines was bringing an Amphiktyonic war within the borders of Attica itself. But it was no hard task to convince them that the building of the city of Kirrha and the cultivation of the land around it were offences only against the sentence of men who had been dead well nigh two hundred years, while they vastly promoted the comfort and security of the pilgrims who crowded to the Delphian festivals; and thus Æschines found himself foiled by the resolution of the people to have nothing to do with the special Amphiktyonic meeting to which he had invited them. The fact that the Thebans came to the same decision seems to indicate the growth of a more friendly feeling on their part towards the Athenians, and to account for the slender success which attended the operations of the remaining Amphiktyons:

Refusal of the Athenians and Thebans to send envoys to the Amphiktyonic assembly.
339 B.C.

At the regular meeting held in the autumn the Athenian envoys were, it seems, present; nor can we doubt that Philip also was there represented. As a member of the brotherhood, he had a right to interfere in person; but it was more in accordance with the policy of his life to wait with patience for the invitation which he knew was coming. He had no sooner received it than he announced his immediate purpose of

Fortification of Elatela by Philip.

marching to the help of the god ; but instead of hastening through the desolate Phokis to Delphoi, he paused by the way to re-fortify the dismantled town of Elateia. Any further attempt to keep up the pretence of Amphiktyonic execution against the Lokrians would now have been absurd. The mask was therefore flung aside, and his envoys appeared at Thebes to say that he was going to punish the Athenians, and to demand their aid in the enterprise. Of their compliance he entertained no doubt. He knew well how wide a gulf had separated Thebes from Athens ; he knew that if he had made a free passage into Attica the condition of his help during the last Sacred War, he would have encountered no opposition ; and he felt that having given that help unconditionally, he might now fairly look for his reward. Assuredly he would not have been disappointed, if at this moment Æschines could have carried the Athenians with him.

The Prytaneis were seated at their evening meal when the messenger reached Athens with the tidings that Philip had established himself at Elateia. At once they cleared the market-place, and sent the herald to summon the people to the assembly at break of day. When however the senate had explained the reason for the summons and the citizens were invited to speak, there was for a while a dead silence. All felt, says Demosthenes, that neither patriotism nor wealth could supply the lack of the one thing needful in a counsellor at this crisis,—the knowledge, namely, of the real motives by which Philip was guided. Conscious that he had divined these motives but too well, Demosthenes at length came forward to cheer them with the assurance that they might yet, if they bestirred themselves, check him in his triumphant career. They might suppose or they might have been told that the Thebans were to a man on Philip's side. The very fact that he was fortifying Elateia conclusively refuted such a notion. The hearty support of the Thebans would have rendered that task superfluous, and the Athenians would by this time have seen his army within their borders. But Philip had not this support ; and it remained for the Athenians to determine whether they would avail themselves of the friendly feeling which many Thebans assuredly entertained for them. If they chose to harp upon the miserable quarrels of their past history, the golden opportunity would soon be lost : if on the other hand they would offer to help them at once and with all their forces and unconditionally, he felt assured that their offer would be joyfully welcomed, and a foundation laid for harmonious action which might lead to true and permanent union.

The proposal was carried without a dissentient voice. Even

Æschines felt that in the supreme exaltation of the moment he dared not put before them his poisoned cup of flattery and treason. He saw that for once the people were in earnest, and to his dismay he learnt that the same spirit had been kindled in the Thebans. Nor was the disappointment of Philip less keen than that of his worshipper. He had fully counted on their neutrality at least, if not on their enthusiastic support, and now he must fight his way through Boiotia instead of marching leisurely across it into Attica. At Athens Demosthenes had at length acquired an influence scarcely less than that which had been exercised by Perikles. By his advice everything was made to give way to the indispensable needs of the hour. The new works at the Peiraieus were suspended; the existing law respecting the Theoric Fund was repealed, and the revenue which would have been spent on religious celebrations was diverted to the purposes of the war.

During the ten months which passed between the fortification of Elateia and the catastrophe which closed the struggle, the allies were not idle. Demosthenes was crowned for some successes gained by their combined forces, and a more serious hindrance was placed in Philip's path by the re-establishment of Phokis. On the other hand that unwearied and politic leader fulfilled the mission which the Amphiktyons had laid upon him. The sentence passed in the time of Solon was again put in force, and the Amphisians were driven into exile. Of the incidents immediately preceding the fatal fight of Chaironeia we know nothing, of the battle itself little more than the result. It is enough to say that on the one side was the most consummate general of the age, on the other no one commander of more than average military talent; that among the allies citizens who had to overcome a strong repugnance to personal service were pitted against veteran mountaineers such as those which won for the elder Cyrus a hundred victories;¹ that if the Thebans had their Sacred Band and the phalanx which had wrought wonders when wielded by Epameinondas, their discipline was now more slack and their ardor less vehement, while lastly the tactic which had won the day at Leuktra and Mantinea was more than counteracted by the new weapon with which Philip had armed his columns. The long sarissa or pike could do terrible execution at a distance which the Theban spear failed to reach. The struggle was fierce and obstinate; but at length the youthful Alexander saw the Sacred Band borne down beneath his father's hosts, and the iron discipline of his northern warriors shatter the hopes of Thebes and Athens.

Alliance
between
Thebes and
Athens.

Battle of
Chaironeia.
338 B.C.

¹ See p. 112.

The loss on the side of the allies, both of the slain and of prisoners, was terrible. The two Athenian leaders escaped from the field; but by a practice which had now become a habit the people summoned Lysikles before their bar and condemned him to death. The Theban general Theagenes was among the dead: but his countrymen stigmatised him as a traitor. Both the men were in all likelihood innocent: but a people must be far gone on the downward path when they can habitually treat failure after honest effort as a crime.¹ If some in like manner taunted Demosthenes with gross cowardice, the fact that his influence was increased rather than abated proves conclusively that the charge was not credited by the Athenians generally. Either by his advice or by that of Hyperides decrees were passed ordering the country population to take refuge in the outlying forts or within the walls of Athens, removing the civil disabilities of all citizens who had been deprived of their franchise, granting citizenship to the *Metokoi* and freedom to the slaves on condition of their bearing arms for the defence of the city. All that was needed for the repair of the walls or fortifications was done with that rapidity which had always characterised Athenian workmen; and Athens stood ready for a siege, for which she might fairly expect a successful issue, so long as her fleets, unaffected by the recent disasters, remained supreme at sea. The tidings of the catastrophe had been received with dismay; but calmer thought soon showed the wide contrast between their present circumstances and the hopelessness of their position when they learnt that their fleet and army had both been destroyed at Syracuse.

For the present they had nothing to fear. Philip shrank probably from an enterprise which might involve months of toil and a ruinous outlay, while it might also awaken a genuine Pan-Hellenic spirit which was now either dormant or dead. His wrath burst not on the Athenians but on the people who had changed sides when it was too late and had appeared with his enemies on the field of Chaironeia. His Theban prisoners

¹ According to Diodoros, xvi. 88, the invective of the orator Lykourgos, his accuser, reviled him simply for his failure. The man who could endure to live when he had left a thousand citizens dead upon the field, and two thousand more in captivity, was in his judgment deserving of death. The Demos shared this opinion, and Lysikles was condemned. In all the agony caused by disasters far more terrific, no one proposed that Marshal Mac-

Mahon should be shot after the battle of Sedan, or thought the worse of the Emperor Napoleon because, in his own words, he had been unable to die at the head of his army. The querulous behavior of the Athenians presents a mournful contrast to the manliness of the Roman senate which could thank the general whose army had been cut to pieces, because he had not despaired of the commonwealth.

were sold into slavery : and when Thebes itself, whether by blockade or otherwise, fell into his hands, many of the citizens were slain, many banished, and the old despotism of the days of Phoibidas was restored, with only the difference that the Kadmeia was held by a Makedonian instead of by a Spartan garrison. The Athenians, he saw, might be made more useful by taking another course. In the devotion of Æschines, who now threw off all disguise and proclaimed his personal friendship and affection for the conqueror, he had an instrument more powerful than squadrons of armed men. It was his purpose to combine the forces of the chief Hellenic cities under his own command ; and to men like Æschines, who could share the drunken revels which celebrated his victory,¹ he must look for the success of his scheme.

From the mission which he had offered to undertake, Æschines came back with loud praises of the generosity which consented to release without ransom all the Athenian prisoners and to restore their frontier fortress of Oropos, on the one condition that they should publicly acknowledge Philip as supreme chief of all the Hellenes in peace and in war. The terms obtained by Demades were accepted. Probably even Demosthenes felt that further resistance was for the present at least impossible, while the adulations with which his countrymen greeted their new lord must have left him with little hopes for the future. The Athenians were now paying the penalty of the infatuation which had left the Olynthian confederacy at the mercy of the man whom they were now content to approach as apt disciples in the school of flattery.

Acknowledgment of Philip as supreme chief of all the Hellenes

There was, in fact, not much more work to be done. Philip passed on into Peloponnesos, and treating with contempt the refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge his supremacy, summoned a congress of his dependent allies to meet him at Corinth and discuss a plan for the conquest of Persia. Among these subjects appeared the Athenians, to sanction an enterprise which the achievements of the Ten Thousand had shown to be practicable, if not easy, and which Isokrates had held up to the ambition or the avarice of his countrymen. The scheme, which in his Panegyric had attracted them with its glowing colors, lost its special charms when it was seen to mean nothing more than obedience to the dictates of a foreign master. To the Greeks of Lesser Asia the overthrow of the Persian despot would bring not the coveted liberty of tearing each other in pieces, but merely a change of lords. To the world at large it was a matter of not much consequence ; and for themselves it may

Expedition of Philip into Peloponnesos.

¹ Demosth. *On the Crown*, p. 321.

be doubted whether the strong repression of a foreign power was not a better thing than the freedom which during the whole course of their history had been little more than a fine name for feuds, factions, and internecine war.

CHAPTER III.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

THE young Alexander, commonly called the Great, was born when his father had just entered on his career of successful war and still more successful diplomacy. He inherited the qualities of both his parents, and the result was the combination of a boundless ambition with sober and practical wisdom in dealing with the exigencies of the moment. He grew up with the consciousness that he was the heir of a king whose power was rising with vast and rapid strides; and the stories told of him attest at the least the early awakening of a mind formed in the mould of the heroes of mythical Hellas. Nay, the blood of Achilleus was flowing, as he believed, in his veins; and the flattery of his Akarnanian tutor Lysimachos, who addressed him as the Son of Peleus, may have strengthened in him his passionate love of the immortal poems which told the story of that fiery warrior. By another tutor, the Molossian Leonidas, his vehement impulses were checked by a wholesome discipline, while his ambition was quickened by a rebuke which, on his placing too much incense in the censer, bade him wait until he became master of the lands in which the frankincense grew. But the genius of Alexander was moulded in a far greater degree by that of Aristotle, the greatest conqueror in the world of thought. At the age of thirteen he became for three years the pupil of a man, who had examined with keen scrutiny the political growth and the constitutions of a crowd of states, and who had brought together a vast amount of facts and observations for the systematic cultivation of physical science. During these three years the boy awoke to the knowledge that a wonderful world lay before him of which he had seen little, and threw himself with insatiable eagerness into the task of gathering, it is said, at any cost a collection for the study of natural history. While his mind was thus urged in one direction, he listened to stories which told him of the great quarrel still to be fought out between the East and the West, and learnt to look upon himself as the champion of Hellas against the barbarian despot of Sousa.

The future conqueror was sixteen years of age when he was left at home as regent while his father besieged Byzantion and Perinthos. Two years later the alliance of Thebes and Athens was wrecked on the fatal field of Chaironeia. But the prospects of Alexander himself became now for a time dark and uncertain. The admiration which Philip had once felt for Olympias, Alexander's mother, had long since given way to dislike and even to dread of her furious and vindictive temper. The Molossian princess was divorced, and Kleopatra the daughter of the Makedonian Attalos took her place. This act roused the wrath not only of Olympias but of her son, who, if the tale is to be believed, hurled a goblet at Attalos when at the marriage feast the latter expressed a hope that Philip might soon have a legitimate successor to his power. Blind with rage, Philip, the story goes on to say, rushed on his son with his drawn sword, but stumbled and fell partly from passion, more from drunkenness, while Alexander with lofty contempt bade the guests look at the man who wished to extend his conquests from Europe into Asia while he was unable to convey himself steadily from one couch to another. With Olympias Alexander took refuge in Epeiros. Kleopatra became the mother of a son. Her father Attalos rose higher in the king's favor, and not a few of Alexander's friends were banished.

Feuds in the house of Philip.

The feuds in his family formed no subject of pleasant thought to Philip himself, who sought to counteract their ill effects by arranging a marriage between his daughter Kleopatra and her uncle, the Epeiroi King, Alexander, the brother of Olympias. The marriage feast was celebrated at Aigai. Clothed in a white robe, and walking purposely apart from his guards, Philip was approaching the theatre when he was struck dead by the dagger of Pausanias, a man who, having been horribly wronged by Attalos, had in vain sought redress from the king. The murderer was at once cut down; and it became impossible to learn from him whether he had or had not any accomplices in his crime. Some were suspected and put to death, others who were at a safe distance were eager to accuse themselves: but if the Persian king boasted, as it is said, of his share in the matter, he took credit to himself for an incitement which to a man in the position of Pausanias was at the least superfluous.

Assassination of Philip at Aigai. 336 B.C.

It is certain that Alexander, if he mourned his father's death at all, can have deplored it only as involving himself in political difficulties; but he took care to act as if he were grieved by it, and (if we may give credit to the excellent writings of historians of which unfortunately not one is contemporaneous) he avenged it we are told by putting out of the way all whose claims or designs might clash with his own. Among these was his cousin Amyntas, the son of Perdikkas, elder

Alexander becomes king.

brother of Philip, together with the infant son of Kleopatra, who fell a victim herself to the unforgiving Olympias.

The Greeks of Thebes and Athens knew little what sort of man had taken the place of Philip. Demosthenes, who, although he was mourning for the death of his own daughter, appeared in festal attire to announce the death of the Makedonian king, held up Alexander to ridicule as a bragging and senseless Margites; and, not in Athens merely or in Sparta, it was believed that the hour had come for shaking off the oppressor's yoke. But they were to reckon with one who could swoop on his prey with the swiftness of the eagle. Barely two months had passed from the death of his father, before the youth of twenty years stood with his army on the plains of Thessaly. The argument of the Makedonian phalanx was not to be resisted. The Thessalians recognised him as the Hegemon or leader of the Greeks: and the youthful king passed on to Thebes, which had been held by a Makedonian garrison since the fatal fight at Chaironeia. Thence he betook himself across the isthmus to Corinth; and Athenian envoys headed by Demades, and accompanied by Demosthenes as far as the frontier, carried to Alexander apologies more abject and honors more extravagant than any which had been paid to his father. He received them at Corinth in an assembly from which he demanded the title of supreme leader of the Hellenic armies, and to which he guaranteed in his turn the autonomy of every Hellenic city. None knew better than Alexander that from the whole armory of weapons which might be forged to crush the independence of Hellas none would more effectually do his work than a theory of freedom which meant disunion, and of self-government which meant endless feud, faction, and war.

When, a little while after his glorification at Corinth, Alexander set out on an expedition across the mighty barrier of the Balkan range, he disappeared from the world of the Greeks. Silence led to rumors of his defeat, and the rumors of defeat were followed by more confident assertions of his death. At Thebes and at Athens the tidings were received by some with eager belief. The covenant made with Alexander was made only with him personally. The Theban exiles at Athens were anxious to repeat the attempt which, half a century earlier, had been made against the Spartan garrison of the Kadmeia by Pelopidas; and with help in arms and money from Demosthenes and other Athenians they entered Thebes, obtained from the assembly a declaration of its autonomy, and summoned the garrison in the citadel to surrender. The answer was a blank refusal; and a double line of circumvallation was drawn around the Kadmeia, while envoys were sent to call forth aid from

Destruction
of Thebes.
335 B.C.

every quarter. The belief in Alexander's death was dispelled not by any gradual reports of his escape from the barbarians, but suddenly by his own appearance at the Boiotian Onchestos. He had just defeated his enemies when he heard of the revolt of Thebes, and he determined to smite the rebels without turning aside to take even a day's rest at Pella. Within a fortnight he had occupied the pass of Thermopylai, and two days later his army was encamped on the southern side of Thebes, thus cutting off all chances of aid from Athens. It was his wish to avoid an assault : and he contented himself with demanding the surrender of two only of the anti-Makedonian leaders, offering to re-admit the rest to the convention made at Corinth during the preceding year. The citizens generally were anxious to submit : but the exiles felt or feared themselves to be too deeply committed, and the answer took the form of a defiance accompanied by a demand for the surrender of Antipatros and Philotas. They had sealed their own doom. Personal bravery was of no use against the discipline, the numbers, and the engines of the enemy. The defenders were driven back into the city : the invaders burst in with them, and the slaughter which followed was by no means inflicted by the Makedonians alone. The Plataians, Thespians, and Orchomenians felt that they had old scores to settle. To their decision and to that of the rest of his Greek allies Alexander submitted the treatment of the city. The sentence was promptly pronounced. The measure which the Thebans would have dealt out to Athens on its surrender to Lysandros should now be dealt out to themselves. The walls and every building within them were to be rased to the ground ; its territory was to be shared by the allies ; the whole people (priests and priestesses with the Proxenoi or friends of the Makedonians being the only exceptions) were to be sold as slaves, and such as had escaped were to be pronounced outlaws whom no Greek city should dare to harbor. As they had said, so was it done, the house of the poet Pindar alone being spared from demolition and his descendants alone being allowed to retain their freedom. It was convenient for Arrian to say that this frightful havoc was wrought not by Alexander, but by his Greek allies. The jackals had done the lion's work : but there can be little doubt that they had done it precisely as he wished it to be done. His end was gained. The spirit of the Greeks was crushed. A great city was blotted out, and the worship of its gods was ended with its ruin. These gods were in due time, it was believed, to take vengeance on the conqueror. Dionysos, the lord of the wine-cup and the revel, the special guardian and patron of the Theban city and land, was not to be defied and insulted with impunity ; and his hand was seen in the awful crimes committed in the far East by the

drunken madman whose victories had led him to believe in his own divinity.

But for the present the only hindrance to his eastern enterprise was removed from the path of Alexander. Without turning aside to Athens he went on to Corinth to receive again the adulations of the independent Greeks, and to find a less courtly speaker, it is said, in the Cynic Diogenes who, on being asked whether Alexander could do anything to serve him, replied from his tub that he might stand aside out of his sunshine. From Corinth he returned to Makedonia, having left Greece for the last time.

Six months later he set off from Pella, and crossed the Hellespont at Sestos, to appease at Ilium by a costly sacrifice the wrath of the luckless Priam, and then marched on, with not more perhaps than 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry and with a treasure chest almost empty, to destroy the monarchy of Cyrus. With him went men who were to be linked with the memory of his worst crimes and of his most astonishing triumphs,—Hephaistion, Kleitos, Eumenes, Seleukos, Ptolemy the son of Lagos, Parmenion with his sons Philotas and Nikanor. His work was more than half done when he stood with his army on Asiatic soil. The Persian fleet might have baffled him at the outset; but his Makedonian phalanx was a perfect military machine which placed every enemy at a serious disadvantage.

The effects of their discipline on the ill-trained and ill-officered forces of the Persians were to be seen at once on the banks of the Granikos, a little stream flowing to the Propontis from the slopes of Ida. Losing, it is said, only 60 of his cavalry and 30 of his infantry, he annihilated the Persian force, 2,000 out of 20,000 infantry being taken prisoners, and nearly all the rest slain. The terror of his name did his work, as he marched southwards. The citadel of Sardeis might with ease have been held against him: before he came in sight of the city, the Persian governor hastened to surrender it with the town and all its treasure. At Ephesos he found the city abandoned by its garrison: Miletos he carried by storm. Before Halikarnassos he encountered a more obstinate resistance from the Athenian Ephialtes; but the generalship and the valor of the latter were of no avail. Alexander entered Halikarnassos, and the Rhodian Memnon remained shut up in the citadel. Leaving Ptolemy with 3,000 men to blockade it, Alexander spent the winter in the conquest of Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia, ending his campaign at Gordion on the river Sangarios.

Here was preserved the ancient waggon of Gordios, the mythical Phrygian king. Whoever could untie the knot, curiously

twisted with fibres of the cornel tree, which fastened its pole to the yoke, was, so the story ran, to be lord of Asia. Alexander, as much at a loss as others to unloose it, cut it with his sword : but the prophecy was none the less held to be fulfilled. If he was thus favored by sentiment, he was favored still more by the death of the Rhodian Memnon without whom the Persian fleet became practically useless, and by the infatuation which led Dareios to abandon the policy of defence by sea for offensive warfare by land. From all parts of his vast empire was gathered a host which numbered, as some said, 600,000 men ; and the despot was as much elated at the sight as Xerxes when he looked down on his motley multitudes at Doriskos. Like Xerxes, he had one, the Athenian exile Charidemos, by his side to warn him that Asiatic myriads were not to be trusted in an encounter with the disciplined thousands of Alexander ; but he lacked the generosity which made Xerxes dismiss Demaratos with a smile for his goodwill. Dareios seized the exile with his own hand and gave him over to the executioner. 'My avenger,' said Charidemos, 'will soon teach you that I have spoken the truth.' The Persian acted as though he wished to bring about the speediest fulfilment of the prediction. Between himself and the invader lay the huge range of Tauros and the passes of the Armenian, Kilikian, and Assyrian gates, all of them practically impregnable ; but the warning of Memnon to confine himself to these defences was cast to the winds. The Greek mercenaries were withdrawn from the fleet to be added to the land forces : but although a hundred of these could have effectually barred the passage of Alexander, the invader was suffered to cross the mountain defile without the loss of a man. Nay, so great was the contempt of Dareios for the few thousands of the enemy that he wished to give them a free path until they reached the plain from which, as he thought, he would sweep them away. But he could not wait patiently for Alexander at Sochoi to the east of the Amanian range. Alexander had been ill, and he had work to do in subjugating western Kilikia. When at length the invader set out on his march towards the southern Amanian pass, Dareios with his huge unwieldy train crossed the northern pass and took possession of Issos two days after Alexander had left it. He had placed himself in a trap. Alexander hurried back to the Kilikian gates, and thence advanced to the slaughter, for battle it cannot be called. In a space barely more than a mile and a half in width, hemmed in by the mountains on the one side and the sea on the other, Dareios on his royal chariot, in the midst of multitudes who had scarcely room to move, awaited the attack. Alexander fell suddenly on his right wing. The first onset was enough. The Persians broke and fled. Dareios, thinking himself in danger,

turned his chariot and fled amongst the foremost. The Persian centre behaved well, but it mattered little now what they might do. Even the Greek mercenaries, the best troops in the Persian service, were pushed back and scattered. The work of death was done as much by the Persians themselves as by their pursuers. Four thousand talents filled the treasure-chests of the conqueror; and the wife, mother, and son of Dareios appearing before him as prisoners were told that they should retain their royal titles, his enterprise being directed not against Dareios personally but to decide fairly and openly who should be lord of Asia.

The true value of armed Asiatic hordes was now as clear as the sun at noonday. Parmenion advanced to attack Damascus; but he needed not to strike a blow. The governor Expedition into Phœnicia. Fall of Tyre. allowed the treasures in his charge to fall into his hands and then surrendered the city. Alexander himself marched southwards to Phœnicia. At Marathous he replied to a letter in which Dareios demanded the restoration of his family and reproached him for his wanton aggression. His answer repeated what he had already said to his wife, adding that if he wrote again Dareios must address him not as his equal but as his lord. 'I am now master of Asia,' he wrote, 'and if you will not own me as such, I shall treat you as an evildoer. If you wish to debate the point, do so like a man on the field of battle. I shall take care to find you wherever you may be.' The island city of Arados was surrendered on his approach. Sidon opened her gates. From the Tyrians he received a submission which only refused his request to offer within their walls a sacrifice to their god Melkarth whom he chose to identify with his own alleged progenitor Herakles. This reservation he determined to treat as a defiance. For seven months 332 B.C. the siege went on: but the issue was certain. When at length the southern wall was breached, Alexander was among the foremost who found their way in. The Tyrians sold their lives dearly, and Alexander on getting possession of the city hanged 2,000 of them, it is said, on the seashore. The survivors with the women and children were sold as slaves.

Before the catastrophe of the great Phœnician city Alexander had received a second letter in which Dareios offered him his March into Egypt. Founding of Alexandria. daughter in marriage together with the session of all lands to the west of the Euphrates. 'Were I Alexander,' said Parmenion (if we may believe the story), 'I should take these terms and run no further risk.' 'So should I,' answered Alexander, 'if I were Parmenion: but as I am Alexander, I cannot.' So he wrote to Dareios after this fashion. 'You offer me part of your possessions, when I am lord of all. I will not take it. If I choose to marry your daughter, I will do so, whether you like it or not. Come to me yourself, if you wish for

gentle treatment.' Dareios sent no more letters. The issue, he saw, must be determined by the sword. For the present he was left to himself. Alexander's face was turned towards Egypt. Gaza stood in his path and dared to resist his will. A siege of two months was followed by a ruin as complete as that of Tyre. From Gaza a march of seven days brought him to Pelousion. The Persian governor opened its gates to receive him, and the Egyptians expressed their delight at exchanging a Persian for a Makedonian master. Marching in triumph to Memphis, he offered solemn sacrifice to the calf-god Apis, and then with the true instinct of the ruler and the statesman he hastened to found for his new kingdom the new capital which after nearly two millenniums remains a highway for the commerce of three continents.

Success thus unparalleled was, it would seem, already producing its effects upon him. Calmly reviewing the marvellous course of his march from Sestos and Ilion to the Egyptian Mem-
 phis, he could explain it only on the supposition that he was no child of a human father, and he determined to obtain from the oracle of Amoun in the Libyan Oasis a solution of this mystery. The response greeted him as the son not of Philip but of Zeus; and he returned with the conviction that the divine honors paid to Herakles and Perseus were his own by indubitable right. Marching back into Phenicia, he hastened to Thapsakos and there crossed the Euphrates. Thence turning northwards he made a sweep which brought him to the Tigris below Nineveh (Mosul), and then without opposition crossed a stream where the resistance of a few hundreds might have destroyed his whole force. After a few days' march to the southeast he received the news that Dareios with his army was close at hand. Still convinced that mere numbers must with ample space decide the issue of any fight, and attributing his defeat at Issos only to the cramped position of his troops, the Persian king had gathered a vast horde, which some represent as more than a million, on the broad plain stretching from Gaugamela eastward to Arbela. His hopes were further raised by changes made in the weapons of his troops and more especially in the array of his war-chariots. For the Makedonians it is enough to say that they were led by a man whose generalship had never shone more conspicuously than in the cautious arrangements which preceded the battle of Arbela, or rather of Gauge-
 mela. All went as he had anticipated. As at Issos, the despot fled; and the bravery and even gallantry of the Persians opposed to Parmenion were of no avail when the main body had hurried away after the king. So ended the last of the three battles which had sufficed to destroy the Persian empire, or rather to put Alexander in the place of the Great King; and the first scene in the great drama of Alexander's life was ended.

Battle of
 Arbela, or
 Gaugamela.
 331 B.C.

The victory of Gaugamela opened for the conqueror the gates of Babylon and Sousa. The treasures found in the former furnished an ample donative for all his men: those of Sousa amounted, it is said, to nearly twelve million pounds sterling. The Persian king had wasted men on the battlefield; he had hoarded coin, which, freely spent in getting up a Greek army under Greek generals, might have rendered the enterprise of Alexander impossible. From Sousa Alexander turned his face towards Persepolis, the ancient capital of Cyrus. Before him lay the fastnesses of the Uxians to whom the Persian monarchs had been accustomed to pay tribute when they went from the one capital to the other. The same demand was now made to Alexander, who told them to come to the pass and take it, and then following a new track which had been pointed out to him descended on their villages and taught them that they had now to deal with a sovereign of another kind. With Persepolis Pasargadai, the city which contained the tomb of Cyrus, opened its gates to receive the avenger of the iniquities of Xerxes. As such, he determined to inflict on Dareios a signal punishment. Five thousand camels and a crowd of mules bore away the treasure amounting, it is said, to nearly thirty millions of pounds sterling; and then the citadel was set on fire. The men in the city were killed, the women made slaves; and smoking ruins alone remained to tell of a sentence deliberately passed and coolly executed.¹

For a month he allowed his main army to rest near Persepolis: for himself there could be no repose. With his cavalry he overran and in spite of the rigors of winter in a desolate land he subdued the whole region of Farsistan. Then returning to Persepolis, he set forth on his march to Media where the fugitive king had hoped to be safe from his pursuit. Dareios had left Agbatana eight days before his pursuer could reach it. In this ancient fastness of the Median and Persian sovereigns Alexander deposited his treasures, exceeding it is said forty millions sterling in amount, under the charge of a strong Makedonian garrison, headed by Parmenion. He then hastened on towards the Caspian gates, and learnt, when he had passed them, that Dareios had been dethroned and was now the prisoner of the Baktrian satrap Bessos. The tidings made Alexander still more eager to seize him. His efforts were so far successful that Bessos felt escape to be hopeless unless Dareios could be made to leave his chariot and fly on horseback. Dareios refused to obey. He was found soon afterwards by a Makedonian soldier, mortally wounded, and died before Alexander could come to him.

The conqueror now sat on the throne of Xerxes and felt or pro-

¹ Curtius, vii. 23; Strabo, xv. p. 814; Contents to Book XVII. of Diodoros.

Surrender of
Babylon,
Persepolis,
and Pasargadai.
331-330 B.C.

Death of
Dareios.
330 B.C.

fessed to feel himself his successor. His course of conquest was still unbroken ; but successful forays against the Mardians on the northern slopes of Mount Elbruz, against the Arians of the modern Herat and the Drangians of the present Seistan, were followed by an exploit of another sort. He had heard that a conspiracy against himself had been revealed to Philotas, son of Parmenion, and that Philotas for two days had kept the secret to himself. On being asked why he had done this, Philotas answered that his information came from a worthless source and deserved no notice. Alexander professed himself fully satisfied with the explanation ; but Philotas, it seems, had spoken freely to his mistress Antigone of the large share which he and his father had had in the conquests of Alexander, and Antigone had in her turn become an informer. Of real evidence against Philotas there was not a shred, and a letter from Parmenion to his son, found when Philotas was treacherously arrested, could tell against them only in the eyes of one who was resolved that Philotas should die. But Alexander could not rest content with his death alone. There had been nothing yet, even in the way of shadowy slander, to criminate Parmenion ; and he resolved that the needful charges should be drawn by tortures from his son. Hidden by a curtain, the conqueror of the world watched the agonies and scoffed at the screams of the friend who had fought by his side in a hundred fights.¹ The issue was, or was said to be, what he desired. Philotas had confessed ; and Alexander sent off to Agbatana a man bearing two dispatches, one to cheat Parmenion into a false security, the other conveying to the officers next to him in command the real order for his assassination. The old man was reading the lying letter of the despot, when he received a mortal stab in his back. The soldiers on hearing of this dastardly deed furiously demanded the surrender of the assassins, and were with difficulty withheld from taking summary vengeance on seeing the written orders of Alexander. The command of Philotas, who had been at the head of the Companion-cavalry, was shared between Kleitos and Hephaistion ; and Alexander turned from private murder to public war.

The autumn and winter were spent in overrunning parts of the modern Afghanistan and Cabul, in the foundation of the Caucasian Alexandria, and in the passage of the Hindu-Kush. He was now in the satrapy of Bessos. The surrender of Aornos and of Baktra was followed by the passage of the Oxus, and by the betrayal of Bessos, who was sent naked and in chains to the city which had been his capital. His next exploit was the slaughter, in Sogdiana, of the descendants of the Milesian Branchidai who, having incurred the hatred of their

Murder of
Philotas and
Parmenion.

Passage of
the Jaxartes
330-329 B.C.

¹ Plutarch, *Alex.* 49 ; Curtius, vi. 11, 15.

fellow-Greeks for surrendering to Xerxes the treasures of their temple, had followed the despot on his retreat, and had been by him placed in this distant region. Five generations had passed away since that time, when Alexander gave the order that not one of them, man, woman, or child, should be left alive. The massacre was followed by the destruction of their city, their gardens, and their groves, of everything, in short, which might serve to show that the place had ever been inhabited. Thence, by way of Marakanda (Samarcand) he reached the Jaxartes (which he believed to be the Tanais or Don), and on its banks laid the foundations of another Alexandria.¹ Presently he crossed the river to chase some Scythians who showed themselves on the further side; and the end of this chase which was extended over a few miles marked the northernmost point reached in his campaign. The winter was spent in the Baktrian city of Zariaspa, where Alexander, summoning Bessos before him, had his nose and ears cut off,² and then sent him to be killed by his countrymen at Agbatana.

In the following summer, his army was gathered again at Marakanda. Repose from field-work left room for the display of the overbearing pride natural in one who had convinced himself that he was a god, and for the boundless flattery of those who found their interest in keeping up the delusion. But there were not wanting others to whom this arrogance and servility were intensely disgusting. The anger of these men was the more fierce from the necessity of avoiding all open expression of it; but in the banquets of the divine son of Amoun, there was always a risk that these pent-up feelings might burst forth like a winter torrent. The catastrophe was not long in coming. In a feast at Marakanda, Alexander, boasting of all that he had done since the death of his father, took credit further for the victories of Philip in the later years of his reign. The patience of Kleitos had long been severely taxed, and in the heat of the banquet all thought of prudence was cast aside. He spoke his mind plainly, telling Alexander that all his exploits taken together were not equal to those of the man who had found Makedonia a poor and distracted country and had left it a mighty and coherent monarchy, and that his own greatest victories had been won through the aid of Philip's old soldiers, some of whom he had murdered. Stung to the quick, Alexander gave utterance to his burning rage: but his retort only led Kleitos to remind him of the battlefield of the Granikos, where he had saved Alexander from death by cutting off the arm of the Persian whose sword was raised to smite him, and to warn him that, if he could not bear

¹ Arrian, iv. 3; Curt. vii. 6.

² Arrian, iv. 7, 5.

Murder of
Kleitos.
328 B.C.

to listen to the words of truth, he had better confine himself to the society of slaves. Alexander felt for his dagger; it had been purposely placed out of his reach. He called to his guards to sound an alarm; they hesitated to obey the orders of a raving drunkard. Some of the more sober and moderate of the party held him in their arms, praying him to do nothing hastily. By way of answer, he reviled them for keeping him a prisoner as Bessos had kept Dareios. Shaking himself free, he snatched a pike from one of the guards, and thrust it through the body of Kleitos, bidding him go to Philip and Parmenion.¹ The rage of the tiger was followed by a furious remorse, in which, with considerable truth, he denounced himself as unfit to live. For three days he would neither eat nor drink, and the army, alarmed at the threatened starvation of their king, voted that Kleitos had been justly slain, and that the body should not receive burial. By reversing this vote, Alexander seemed to feel that he had gone far towards acquitting himself. Whatever might be lacking to restore his self-complacence was supplied by a prophet, who assured him that the disaster had been brought about wholly by the wine-god Dionysos to whom he had offered no sacrifice on the day of the banquet. It is not easy to determine whether the fitter object for loathing be the drunken murderer, or the wretches who could speak of his mental agonies after his crime as entitling him to sympathy and praise.

A few weeks after the murder of Kleitos, Alexander captured the Sogdian rock, a fastness from which common care would probably have sent him away baffled. Having next reduced the rock of Chorienes, he returned to Baktra ^{Murder of Kallisthenes.} to celebrate his marriage with Roxana, the daughter of ^{328 B.C.} Oxyartes, who had been among the captives taken on the Sogdian rock. The marriage feast was seized by Alexander as an opportunity for extracting from his Greek and Makedonian followers a public acknowledgment of his divinity. It was arranged that the sophist Anaxarchos, or, as some said, the Sicilian Kleon, should make a speech, advising all to worship at once the man whom they would certainly have to worship as a god after his death. The speech was delivered. The silence of most of the Makedonian officers, who sat unmoved, sufficiently expressed their disgust; but no one ventured to speak, until the Olynthian Kallisthenes, the nephew of Aristotle and the author of a history which brought the narrative of Alexander's campaigns at least to the battle of Gaugamela, insisted on the impiety of all attempts to confound the distinction between gods and men. Conceding to the

¹ Curt. viii. 1; Arrian, iv. 1; Plutarch, *Alex.* 50-1.

conqueror the highest place amongst military leaders and the first rank amongst statesmen, he rebuked Anaxarchos for making a suggestion which ought to have come from anyone rather than from himself.¹ The applause which his words drew from the Makedonians showed Alexander that open opposition would be useless; but he was none the more turned from his purpose. It was not long before he found a pretext for the murder of Kallisthenes. A conspiracy was discovered amongst his pages. These unfortunate men were tortured (but without extracting from them anything to implicate Kallisthenes), and then stoned to death, as Alexander would have it, not by his orders, but by the loyal impulse of his army. Kallisthenes, he was resolved, he said, himself to punish, together with those who had sent him,—an insinuation manifestly against his uncle Aristotle, possibly also against all those Greeks for whom freedom of speech and action had not yet altogether lost its value. The philosopher who had extolled Alexander as the greatest of earthly generals and statesmen was first put to the torture and then hanged, and the conqueror went quietly on to subdue the regions between the Hindu Kush and the right bank of the Indus, and to storm the impregnable rock of Aornos. It was the old story. On the one side was an iron discipline, a careful commissariat, and weapons with which none others could compete; on the other, a total want of concert, utter ignorance of all scientific warfare, and a vague fear of the masses of men who, acting with the precision of machinery, swept away everything that came in their path.

The next river to be crossed was the Indus. The bridge was constructed by Hephæstion and Perdikkas probably near the present Attock. The surrender of Taxila left Alexander an open path until he reached the Hydaspes (Jelum), where Poros was beaten only after a severe struggle. Alexander in the land of the Five Streams. 326 B. C. The Indian prince was taken prisoner and treated with the courtesy which the family of Dareios had received after the battle of Issos. Here died Alexander's horse Boukephalos (Bucephalus); and the loss was commemorated by the founding of Boukephalia. The passage of the Akeshines (Chenab), running with a full and impetuous stream, was not accomplished without much danger: that of the Hydraotes (Ravee) presented less formidable difficulties, but he was encountered on the other side by Indians who intrenched themselves strongly in their town of Sangala. Their resistance ended, it is said, in the slaughter of 17,000 and the capture of 70,000. About forty miles further to the south-east flowed the Hyphasis (Sutlej). He approached its banks in the

¹ Arrian, iv. 11.

full confidence that a few days more would bring him to the mighty stream of the Ganges. But he had reached the goal of his conquests. The order for crossing the stream called forth murmurs and protests at once from his officers and from the soldiers, who expressed plainly their refusal to march they knew not whither. Alexander, in ire, laid before his officers his schemes of further conquest: but when he offered the sacrifice customary before crossing a river, the signs were pronounced to be unfavorable. The die was cast. Twelve mighty altars remained to show that Alexander had advanced thus far on his conquest of the world; and in the midst of deluges of rain the army set out on its westward journey. The reinforcements which he found on reaching the Hydaspes might, if they had advanced as far as the Hyphasis, have turned the scale in favor of further progress to the east: they enabled Alexander to undertake with greater ease a voyage down the Hydaspes to its junction with the Indus after receiving the waters of the Akesines, Hydraotes, and Hyphasis, and thence onwards to the Indian ocean.

From the mouth of the Indus he ordered his admiral Nearchos to take the fleet along the shores of the ocean and the Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Tigris. The army marched by land through the Gedrosian desert, suffering more from thirst and sickness than they had suffered in all their battles and forced marches. At length he reached Pasargadai to find the tomb of Cyrus broken open and plundered, and to avenge the insult offered to the man whom he regarded as the founder of his own dynasty. Early in the following year he entered Sousa, and there celebrated his marriage with Stateira, the daughter of Dareios, and Parysatis, the daughter of Ochos the predecessor of Dareios. These Asiatic marriages were by many regarded with feelings of dislike; and Alexander sought to render them popular by offering to pay the debts of his soldiers—a strange mode of winning over sober and steady men who had no debts, but an effectual argument for the spendthrifts and ruffians of his army. His new levies of Persian youths, armed and disciplined after the Makedonian fashion, had now made him independent of his veteran soldiers; and his declared intention of sending home the aged and wounded among them called forth the angry remonstrances of their comrades, who bade him complete his schemes of conquest with the aid of his father Amoun. Alexander rushed into the throng, seized some and had them executed, and then disbanded the whole force. For two days he shut himself up in his palace, leaving the soldiers without orders; on the third he marshalled his Persian levies (Epigonoi, as he called them) into divisions, bearing the Makedonian military titles, under Persian officers. The spirit of the veterans

Nov. 326.

Aug. 325 B.C.

Return to
Sousa.
324 B.C.

was completely broken by this thorough ignoring of their existence. They threw down their arms at the palace gates and begged forgiveness with cries and tears. Alexander accepted their contrition, and the restoration of harmony was celebrated by a sumptuous sacrifice.

But for Alexander past victories were only a stimulus to further exploits. Arabia still remained unsubdued, and for this conquest a vast addition was needed to his fleet. Orders were sent to Phenicia for the construction of ships, which were to be taken to pieces and sent overland to Thapsakos on the Euphrates, while others were to be built at Babylon. But the shadows of death were soon to fall upon him. The journey to Agbatana was marked by a violent quarrel between Eumenes and Hephaestion; their reconciliation was soon followed by the death of the latter from an attack of fever. The grief of the conqueror was as fierce as that of Achilles; it would perhaps be not unfair to set it down as a deliberate imitation of it. For two days he neither ate nor drank; he cut his hair short, and ordered that the horses and mules in his army should have their manes docked also. Human blood could scarcely be shed with prudence on his pyre; but he was resolved that his friend should begin his life in the unseen world with unstinted wealth, and the precious things burnt on his funeral pile at Babylon (the sides of the square being a furlong in length) represented, it is said, a sum of nearly two million and a half pounds sterling. Messengers were sent to the Egyptian oracle to ask if the dead man might be worshipped as a god; and Eumenes, with many others, took care to anticipate its answer by offering him such honors as might fall in with the humor of the divine mourner. His grief seemed to serve no other purpose than to render his bursts of passion more fearful. None dared to address him except in the language of the most grovelling flattery; and, in the words of Plutarch, his only consolation was found in his old habit of man-hunting. The diversion was this time furnished by the Kossaians, some mountain tribes between Media and Farsistan.

His march to Babylon steeped him still more in the intoxication of success. As he advanced on his path, he was met by ambassadors not only from Illyrians and Thrakians, from Sicily and Sardinia, from Libya and Carthage, but from Lucanians and Etruscans, and, as some said, from Rome itself. He received the worship of Ethiopians and Scythians, of Iberians and Gauls, and even of Greeks, who entered his presence with wreaths on their heads, offering him golden crowns. The lord of all the earth could scarcely look for wider acknowledgment or more devout submission; but his self-gratulation may have been damped by the warning of the Chaldean priests, that it would

Death of
Hephaestion.
324 B.C.

Death of
Alexander at
Babylon.
323 B.C.

be safer for him not to enter the walls of Babylon. For a while he hesitated; but he had more to do than to heed their words. The preparations for his Arabian campaign must be hurried on. All that might be needed must be done to improve the navigation of the Euphrates; a new city must be built to rival perhaps the Alexandria which he had founded on the banks of the Nile; and his Persian levies must be disciplined into masses as formidable as those which had fought his own battles and the battles of the father whom he disowned. More than all, he had to celebrate the obsequies of Hephaestion, whose body had been brought to Babylon from Agbatana. The feasting which everywhere accompanied the funeral rites of the ancient Aryans was exaggerated by the Macedonians, as by other half-rude or savage tribes, into prolonged revelry. Alexander spent the whole night in the house of his friend Medios in drinking, and the whole of the next day in sleeping off his drunkenness. Throughout the following night the same orgies were repeated.¹ When he awoke in the morning, he was unable to rise. Fever had laid its grasp upon him, and each day its grasp became tighter, while he busied himself incessantly with giving orders about his army, his fleet, his generals, until at length the powers of speech began to fail. When asked to name his successor, he said that he left his kingdom to the strongest (or the worthiest). His signet ring he took from his finger and gave to Perdikkas. Throughout the army the tidings of his illness spread consternation. Old grudges were all forgotten. His veterans forced themselves into his presence, and with tears bade farewell to their general whose signs showed that he still knew them. A few hours later Alexander died, after a reign of less than thirteen years, and before he had reached the age of thirty-three.

That the schemes with which almost to the last moment he had been absorbingly busied must, had he lived, have been in great part realised, can scarcely be doubted, unless we suppose that causes were at work which at no distant period would disturb and upset the balance of his military judgment, and deprive him of that marvellous power of combination, and of shaping means to circumstances, in which Hannibal and Napoleon are his only peers. It would be rash to say that such a darkening of his splendid powers might not have been brought about even before he could reach middle age. In truth, except as a general, he had lost the balance of his mind already. The despot who fancied himself a god, who could thrust a pike through the body of one friend, and sneer at the cries drawn forth from another by the agonies of torture, who could order the

¹ Arrian, vii. 24-5.

massacre of hundreds or of thousands for the offences of their remote forefathers, was already far removed from the far-sighted prudence of the politic statesman and ruler. His conquests served great ends ; and before he set out on his career of victory, he may have had some faint and distant vision of these ends. Desire for knowledge, the wish to see new forms of human and of animal life, the curiosity of traversing unknown lands, of laying open their resources, of bringing them all within the limits and the influence of the Makedonian, or, as he sometimes put it, the Hellenic world, the eagerness to establish over all known, possibly over all unknown regions, a mighty and centralised empire which should avail itself to the full of all their forces and throw down the barriers which rendered the interchange of their wealth impossible, may, to some extent, have mingled with his alleged or his real purpose of avenging on the Persian king the misdoings of Xerxes, Dareios, and Kambyses. But there is little evidence or none that these motives retained their power as he advanced further on his path of victory, while there seems to be evidence only too abundant that all other motives were gradually and even fast losing strength as the mere lust of conquest grew with his belief or his fancy of his superhuman power and origin. During his sojourn with Aristotle he must have learnt that real knowledge can be reached, and good government insured, only where there is freedom of thought and speech, and where the people obey their own laws. A few years later he had come to look on Aristotle as an enemy to be punished with scarcely less severity than Kallisthenes : he had put on the robes and the habits of a Persian despot, and substituted his own arbitrary will for the judicial processes of law. Persian customs, Persian adoration and flattery, were putting more and more in the background the civilisation which rests on the recognised rights and liberties of the people ; and when he wasted millions on the pyre of Hephæstion, it may almost be said that the results which he had achieved were precisely those which would have followed if Xerxes had been the conqueror at Salamis, Plataiai, and Mykalê. If at the outset he wished to Hellenize Asia, his history seems to show that he achieved at least as much success in Asiaticizing Hellas. Nor can we shut our eyes to the vast difference of the conditions under which his own wars were carried on from those against which his father had to struggle. Philip made his rude and ill-armed mountaineers victorious over the discipline, the weapons, and the bravery of the Greeks. Alexander found those mountaineers brought to the highest state of efficiency under a military organization as complete as it was elaborate, and led by generals each one of whom was almost the equal of Philip himself. With these forces and these officers he undertook an enterprise in which the

younger Cyrus had all but succeeded, and undertook it under conditions which would have rendered any disaster fatal. He started with an almost empty chest, leaving his commissariat practically to take care of itself, and trusting that Antipatros would be able to maintain his authority in Greece without a reverse. In such an enterprise he must, it is obvious, have failed, had he been compelled to face such enemies as those with which Philip had to struggle through a long series of years. In short, Kleitos may have been impolitic in his utterances at the fatal banquet; but what he said was true. It would be unfair to place Alexander in the ranks of those scourges of mankind amongst whom Alaric and Attila, Genghiz and Timour stand pre-eminent. Of the several accounts of his career which have come down to us, not one unhappily is strictly contemporary; and mere fairness calls upon us to give him the benefit of a doubt when this doubt can be justly entertained in reference even to deeds which carry with them an unutterable horror and shame. It is impossible to deny that with a higher sense of duty Alexander would better have deserved the title of Great. As it is, we must be content to say that in dealing with the necessities of the moment he is unsurpassed by any general, whether of ancient or of modern times.

BOOK VI.

LATER FORTUNES OF THE HELLENIC PEOPLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE LAMIAN WAR.—SICILIAN AFFAIRS FROM THE USURPATION OF THE ELDER DIONYSIOS TO THE RESIGNATION OF TIMOLEON.

FROM the splendid but rapidly shifting scenes of Alexander's Eastern conquests, we can turn to no movements of large or abiding interest in the several Hellenic cities. Combined action had been always difficult. We can scarcely say that it had been realised during the struggle against Xerxes ; and since the fall of Athens, at least, it had become impossible. Spasmodic efforts might show what under other circumstances the people might have done : but their only result was disaster. Isolated in her desperate struggle,

330 B.C. Thebes had been levelled with the dust ; a catastrophe scarcely less complete had put an end to the rising of the Spartan king, Agis, in the Peloponnesos. Like Leonidas and Kleombrotos, Agis fell on the battle-field ; and with him Sparta lost such little strength as she had thus far retained. The victory of Alexander's viceroy, Antipatros, had fastened the Makedonian yoke more firmly on all the Greek states, and nothing remained, even for those who most heartily loathed it, but to continue their confidence in the men who had done what they could to avert the humiliation. In the year which ended the career of

336 B.C. Philip by the dagger of Pausanias, Æschines had arrested, by the writ of illegal procedure, the proposal of Ktesiphon to crown Demosthenes. The issuing of this writ made it impossible to bring before the people the motion which had received the sanction of the Senate, until the question should have been judicially tried. But Æschines was in no hurry to bring it forward. More than once the accusers of Demosthenes had failed to secure the votes of one-fifth of the jurymen ; and Æschines must, of course, run the same risk of incurring the fine of a thousand drachmas. On his part, Demosthenes, especially after the fearful doom which fell on Thebes, might hesitate to provoke by a formal

challenge a discussion which, as he well knew, would involve a minute scrutiny of his whole political career.

With the defeat and death of Agis things were changed. The Athenian Demos might still place their trust in the integrity of Demosthenes; but it was the hour of triumph for the partisans of the Makedonian conquerors, and Æschines could venture to denounce the policy of his rival as from beginning to end the cause of disaster, and of nothing but disaster, to the city. Disdaining to reply to the frivolous charges which accused him of truckling to their foreign master, and of failing to turn to account excellent opportunities for organizing a powerful resistance to him, Demosthenes confined himself to the period which had passed since the peace of Philokrates, and contended that the fearful disasters which had befallen the Hellenic world in no way affected the wisdom and the righteousness of his policy. He might have gone back to the earlier time when the adoption of his counsel would, beyond doubt, have arrested the military career of Philip almost at the outset. He might have claimed the merit of foreseeing even then, and pointing out, the dangers hanging over the divided cities of Greece, and the paramount need of doing all that they could to support the confederacy of the Olynthians. But he was content to show that in making common cause with the Thebans they had at least done their duty, and that if they had failed to do it, the keen sense of disgrace would have been added to the bitter pain of defeat. What they had done, left behind it no sting of humiliation. They had acted as men who put a right value on the freedom which they had inherited from their forefathers; nor apart from this consciousness was there anything in them to which he might effectually appeal. The memory of counsels and efforts which, whatever may have been the motives which prompted them, had brought little gain and enormous loss, would seem to furnish but a frail support against the insinuations and falsehoods of unscrupulous adversaries. Demosthenes could rely on nothing else, and his triumphant acquittal shows the depth of the sympathy which the main body of the people had learnt to feel for him. He had uttered in their hearing the funeral oration of Athenian freedom, and more than four-fifths of his judges pronounced him by their votes to be deserving of their gratitude. Æschines might have paid the fine and remained at home. Feeling that this decision expressed the real convictions of his countrymen, he chose rather to go into exile. Going to Rhodes, he set up a rhetorical school, where, amongst other exercises, he declaimed the oration by which Demosthenes secured the acquittal of Ktesiphon. The applause with which it was received drew from

Contest between Æschines and Demosthenes.

346 B.C.

him the bitter comment that they would have applauded it still more if they had heard the beast himself speak it.

Æschines never saw Athens again. Five years later, Demosthenes was himself an exile. When, on his return from the regions watered by the Indus, Alexander, resting at Sousa, summoned before him the satraps, who, counting on his death, had done pretty much as they pleased, Harpalos, the satrap of Babylonia, put his treasures on ship-board and fled to Athens. Here he hoped that his wealth lavishly spent would rouse the people to a determined rebellion against their Makedonian masters. The first reports spoke of his success, and so roused the wrath of Alexander, that he resolved to go in person and chastise the criminal at Athens. His mind was soon set at rest by the news that the Athenians had refused to have anything to do with the satrap; but his money, or his presence, had set in motion agencies more easily stirred than repressed. On the one side, the orator Hypereides took up his cause with a vehemence which is at once explained if he shared in the golden harvest, but which, on any other hypothesis, remains unintelligible. The hatred of Hypereides for Makedonian rule was not more intense than that of Demosthenes; yet, in this case, Demosthenes agreed with Phokion that any attempt which might bring down on Athens the vengeance of the Makedonian king would be an act of madness. By their advice Harpalos was arrested, and an order made that his treasures should be lodged in the Akropolis, to await the decision of Alexander.

Before the Assembly the satrap stated that his treasure amounted to 720 talents; on being counted, it was found to be no more than 350 talents. Demosthenes, it is said, took no step to remove the false impression, prevalent among the people generally, that the larger sum had been lodged in the treasure chamber of the Parthenon. The charge is worth nothing. So vast a sum could not be counted without much time and trouble, and for such purposes there were special officers in whose responsibility Demosthenes could have no share. The duty of proclaiming the truth lay with these officers, and with the members of the Areiopagos, who were charged to look into the matter. At the end of six months, the latter issued their report, which charged Demosthenes, among many other citizens, with embezzlement, the extent of his criminality being put down at 20 talents. On this charge he was tried and condemned to a fine of 50 talents. His whole property was found to fall short of this sum, and the orator sought a refuge in the Peloponnesian Troizen. That there had been gross corruption it is impossible to doubt; the question is only whether the right persons were punished, the business, as a whole, being not much

Arrival of Harpalos at Athens.
324 B. C.

Charges of embezzlement against Demosthenes and other citizens.
324 B. C.

more mysterious than the murder of Sir Edmondbury Godfrey. It was to the interest of Titus Oates to have good evidence for his plot; it was his business to suppress all evidence of his crime; nor was he the first or the last great criminal who has fully succeeded in doing so. Hypereides was not less successful. He had done all that he could to make his countrymen rush into a war with Alexander on behalf of Harpalos: Demosthenes had done all that he could to prevent them. The satrap had every motive for attaching Hypereides to himself by bribes; with Demosthenes he knew that his money would be only wasted. The pretence that Demosthenes could have filched from the treasure after its sequestration is absurd. From the hands of Harpalos it passed directly into the hands of the officers of the exchequer; and any charge of malversation ought to have been brought against them, not against him. Far more significant is the furious but perfectly barren invective of Hypereides,—the stormy rhetoric of a man who can hide his own guilt only by throwing dirt upon one who is innocent. The sequestration of the treasure, and the dread of Alexander's vengeance, would furnish to those who had received the bribes ample motives for turning the thoughts of the people into a wrong channel; and on none would this motive act so powerfully as on Hypereides. The same dread would influence largely the votes of the jurymen. Had Hypereides been the defendant, they would have been as eager to condemn him as he had been earnest in his advocacy of Harpalos. But the defendant was Demosthenes, and, although it might be with more reluctance, they were ready to condemn him also. The verdict came from a sense not of truth, but of expediency. It was necessary to prove to Alexander that if there had been embezzlement the criminals had been punished; and Demosthenes was selected as the chief victim, because his opposition to Harpalos had offended the less prudent members of the anti-Makedonian party, while his whole career made him an object of hatred to the other side.

A few months later the death of Alexander re-awakened hopes which were to end in terrible disasters, and in a servitude still more ignominious than that which they had endured already. Athenian envoys were sent round to the chief Greek cities to stir up the spirit of resistance to foreign rule. To those who came into the Peloponnesos Demosthenes, who was then at Troizen, gave aid so effectual and so hearty that the Demos, filled with all their old affection, rescinded his sentence of exile, and sent a trireme to bring him back from Aigina. The whole body of the citizens was waiting to welcome him at the Peiræus. Not an archon or a priest remained in the city. Lifting his hands heavenwards, the orator uttered, it is said, a prayer of thanksgiving that he had been allowed to see so happy

Return of
Demosthe-
nes from
exile:
323 B.C.

a day. Alkibiades had been attended by crowds from the harbor to the city ; but Alkibiades had forced his way back, while Demosthenes returned only at the spontaneous bidding of his countrymen. His penalty could not in terms be remitted ; but the people chose to assign to him 50 talents for tending the altar of Zeus the Saviour in his yearly festival, and his discharge of this office was taken as the payment of the fine.

Yet, a few months later, the Lamian war, into which the Athenians with others had plunged in the desperate hope of breaking the Makedonian yoke, had ended in complete Lamian war. and irretrievable disaster, and Demosthenes had died at Death of Demosthenes. 323-322 B. C. the threshold of the Kalaureian Sanctuary of Poseidon. The poison which he carried about him saved him from the weapons or tortures of the exile-hunter Archias ; but some years later, his kinsman Demochares soothed the Athenians with the tale that the loving gods had taken away their servant without stroke of disease or feeling of pain, just when they saw that continued life would only leave him in the hands of unscrupulous and merciless enemies.

A brighter picture is brought before us in another portion of the Hellenic world, where, perhaps, we might have been least disposed to look for it. When the long toil of Demosthenes came to an end at Kalaureia, the Corinthian Timoleon had been dead fifteen years ; but the Sicilians were still enjoying the blessed respite from factions, feud, and usurpation which his energy, courage, and devotion had won for them. In the annals of the years which followed the destruction of the Athenian armament at Syracuse, we may well be forgiven if we see little more than a catalogue of iniquities wrought by Greeks on Greeks speaking the same language and professing to obey the same law. The battle of Kyzikos¹ was 409 B. C. followed by the banishment of Hermokrates ; and Syracuse thus lost her greatest general at a time when the ruin of the Athenian expedition had left the sea open to the fleets of Carthage. The old quarrel between Egesta and Selinous, which had ended in the annihilation of that magnificent armament, now brought about another struggle in which Selinous was left a heap of ruins. The invitation of the Egestaians had brought Hannibal, the son of Giskon, to Sicily as their avenger. That leader came determined to offer up a mighty sacrifice to the shade of his grandfather Hamilkar. Himera was stormed and sacked, and the blood of 3,000 victims flowed to appease the chief who had been slain in the battle-field before its walls some seventy years before.² The 406 B. C. ruin of Himera was followed by the demolition of Akragas ; and while the spoiler dashed in pieces the splendid

¹ See p. 449.

² See p. 67.

buildings of this great city, the oligarch Hipparinos was unconsciously laying in Syracuse the foundations of a tyranny compared with which the rule of Gelon¹ might pass for perfect freedom.

Desperate in the straits to which his vices had reduced him, Hipparinos found in a young clerk employed in some public office an apt instrument for the overthrow of the Demos. Despotism of the elder Dionysios. 405-367 B.C. This young man, known afterwards as the despot Dionysios, began by throwing on the Syracusan generals the blame for all the disasters which had befallen their arms. Elected as one among their successors, he ventured on another throw of the dice, and carried a measure recalling all exiles to the city. These came as his devoted partisans; and relying on their support, he continued to charge his colleagues with treason until the people appointed him military dictator. Dionysios took his measures at once for converting his dictatorship into a tyranny; and the power thus gained he kept for nearly forty years. During this time he crushed his people by taxes and forced loans, or by direct confiscations; but he also enlarged and strengthened the city, and after a fearful struggle, which at one moment he was at the point of giving up as hopeless, he so broke the power of Carthage that no serious attempts were again made to molest him in the eastern half of the island.

So lived in a splendor such as Syracuse had never yet seen, and in a state of personal terror which the homeless beggar might regard with pity, the despot whose magnificence roused Tyranny of the younger Dionysios. 367-343 B.C. the wrath of the Greek pilgrims at Olympia, and whose tragedy on the ransoming of Hektor, deemed worthy of the first prize, was exhibited at the great Dionysian festival of Athens. On his death he left his power to his son, the younger Dionysios, who, four-and-twenty years later, besought the permission of Timoleon to seek a refuge at Corinth. Less fortunate than his father, he spent ten of those years in exile at Lokroi, and returned at length to find that, if he might still play the tyrant, it must be with power sadly cut down. Meanwhile the disease had spread far beyond the walls of Syracuse; and the deadly quarrels of despot with despot, and city with city, so desolated the island, that many in utter despair besought the interference of Corinth, which had led the van in the colonisation of Sicily.

Sent out to bring this chaos, if it might be possible, into some order, Timoleon had to contend first with Dionysios, who departed, as some would have it, to keep a school at Corinth, Career of Timoleon. 344-340 B.C. and then with the Carthaginians, whose fleet Hiketas admitted within the harbor of Syracuse. The sudden capture of Achradina² led Magon, the Punic chief, to suspect that

¹ See p. 66.

² See p. 376.

he was betrayed. His retreat left Timoleon master of the whole city; but that city was almost in ruins. The grass which grew in the Agora and in the deserted streets furnished ample food for horses, and attested the truth of the old adage, that a city without inhabitants was not worthy of the name. Gathered from all parts of Hellas, 10,000 colonists were dispatched from Corinth at the desire of Timoleon; and so strong were the inducements which ^{343 B.C.} he held out, that Syracuse could soon boast a population of 60,000 citizens. The tyrant was expelled; the people again governed themselves under a magistrate called the Amphipolos of the Olympian Zeus. The beneficent work to which Timoleon had devoted himself had its natural result in the increased strength and prosperity of the Hellenic cities, while it excited the jealous fears of the Carthaginians. The fearful defeat of Hasdrubal and Hamilkar on the plain of the Krimêsos left Timoleon free to achieve this great task by expelling all the Sicilian tyrants from their cities. Again was the aid of the Carthaginians sought by the despots of Katanê and Leontinoi; but Giskôn found himself able to do so little that he accepted a peace which recognised the Halykos as the boundary which separated the territory of the Greeks from that of Carthage. The expulsion of the tyrants was followed by the restoration of popular government; and this great object being attained, Timoleon resigned his power. Henceforth he lived as a private citizen in Syracuse, witnessing each year the increasing happiness of the people whom he had rescued from their oppressors. Once more lands which had long remained untilled yielded the magnificent harvests which good soil will rarely fail to ripen under a Sicilian sun; and the island remained a paradise while intestine strife and foreign invaders were making the continental Hellas¹ a desert from the mountain range of Pindos to the cliffs of Kythera and the shores of the Saronic Gulf. It is difficult to repress a natural feeling of sadness when we remember that Demosthenes was not permitted to see at Athens the happiness which, after mighty efforts crowned with rare success, cheered the heart of Timoleon in Sicily.

See p. 1.

CHAPTER II.

FORTUNES OF THE GREEK PEOPLE, FROM THE LAMIAN WAR TO THE EXPULSION OF THE BAVARIAN OTHO.

THE result of the Lamian War was to leave Athens and the Greek cities generally in the power of Antipatros, who chose to govern them through his creatures. At Athens, the banishment of 12,000 citizens (three-fifths of the whole body), as not possessing property to the amount of 2,000 drachmas, left the city in the hands of 9,000 subservient oligarchs, at whose head Phokion held practically the position of a Persian satrap, supported by the orator Demades. The latter was unwise enough, some four years later, to speak of Antipatros as an old and rotten thread which might easily be broken by Perdikkas, the friend of Philip and of his son Alexander the Great. The general whom he thus invited to what he called the deliverance of Hellas was slain by his own soldiers; and the letter containing this phrase came into the possession of Antipatros, who had no hesitation in seizing Demades and procuring his death, though he came as an Athenian envoy. Dying shortly afterwards, Antipatros left his power not to his son Kassandros, but to another veteran general of Alexander, Polysperchon; and Kassandros at once showed his real intentions by sending Nikanor with a forged order from his father, by means of which he was admitted into the Athenian fortress of Mounychia,¹ then held by Menyllos. It was thus clear to Polysperchon that his own hopes of success must depend on his securing the support of the citizens who disliked the government of Antipatros, in other words, by recalling the exiles and restoring the subverted democracies. Phokion at once saw the dangers by which he was thus threatened, and resolved, so far as he could, to strengthen the hands of Nikanor; and he did so effectually by preventing all action on the part of the people, while Nikanor seized Peiraieus. His object was to secure Athens and the Athenian alliance for Kassandros. In this he failed; and the returning exiles, now strong enough to show their will in action, deposed Phokion and his colleagues from their office, and left no other course open to him than an appeal to Polysperchon, who was hastening towards Athens. It so happened that Phokion reached his camp about the same time with the Athenian deputies, who appeared to accuse him and to demand for

Sequel of the career of Phokion.

322 B.C.

318 B.C.

317 B.C.

¹ See p. 234.

Athens the immediate surrender of Peiræus. With the latter condition Polysperchon was not disposed to comply; he was therefore the more ready to bid for their favor by sending Phokion to take his trial at Athens, and of such a trial there could be only one issue. The men who looked on themselves as the restored Athenian Demos could regard only with hatred the man who had been content to work the will of Makedonian masters; and so, by the hemlock-juice, ended at the age of eighty years the life of the man who had insisted on the folly of opposing the ambition or the power of Philip at a time when Demosthenes was striving to show that the task of curbing the one and crushing the other was neither impossible nor difficult.

But in the strife with Polysperchon Kassandros was to be the victor; and Demetrios¹ was to be the satrap of Kassandros, as Phokion had been that of his father. The administration of Demetrios, extended over ten years, is said to have been just and gentle; it is more to the purpose to note the debasement of Athenian feeling which could allow the erection of 360 statues in his honor, one for each day of the Athenian year. When from Athens Kassandros marched into the Peloponnesos, the Spartans thought that the time was come for inclosing their city within walls; and thus passed away another relic of the earlier days when each Hellenic city was supposed to be able to hold its own against assaults from without.

From this time Greece becomes little more than a tool in the hands of competitors for empire elsewhere. If to promote his own designs Kassandros could restore the city of Thebes, and rouse for a moment the enthusiasm of the Messenians and Megalopolitans as they called to mind the benefits received from Epameinondas,² Antigonus could respond by proclamations declaring that the Greeks should be free and left to govern themselves without the interference of foreign garrisons; and in either case the proposals might be made in the name of one member or another of the family of Alexander the Great. The lives of these unfortunate men and women hung indeed on a slender thread. When Kassandros had put to death Roxana,³ with her young son Alexandros, in the fortress of Amphipolis, Polysperchon came forward with the claims of Herakles, the son of Alexander the Great by Barsiné; but the offer from Kassandros of a share in the sovereignty of

¹ Usually called the Phalerean, as being a citizen of the Attic Demos of Phaleron, in order to distinguish him from Demetrios Poliorketes,

the besieger of cities, and son of Alexander's general Antigonus.

² See p. 587

³ See p. 641.

Administra-
tion of the
Phalerean
Demetrios.

317 B.C.

Extinction
of the
family of
Alexander
the Great.
315-314 B.C.

Makedonia sealed the doom of the young prince, and his murder was soon followed by that of his aunt Kleopatra. So by a series of violent deaths inflicted by one or other of his generals, the family of Alexander the Great was brought to an end within fifteen years after the close of his fiery career, the only exception being his half-sister Thessalonikê, the wife of Kassandros himself. In the following year, Demetrios Poliorketes appeared before Peiraieus to carry out, as he said, the plan of his father Antigonos, who was resolved on securing absolute independence to Athens. His arrival warned the Phalerean Demetrios that there was now for him no safety but in flight. He found a refuge accordingly with Ptolemy in Egypt, while the Athenians used their independence to proclaim his namesake, the City-Besieger, and his father Antigonos, as gods and saviours, whose high priest was henceforth to take the place of the Archon Eponymos, and whose exploits were to be embroidered on the sumptuous robe yearly carried in the Pan-Athenaic procession to the shrine of the Virgin-Goddess. But while statues and altars rose in his honor and in that of his boon-companions, the 360 figures of the Phalerean Demetrios were thrown down and treated with the vilest insults. The son of Antigonos rated at their true value these adulations of a degraded people.

Politically the feeling of independence was extinct; but when a decree was passed that no philosopher should be allowed to teach without the special sanction of the Senate and people, a better spirit was shown by the men through whom alone Athens had such greatness as she still possessed. Without one exception the philosophers left Athens, to return to it in the following year when the law had fallen through by an action of Graphê Paranomôn¹ against its proposer. The prosecution, we may note, was vehemently opposed by Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, who seems to have been honestly convinced that the practice of the philosophers was as mischievous as their theories may have been beautiful.

Three years passed away before Demetrios Poliorketes again presented himself at Athens. In the meantime with his father he had assumed the title of king, his example being followed by Lysimachos in Thrace, by Seleukos in Syria, and by Ptolemy in Egypt. He had also tried his skill, as besieger, with no great success upon the Rhodians, who were aided by Kassandros, Ptolemy, and Lysimachos. When he reached Athens, the time was close at hand for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, and the Athenians eagerly

368 B.C.

Expulsion and return of the Athenian philosophers.

Worship of Demetrios Poliorketes at Athens.

seized the opportunity of linking the name of the goddess Dêmêtêr with that of her favorite Demetrios. All other gods were absent or did not exist, and without these two they had no means of withstanding the inroads, not of barbarians, but of their Aitolian¹ kinsfolk. In truth, if the Athenians were to be believed, there was no need of any other god than Demetrios; and as a god, whatever he commanded was by a formal decree pronounced to be holy in respect to the other gods and just in reference to men, although he was defiling the Parthenon itself, in which he was suffered to sojourn, with frightful and disgusting debauchery. A few months later the battle of Ipsos broke his fortunes. His father Antigonos was slain; and Demetrios, sailing from Ephesos to Athens, was met by envoys who told him that the god of the previous year could not be admitted within its gates. Athens now passed under the power of a Kassandrian partisan named Lachares; and when Demetrios next appeared before

Battle of Ipsos.
300 B.C.

298 B.C.

277 B.C.

Fall of the Makedonian monarchy.
168 B.C.

298 B.C.

277 B.C.

168 B.C.

it is said, from the plates which he wore to protect his knees), contrived to regain it, and to hand the sceptre on to his descendants, who held it for more than a hundred years, until Perseus was carried away as a captive to grace the triumph of a Roman conqueror. During this time the Antigonid kings were the masters and sovereigns of Greece; and Demochares, the nephew of Demosthenes, the inheritor of his uncle's patriotism though not of his genius, could establish no better title to the gratitude of his countrymen than the fact that he cut down the cost of government at Athens and was a successful beggar at foreign courts for alms to be bestowed on the Athenian people.

The degradation of the Athenian character would scarcely lead us to look for a sounder state of things elsewhere. Yet the Achaian Achaians of the Peloponnesos were now to make an effort not unlike that which during the time of her empire Athens had made to weld the Greek tribes in some sort into one political body, or at the least to make their common interests a stronger motive for action than local feuds and jealousies; and the importance of Greek history for the next two centuries lies not in the shiftings of opinion at Athens but in the

¹ See p. 2.

working of the Federal principle which showed how much, but for the inherent defects of the Greek character, it must have achieved. The Achaian cities, small and insignificant while Athens, Thebes, and Sparta were great, saw the deadly evils which the incessant strife between those cities had brought about: and the Federal league which had existed for ages among themselves, as it existed also among Aitolians, Epeirots, and Akarnanians, seemed to furnish the means at the least for arresting their further growth. The loose bond of earlier times was indeed made more strict, as the circle of union became wider; but no attempt was made to interfere with the self-government or autonomy of the cities included in the league. The citizen of each town had his place in the assembly of that town: by the same right he had a place in the great Federal Council. In other words, the Federal assembly was primary, not representative;¹ and this fact alone accounts for the difference between the character of this assembly and the Ekklesia of the Athenian Demos. Both were in theory democratic: but at Athens each man had the place of meeting at his own door. The Achaian had to undertake a costly, if not difficult, journey to Aigion; and hence it came about that while the Demos was ruler at Athens, the president of the Achaian league exercised a power far beyond that of the Athenian Probouleutic Senate.² At Athens the poorest man might give his vote; the Federal assembly which met twice yearly for three days at Aigion was necessarily a gathering of the wealthy. In this council the vote was taken not by heads but by cities; but if this insured to the few representatives of a distant town the full weight of the citizens of Aigion itself, it failed to give a larger weight even to cities like Athens and Sparta, if these should be brought into the confederacy.

The Achaian League ceased to be a league for Achaians only, when the town of Sikyon was made a member of it; and when six years later the Sikyonian Aratos was elected General or President, there was no longer any hindrance to the election of an Athenian or a Corinthian to the same office. For two and thirty years he was re-elected in each alternate year, and his long career was marked by almost unfailling success in military adventures by night, and by constant defeat in the open field by day. During that time he did much to earn the gratitude of his countrymen, and much also to insure their ultimate subjection to some foreign power. The hindrances in his path came in part from defects in his own character, in part from the faults of the Hellenic character generally. The spirit which had animated Themistokles and Perikles,—a spirit which would in the end have

Career of
Aratos.
251 B.C.

¹ See p. 12.

² See p. 80. Freeman, *Federal Government*, i. 265.

made the whole Greek world share the benefits of a system carried out for the common good of all,—had long since faded away ; and the Athenians, jealous for the poor semblance of freedom left to them in their so-called autonomy, not only refused to join the league, but put crowns on their heads when they heard that Aratos was dead. The tidings were false ; and Aratos lived to show that he desired for the Athenians something better than the isolation with which they professed to be content, but which it was impossible for them to enjoy.

The work of Aratos was carried on more worthily in the field, often ably in the council-chamber, by the illustrious Philopoi-
 Career of men of Megalopolis, who, having done all that human
 Philopoi- strength and earnestness could do towards securing
 men. the independence of his country, died in the same
 183 B.C. year with Hannibal, the man who had striven to divert from Rome to Carthage the empire of the world. But it was the unhappy fate of the most high-minded of Hellenic champions, that their most brilliant successes should tend, scarcely less than their failures, to frustrate their plans and shatter their hopes ; and Philopoimen, who had stirred the men of Megalopolis to desperate resistance

222 B.C. when the Spartan Kleomenes laid the Great City¹ in ruins, helped chiefly to strengthen the hands of the Makedonian sovereign when his charge turned the
 221 B.C. day against the Spartans on the field of Sellasia.

Meanwhile the feuds of the Akarnanians and Aitolians were preparing a way for the great conquerors of the world to step in and repress, if they could not heal, incessant discord. Dissatisfied with the result of their request for Roman
 Roman in- aid, the Akarnanians entered into an alliance with the
 terference in Hellas. pirates of Illyria, and drew down on themselves the forces both of the Achaian and the Aitolian leagues. Interfering now to some purpose, the Romans put down the Illyrian robbers, and Korcyra

229 B.C. and Epidamnos² became Roman allies ; and Roman allies for the most part became sooner or later Roman subjects. A few years later the treaty made by the

216 B.C. Makedonian king Philip with the Carthaginian Hannibal placed his Greek allies, and among these the cities of the Achaian League, in the number of the enemies of Rome ; and Rome, biding her time, requited the defiance by shattering the power of Philip in the fight at Kynoskephalai, where, forty-six years earlier, Pelopidas had fallen in the moment of victory over the brutal tyrant of Pherai.³ Thirty years later the sceptre of the

¹ See p. 587.

² See p. 62.

³ See p. 592.

Makedonian kings was finally broken on the field of Pydna; but the catastrophe was to bring no real change to the Hellenic cities. The tide of Roman conquest seldom ebbed; and the struggle was ended when the plebeian Mummius looked down upon the plundering of Corinth. The Achaian League, as a military power, was thus brought to an end; as a political society, it was kept alive through the influence of Polybios, and the shadow of the old confederation continued for some generations or some centuries to comfort those who had lost the substance.

Battle of
Pydna.
168 B.C.

Sack of
Corinth.
146 B.C.

Henceforth, as a Roman province, Greece becomes important not for its political systems but for its literature and its art. In one sense the influence of both was singularly great; it was happy for the Greeks that it was not greater. Had the Romans been capable of appreciating the real beauty of Greek art, the Greek cities would have undergone probably a systematic and thorough devastation: but in spite of the servile copying of Greek forms, whether in philosophy or in art, the two peoples continued essentially distinct, and little happened to break in upon the inglorious inactivity of the Greek cities until the waves of Gothic invasion began to break upon the provinces of the Empire. The conduct of the Greeks showed that political degradation had not extinguished their courage or their aptitude for war. Athens was taken by storm; but Dexippos, who wrote a history of the time, managed to recover the Akropolis, and compelled the barbarians to abandon the city. Another officer, named Kleodemos, defeated a portion of the Gothic fleet; and the barbarian host was soon after destroyed by the Roman armies. A hundred and thirty years later the city was to fall into the hands of another Gothic invader. Alaric had advanced on a career of unbroken conquest across the Thessalian plain and through the pass of Thermopylai, which, according to the old tale, a few hundred had held against the myriads of Xerxes. But although at Athens Alaric met with no resistance, he was to find among the Peloponnesian mountains a formidable antagonist in the Vandal Stilichon, a general of Honorius, and to escape from his legions across that narrow strait of the Corinthian gulf which in the days of Athenian greatness had witnessed the splendid achievements of Phormion.¹

Influence of
Greek literature
and art.

Gothic invasions.

267 A.D.

397 A.D.

Events far more momentous were now to give to the Greek people (a nation they cannot be more strictly called than they were in the days of Perikles) an importance of which the wildest fancy

¹ See pp. 289-291.

could never have formed an idea. Before Christianity became the religion of the Empire, the Greeks had organized a Christian Church, and worked out a systematic and subtle theology; and when Constantine transferred the imperial throne from the old Rome to the new, he was laying the foundation of a new empire for the Greek language and Greek thought, while he was also raising a barrier between the East and West which has never been

Transference
of the Im-
perial throne
from the
old Rome
to the
new.

324 A.D.

more than partially thrown down. Under its new name of Constantinople, Byzantium¹ became the home of the Roman Cæsar; and the code of Justinian was put forth in a city which had become the stronghold of the thought and the language of Athens. In short, the Roman empire in its new home gradually became Byzantine; and the change may be regarded as

533 A.D.
The Byzan-
tine empire.

711 A.D.

having been achieved when the Isaurian Leo III., succeeding the second Justinian, imparted to the administration a strictly ecclesiastical character.² The edict against picture-worship, which obtained for him the title of Iconoclast (Eikonoklastes), roused a feeling of vehement indignation in the continental and insular Hellas of ancient times. The Greek cities dared to elect a rival emperor, to man a fleet, and to sail to Constantinople. Leo overthrew the fleet by the Greek fire; the rival emperor was taken and beheaded; but the failure of the enterprise is of itself evidence that the Greeks were still able to assert and to fight for what they regarded as their rights.

For some centuries the history of European Hellas is merged in that of the composite Greek people who had learned to speak of themselves as Romans: and this history under the Basilian sovereigns, who followed the stronger dynasty of Isaurian princes, is that of an empire oppressed by the refinements and complications of its organisation. Law had given place gradually to the arbitrary will of the emperor; and the mind of the emperors was fixed wholly on the retention of their power and the maintenance of their state. From this extreme centralisation followed necessarily the decay of judicial administration in distant regions, which suffered further in the neglect of their public works, the sums needed for roads, bridges, and aqueducts being diverted to the expenses of the sumptuous pageants of the capital. Discontent was thus undermining the imperial authority

The Basilian
emperors.

in the border lands of the empire and making the task of conquest easier for the Seljukian Turks when once they had forced their way across the frontiers. The folly of Constantine X., who allowed the independent Armenians to fall under the Mohammedan yoke and sacrificed the frontier

Inroads of
the Selju-
kian Turks.

1057-67.

¹ See p. 64.

² Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, 443, 501.

fortress of Ani, helped them still more. The hosts of Alp Arslan swept like a tempest over Asia Minor; but the wisdom of Suleiman, the general of his son Malekshah, did more to weaken his great enemy by treating as proprietors of the soil (subject only to the payment of a moderate tribute) the free or servile laborers who had thus far tilled the ground for the benefit of the great Byzantine nobles. The Christian peasants were thus effectually won over to the side of the invaders, against whom the emperor was about to implore the aid of Latin Christendom. The danger was imminent. Mountains visible from the dome of Sancta Sophia were already within the borders of Turkish territory, and the Seljukian sovereigns held their court in that city of Nikaia (Nice) in which had been assembled the first general council of Christendom. The help for which the envoys of Alexios Komnenos urged their master's prayer before the Council of Piacenza (Placentia) was given by the crusading hosts whose object was not the defence of the Eastern Empire but the rescue of the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the infidels. The presence of these Western warriors filled Alexios with fears scarcely less potent than those which had been awakened by Seljukian inroads; nor was the effect of the intercourse thus brought about between the East and West more happy on the subjects of the Byzantine Cæsars. For the Greeks feudalism was a thing of the remote past, of the days of Solon and of the Thessalian and Theban nobility which had been among the most efficient allies of Xerxes.¹ For the crusading chiefs nothing was so hateful as the idea of a central authority which pressed on all orders of the state alike: nothing was so precious as local tyranny and the right of private war. For the subjects of the Eastern Empire the protection of person and property was everything, and to secure this they were willing to put up with a large amount of oppression and corruption in their governors. The gulf which thus separated the mind of the East from that of the West was further and hopelessly widened when in the fifth crusade the forces of Latin Christendom, after the conquest of Zara, were diverted to the task of restoring the Emperor Isaac Angelos to the Byzantine throne. This consummation had been brought about chiefly by the entreaties of Alexios, the son of Isaac; but when the young prince was associated with his father in the imperial dignity, the difficulty of satisfying the crusading leaders was forcibly brought home to him, and the insidious counsels of Alexios Doukas, commonly known as Mourzoufle from the shagginess of his dark eyebrows, led him to send a

The Cru-
sades
1095.

1202.

1203.

¹ See p. 25.

squadron of fire-ships into the fleet of his allies. It was his last exploit. After his deposition, the throne, having been filled for a time by one or two more emperors, passed to Mourzoufle, who, having failed in his attempts to negotiate a peace with the Venetian doge Dandolo, put Alexios to death. The professed grief and rage of the crusaders at the murder of their former friend could be soothed only by placing a Latin emperor on the throne of the Eastern Cæsars. A siege of four days made the Latin warriors masters of the city; and the excesses which followed their triumph turned the indifference or aversion of the Greeks for the Western Christians into burning hatred. The patriarchal chair in the church of Sancta Sophia, the magnificent work of Justinian, was polluted by an abandoned woman who with disgusting gestures and in shameless attire screamed out from it a drunken song. Wretches blind with fury drained off draughts of wine from the vessels of the altar: horses were driven into the churches to bear away the sacred treasures, and if they fell, were lashed and goaded till their blood streamed upon the pavement. 'How,' asked the Pope, Innocent III., 'shall the Greek Church return to ecclesiastical unity and to respect for the Apostolic See, when they have seen in the Latins only examples of wickedness and darkness, for which they might justly loathe them worse than dogs?'

The crusaders had come to a people which to some extent might be described as in a state of decrepitude, but to a land, nevertheless, not less Christian than Italy or France,—
The Latin Empire of Constantinople. to a land which boasted churches of an antiquity more venerable than those of Milan, Ravenna, and Rome itself, and in which the ritual of the Church had taken root while Western Christianity was in its cradle, and had moulded the life, the thoughts, the very being of all its members. This ancient civilisation the crusaders now fancied that they could crush or sweep away. All dignities, offices, and lands were shared exclusively among the conquerors. The code of Justinian gave place to the Assize of Jerusalem, and not a single Greek was permitted to take part in the administration of the law. But the old spell of Greek learning and art had not altogether lost its power. The Pope sent young men from the schools of Paris to strengthen themselves by the wisdom of the East: the French king Philip Augustus invited young Greeks to Paris to receive instruction in the creed and ritual of the West. Both were playing with edged tools: both were encouraging that intercourse of thought which was in the end to scatter to the winds the theory of the divine right of temporal despots and the infallibility of spiritual rulers.

The power of the old Byzantine Cæsars was, however, rather divided than crushed by the Latin crusaders, who held Constantinople for more than half a century. Theodore Laskaris, the son-in-law of the usurper who dethroned Isaac Angelos, established himself at Nice, first as despot, then as emperor. Other parts of the empire were likewise in revolt against the new Cæsars. The governors of Trebizond,¹ without changing their titles at first, became sovereigns of their province and laid the foundations of their later empire. A power not less formidable sprang up in the city of Durazzo, the old Epidamnos² which, to avoid what to them seemed a name of ill omen, the Romans had called Dyrrhachium; and when at length the general of Michael Palaiologos wrested the capital from the Latin conquerors, the Greeks were left with a bitter hatred of the laws, customs, and government of Latin Christendom.

Rise of new empires at Nice, Trebizond, and Durazzo.

1261 A.D.

But whatever may have been the amount of evil thus wrought, it was to some extent compensated by the first crusade, which carried Godfrey and Tancred to Jerusalem. The doom of the empire was sealed unless the Turks could be drawn away from Bithynia and Phrygia, in which their armies could now work their will. In the western warriors of the Cross the Seljukians for the time found their match. The capital of the Turkish sultan of Roum was transferred from Nice to the remote and obscure city of Cogni (Ikonion): the authority of the Byzantine emperor was re-established along the coasts of Asia Minor, and the existence of his empire prolonged for nearly 350 years. During this long period the course of the composite Greek people ruled by the Byzantine Cæsar was steadily downward, while under the training of Othman and of his son Orkhan the Ottoman Turks were bracing themselves for the final struggle with the empire of the East. The stern discipline, the well-ordered life, and the good faith of this nomadic tribe under these earnest leaders won for them the adhesion of many tribes which had been the subjects of the Seljukian chiefs, and opened for them the gates of many a Greek city. The laws of Orkhan welded his rude mass of followers into an organised polity; and the wisdom of his brother Allah-ed-deen suggested a scheme which was to be the deathblow of the Byzantine power. This scheme was the creation of an army, in which every man should be for life a member of the sultan's family. This force consisted of Christian children taken at an age when they could be brought up in the faith of Islam without the forcible conversion of prisoners

Rise of the Ottoman Turks.

1329.

The enrolment of the Janissaries.

¹ Trapezous, see pp. 57, 511.

See p. 62.

forbidden by the Koran : and in these troops the Ottoman leaders found supporters more devoted than the Popes have found in the Mendicant Orders or the Jesuits. An education equally sound and vigorous would, if imparted by their parents, have made them not less strenuous in support of Eastern Christendom : the fact that it could not be or was not given speaks volumes for the degraded state of the Greek population generally. Nay, the taking of the children seems by this wretched folk to have been rather welcomed as a boon ; and when Orkhan imposed a regular tax of tribute children to be levied in every conquered district, it was received by many as a measure which saved their sons from starvation.

Constantine XI., the last of the Byzantine Cæsars, was crowned at Sparta. Two years later the death of the Sultan Murad II. left the Ottoman throne to the man who was resolved that he would reign in the new Rome of Constantine. The Eastern Emperor was indeed already his vassal ; and an ill-timed attempt to play the part of an independent monarch led to the final struggle, which after a desperate resistance ended in the sacking of Constantinople. The chief care of the conqueror was to render it a worthy capital for the Ottoman sovereign ; and for this purpose it was practically necessary to repeople it. The arms of Mohammed II. were afterwards victorious in Trebizond and Sinopê, in Lesbos and the Peloponnesos : and from all these a large number of Greek families (how many, we cannot say) were, after the fashion followed by Dareios and Xerxes, removed to Byzantion.

In this there was not much gain. The hand of the Ottoman Turk gradually effaced such relics of old Greek customs and character as had survived the formal ceremonialism of the Byzantine court or the rigid uniformity of Eastern orthodoxy. Ancient Hellas was now placed under a feudal system which left the wealth of the country in the hands of the timariots or vassals of the Sultan ; and the exaction of every fifth child by way of tribute brought about a dull acquiescence in a system which took their sons to replenish the ranks of the janissaries and their daughters to fill the harems of Turkish nobles. Nearly two thirds of the Ottoman revenues were furnished by the haratch or capitation tax levied with a few exceptions on every male, not a Mohammedan, above the age of ten years. The decay of commerce, the neglect of the public ways, and the difficulty of getting produce to a market, led the country people to accept as a boon the land-tax which demanded a fixed portion of produce in kind ; and thus a system was fastened on the land which may be said as surely to enslave it as the system

Coronation
of Constantine XI.

1449.

Fall of Constantinople.

1453.

Ottoman administration in Western Greece.

against which Solon indignantly protested,¹ and which in certain points it resembled. None could house their crops until the tax-gatherer should have carried away the portion reserved for the government; and the Moslem lord, aided by a Moslem collector, had the power of oppressing the farmer and the peasant much as he might please. Such a system left no room for improvements in the processes of cultivation, and effectually checked the investment of capital in land. The old tools were used, the old methods retained, only with greater listlessness and want of spirit and intelligence. During these ages of oppression the Greek population continued to decline. Perhaps no time can be pointed out when things were otherwise, since the days when Polybios bitterly deplored the effects of the loathsome vices which had eaten like a canker into the very heart of the people. But the decay was now vastly more rapid. There were no longer the comparatively flourishing cities which counteracted the ravages caused by the Slavonian inroads of the sixth century: there was, in short, no scope for patriotism or enterprise of any kind, and if the victory of Lepanto enabled the Venetians to purchase peace by pledging themselves to pay a yearly tribute for the island of Zante (Zakynthos), it in no way hindered the Turks from making up their losses by demanding fresh seamen and fresh ships from the Greeks whether of the islands or of the mainland. The Turkish conquests had, further, the effect of driving away the learned class who had thriven on the wealth of the Byzantine nobles. To the land which they deserted this was little loss; to Western Europe it was in the end a positive benefit: but the change left the peasantry to represent the old Greek population; and these peasants delighted to think of themselves not as Greeks but as Romans and Christians, the descendants of the conquerors of the world and the professors of the orthodox faith.²

Victory of
the Venetians at
Lepanto.
1573.

More than a century had passed away since the battle of Lepanto, when the Venetian Senate saw in the defeat of the Turks by John Sobieski at Vienna a reason for beginning a war by which they might hope to repay themselves the costs of the contest. This motive led directly to a series of campaigns in Greece, under the command of Francesco Morosini, who, after many solid and some brilliant successes, occupied Athens and laid siege to the Akropolis. The magnificent structures of the old Greek architects, which graced this little hill, were still in great part perfect: but the Turks had made use of the Parthenon as a powder-magazine, and a Venetian bomb falling into it shattered and

Campaigns
of the Venetian
Morosini in
Greece.

1687.

¹ See p. 76.

² Finlay, *Greece under Othoman and Venetian Domination*, p. 143.

partially destroyed the work of Pheidias, Iktinos, and Kallikrates.¹ Thirty years later the peace known as that of Passarovitz, which secured to Venice its conquests in Dalmatia with some other towns, left the Peloponnesos once more in the hands of the Sultan; but the condition of the people was nevertheless changed for the better. In place of personal labor the peasant now paid a fixed portion of the produce of the soil, or its value in money, and he thus became either the legal tenant or the owner of the land on which he toiled; and the result of the change, a result much like that which followed the reforms of Solon², was a state of feeling which would have rebelled against the exaction of the tribute children, if that impost had been still a present reality. This spirit of independence was still further fostered by the French Revolution, and the songs of Rhiga of Velestinos bore fruit a generation later, although their author fell a victim to the treachery of his fellow-countrymen.

The task of shaking off the Turkish yoke was a work of nearly thirty years; and the warfare on both sides was such as might be expected where the antagonism both of race and of creed has been exasperated by ages of oppression and suffering into unreasoning hatred. The intricacies of modern diplomacy, which can seldom go straight to a mark even of the clearest right and duty, came in to multiply difficulties, and to prolong the contest by raising hopes, and disappointing them, and then raising them again. That the Greeks should enter on such a struggle without the faults which had marked them even in their best days, none but dreamers could expect; and the hindrances raised by want of union and the jealousies of faction were fully as great as those which were presented by the arms of their enemies. The declaration of independence put forth at the Achaian Kalavrita was followed by a massacre of the inhabitants of Patras on the entry of the pasha of Lepanto for the relief of the Turkish garrison; and the crime of the Greeks of the Peloponnesos in seeking to recover their freedom was avenged on the Greeks of Constantinople who had nothing to do with it. The richest Greek bankers were murdered for the sake of their wealth; the patriarch was killed, and the Greek churches were destroyed. But the fall of Tripolitza,³ a town standing in the triangle formed by the three ancient cities of Tegea, Mantinea, and Pallantion, cost the Turks the lives of 6,000 men and carried the Greeks somewhat nearer to the end at which they were aiming. The provisional government now set up published a

¹ See p. 259.

² Finlay, *Greece under Othoman Domination*, p. 30.

³ See p. 595.

decree abolishing slavery and forbidding the sale of Turkish prisoners; the Turks retorted by a massacre, utterly wanton and unprovoked, which left Chios a desert. Forty thousand of the islanders, who had taken no part in the enterprise of their western countrymen, had been ruthlessly slain, when the consuls of England, France, and Austria came forward to assure the miserable fugitives who had fled to the mountains that they could trust to the sincerity of the Turks who promised a complete amnesty to all who returned to their homes. Seven thousand came back, and all were mercilessly slaughtered; and thirty thousand captives sold in the markets of Smyrna and Constantinople perhaps more than paid the expenses to which the Turks had been put in murdering their kinsfolk. Years dragged slowly on, marked by some heroic exploits and some miserable deeds, until the capture of Athens seemed to forebode ultimate failure to the Greek cause. The ruffian Kiutaki who commanded the Turks fancied that Lord Cochrane and General Richard Church were among his 240 prisoners, and, having had the eighteen European volunteers found among them cut down in his presence, ordered the rest to be massacred. To Lord Cochrane and still more to General Church in his Akarnanian campaign the Greeks were indebted for a series of operations which changed the course of things on land. At sea, the Turkish fleet under Ibrahim Pasha provoked a contest with the allied squadrons of England, France, and Russia in the bay of Navarino, where Demosthenes had won his victory over Brasidas.¹ The English admiral, Sir Edward Codrington, was no enthusiastic Phil-hellen; but, while acting strictly within the letter and according to the spirit of his instructions, he could not regret that the Turks had thus chosen to bring on themselves a signal punishment for former crimes against humanity and law.

The 'Great Powers,' which had at first left the Greeks to get on as best they could, now stepped in for the settlement of affairs which fell within the sacred circle of diplomacy. The Greeks were to be placed under an hereditary sovereign who should be the independent tributary of the Sultan; and the office was in the first instance offered to Leopold, afterwards King of the Belgians, and refused by him. Some, perhaps many, of the evils which marked the reign of the Bavarian Otho, who was at last chosen for the post, might have been avoided or lessened, had this wise and careful statesman undertaken the irksome task of replacing faction by order, and self-seeking by single-hearted efforts for the common good. The plan

1822.

Massacre of
Chios (Scio)
by the
Turks.

Capture of
Athens by
the Turks.
1827.

Battle of
Navarino.

Appoint-
ment of
Otho, by the
Great Pow-
ers, as King
of the
Greeks.

¹ See p. 316.

of Otho was to govern the Greeks by thrusting his Bavarian followers into all lucrative offices ; but this system was summarily cut short by the bloodless revolution of 1843. Nineteen years later another revolution, equally bloodless, deposed the Bavarian king ; and the Greek people themselves chose first the English prince Alfred, and, on learning that this choice could not be carried out, took the Danish prince George.

That man must be sanguine indeed who can bring himself to think that during the years which have since passed, the evils which affect Greek society have been attacked at their root. Little has been done, perhaps nothing, towards settling the country by the making of roads and bridges, by the suppression of brigandage, by encouraging the investment of capital in land, by drainage of the soil, and by improving the methods of agriculture. The old Turkish land-tax, welcomed at first almost as a boon, has been retained with so much success as, in the words of the great historian of modern Greece, to make the task of cultivating its soil even less profitable than that of writing its history.¹ The old faults of the Greek character still produce their evil fruit of personal corruption, of reckless place-hunting, of selfishness, faction, jealousy, and slander. The memory of a great past still leads to talking rather than to action ; and the close of half a century of independence leaves the Greeks much where they were when the first years of freedom seemed to give promise of better things. Perhaps these evils will remain much as they are now, until a wider revolution shall have changed the face of South-Eastern Europe. It is scarcely reasonable to suppose that one small portion of the composite Greek people² can be brought to orderly government and self-control, while a vastly larger portion still lies under the yoke of a senseless and intolerable tyranny. The countries in which Herodotos took pride as the loveliest and richest of the world³ have been reduced by the grinding exactions of cen-

¹ Finlay, *Greece under Othoman Domination*, p. 30.

² Time may, perhaps, be better spent than in attempts to determine how far the present condition of the people is owing to the influence of language or to affinity of blood. There can be no doubt that the establishment of New Rome strengthened the foundations of the wide empire which the conquests of Alexander had insured to dialects marked by a singularly tenacious vitality ; nor is there any reason for supposing that the people of the Hellas known to Thucydides and Xenophon are less Hellenic than the

language which they speak. The latter, after the Ottoman conquest, was flooded with Turkish and other foreign words ; the former have been intermingled with the conquerors who have successively swept over the land. But the task of throwing off these foreign words has been found more easy than the regeneration of Greek society. The reason is obvious. In Mr. Finlay's words 'the language retained its ancient structure and grammar : the people had lost their ancient virtues and institutions.'—*History of Greece*, 1453-1821, p. 350.

³ See p. 101.

turies to a desert in which the living scarcely suffice to bury their dead, while the robbers squander their gains on costly palaces, on enervating debauchery, and useless ironclads at Constantinople. In dealing with the Greeks of the Peloponnesos, or of Attica only, we are dealing with a bare fragment of a people which, if united, would be a mighty nation, and would at once start into life and energy. That union must embrace Greek and Serd, Albanian, Rouman, and Bulgarian ; but this consummation cannot be looked for until the invading horde, for such, in strictness of speech, the Turks are still, shall have been 'driven back to its native deserts, or else die out, the victim of its own vices, on the soil which it has too long defiled.' Their departure would indeed leave open the grandest of all fields for the great experiment of Monarchic Federalism ;¹ but whether the problem is to be solved thus or in some other way, it is hard to repress a feeling of impatience and indignation at the continuance of evils not only unchecked, but stimulated and intensified by the supreme selfishness of tyrants to whom the righteous title of rulers cannot be applied without a ludicrous misuse of words.

¹ Freeman, *Federal Government*, 711.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

B. C.	PAGE	
? 670-570	43	<i>Sikyon</i> . . . Time assigned to the Orthagorid dynasty, ending with Kleisthenes.
? 630	74	<i>Athens</i> . . . Conspiracy and failure of Kylon.
?	118	<i>Egypt</i> . . . Founding of Naukratis in the reign of Psammitichos.
?	46	<i>Megara</i> . . . Tyranny of Theagenes.
? 585	44	<i>Corinth</i> . . . Death of the tyrant Periandros.
560	82	<i>Athens</i> . . . Seizure of the Akropolis by Peisistratos.
?	97	<i>Media</i> . . . Defeat and dethronement of Astyages (?) by Cyrus, who establishes the Persian empire.
?	104	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . Conquest of the Asiatic Hellenes by Kroisos (Cræsus) king of Lydia. ? First conquest of Ionia.
559	82	<i>Athens</i> . . . Death of Solon.
545	106	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . Fall of Kroisos. The Lydian empire absorbed in that of Persia. ? Second conquest of Ionia.
544	111	Revolt of Paktyas against Cyrus. Conquest of Lydia by Harpâgos. ? Third conquest of Ionia.
?	114	<i>Babylon</i> . . . Siege and capture of Babylon by Cyrus.
527	84	<i>Athens</i> . . . Death of Peisistratos.
? 525	118	<i>Egypt</i> . . . Invasion of Kambyses.
	119	Failure of the Persian expedition to Amoun, and abandonment of the expedition against Carthage.
? 522	126	<i>Samos</i> . . . Death of Polykrates, tyrant of Samos. Despotism of Maiandrios and Syloson.
? 520	123	<i>Persia</i> . . . Election or accession of Dareios to the Persian throne.
		Suppression of the Magian rebellion.
	124	<i>Babylon</i> . . . Revolt and conquest of Babylon.
? 516	130	<i>Scythia</i> . . . Scythian expedition of Dareios.
514	85	<i>Athens</i> . . . Conspiracy of Aristogeiton, and death of Hipparchos.
?	60	<i>Korkyra</i> . . . Foundation of the colony from Corinth.
510	86	<i>Athens</i> . . . Invasion of Kleomenes, king of Sparta, who expels Hippias. Fall of the Peisistratid dynasty.

B. C.	PAGE	
509	87	<i>Athens</i> Factions between the Alkmaionid Kleisthenes and Isagoras. Reforms and expulsion of Kleisthenes, followed by his return.
	92	Embassy from Athens to Sardeis, to ask for an alliance with the Persian king.
	93	<i>Plataiai</i> Alliance of Plataiai with Athens.
	94	<i>Boiotia</i> Victories of the Athenians in Boiotia and Euboea. Four thousand Athenian Klerouchoi placed on the lands of the Chalkidian Hippobotai. Alliance between Thebes and Aigina, followed by a war with Athens.
	95	<i>Sparta</i> Hippias pleads his cause before a congress of Peloponnesian allies.
	96	The Corinthians protest against all interference with the internal affairs of autonomous communities; and Hippias returns to Sigeion, where he busies himself in intrigues for the purpose of precipitating the power of Persia upon Athens.
502	136	<i>Naxos</i> Some oligarchic exiles from Naxos ask help from Aristagoras of Miletos, at whose request Artaphernes sends Megabates to reduce the island.
	137	
	139	IONIAN REVOLT. On the failure of the expedition Aristagoras revolts against Dareios, and goes to ask help first from Sparta, where he gets nothing, then from Athens where the people dispatch twenty ships in his service.
		<i>Asia Minor</i> Burning of Sardeis.
	140	Extension of the revolt to Byzantion and Karia. Defeat and death of Aristagoras. Capture and death of Histiaios.
	143	Defeat of the Ionian fleet at Ladé.
? 496	149	<i>Sparta</i> Deposition and exile of Demaratos.
495	144	<i>Miletos</i> Fall of Miletos in the sixth year of the revolt. SUPPRESSION OF THE IONIAN REVOLT. Third (? fourth) conquest of Ionia.
	145	<i>Ionia</i> Political reforms of Artaphernes and Mardonios.
? 492	147	<i>Thrace</i> Destruction of the fleet of Mardonios by a storm on the coast of Athos.
? 491		<i>Athens and Sparta</i> . The Persian heralds sent by Dareios to demand earth and water are said to have been thrown into the Barathron at Athens and into a well at Sparta.
490	150	<i>Marathon</i> Landing of Hippias with the Persians at Marathon.
	151	Pheidippides sent to Sparta from Athens to ask immediate help against the Persians. Alleged debates in the Athenian camp at Marathon.
	154	Defeat of the Persians and departure of their fleet.
	155	The raising of the white shield, and alleged charge of treachery against the Alkmaionidai.
489	157	<i>Paros</i> Expedition of Miltiades to Paros. On its failure he is sentenced to a fine of fifty talents, but dies before it is paid.
486	160	<i>Persia</i> Death of Dareios who is succeeded by Xerxes. Xerxes makes preparations for invading Egypt.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.

675

B.C.	PAGE	
	161	<i>Egypt</i> . . . Reconquest of Egypt.
	163	<i>Persia</i> . . . The invasion of Hellas, suggested, it is said, by Mardonios and opposed by Artabanos, resolved upon by Xerxes, who marches to Sardeis.
483	173	<i>Athens</i> . . . Ostracism of Aristicides.
481		Two hundred ships built by the advice of Themistokles.
	174	<i>Corinth</i> . . . Pan-Hellenic congress at the isthmus.
	177	Mission to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse.
480	163	<i>Hellespont</i> . . . Construction of the bridge of boats for the passage of the Persian army.
	167	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Review of the Persian army at Doriskos.
	171	Hellenic and other cities laid under forced contributions.
	172	<i>Thessaly</i> . . . Xerxes at Tempe.
	179	Abandonment of the pass of Tempe by the allies, and consequent Medism of the Thessalians.
	180	<i>Sparta</i> . . . June. Departure of Leonidas for Thermopylai.
	182	<i>Magnesia</i> . . . Destruction of a large portion of the Persian fleet by a storm on the Magnesian coast.
	191	<i>Artemision</i> . . . The Greek fleet takes up its station on the northern coast of Eubœia.
	183	<i>Thermopylai</i> . . . March of Hydarnes over Anopaia for the purpose of cutting off the Greek army.
	187	Victory of the Persians and death of Leonidas.
	192	<i>Eubœia</i> . . . A Persian squadron sent round Eubœia to take the Greek fleet in the rear.
		In the first action off Artemision the Greeks take thirty ships.
		A second storm does further damage to the Persian fleet.
	193	In a second sea fight the Greeks have the advantage, but resolve to retreat to Salamis.
		Fortification of the Corinthian isthmus.
	194	<i>Attica</i> . . . Migration of the people to Troizen, Salamis, and Aigina.
	195	<i>Phokis</i> . . . Devastation of Phokis by the Persians who are defeated, it is said, at Delphoi.
	196	<i>Athens</i> . . . Occupation of Athens by Xerxes.
	198	<i>Salamis</i> . . . Themistokles by sending a message to the Persians prevents the intended retreat of the allies.
	200	Battle of SALAMIS.
	204	Xerxes determines to go home, leaving Mardonios to carry on the war.
		Departure of the Persian fleet.
	205	March of Xerxes through Thessaly and Thrace to the Hellespont.
	67	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera.
	209	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Siege and capture of Olynthos by Artabazos, who fails in his attempt on Potidaia.
	210	<i>Andros</i> . . . Siege of Andros by Themistokles.
479	211	<i>Aigina</i> . . . Gathering of the Greek fleet at Aigina under Xanthippos and Leotychides.
	212	<i>Attica</i> . . . Mardonios offers specially favorable terms to the Athenians. On their rejection he occupies Athens, but abstains from doing any injury to the city or country, until he learns, from the entrance of the Spartan army into Attica, that there was no hope of carrying out his plans successfully.
	213	
	216	

B.C.	PAGE	
		<i>Bœotia</i> . . . Retreat of Mardonios to Thebes after the burning of Athens.
	218	Advance of the allies into the territory of Plataiai.
	223	Battle of PLATAIAI. Defeat and death of Mardonios.
	224	Retreat of Artabazos.
	225	The Persian camp stormed.
	226	Siege of Thebes. The Theban prisoners put to death at the Corinthian isthmus.
	227	<i>Mykalé</i> . . . Probably midsummer. The allied fleet sails first to Samos, then to Mykalé.
	228	Battle of MYKALÉ. Ruin of the Persian fleet.
	230	Foundation of the ATHENIAN EMPIRE.
	232	<i>Sestos</i> . . . Siege of Sestos.
		<i>Athens</i> . . . Rebuilding of the city, and fortification of Peiræus.
	233	Mission of Themistokles to Sparta.
	234	Building of the walls of Themistokles.
478	235	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . Victories of Pausanias at Kypros (Cyprus) and Byzantion.
478	235	<i>Byzantion</i> . . Pausanias sends his prisoners to Xerxes, is recalled to Sparta, and deprived of his command.
477	236	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . Dorkis and the Spartan commissioners withdraw from all interference in the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks, and leave the ground open for the establishment of the Athenian confederacy.
		Assessment of tribute by Aristides on the members of the Delian confederacy.
	237	<i>Sparta</i> . . . Treason and death of Pausanias.
	254	<i>Athens</i> . . . Development of the Kleisthenean constitution.
? 471	239	Ostracism of Themistokles.
? 468	245	Death of Aristides.
467	68	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Fall of the Gelonian dynasty.
466	247	<i>Naxos</i> . . . Revolt and subjugation of Naxos.
465	248	<i>Thasos</i> . . . Revolt of Thasos, which is conquered at the end of two years.
464	249	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Revolt of the Helots. Dismissal of the Athenian troops by the Spartans. Alliance between Athens and Argos.
461		Alliance of Megara with Athens.
		Building of the Long Walls of Megara.
460	250	<i>Athens</i> . . . The Athenians send a fleet and army to aid the Egyptians in their revolt against Artaxerxes.
		<i>Aigina</i> . . . Siege of Aigina by the Athenians.
		<i>Peloponnesos</i> . . Defeat of the Corinthians by Myronides.
		<i>Athens</i> . . . Building of the Long Walls of Athens.
457	251	<i>Bœotia</i> . . . Defeat of the Athenians at Tanagra.
		Victory of the Athenians at Oinophyta.
?		Greatest extension of the Athenian empire.
	257	<i>Athens</i> . . . Banishment of Kimon.
456	256	Reforms of Ephialtes, followed by his murder.
455	249	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . The expelled Helots placed by the Athenians in Naupaktos.
		<i>Aigina</i> . . . Conquest of Aigina by the Athenians.
	251	<i>Egypt</i> . . . Destruction of the Athenian fleet.
	252	<i>Kypros</i> . . . Final victories and death of Kimon.
		(<i>Cyprus</i>) . . . Alleged convention of Kallias.
? 447	240	<i>Magnesia</i> . . . Death of Themistokles.

B.C.	PAGE	
	253	<i>Boiotia</i> . . . Defeat of the Athenians under Tolmides at Koroneia. Evacuation of Boiotia.
446		<i>Euboia</i> . . . Revolt of Euboia from Athens.
		<i>Megara</i> . . . Megara follows the example of Euboia.
? 443	258	<i>Athens</i> . . . Banishment of Thoukydides, son of Melesias.
		Building of the third wall, parallel to the western or Peiraic wall.
	272	Accusation and death of Pheidias.
	259	Extension of Athenian settlements to Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros, and Synope.
440		<i>Samos</i> . . . Revolt of Samos, effected by the oligarchical party, is followed by the revolt of Byzantion.
	260	The Samians ask help from the Spartans, who summon a congress of their allies, in which the Corinthians insist on the right of every independent state to the management of its own affairs.
437	259	<i>Amphipolis</i> . . Founding of Amphipolis by Hagnon.
436	261	<i>Korkyra</i> . . . The Korkyraians refuse to help the demos of Epidamnos, who apply to the Corinthians.
		A Corinthian army admitted into Epidamnos.
	262	The Korkyraians express their readiness to submit to arbitration: the proposal is rejected by the Corinthians.
433	263	Surrender of Epidamnos.
432	264	The Korkyraians seek to effect an alliance with the Athenians, who decide on a defensive alliance, and send ten ships.
	265	These ships take part in a sea-fight in which the Corinthians defeat the Korkyraians. Hence the

FIRST ALLEGED CAUSE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

		On the arrival of a second Athenian squadron the Corinthians return home.
266	<i>Potidaia</i> . . .	The Makedonian chief Perdikkas tries to stir up revolt in Potidaia against Athens.
		The Athenians send a fleet to Potidaia.
		Embassies from Potidaia to Athens and Sparta.
		The Corinthian Aristeus forces his way into Potidaia.
		Blockade of Potidaia by the Athenians. Hence the

SECOND ALLEGED CAUSE OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

	267	<i>Athens</i> . . .	The Athenians pass a decree excluding the Megarians from all Athenian ports.
		<i>Sparta</i> . . .	In an assembly of Peloponnesian allies the Corinthians insist on war with Athens.
	269		In a secret debate of the Spartans the majority decides for war.
	270		Autumn. In a congress held at Sparta a large majority of the allies resolve on war.
431			Efforts of the Spartans to bring about the banishment of Perikles.
	271		The final demands of the Peloponnesians rejected by the Athenians, who express their readiness to submit to arbitration.

B. C.	PAGE	
	273	<i>Plataiai</i> . . . Surprise of Plataiai by a party of Thebans who are admitted into the city by Naukleides.
	274	The Thebans in their turn are surprised by the Plataians who, in breach of their promise to the Theban reinforcement, slay all their prisoners.
	275	The Plataian women and children removed to Athens.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. FIRST YEAR.

	277	The Peloponnesian forces under Archidamos in vade Attica and attack Oinoë.
		Ravaging of the demos of Acharnai.
	278	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . The Athenians, aided by the Korkyraians, attack Methônê. Brasidas throws himself into the city.
		<i>Aigina</i> . . . The inhabitants of Aigina expelled by the Athenians are allowed by the Spartans to settle in Thyreatis.
		<i>Megara</i> . . . The Athenians ravage Megaris.
	279	<i>Athens</i> . . . A reserve fund of 1,000 talents placed in the Akropolis.
		<i>Thrace</i> . . . Sitalkes, chief of the Odrysi, becomes an ally of Athens, with which Perdikkas again makes peace.
	280	<i>Athens</i> . . . Funeral oration of Perikles.

SECOND YEAR.

430	281	<i>Attica</i> . . . Second invasion of Attica.
		Outbreak of the plague at Athens.
	283	Unpopularity of Perikles consequent on the ravages of the disease. He is fined, but re-elected Strategos.
	286	<i>Potidaia</i> . . . Terrible losses by the plague in the Athenian camp. Surrender of Potidaia to Xenophon.
		<i>Athens</i> . . . The Spartan envoys to the Persian court intercepted in Thrace by Sadokos, son of Sitalkes, are brought to Athens, and there put to death along with the Corinthian Aristeus.

THIRD YEAR.

429	287	<i>Plataiai</i> . . . The Spartan army with their Boiotian allies invades the territory of Plataiai. On the rejection of his proposals for neutrality Archidamos invests the place.
	288	<i>Chalkidikê</i> . . . Defeat of the Athenians under Xenophon.
		<i>Akarnania</i> . . . The Spartan Knemos, wishing to detach Akarnania from Athens, determines to attack Stratos.
	289	Defeat of the clans in Alliance with him. Retreat of Knemos.
	290	<i>Naupaktos</i> . . . Phormion intercepts the Corinthian fleet, and wins a splendid victory.
		<i>Krete</i> Fruitless Athenian expedition to Krete.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. THIRD YEAR (*continued*).

PAGE		
291	<i>Naupaktos</i> . .	The Peloponnesian fleet contrives to entice Phormion into the Corinthian gulf; but the triumph of the Spartans is turned into a second victory for Phormion.
292	<i>Salamis</i> . . .	Brasidas and Knemos, being compelled to give up a proposed night attack on Peiraicus, make a raid on Salamis, and carry off the Athenian guard-ships.
293	<i>Makedonia</i> . .	Sitalkes, the Odrysian chief, advances to Anthemous; but through the intrigues of Perdikkas he is constrained to retreat.

FOURTH YEAR.

428	294	<i>Lesbos</i> . . .	Revolt of all Lesbos from Athens, with the exception of the town of Methymna.
	295		Kleippides, sent with forty ships to reduce the island, allows the Lesbians to send envoys to Athens.
	296		On the prayer of the Lesbian ambassadors who appear at the Olympic festival a Peloponnesian fleet under Alkidas is ordered to support the revolt.

FIFTH YEAR.

427	297	<i>Attica</i> . . .	Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians under Kleomenes.
		<i>Lesbos</i> . . .	The oligarchs incautiously arm the demos who insist on a distribution of corn, threatening in default to throw open the gates to the Athenians.
			The Mytilenaian oligarchs make a convention with Paches.
	298		Alkidas arrives too late and, being resolved to return home, massacres his prisoners at Myonesos.
		<i>Athens</i> . . .	The Mytilenaian prisoners, 1,000 in number, are sent to Athens.
	299		In the debate which follows, Kleon proposes the execution of the whole Mytilenaian people.
	300		The sentence is passed, but revoked the next day, chiefly through the strenuous exertions of Diodotos. The Mytilenaian prisoners at Athens are slain, but the trireme sent to arrest the execution arrives just in time.
	301		
	302	<i>Plataiai</i> . . .	Upwards of 200 Plataians manage to escape from the city. The rest are compelled to surrender through famine, and in accordance with the Theban plan are all put to death.
	304		
	305	<i>Korkyra</i> . . .	The prisoners sent back from Corinth carry a decree establishing the ancient friendship with the Peloponnesians.
	306		They bring a charge of Attikism against Peithias, who, being acquitted, retaliates by accusing the nobles of cutting stakes in the grove of Zeus.
	307		Murder of Peithias.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. FIFTH YEAR (*continued*).

B. C.	PAGE	
		Nikostratos, the Athenian admiral, seeks to allay the feud between the oligarchs and the demos.
	308	Indecisive victory of Alkidas.
	309	The Athenian admiral Eurymedon, anxious to get to Sicily, connives at the massacre of the oligarchs.
	310	<i>Megara</i> . . . Conquest of Minoa by Nikias.
	311	<i>Athens</i> . . . Second outbreak of plague in the summer.
		<i>Melos</i> . . . Unsuccessful expedition of Nikias to the Spartan colonies of Melos and Thera.
		<i>Trachis</i> . . . Foundation of the Spartan colony of Herakleia.

SIXTH YEAR.

426	312	<i>Akarnania</i> . . . The Akarnanians beseech Demosthenes to blockade Leukas.
		Demosthenes resolves on a campaign in Aitolia, with the view of advancing into Boiotia, and there restoring the supremacy of Athens.
	313	His defeat and return to Naupaktos.
		The Ambrakiots seize Olpai.
	314	Defeat and death of the Spartan general Eurylochos, followed by the ignominious retreat of the Peloponnesians under Menedaios.
		The Ambrakiot reinforcements cut off at Idomené.

SEVENTH YEAR.

425	315	<i>Pylos</i> . . . Demosthenes occupies Pylos, from which Brasidas in vain tries to dislodge him.
	317	The Spartan fleet defeated by the Athenians in the harbor of Sphakteria.
	318	Blockade of the Spartan hoplites in the island. Terms of truce arranged on the surrender of the fleet to the Athenian generals.
	319	<i>Athens</i> . . . Spartan envoys appear at Athens to negotiate a peace. Kleon demands the surrender of the hoplites, and brings about the dismissal of the ambassadors.
	320	<i>Pylos</i> . . . The Athenians refuse to restore the Spartan fleet. Distress of the besiegers.
	321	<i>Athens</i> . . . The news from Pylos causes great dissatisfaction.
	322	Nikias treacherously abandons his command to Kleon, who promises to return victorious in twenty days.
	323	<i>Pylos</i> . . . Attack on Sphakteria. Capture of 292 hoplites, who are conveyed to Athens.
		Establishment of a permanent Athenian garrison. Ravages caused by Messenians from Naupaktos.
	326	<i>Athens</i> . . . Artaphernes, the Persian envoy to Sparta, is brought to Athens, and sent back to Ephesos, with some Athenian envoys, who are compelled to return on the death of Artaxerxes.
	327	<i>Chios</i> . . . The Chians are ordered by the Athenians to pull down the new wall of their city.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. EIGHTH YEAR.

B.C.	PAGE	
424	327	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . The Athenians establish a garrison in Kythera, and take Thyrea. The Aiginetans captured within it are taken to Athens and put to death.
	328	Alleged massacre of 2,000 Helots by the Spartans, who receive overtures from Perdikkas for combined operations against the Athenian empire.
	329	Brasidas is sent in command of the expedition into Thrace.
	330	The Athenians get possession of Nisaia, but retreat from Megara when Brasidas offers battle.
		The Megarians demolish their Long Walls.
	361	<i>Sicily</i> In the CONGRESS OF THE SICILIAN GREEKS AT GELA Hermokrates inveighs against the aggressiveness of the Athenians. General peace between the Sikeliot cities.
	331	<i>Boiotia</i> . . . Failure of the plan of Demosthènes for the subjugation of Boiotia.
		BATTLE OF DELION; decisive victory of the Thebans.
	333	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Brasidas, having marched through Thessaly, appears before Akanthos, where the people are averse to the idea of revolt from Athens.
	334	THE REVOLT OF AKANTHOS is brought about by the eloquence and the threats of Brasidas, supported by the oligarchic faction.
	335	Surrender of AMPHIPOLIS to Brasidas.
	336	Thucydides arrives on the same day at Eion. For his remissness in failing to save Amphipolis he is banished or goes into voluntary exile.
	338	Brasidas takes Torôné.

NINTH YEAR.

423		<i>Sparta</i> . . . The Athenians accept the year's truce offered by the Spartans on the basis of maintaining the <i>status quo</i> .
	363	<i>Sicily</i> Dismantling of Leontinoi.
	338	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Brasidas is received into Skiôné against the wishes of the party favorable to Athens.
	339	The commissioners arrive to announce the truce. Brasidas insists that Skiôné revolted before it began.
		Revolt of Mendé from Athens. It is recovered by Nikias and Nikostratos.

TENTH YEAR.

422	341	<i>Athens</i> . . . Kleon is placed in command of the army for operations in Thrace.
	342	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Recovery of Torôné by Kleon.
	343	BATTLE OF AMPHIPOLIS. Death of Brasidas and of Kleon.

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. ELEVENTH YEAR.

B. C.	PAGE	
421	343	<i>Athens</i> . . . Ratification of the peace of Nikias.
	346	<i>Amphipolis</i> . . . The Chalkidians refuse to give up Amphipolis.
	347	<i>Athens</i> . . . Separate treaty between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians surrender the prisoners taken at Sphakteria.
	348	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Formation of the new Argive confederacy. <i>Peloponnesos</i> . The Athenians are induced to withdraw the Messenians and Helots from Pylos and place them in Kephallenia.

TWELFTH YEAR.

420	352	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Alliance between Argos and Sparta.
		<i>Athens</i> . . . Defensive alliance between Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea.
		<i>Olympia</i> . . . The Athenians present at the games. Victories of Alkibiades.

THIRTEENTH YEAR.

419	353	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Alkibiades makes a progress through Achaia. The Athenians bring the Messenians and Helots back to Pylos.
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FOURTEENTH YEAR.

418	354	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Invasion of Argos by the Spartans under Agis, who grants the Argives a truce of four months.
	355	BATTLE OF MANTINEIA. Complete victory of the Spartans, who thus regain their old position.
	356	Oligarchical conspiracy of the One Thousand at Argos.

FIFTEENTH YEAR.

417	357	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Rising of the Argive demos against the oligarchs. Building, and demolition of the Long Walls of Argos.
		<i>Makedonia</i> . . . Unsuccessful attempt of the Athenians to recover Amphipolis.

SIXTEENTH YEAR.

416	358	<i>Melos</i> The Melians, refusing to join the Athenian confederacy, are besieged, and on their surrender are massacred.
	363	<i>Athens</i> Arrival of envoys from Eggesta in Sicily to ask help against the people of Selinous. The Eggestians promise to bear the whole costs of the war.

SEVENTEENTH YEAR.

415	364	<i>Athens</i> Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos appointed generals of an expedition to Sicily.
	367	Mutilation of the Hermai.
	368	Accusation of Alkibiades on a charge of profana-

PELOPONNESIAN WAR. SEVENTEENTH YEAR (*continued*).

B.C.	PAGE	
		tion. His trial postponed until after his recall from Sicily.
	369	Departure of the fleet from Athens.
	370	<i>Syracuse</i> Hermokrates warns the Syracusans of the coming invasion. He is contradicted by Athenagoras.
	371	<i>Italy</i> The Athenian fleet reaches Rhegion. The wealth of Egesta turns out to be a mere cheat.
	372	<i>Sicily</i> The Athenians, having sailed first to Syracuse, occupy Katanê.
	373	Alkibiades, summoned to Athens, makes his escape from Thourioi, and is sentenced to death in his absence.
	375	<i>Syracuse</i> Landing of the Athenians in the Great Harbor. The Athenians win a victory, of which Nikias makes no use.
	379	<i>Sparta</i> Alkibiades urges the active resumption of the war against Athens, the mission of a Spartan general to Syracuse, and the establishment of a permanent garrison in Attica.

EIGHTEENTH YEAR.

414	382	<i>Syracuse</i> Landing of the Athenian army at Leon. Surprise of Epipolai.
	383	The Athenians build a fort on Labdalon. The first Syracusan counterwork taken by the Athenians.
	384	Lamachos is killed at the taking of the second counterwork.
	385	The Athenian fleet returns from Naxos to the Great Harbor of Syracuse. The Athenians again have everything in their favor, and Nikias again makes no use of the opportunity.
	386	The Syracusans depose Hermokrates from his command. Gylippos crosses to Taras; Nikias makes no effort to intercept him at sea.
	387	Gylippos, having entered Syracuse, takes the fort on Labdalon.
	387	Nikias fortifies Plemmyrion.
	388	Victory of the Syracusans. Nikias writes to ask for more help from Athens.

NINETEENTH YEAR.

413	390	<i>Attica</i> The Peloponnesians, by fortifying Dekeleia, begin the so-called
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DEKELEIAN WAR.

	391	<i>Syracuse</i> A naval victory of the Athenians is made worthless by the loss of Plemmyrion.
	393	The destruction of the fleet of Nikias prevented by the arrival of Demosthenes with 73 triremes.
	395	Failure of the night attack of Demosthenes on Epipolai.
	396	Nikias refuses to retreat, or even to withdraw the fleet to Katanê or Naxos.

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN) WAR. NINETEENTH YEAR

(continued).

B.C.	PAGE	
	398	Eclipse of the moon. Nikias refuses to stir for 27 days. [don.
	399	Defeat of the Athenian fleet. Death of Eurymedon.
	400	The Syracusans close the Great Harbor.
	402	Destruction of the Athenian fleet.
	403	The Athenian retreat delayed by a stratagem of Hermokrates.
	406	After a retreat of terrible suffering extending over 7 days, the division of Demosthenes surrenders, on the promise that their lives shall be spared.
	407	Surrender of Nikias to Gylippos. The prisoners are thrown into the quarries of Epipolai.
	409	Demosthenes, in defiance of the compact made with him, is put to death along with Nikias.
	411	<i>Athens</i> . . . The Athenian slaves desert in large bodies to the Spartans at Dekeleia.
		<i>Attica</i> . . . Dismissal of the Thracian mercenaries, who massacre the people of Mykalessos.
	412	The catastrophe in Sicily aggravates the dislike of the oligarchical factions for Athens.
	413	<i>The Egean</i> . . The Euboians and Lesbians ask help from Sparta in their meditated revolt from Athens. The Persian king claims the tribute assessed on the Greeks by Darcios.

TWENTIETH YEAR.

412	415	<i>Western Hellas</i> } Mission of Aristokrates from Athens to Chios.
		<i>The Egean</i> } Victory of the Athenians over the Peloponnesians at Peiraion.
	416	Revolt of Chios, Lebedos, and Erai. On receiving tidings of these revolts the Athenians resolve to make use of the reserve funds in the Akropolis.
	417	Revolt of Miletos. First treaty between the Spartans and the Persians.
	418	Insurrection of the people in SAMOS against the oligarchical government.
		REVOLT OF LESBOS, which is reconquered by the Athenians.
	419	The Athenians ravage Chios.
	421	The Athenians muster a fleet of 104 triremes in Samos.
	422	Second treaty between the Spartans and the Persians.
		The Athenians fortify Delphinion, and ravage Chios.
	424	Revolt of Rhodes from Athens brought about by the oligarchic faction.
	425	Alkibiades takes refuge with Tissaphernes, and makes overtures to the Athenian (oligarchic) officers at Samos, promising them the help of the Persian king if the Athenian democracy is put down.
	426	
	427	Opposition of Phrynichos to the counsels of Alkibiades.
	428	<i>Athens</i> . . . Mission of Peisandros to Athens from Samos.

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR. TWENTIETH YEAR (*continued*).

B.C.	PAGE	
	429	The Athenians appoint 10 commissioners to settle matters with Tissaphernes.
	430	<i>The Egean</i> . . . Organization of the oligarchical conspiracy. Victory of the Athenian fleet at Rhodes.

TWENTY-FIRST YEAR.

411	433	<i>Athens</i> . . . Reign of terror. Usurpation of the Four Hundred.
	436	<i>Samos</i> . . . The Athenian army resolves to maintain the Kleisthenean constitution. Being heartily supported by the Samians, they declare Athens to be in revolt from the people.
	437	Alkibiades elected Strategos by the citizens at Samos.
	439	<i>Athens</i> . . . Fortification of Eetionia by the Four Hundred.
	440	Destruction of the fort with the sanction of Theramenes.
	441	<i>Euboia</i> . . . Defeat of Thymochares. Revolt of the island.
	442	<i>Athens</i> . . . Suppression of the Four Hundred. Practical restoration of the Periklean polity.
	443	Trial and execution of Antiphon.
	444	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Revolt of Byzantion from Athens.
	445	Tissaphernes sends back the Phœnician fleet from Aspendos.
	447	Victory of the Athenians under Thrasyboulos and Thrasylos off KYNOSSEMA.

TWENTY-SECOND YEAR.

410	449	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Battle of KYZIKOS. Death of Mindaros; destruction of the Peloponnesian fleet. The Athenians again become masters of the highway of the Hellespont.
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TWENTY-THIRD YEAR.

409	452	<i>The Egean</i> . . . Thrasylos cuts off the Syracusan squadron.
		<i>Pylos</i> Recovery of Pylos by the Spartans.
		<i>Megara</i> The Megarians recover the port of Nisaia.
	652	<i>Sicily</i> Destruction of Selinous by Hannibal Giskon, who storms Himera.

TWENTY-FOURTH YEAR.

408	453	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . The Athenians reduce Chalkedon.
	454	The younger Cyrus sent down as Persian commander-in-chief in Asia Minor.

TWENTY-FIFTH YEAR.

407		Lysandros organises a system of Clubs as a means of increasing his own power.
	455	<i>Athens</i> Return of Alkibiades.
	456	<i>The Egean</i> Defeat of the pilot Antiochos off Notion.
	457	Alkibiades plunders Kymê. He is deprived of his command.

PELOPONNESIAN (DEKELEIAN OR IONIAN) WAR. TWENTY-SIXTH YEAR.

B.C.	PAGE	
406	458	Kallikratidas, having succeeded Lysandros, storms Methymna, and blockades Konon and Archestratos in Mytilênê.
	461	BATTLE OF ARGENNOUSSAI. Victory of the Athenians. Death of Kallikratidas.
	463	The Athenian generals commission Theramenes and Thrasyboulos to rescue the crews of the disabled vessels. A storm prevents the execution of the order.
	465	<i>Athens</i> . . . A despatch from the generals makes known these facts; and Theramenes resolves to destroy the generals. He avails himself of the festival Apaturia to increase the feeling against them.
	469	Proposal of Kallixenos that the people shall proceed at once to pronounce judgment on the generals in a lump.
	471	<i>Athens</i> . . . Protest of Sokrates.
	473	Murder of six of the generals.
	474	<i>The Egean</i> . . Eteonikos compels the Chians to pay for the support of the Peloponnesian troops.
		Appointment of Lysandros as secretary to Arakos.
		Demolition of Akragas [Agrigentum].

TWENTY-SEVENTH YEAR.

405	476	Lysandros takes Lampsakos. The Athenian fleet is posted at AIGOSPOTAMOI, and is betrayed into the hands of Lysandros.
	477	Escape of Konon to Kypros (Cyprus).
	478	Lysandros orders the Athenian garrisons in all the conquered towns to go straight to Athens.
	481	<i>Athens</i> . . . The pressure of famine is thus increased; but some political relief is obtained by the Psephisma of Patrokleides.
	482	Lysandros blocks up the entrance to Peiraiæus with 150 ships.
	483	SURRENDER OF ATHENS, followed by the dismantling of the Long Walls.
405-367	}	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Despotism of the elder Dionysios.
404		<i>Athens</i> . . . Tyranny of the Thirty at Athens, supported by the Spartan harmost and garrison.
	488	Opposition of Theramenes to Kritias.
	489	Death of Theramenes.
	491	The exiles under Thrasyboulos occupy Phylê.
	492	The Thirty, after massacring 300 Eleusinians, are defeated by the exiles, and Kritias is slain.
	493	Lysandros returns to Athens, after subduing the Semians, and thus bringing to an end the PELOPONNESIAN WAR.
	494	The exiles, with the aid of Pausanias, the Spartan king, put down the Thirty.
	495	Restoration of the Democracy. Revision of the laws of Drakon and Solon.
	496	Limitation of the citizenship to the sons of citizen-parents on both sides.
	497	

EMPIRE OF SPARTA.

P.C.	PAGE	
	497	<i>Phrygia</i> . . . The Spartans bring about the murder of Alkibiades.
	499	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother Artaxerxes, gathers an army of Greek mercenaries, among whom is the historian Xenophon.
401	502	<i>Mesopotamia</i> . . . Having marched to Kunaxa, he is there slain in a sudden attack on Artaxerxes.
	507	Retreat of the Ten Thousand under Xenophon.
	511	<i>Trapezous</i> . . . Arrival of the Ten Thousand at Trapezous.
400	515	<i>Byzantion</i> . . . The Ten Thousand at Byzantion.
	520	<i>Athens</i> . . . Trial and execution of Sokrates.
	509	Return of Xenophon to Athens.
399	549	<i>Sparta</i> . . . Death of Agis. Election of Agesilaos as king in his place.
398	551	Conspiracy of Kinadon.
397	552	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Derkyllidas, having put down Meidias, the murderer of Mania, reduces Atarneus.
	553	Operations of Derkyllidas in Karia.
396		The Spartans send Agesilaos to settle the affairs of the Asiatic Greeks.
		The Thebans interrupt his sacrifice at Aulis.
	554	<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Agesilaos despatches Lysandros to the Hellespont.
395		Death of Tissaphernes.
	555	Rising of the Rhodian demos against the Spartans.
	556	Murder of the Rhodian Dorieus by the Spartans.
	557	<i>Thebes</i> . . . The Rhodian Timokrates is sent by the Persian Tithraustes to Thebes to stir up war against Sparta.
		BOIOTIAN WAR between Thebes and Sparta. Lysandros is ordered to march from Heralkleia and attack Haliartos.
	558	The Thebans ask aid of the Athenians, who grant it unanimously.
		Lysandros is slain before the walls of Haliartos.
	559	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . . . Evacuation of Boiotia by the Spartans.
		An alliance between Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos, converts the Boiotian into the CORINTHIAN WAR.
		Recall of Agesilaos from Asia.
394	560	The Battle of Corinth insures the Peloponnesian ascendancy of the Spartans. A few days later the maritime empire of Sparta is overthrown
	557	<i>Knidos</i> . . . by the victory of Konon in the BATTLE OF KNIDOS.
		<i>Boiotia</i> . . . At Chaironeia, Agesilaos hears of Konon's success, but conceals his knowledge till after the battle of Koroneia, in which he wins a doubtful victory.
	560	
	561	Agesilaos returns to Sparta by way of Delphoi.
		<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Abydos alone holds out for the Spartans under Derkyllidas.
393	562	<i>Athens</i> . . . Rebuilding of the Long Walls by Konon.
392		<i>Corinth</i> . . . The Spartans pull down portions of the Long Walls between Corinth and its port of Lechaion.
		These being rebuilt by the Athenians, the Spar-

EMPIRE OF SPARTA (*continued*).

B.C.	PAGE	
391	563	tans despatch Antalkidas to the Persian king to obtain a peace on the basis of the independence of every Hellenic city.
		<i>Asia Minor</i> . . . Antalkidas procures the arrest of Konon.
389		Death of Thrasyboulos at Aspendos.
388	564	<i>Athens</i> . . . Attack of Teleutias on the Peiræus.
387		PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS imposed on the Greeks by the Persian king.
386	566	<i>Boiotia</i> . . . The Spartans restore Plataiai.
		<i>Peloponnesos</i> . . . The Spartans break up the city of Mantinea.
383	568	<i>Olynthos</i> . . . They resolve to suppress the OLYNTHIAN CONFEDERACY.
382	569	<i>Thebes</i> . . . Phoibidas, one of the generals sent against the Olynthians, seizes the Kadmeia of Thebes on his way.
		Execution of Ismenias.
379		<i>Olynthos</i> . . . After a strenuous resistance the Olynthians are compelled to join the Spartan confederacy.
	572	<i>Thebes</i> . . . Conspiracy of Pelopidas.
		Surrender of the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia.
	573	<i>Attica</i> . . . The unsuccessful attempt of Sphodrias on the Peiræus leads to the formation of a new Athenian confederacy.
	574	<i>Thebes</i> . . . Establishment of the Sacred Band by Epameinondas.
		Decay of Spartan power. The Thebens defeat and slay Phoibidas.
377	575	<i>Naxos</i> . . . Defeat of the Spartan admiral Pollis by the Athenian Chabrias.
376		<i>Athens</i> . . . The growth of Theban power rouses the jealousy of the Athenians, who make peace with the Spartans. But this is followed almost immediately by a renewal of war.
	576	
373	577	<i>Korkyra</i> . . . Iphikrates intercepts a squadron of ships sent by Dionysios, tyrant of Syracuse, to aid the Spartans.
372		<i>Boiotia</i> . . . The Thebens seize Plataiai; and the Athenians, appealing to the terms of the peace of Antalkidas, call on the Spartans to enforce them. The attempt leads to a declaration of war by the Spartans against the Boiotians.
371	578	
	579	March of Kleombrotos to Leuktra.
	580	The empire of Sparta brought to an end by the victory of Epameinondas in the BATTLE OF LEUKTRA.
	584	Punishment of the Orchomenians and Thespians by the Thebens, who obtain a verdict from the Amphiktyonic Assembly against the Spartans.
	585	<i>Thessaly</i> . . . Assassination of Iason of Pherai.
		<i>Peloponnesos</i> . . . Having re-established Mantinea, the Arkadians ask help of the Thebens.
370	586	Epameinondas invades Lakonia, advancing close to Sparta.
		The Spartans ask aid of Athens, and receive it.
369		Epameinondas founds the city of Megalopolis,

EMPIRE OF SPARTA (*continued*).

B.C.	PAGE	
	587	restores the Messenians, and builds the city of Messênê.
	589	He forces his way through a Peloponnesian and Athenian force near the isthmus.
368	590	In THE TEARLESS BATTLE the Arkadians are defeated by Archidamos.
367		Again entering Peloponnesos, Epameinondas adds the Achaian cities to the Theban confederacy.
367-343	}	<i>Sicily</i> . . . Tyranny of the younger Dionysios.
366		<i>Boiotia</i> . . . The Thebans obtain from the Persian king a rescript proclaiming the supremacy of Thebes and the independence of Messênê.
	591	Peace between Thebes, Corinth, and other cities, the Spartans being self-excluded.
365		<i>Samos</i> . . . Conquest or recovery of Samos by the Athenian general Timotheos.
		<i>Sestos</i> . . . The Athenians recover Sestos.
	592	<i>Thessaly</i> . . . Death of Pelopidas in the BATTLE OF KYNOSKEPHALAI.
362	593	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . . . Irritated by the jealousies of the Arkadians, the Thebans again send Epameinondas into Peloponnesos.
	594	Having failed to take Sparta and Mantinea by surprise, Epameinondas attacks the Spartans at once.
	595	BATTLE OF MANTINEIA. Victory and death of Epameinondas.
	599	<i>Athens</i> . . . Execution of Leosthenes.
361		<i>Egypt</i> . . . Death of Agesilaos on the road to Kyrênê.
358		<i>Athens</i> . . . The Second Athenian empire reaches its furthest limit by the recovery of the Chersonesos.
	600	<i>Makedonia</i> . . . Philip, father of Alexander the Great, becomes king shortly after the death of Perdikkas.
	604	Philip withdraws his garrison from Amphipolis, of which he again obtains possession a few months later.
	601	<i>Euboia</i> . . . The recovery of Euboia by the Athenians is followed
357-5	602	<i>Athens</i> . . . by the SOCIAL WAR, in which the second Athenian empire is practically overthrown. Condemnation of Timotheos.
356	605	<i>Makedonia</i> . . . The Olynthians, rejected by the Athenians, make an alliance with Philip. Birth of Alexander the Great.
		<i>Phokis</i> . . . Outbreak of the SACRED WAR, in consequence of a fine inflicted on the Phokians by the Amphiktyonic Assembly.
355	606	On the defeat and death of Philomelos, Onomarchos becomes general of the Phokians.
		After compelling Philip for some time to abandon Thessaly, Onomarchos is himself defeated and slain by Philip.
352		
	607	<i>Athens</i> . . . On hearing these tidings the Athenians fortify Thermopylai, but on hearing a report first of Philip's illness, then of his death, again become inactive, in spite of the urgent remonstrances of DEMOSTHENES.

EMPIRE OF SPARTA (*continued*).

B. C.	PAGE	
350	611	The Olynthians again ask aid of Athens. The promise is given, but not fulfilled.
	612	Demosthenes urges the appointment of Commissioners to see to the laws relating to the Theoric Fund.
349	613	<i>Euboia</i> . . . This island again revolts. The Athenians try in vain to subdue it.
347	615	<i>Olynthos</i> . . . Fall of Olynthos. Philip dismantles the city. <i>Boiotia</i> . . . The Thebans invite Philip to aid them in bringing the SACRED WAR to an end. <i>Athens</i> . . . The Athenians, irritated by the conduct of the Phokians under Phalaikos, seek an alliance with Philip.
	616	Mission of Æschines, who is won over by Philip.
346	617	<i>Makedonia</i> . . Philip expresses his readiness to accept a peace which shall secure to each party its own possessions at the moment of the ratification.
	618	The Athenians assent to the exclusion of the Phokian name from the PEACE OF PHILOKRATES. Æschines, being sent with Demosthenes and others to receive the oath of Philip, treacherously delays to do so, until Philip is close to Thermopylai.
	619	
	620	The submission of Phalaikos to Philip brings the SACRED WAR to an end. Philip, throwing off his disguise of friendliness to Athens, declares himself the ally of Thebes.
	621	Philip, being elected into the Amphiktyonic brotherhood, acquires the formal right of interfering in Hellenic affairs.
344	653	<i>Corinth</i> . . . Timoleon is ordered to go to the aid of the Syracusans. <i>Sicily</i> . . . Timoleon, having gained possession of Syracuse, summons 10,000 new colonists from Peloponnesos.
343	622	<i>Athens</i> . . . A dispute between Philip and the Athenians respecting the inlet of Halonnesos is followed three years later by a fresh offence in the march of Philip across the Chersonesos.
340		The Athenians now declare war.
		<i>Sicily</i> . . . BATTLE OF THE KRIMĒSOS. Decisive victory of Timoleon over the Carthaginians. Having put down all the Sicilian tyrants, Timoleon resigns his power.
	623	<i>Thrace</i> . . . Philip is baffled at Perinthos and Byzantion. <i>Athens</i> . . . Financial reforms of Demosthenes.
		The Athenians order the gilt shields in the Delphian temple, taken from the Thebans after the battle of Plataiai, to be refurbished.
	624	<i>Phokis</i> . . . The Lokrians denounce the impiety of replacing these offerings without re-consecration. Æschines retorts the charge of impiety by denouncing the violation of the curse pronounced against Kirrha in the days of Solon,—thus bringing about the THIRD SACRED WAR.
339	625	The Athenians and Thebans refuse to send envoys to the Amphiktyonic Assembly for the spring meeting.

EMPIRE OF SPARTA (*continued*).

B. C.	PAGE	
	626	<i>Boiotia</i> . . . On his way to Phokis, Philip fortifies Elateia.
		<i>Athens</i> . . . Demosthenes urges successfully an immediate unconditional alliance with Thebes.
338	627	<i>Boiotia</i> . . . BATTLE OF CHAIRONEIA. Total defeat of the Athenians and Thebans.
	628	Thebes is surrendered, and a Makedonian garrison is placed in the Kadmeia.
	629	Philip restores the Athenian prisoners on condition that the Athenians acknowledge him supreme chief of all the Hellenes.
		<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Philip receives the Greeks in a congress at Corinth.
336	631	<i>Makedonia</i> . . Assassination of Philip at Aigai.
	632	ALEXANDER THE GREAT becomes king; he goes first to Thermopylai, then to Corinth, where he guarantees in his own interest the autonomy of every Hellenic city.
		<i>Thebes</i> . . . The absence of Alexander in an expedition to the north of the Balkan Mountains gives rise to a report of his death, which leads the Thebans to take up arms.
	633	Siege and storming of Thebes. Destruction of the city.
	647	<i>Athens</i> . . . Æschines, by a charge under the writ <i>Graphê Paranomôn</i> , arrests the proposal of Ktesiphon to crown Demosthenes.
334	634	<i>Hellespont</i> . . Alexander crosses the Hellespont to carry out his enterprise of the conquest of Persia.
		BATTLE OF THE GRANIKOS.
		Alexander, having spent the winter in conquering Lykia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia, goes to Gordia and cuts the Knot.
333	635	<i>Asia</i> BATTLE OF ISSOS. Second routing of the Persian forces.
332	636	Expedition into Phenicia. Siege and fall of Tyre.
	637	<i>Egypt</i> March into Egypt. Founding of Alexandria.
		<i>Asia</i> BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA OR ARBELA. Third total defeat of the Persian forces.
331-0	638	Plundering of Babylon and Sousa, Persepolis and Pasargadaï.
330		Death of Dareios.
	639	Alexander murders Philotas and Parmenion.
	647	<i>Peloponnesos</i> . Death of the Spartan king Agis in a battle fought for the purpose of throwing off the Makedonian yoke.
	648	<i>Athens</i> . . . Demosthenes defeats Æschines by his speech on the Crown.
329	640	<i>Asia</i> Alexander crosses the Oxus and Jaxartes, and mutilates the murderer of Dareios at Zariaspa.
328	641	Murder of Kleitos.
		Alexander marries Roxana.
		Murder of Kallisthenes.
326	642	Alexander, having crossed the Indus, founds Boukephalia on the spot where his horse died. He reaches the Hyphasis, beyond which his troops refuse to advance.
324	643	Having returned to Sousa through the Gedrosian desert, he marries Stateira and Parysatis.

EMPIRE OF SPARTA (*continued*).

B. C.	PAGE	
	644	<i>Asia</i> Death of Hephaistion.
	649	<i>Athens</i> Arrival of Harpalos with his treasure, which is placed in the Parthenon. Demosthenes, with other citizens, is charged by Hypereides with embezzling a portion of it.
323	650 651	Condemnation and exile of Demosthenes. This sentence is rescinded by the Athenians, who send a trireme to Troizen to bring him back.
	645	<i>Asia</i> Death of Alexander at Babylon.
322	652	<i>Greece</i> The LAMIAN WAR ends in the complete subjugation of the Greeks. Death of Demosthenes.
	655	<i>Athens</i> Banishment of 12,000 Athenian citizens. Phokion remains in power, aided by Demades.
318		Death of Demades.
		Kassandros, son of Antipatros, obtains admission for Nikanor into the fortress of Mounychia.
317		Return of the exiles. With the help of Phokion, Nikanor seizes the Peiraiæus.
	655	Phokion, deposed from his command, hastens to the camp of Polysperchon, who sends him to Athens for trial.
	656	Execution of Phokion. The Phalerean Demetrios appointed governor of the city by Kassandros.
		The Spartans build a wall round their city.
315		<i>Thebes</i> Restoration of Thebes by Kassandros.
308		<i>Makedonia</i> Extinction of the family of Alexander the Great.
307	657	The title of king is assumed by Antigonos and Demetrios Poliorketes in Makedonia, by Ptolemy in Egypt; by Lysimachos in Thrace, and by Seleukos in Babylonia.
		<i>Athens</i> On the appearance of Demetrios Poliorketes before Peiraiæus, the Phalerean Demetrios makes his escape to Egypt. A law being passed that no philosopher should be allowed to teach without the sanction of the Senate and people, all the philosophers leave Athens.
306		In the following year the law is repealed, and the philosophers return.
300	658	<i>Asia Minor</i> BATTLE OF IPSOS. Death of Antigonos.
298		<i>Athens</i> Demetrios Poliorketes besieges and takes Athens.
277		<i>Makedonia</i> Antigonos Gonatas succeeds his father Demetrios Poliorketes.
251		<i>Peloponnesos</i> Extension of the Achaian League.
245-217	} 659	Career of Aratos.
229	660	<i>Korkyra</i> Korkyra and Epidamnos become allies of Rome.
222		<i>Peloponnesos</i> Megalopolis destroyed by Kleomenes.
221		Defeat of Kleomenes at SELLASIA.
216		<i>Korkyra</i> Treaty between Philip and Hannibal.
183		<i>Peloponnesos</i> Death of Philopoimen.
168		The dynasty of the Antigonid kings comes to an end with Perseus on the conquest of the country by the Romans.

EMPIRE OF SPARTA (*continued.*)

B. C.	PAGE	
146	661	<i>Corinth</i> . . . Sacking of Corinth by the Romans under Mummius. The Achaian League comes to an end as a military power. Establishment of the Roman province of Achaia.
A. D.		
267		<i>Athens</i> . . . Storming of Athens by the Goths, who are driven out by Dexippos.
324	662	<i>Byzantion</i> . . . Foundation of Constantinople, or New Rome, as the seat of Roman empire.
397	661	<i>Western Greece</i> Invasion of Alaric, who escapes from Stilichon, the General of the Emperor Honorius.
533		<i>Byzantion</i> . . . Promulgation of the Justinian code.
711		Reign of the Iconoclast Leo III., the Isaurian.
726		Leo III. suppresses the rebellion of the Greeks.
1057-	} 662	Inroads of the Seljukian Turks.
1067		
1095		
1204	663	The Emperor Alexios asks the help of Europe at the Council of Piacenza (Placentia). The army of the Fifth Crusade appears before Constantinople.
1205-	} 664	Capture of the city by the Crusaders, who establish the Latin dynasty in Constantinople.
1261		
1329	665	Enrolment of the Janissaries.
1449	666	<i>Sparta</i> . . . Coronation of Constantine XI., the last of the Byzantine Cæsars.
1453		<i>Constantinople</i> Conquest of the empire by the Ottoman Turks.
1573	667	<i>Lepanto</i> . . . Victory of the Venetians over the Turks.
1687		<i>Athens</i> . . . Siege of the Akropolis by the Venetian Morosini. Destruction of the Parthenon.
1718	668	THE PEACE OF PASSAROVITZ leaves the Peloponnesos in the hands of the Sultan. Rebellion of the Western Greeks against the Turks.
1821		<i>Kalavrita</i> . . . Declaration of independence.
1822	669	<i>Chios</i> . . . Massacre of Chios (Scio) by the Turks.
1827		<i>Athens</i> . . . Capture of the city by the Turks.
		<i>Navarino</i> . . . BATTLE OF NAVARINO. Destruction of the Turkish fleet by the combined fleets of Russia, France, and England.
1832		<i>Athens</i> . . . The Bavarian Prince Otho recognised as king by the National Assembly.
1843	670	He is compelled to dismiss his Bavarian followers
1862		The deposition of Otho is followed by the election, first, of the English Prince Alfred, and, secondly, of the Danish Prince George.